UDC 327.51:327.56(470)
Biblid: 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. 63, No 1146, pp. 39-65
DOI:

Pregledni članak
Received: 17 Dec 2011
Accepted: 01 Jan 1970

NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST AS A DETERMINING FACTOR OF THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY OF SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Milosavljević Slаđаn (Dоktоrаnt nа Fаkultеtu bеzbеdnоsti Bеоgrаdskоg univеrzitеtа),

In the last decade of the 20th century, the idea had emerged in the West to expand the NATO to the East and to admit Central and East European countries as full members to that alliance. The idea resulted from the intention of the West to capitalize, by its own opinion, on the victory in the Cold War and to establish a NATO-centric security system as a primary and dominant in Europe. There were no big obstacles on that way and that idea was operationalised in the next few years. Russia found itself before a political and security dilemma. It was necessary for it to take a stand and define a new strategy towards this political and strategic problem and to protect its vital national interests. The amplitude of possible options ranged from a hard, irreconcilable position, continuation of the confrontation and returning to the Cold War matrix, to the unconditional acceptance of the NATO expansion towards the Russia’s borders and making an irreparable damage to Russia’s security and political interests. A compromised option was made, which consisted of making as small as possible the damage and making as much benefit as it was possible under the given circumstances. Russia institutionalised and formalised this perception by its decisions and positions in its basic strategic documents (The National Security Concept, The Foreign Policy Concept, Russia’s Military Doctrine), which were adopted at the beginning and in end of the last decade of the 21st century. They fully verified the rationality and correctness of the chosen Russian Federation’s strategy.

Keywords: Russian Federation, NATO, security strategy, new world order