

MEĐUNARODNA POLITIKA

BEOGRAD, GOD. LXXVII, BR. 1197, MAJ–AVGUST 2026.

Marko Vignjević

EVROPSKE INTEGRACIJE ZAPADNOG BALKANA
IZ PERSPEKTIVE KONCEPTA „VOJNE MOBILNOSTI”

Lotfi Sour

SMALL STATE ACTIVISM AND THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY:
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE LOGIC
OF MANAGED REGIONAL OVERSTRETCH

Uroš Popadić

LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND ITS LIMITATIONS
IN THE CASE OF THE FAILED UN MISSION IN MALI

Duško Dimitrijević

OTVORENA GRANIČNA PITANJA CRNE GORE I HRVATSKE

Miroslav Glišić, Nevena Glišić

ANALYSING LORD ISMAY'S DICTUM, “OUT, IN, AND DOWN”,
DURING NATO'S EARLY DEVELOPMENT

Mitko Arnaudov, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić, Marjan Gjurovski

MEDIA SECURITISATION OF THE MIGRATION PROCESS
ON THE SO-CALLED BALKAN ROUTE:
A CASE STUDY OF SERBIA AND NORTH MACEDONIA

Mirjana S. Dejanović

THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN ACHIEVING ESG
AND SDG SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS



INSTITUT ZA MEĐUNARODNU
POLITIKU I PRIVREDU

ISSN 0543-3657
eISSN 2787-0618

MEĐUNARODNA POLITIKA

Makedonska 25, 11000 Beograd, poštanski fah 413, tel. +381 11 3373 824
www.medjunarodnapolitika.rs; mp@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

UDK 327

ISSN 0543-3657 eISSN 2787-0618

Godina LXXVII, br. 1197, maj-avgust 2026.
izlazi četvoromesečno

Izdavač

Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 11000 Beograd, Makedonska 25

Za izdavača

dr Gordana MIŠEV, v.d. direktora

Glavni i odgovorni urednik

dr Ana JOVIĆ-LAZIĆ

Zamenik glavnog i odgovornog urednika

dr Sanja JELISAVAC TROŠIĆ

Sekretar redakcije

msr Stefan BOŠKOVIĆ

Lektura

Maja JOVANOVIĆ

Prelom

Sanja BALOVIĆ

Štampa: Donat Graf doo, Beograd

Elektronskom izdanju moguće je slobodno pristupiti na sajtu časopisa

Pogledi izneti u člancima odražavaju lični stav autora,
a ne nužno i stav Izdavačkog saveta i Uredništva

ERIH PLUS
EUROPEAN REFERENCE INDEX FOR THE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES



DOAJ



COBISS+



Central and Eastern European Online Library



Crossref

Objavlјivanje časopisa *Međunarodna politika* finansira Ministarstvo nauke,
tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije

IZDAVAČKI SAVET

- Prof. dr **Ivo Visković**, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka
Univerziteta u Beogradu, Srbija, predsednik Izdavačkog saveta
- Prof. dr **Aleksis Trud**, redovni profesor, Univerzitet u Versaju, Versaj, Francuska
- Dr **Biser Bančev**, naučni saradnik, Institut za balkanske studije,
Bugarska akademija nauka, Sofija, Bugarska
- Prof. dr **Vasilij Klavdijevič Belozerov**, redovni profesor, Katedra za političke nauke,
Moskovski državni lingvistički univerzitet, Moskva, Rusija
- Prof. dr **Violeta Rašković-Talović**, redovni profesor,
Fakultet za međunarodnu politiku i bezbednost Univerziteta Union „Nikola Tesla“,
Beograd, Srbija
- Dr **Dejan Stojković**, docent, Univerzitet odbrane Republike Srbije, Beograd, Srbija
- Dr **Žoltan Hajdu**, naučni savetnik, Mađarska akademija nauka,
Centar za ekonomske i regionalne studije, Budimpešta, Mađarska
- Prof. dr **Jovanka Šaranović**, vanredni profesor,
Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd, Srbija
- Prof. dr **Luka Brkić**, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih znanosti,
Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska
- Prof. dr **Marjan Đurovski**, vanredni profesor,
Fakultet za bezbednost – Skoplje, Univerzitet „Sv. Kliment Ohridski“,
Severna Makedonija
- Dr **Miroslav Glišić**, docent, Univerzitet odbrane Republike Srbije, Beograd, Srbija
- Prof. dr **Tanja Mišević**, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija
- Prof. dr **Tian Deven**, redovni profesor, Institut za evropske studije,
Kineska akademija društvenih nauka, Peking, Kina

UREĐIVAČKI ODBOR

- Prof. dr **Aleksandar Milošević**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija
- Prof. dr **Artur Adamcik**, vanredni profesor, Centar za Evropu, Univerzitet u Varšavi,
Varšava, Poljska
- Prof. dr **Beatris Bisio**, vanredni profesor, Katedra za političke nauke,
Federalni univerzitet u Rio de Žaneiru, Rio de Žaneiro, Brazil
- Prof. dr **Birgul Demirtaş**, redovni profesor, Tursko-nemački univerzitet,
Odsek za političke nauke i međunarodne odnose, Istanbul, Turska
- Prof. dr **Badar Alam Ikbāl**, vanredni profesor, Ekonomsko-finansijski fakultet,
Univerzitet Monarh, Cug, Švajcarska
- Prof. dr **Darina Grigorova**, redovni profesor, Istorijski fakultet,
Sofijski univerzitet „Sv. Kliment Ohridski“, Sofija, Bugarska
- Dr **Dušan Dostanić**, naučni saradnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, Srbija
- Prof. dr **Žuža M. Časar**, vanredni profesor, Katedra za političku geografiju
i regionalni razvoj, Univerzitet u Pečuju, Pečuj, Mađarska

Dr **Ivan Dujić**, viši naučni saradnik,
Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Marko Babić**, vanredni profesor, Centar za Evropu, Univerzitet u Varšavi,
Varšava, Poljska

Prof. dr **Marko Dašić**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta
u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Dr **Marko Kovačević**, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Miloš Hrnjaj**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Miroslav Mladenović**, redovni profesor, Fakultet bezbednosti,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Nemanja Džuverović**, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Olga Barbašjević**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet za međunarodne i političke
studije, Jagelonski univerzitet, Krakov, Poljska

Prof. dr **Olga Šiškina**, vanredni profesor, Katedra za međunarodne odnose
i spoljnu politiku Rusije, Univerzitet MGIMO, Moskva, Rusija

Prof. dr **Petar Stanojević**, redovni profesor, Fakultet bezbednosti,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Rastislav Kazanski**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka
i međunarodnih odnosa, Univerzitet Matej Bel, Banska Bistrica, Slovačka

Prof. dr **Rut Ferero Turion**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka i sociologije,
Univerzitet Komlutense u Madridu, Madrid, Španija

Prof. dr **Sebastian Stepie**, vanredni profesor, Ekonomski fakultet,
Univerzitet za ekonomiju i biznis u Poznanju, Poznanj, Poljska

Dr **Stevan Gajić**, naučni saradnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd, Srbija

Prof. dr **Stevan Nedeljković**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka,
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Srbija

Doc. dr **Halil Emre Denis**, docent, Katedra za političke nauke i međunarodne odnose,
Univerzitet Hakari, Hakari, Turska

Dr **Hrvoje Butković**, viši znanstveni suradnik,
Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose, Zagreb, Hrvatska

MEĐUNARODNA POLITIKA

UDK 327

Godina LXXVII, br. 1197, maj-avgust

ISSN 0543-3657

eISSN 2787-0618

Međunarodna politika br. 1197, maj-avgust 2026. godine

Sadržaj

Marko VIGNJEVIĆ

Evropske integracije Zapadnog Balkana
iz perspektive koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“ 197

Lotfi SOUR

Small State Activism and the Limits of Strategic Autonomy:
The United Arab Emirates and the Logic
of Managed Regional Overstretch 219

Uroš POPADIĆ

Liberal Peacebuilding and Its Limitations
in the Case of the Failed UN Mission in Mali 251

Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ

Otvorena granična pitanja Crne Gore i Hrvatske 283

Miroslav GLIŠIĆ,

Nevena GLIŠIĆ

Analysing Lord Ismay's Dictum, "Out, In, and Down",
During NATO's Early Development 331

Mitko ARNAUDOV,

Sanja JELISAVAC TROŠIĆ,

Marjan GJUROVSKI

Media Securitisation of the Migration Process
on the So-Called Balkan Route:
A Case Study of Serbia and North Macedonia 357

Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu (IMPP) 195

*Mirjana S. DEJANOVIĆ*The role of Islamic banking in achieving ESG
and SDG sustainable development goals

381

SPISAK RECENZENATA

403

UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

407

UPUTSTVO ZA AUTORE

417

UDK 339.923:327(497-15)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, br. 1197, str. 197–218
Originalni naučni rad
Primljen: 12. 06. 2026.
Revidiran: 30. 07. 2026.
Prihvaćen: 18. 08. 2026.
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.1
CC BY-SA 4.0

Marko VIGNJEVIĆ¹

Evropske integracije Zapadnog Balkana iz perspektive koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“

SAŽETAK

Koncept „vojne mobilnosti“ (*Military Mobility*) predstavlja okvir u kojem bi, pod uticajem geopolitičkih i geostrateških okolnosti rata u Ukrajini, saradnja između NATO-a (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization* – NATO) i Evropske unije (*European Union* – EU) mogla biti intenzivnija. U radu se postavlja pitanje da li dati koncept može uticati na proces evropskih integracija zemalja koje, zajedno sa tzv. Kosovom, čine geopolitičku konstrukciju Zapadnog Balkana? S tim u vezi, pretpostavka je da bi politika proširenja EU, koja je do sada pratila geostrategiju Severnoatlantske alijanse prema Rusiji, postavila kao kriterijum značaj položaja na koridorima za vojni transport. Prvi deo rada započinje teorijskim sagledavanjem odnosa između država i njihovih savezništava usled izazova u anarhičnim međunarodnim odnosima, nakon čega sledi analiza relevantnih strateških dokumenata NATO-a i EU. Cilj ove analize je da se ukaže na pojam „vojne mobilnosti“, njegove strateške perspektive i ukupni značaj sa saradnju NATO-a i EU. Rad se u drugom delu konkretno bavi položajem Zapadnog Balkana na koridorima „vojne mobilnosti“ koje su NATO i EU predvideli u kontekstu hipotetičkog sukoba sa Rusijom. Uporedno se prikazuje položaj pojedinih zapadnobalkanskih država, gde se važnost tog položaja apostrofira iz uglova konkretnog koridora i potencijalne strateške interkonekcije između dva ili više koridora „vojne mobilnosti“. Analiza je pokazala da je geostrateška važnost prvenstveno određena izlaskom na Jadransko more. Na tome se

¹ Skupština grada Beograda. E-mail: vignjevicmarko90@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0006-1481-2861.

temelji zaključak ovog rada da u procesu evropskih integracija Zapadnog Balkana, a iz perspektive koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“, najveću prednost da postanu nove članice EU imaju Albanija i Crna Gora.

Ključne reči: NATO, EU, Rusija, „vojna mobilnost“, Zapadni Balkan, evrointegracije, geostrategija.

European Integration of the Western Balkans from the Perspective of the Concept of “Military Mobility”

SUMMARY

The concept of “military mobility” represents a framework in which, under the geopolitical and geostrategic influences of the war in Ukraine, the cooperation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO) and the European Union (European Union-EU) could be more intense. The paper raises the question of whether this concept can influence the process of European integration of countries that, together with the so-called Do Kosovo constitute the geopolitical construction of the Western Balkans? In this regard, the assumption is that the EU enlargement policy, which until now followed the geostrategy of the North Atlantic Alliance towards Russia, would set as a criterion the importance of the position on the corridors for military transport. The first part of the paper begins with a theoretical overview of the relations between states and their alliances due to challenges in anarchic international relations, followed by an analysis of relevant NATO and EU strategic documents. The aim of this analysis is to point out the concept of “military mobility”, its strategic perspectives and overall importance with NATO and EU cooperation. In the second part, the paper specifically deals with the position of the Western Balkans on the “military mobility” corridors that NATO and the EU have foreseen in the context of a hypothetical conflict with Russia. The position of certain Western Balkan states is shown in comparison, where the importance of that position is apostrophized from the angles of the concrete corridor and the potential strategic interconnection between two or more corridors of “military mobility”. The analysis showed that the geostrategic importance is primarily determined by the access to the Adriatic Sea. The conclusion of this paper is based on this, that in the process of European integration of the Western Balkans, and from the perspective of the concept of “military mobility”, Albania and Montenegro have the greatest advantage in becoming new EU members.

Keywords: NATO, EU, Russia, “military mobility”, Western Balkans, European integration, geostrategy.

Pojam i strateške perspektive koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“

Koncept „vojne mobilnosti“ (*Military Mobility*), kao okvir saradnje Severnoatlantske alijanse (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO*) i Evropske Unije (*European Union – EU*), podstaknut oružanim sukobom Rusije i Ukrajine, indikuje važna naučno-društvena pitanja u opsegu evropske geopolitike i geostrategije.

Predstojeća analiza započinje tezom da su međunarodni odnosi anarhični, jer iznad država ne postoji autoritet ili neka nadnacionalna instanca koja bi u interesu globalne bezbednosti efikasno koordinisala različite interese država. Prema realističkom stanovištu, u tim okolnostima su velike mogućnosti za izbijanje sukoba zbog toga što svaka država, usled odsustva opšteg sistema prava i mehanizama za njegovo sprovođenje, mora da se brine o sebi (Kaarbo and Lantis and Beasley 2013, 8). Međutim, ako se sagledaju savremeni međunarodni odnosi, potrebna je šira i preciznija ocena da su oni višeslojno određeni pojedinim elementima koji, prema Aleksandru Ventu (*Alexander Wendt*), čine „hobsovski“, „lokovski“ i „kantovski sistem anarhije“. Ventova klasifikacija počiva na ideji da se međunarodna politika vodi u okvirima anarhije i da države preuzimaju uloge koje su u tim okvirima dominantne – neprijatelj, rival i prijatelj – a koje su tipične za svaki od ta tri sistema. Uloga neprijatelja je najviše zastupljena u tzv. „hobsovskom sistemu“, u kome vlada strah jedne države da će je ona druga uništiti u cilju svog opstanka (može se reći da u ovom sistemu preovladava načelo „ako želiš mir, spremaj se za rat“ – prim. aut). „Lokovskim sistemom“ dominira rivalstvo, odnosno takmičenje između država koje se odvija po određenim pravilima, a koja države slede ne želeći da jedna drugu unište. U poslednjem „kantovskom“ sistemu preovladava uloga prijatelja kao i pravila nenasilja i uzajamne pomoći (Kovačević i Vujinović 2014, 150).

Uprkos tome što je daleko od „hobsovskog sistema“, ili tzv. „prirodnog stanja“ u kom je svako svakome neprijatelj, današnji svet nije lišen ratova. Od kraja Drugog svetskog rata do danas oružani sukobi izbijaju na „periferiji“ ili u određenim regionima, ne zahvatajući šire svetske razmere. Velike sile često u domenu „perifernih“ i „proksi ratova“ odmeravaju snage, tako što u skladu sa svojim interesom podupiru određenu stranu u sukobu. Ali podrška je ograničena kako „posredničko ratovanje“ ne bi prešlo u direktan sukob između indirektno involviranih sila. Za analizu načina na koji se sukobi odvijaju korisno je uvažiti pojam „indirektne strategije“ (*indirect strategy*), koja, za razliku od „direktne“, teži izbegavanju neposredne konfrontacije i masovne upotrebe vojne sile. Jedan od ključnih autora ove vrste strategije je drevni kineski filozof Sun Cu (*Sun Tzu*), koji

je u svom delu „Umeće ratovanja“ (*The Art of War*) naglašavao važnost psihološkog delovanja na neprijatelja nauštrb fizičkog nasilja (Csurgai 2021, 56).

Međudržavni oružani sukobi su jedna od posledica kontinuiranog rivaliteta koji se, iako to neretko tako ne izgleda, odvija po izvesnim pravilima. Kada se u kontekstu međunarodne politike pomenu pravila, prva asocijacija jeste sistem međunarodnog prava, koji definiše prava i obaveze država u mirnodopskim i ratnim prilikama. Istini za volju, ne mogu se zanemariti brojni primeri kršenja utvrđenih međunarodnopravnih normi, njihovog selektivnog sprovođenja ili primene tzv. „dvostrukih aršina“. Kako postoje pravila koja su kodifikovana u različitim poveljama, deklaracijama, rezolucijama, konvencijama itd., tako postoje i njihova selektivna i tendenciozna tumačenja i zloupotrebe.

Pored svega toga, pojedine države među sobom baštine tradicionalno prijateljske odnose na kojima se temelji njihova politička, ekonomska, vojna, kulturološka i druga saradnja. U tim odnosima vlada princip uzajamne pomoći koju, pored tradicije, pokreću i zajednički interesi dve strane u određenim strateškim pitanjima. Interesi pojedinačne i kolektivne bezbednosti okupljaju države u šire saveze, čije delovanje znatno utiče na svetske geopolitičke tokove.

Savezi su često odraz bezbednosnih okolnosti koje stvaraju međudržavni odnosi moći. Svaki pokušaj jedne ili više država da stekne moć suštinski znači pretnju za druge države u njenom susedstvu. Na drugoj strani, nedostatak moći neku državu primorava da stupi u savezništvo sa državama koje su u stanju da je zaštite. Stiven M. Walt (*Stephen M. Walt*) u knjizi „Poreklo saveza“ (*The Origins of Alliances*) piše da „države u anarhiji stvaraju saveze kako bi se zaštitile. Njihovo ponašanje je uslovljeno pretnjama koje primećuju, a moć drugih je samo jedan od faktora u proceni“ (Walt 10, 1987). Najčešći oblik su vojna savezništva u kojima su definisane obaveze ugovornih strana u situacijama oružane agresije. NATO je primer „defanzivnog pakta“ koji podrazumeva obavezu da, u slučaju napada na jednu od država članica, ostale reaguju u cilju njene odbrane. S druge strane, treba ukazati i na trend delegiranja dela državnog suvereniteta formatima regionalnih integracija, poput EU, koji zahvaljujući tome deluju kao istaknuti geopolitički akteri (Csurgai 2021, 56). Na samom nivou prekograničnog nastupa jedne države, „stvaranje saveza je produžetak spoljne politike drugim sredstvima“. (Mintz and DeRouen 126–127, 2010).

Koalicije država se, s tim u vezi, rukovode interesima koje određuje i element prostora kao zajednički imenitelj geopolitike i geostrategije.

Milomir Stepić precizira da su „pravo na prostor“, kao i primat, preuzimanje, kontrola i upravljanje prostorom, predmet interesovanja obe discipline. Shodno tome, domen njihovog proučavanja jesu nerešena teritorijalna i pogranična pitanja, etno-prostorni sporovi, međudržavni konflikti i ekspanzionističke pretenzije, posebno ako one imaju šire makroregionalne i globalne projekcije“ (Stepić 88, 2016). U kategoriji prostora veoma je važan odnos između kopna i mora, između telurokratije i talasokratije, jer „borbe u kojima pomorska moć teži kopnenoj a kopnena pomorskoj, u kojoj pomorska sila sprečava kopnenu da stekne i maritimnu moć, decenijama do danas kreiraju događaje u međunarodnoj politici“ (Vignjević 2024, 37). Gledano opet iz jednog šireg i preciznijeg ugla koji, prema Džejsu Viskeru (*James Biser Whisker*) i Kevinu Spajkeru (*Kevin R. Spiker*), percipira da geopolitika „proučava efekte geografije, posebno ekonomske geografije, na međunarodnu politiku, dok geostrategija predstavlja stratešku upotrebu geopolitike“ (Whisker and Spiker 142, 2022), neophodno je odgovarajuće prostorno pozicioniranje koje će nekoj državi ili savezu država omogućiti da ostvare definisane interese u koje spada i zaštita od identifikovanih bezbednosnih pretnji. Geostrategija se u tom pogledu više odnosi na načine za uspostavljanje kontrole nad određenim kopnenim i pomorskim pravcima koje je, u kontekstu globalnog rivalstva, presudno. Geografski činilac naglašavaju i Hadson (*Valerie M. Hudson*) i Dej (*Benjamin S. Day*) kada kažu da je „pristup lukama, plovnim putevima i strateški važnim kopnenim objektima aspekt geografije od velikog značaja za spoljne poslove“ (Hudson and Day 172, 2020). Naročito je važna prevlast nad morima koja nude višestruke strateške prednosti. Krucijalne su akvatorije koje omogućavaju pristup prirodnim resursima ili kontrolu pravaca – moreuza, kanala, rtova itd. – za transport, na primer, retkih sirovina, hrane, nafte i gasa (posebno tečnog prirodnog gasa). Njihova strateška uloga je veoma bitna kako sa ekonomskog, tako i sa vojno-taktičkog aspekta (Csurgai 2021, 56). To dobro ilustruju primeri Omurskog moreuza, primeri Bosfora i Dardanelija u službi evroatlantskog „zadržavanja“ Rusije u Crnom moru, ili primeri tzv. „Severoistočnog“ i „Severozapadnog prolaza“ čija će se uloga u arktičkom regionu sve više zapažati.

Odnosi geopolitičke i geostrateške konkurencije evroatlantizma i Rusije kao aktivnu komponentu sadrže „istorijsko nadmetanje mora i kopna“, odnosno bezbednosno izazovne i riskantne napore jedne pomorske moći da ograniči i spreči onu drugu, kopnenu, da se razvije u talasokratskoj perspektivi. U tom trvenju se pod diktatom rata u Ukrajini i potencijalnih modela njegovog okončanja, koji podrazumevaju da se Rusiji delimično ili potpuno ustupe teritorije nad kojima je uspostavila

kontrolu tokom sukoba, može intenzivirati vojno-strateška saradnja NATO-a i EU. Moguće jačanje ruskog uticaja u Crnom moru, koje bi ti ustupci potencijalno uslovlili, sa geopolitičkom i geostrateškom refleksijom na „sanitarni kordon“, doprinelo bi saradnji NATO-a i EU u okviru koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“.

Dokument pod nazivom „Strateški koncept NATO-a 2022“ (*NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*), koji su šefovi država članica usvojili na Samitu u Madridu krajem juna 2022. godine, ističe da je Severnoatlantska alijansa „određena da čuva slobodu i bezbednost saveznika. Njena ključna i najveća odgovornost leži u obezbeđivanju kolektivne bezbednosti, u pogledu svih pretnji i iz svih njihovih pravaca. „Mi smo“, kako se u dokumentu navodi, „odbrambena alijansa“ (*NATO Strategic Concept 2022*).

Ova međunarodna organizacija pred sebe postavlja tri osnovna zadatka: odvracanje i odbranu, prevenciju i upravljanje krizama i kooperativnu bezbednost. Ruska Federacija se, u bezbednosnom okruženju koje karakterišu „strateško nadmetanje, sveobuhvatna nestabilnost i ponavljajući šokovi“ (*Ibid.*, 3) percipira kao „najznačajnija i direktna pretnja po bezbednost saveznika ali i mir i stabilnost u evroatlantskoj oblasti. Ova zemlja teži da uspostavi sfere uticaja kroz prisilu, subverziju, agresiju i aneksiju“ (*Ibid.*, 3). Među strateškim izazovima, u vidu modernizacije nuklearnih kapaciteta Rusije, bitno figurira i „gomilanje ruskih vojnih snaga u oblasti Baltičkog, Crnog i Sredozemnog mora, uz istovremeno vojno integrisanje sa Belorusijom“ (*Ibid.*, 3).

U svojoj posvećenosti načelima odbrane i odvracanja, a u cilju onemogućavanja bilo kakvog pokušaja agresije, NATO će obezbediti „stalno prisustvo na kopnu, moru i u vazduhu, uključujući pri tome i ojačanu integrisanu protivvazдушnu i raketnu odbranu“ (*Ibid.*, 3). Iz talasokratskog aspekta Severnoatlantske alijanse, dokument prepoznaje pomorsku bezbednost kao „ključ mira i prosperiteta“. NATO će nastojati da „odvрати svaku pretnju u pomorskom domenu, podrži slobodu plovidbe, obezbedi pomorske pravce i zaštiti svoje glavne linije komunikacije“ (*Ibid.*, 3).

U posebnom paragrafu stoji da su regioni Zapadnog Balkana i Crnog mora „od strateške važnosti za alijansu“, da će ona „nastaviti da podržava evroatlantske aspiracije tamošnjih zainteresovanih država“ i da će uložiti napore kako bi se „ojačali njihovi kapaciteti za odupiranje različitim pretnjama i izazovima sa kojima se suočavaju, kao i otpornost prema prisili treće strane i njenom malignom mešanju u njihove unutrašnje poslove“ (*Ibid.*, 11).

U „Belom papiru evropske odbrane – Spremnost 2030“ (*White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030*), iz marta 2025. godine, konstatuje se da su „pretnje po evropsku bezbednost, načinom na koji se šire, akutne“. S tim u vezi, sekuritizacija razmatra geografske i druge faktore koji utiču na ukupno bezbednosno okruženje EU. „Prvo, geografija i istorija učinili su EU ranjivom pred izazovima iz njenog šireg okruženja. Blizina Severne Afrike i Bliskog istoka doprineli su prelivanju posledica rata, migracija i klimatskih promena iz tih regiona u Evropu. Arktik na severu postaje arena geopolitičkog nadmetanja. SAD, tradicionalni saveznik, izražavaju uverenje da su previše posvećeni Evropi i nastoje da smanje svoju istorijsku ulogu glavnog bezbednosnog garanta. Kao drugo, postoji širok spektar različitih pretnji koje su međusobno povezane (terorizam, hibridni napadi, međunarodni organizovani kriminal, sajber kriminal itd.).“ (*White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, 2025*). Sledeća i treća konstatacija upozorava na rusku ratnu ekonomiju koja se, „fokusirana na ostvarenje ratnih ciljeva, zasniva na mobilizaciji industrije i tehnološkim inovacijama“ (*Ibid.*, 4).

O sekuritizaciji ruskog faktora govori i procena iz dokumenta da „ukoliko se Rusiji dozvoli da ostvari svoje ciljeve u Ukrajini, njene teritorijalne ambicije će se proširiti dalje. Rusija će i u doglednoj budućnosti ostati fundamentalna pretnja za evropsku bezbednost“ (*Ibid.*, 4). Takođe je važna ocena da Rusija „uporno ispunjava evropsko susedstvo tenzijama i nestabilnošću, nezavisno da li je reč o Zapadnom Balkanu, Gruziji, Moldaviji ili Jermeniji“ (*Ibid.*, 5).

Kako bi odvratile svaku moguću oružanu agresiju spolja, države članice EU moraju imati odgovarajuće kapacitete koji su potrebni za ispunjavanje svih vojnih zahteva. U „Belom papiru“ preovladava pesimistična ocena da države članice „pate od kritičnih praznina u kapacitetima koje pogađaju izvršavanje kompleksnih vojnih operacija na duži period“ (*Ibid.*, 6). Popunjavanje praznina predstavlja strateški prioritet za čiju će realizaciju biti potrebno nekoliko godina. U tom kontekstu se pominje i uloga Severnoatlantske alijanse jer „obnova evropske odbrane zahteva akciju u nekoliko dimenzija, u bliskoj saradnji sa NATO“ (*Ibid.*, 6). „Stoga je“, kako se u dokumentu dalje naglašava, „više nego urgentno da se ti naponi sada intenziviraju“ (*Ibid.*, 6). Na osnovu uočenih problema i urgentne potrebe za njihovim rešavanjem, „Beli papir evropske odbrane“ definiše sedam prioriternih oblasti „koje su ključne za izgradnju snažne evropske odbrane“. Jedna od tih oblasti je i „vojna mobilnost“ koja, prema „Belom papiru evropske odbrane“, podrazumeva „široku mrežu puteva, koridora, aerodroma, luka i elemenata podrške i usluga koja olakšava besprekoran i brz transport

trupa i vojne opreme širom EU i partnerskih zemalja“ (Ibid., 7). Dati koncept je suštinski preduslov evropske bezbednosti i odbrane, kao i evropske podrške Ukrajini (Ibid., 8).

Treba podvući da je ideja efikasnog vojnog transporta bila strateški naročito važna i u vremenu Hladnog rata. U projekcijama potencijalnog sukoba centralno je bilo i pitanje fizičke distance zemalja i regiona koji su spadali u interesne sfere tada bipolarno podeljenih blokova. „Varšavski pakt“ (*The Warsaw Pact – Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance*) imao je prednost u odnosu na NATO zbog činjenice da su zemlje pod njegovim okriljem bile bliže Zapadnoj Evropi, a snage Severnoatlantske alijanse na evropskom kontinentu oslonjene na pomoć i podršku odreda fizički udaljenih SAD i Kanade. Vojni transport u cilju pružanja pomoći bi zbog te geografske udaljenosti zahtevao mnogo vremena (Csurgai 2021, 19). Problem vojne mobilnosti za NATO, koji je u hladnoratovskom dobu ipak bio manji nego danas, usložilo je kasnije geostrateško pomeranje Alijanse ka istoku.

NATO je regularno izvodio velike vojne vežbe prelazeći bez ograničenja preko teritorija država članica i njihovih granica. Pogodna okolnost bila je i infrastruktura izgrađena za potrebe snaga Severnoatlantske alijanse, precizno definisani putevi i železnice za vojni transport, utvrđeni kapaciteti mostova i dimenzije tunela na tim rutama. Kako se NATO „širio na istok“ tako su u njegov sastav ulazile zemlje koje nisu imale standardizovanu infrastrukturu. Nakon sloma i nestanka Sovjetskog Saveza i Varšavskog pakta, zatim osnivanja EU, sve do ruske aneksije Krima 2014. godine, pitanje vojne mobilnosti nije podrobno razmatrano u okvirima NATO-a (Stanić 2025, 77). „Pitanje kretanja trupa se takođe pojavilo na političkom horizontu, jer je Severnoatlantska alijansa počela da jača svoje „istočno krilo““ (Majchút and Belan and Varecha 2022, 1042).

Aneksija i brojne vojne vežbe koje je Rusija kasnije izvela u Belorusiji, i u blizini baltičkih zemalja, navela je NATO i EU da započnu prikupljanje podataka o stanju i mogućnostima vojne namene puteva i železnica na teritoriji zemalja članica (Stanić 2025, 78). „Inicijalna kapisla“ za razmatranje koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“ konkretno je bila vežba pod nazivom „Čuvar sablje“ (*Saber Guardian*) koja je, uz učešće dela američkih oružanih snaga iz Nemačke i Poljske, izvedena u Rumuniji 2017. godine. Uočeno je da prebacivanje vojne opreme, s jedne strane, opterećuju rumunski administrativni propisi, a s druge strane i nedostajuća infrastruktura (Stanić 2025, 76).

„Beli papir evropske odbrane“ uočava oba problema na nivou EU jasno ističući važnost njihovog otklanjanja. Naime, „postojeća

neusaglašenost procedura, uključujući carine, često uzrokuje ozbiljna kašnjenja u izdavanju prekograničnih dozvola“ (White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030). Dokument iz tog razloga nalaže da „EU i zemlje članice moraju smesta da, kako u kontekstu kopnene tako i pomorske bezbednosti, pojednostave propise i procedure i da oružanim snagama obezbede pristup transportnim objektima, mrežama i sredstvima“ (Ibid., 8). EU je na planu infrastrukture, koja treba da služi efikasnom pomeranju vojnih trupa i opreme, do sada identifikovala četiri prioriteta multimodalna koridora (železnički, putni, pomorski i vazdušni) u koje je neophodno investirati, kao i ukupno pet stotina „žarišnih tačaka“ koje zahtevaju hitnu rekonstrukciju (npr. proširenje železničkih tunela, aerodromskih i lučkih terminala, ojačanje putnih i železničkih mostova). Dokument konačno upozorava da EU, pored staranja o njihovoj bezbednosti, obnovi i održavanju, takođe mora da, posebno u saradnji sa NATO-om, utvrdi i potencijalna „uska grla“ u energetsom snabdevanju (Ibid., 8).

„Transevropska transportna mreža“ (*Trans-European Transport Network – TEN-T*) je od velikog operativnog značaja. Za ovu mrežu različitih saobraćajnica kojima je ispresecan evropski kontinent predviđena je tzv. „dvostruka namena“ (*dual use*) – civilna i vojna. „Uredba o Transevropskoj transportnoj mreži“ (*TEN-T Regulation*) revidirana je u junu 2024. godine i u skladu s tim nameće obavezu državama da, kada grade nove ili rekonstruišu postojeće saobraćajnice na „Transevropskoj transportnoj mreži“ i koje se preklapaju sa mrežom vojnog transporta, ispune odgovarajuće standarde kako bi infrastruktura izdržala transport vojnih trupa i opreme (Clapp and Kiss and Gullentops 2025). Na otvaranju sastanka „Platforme za koridor Crno more – Egejsko more“ (*Black Sea–Aegean Sea Corridor Platform – BACP*), održanog u Solunu u junu 2026. godine, evropski komesar za održivi transport i turizam Apostolos Cicikostas (Απόστολος Τζίτζικώστας) izjavio je: „Potrebna nam je infrastruktura koja je održiva, otporna na klimatske promene, digitalno omogućena i sposobna da podrži vojnu mobilnost gde je to potrebno“ (European Commission 2026). Veliki doprinos se ogleda u stvaranju informacionog sistema Evropske komisije (*TENtec*), koji značajno pomaže funkcionisanje „Transevropske transportne mreže“ jer se zasniva na podacima o lukama, aerodromima, rečnoj plovidbi, železnicama, mostovima i drugo. Od 2018. godine sistem uključuje i podatke o vojnim aspektima transportne mreže (Usecicz and Czekaj and Bartoszek 2022, 20).

Evropska komisija (*European Commission*) usvojila je u novembru 2025. godine „Paket vojne mobilnosti“ (*Military Mobility Package*), što je značajan korak ka uspostavljanju tzv. „Vojnog Šengena“ (*Military Schengen*), koji

„nije samo odgovor na strateške potrebe država članica, već može biti i dokaz institucionalne koherentnosti EU kroz uključivanje institucija odgovornih za transport, unutrašnje i carinske poslove, zdravstvo, socijalna i pitanja zaštite životne sredine, kao i za produbljivanje saradnje sa NATO-om“ (Majchút and Belan and Varecha 2022, 1042). U interesu stvaranja prostora za „vojnu mobilnost“ širom EU do 2027. godine, usvojeni „paket“ podrazumeva: uklanjanje regulatornih barijera ili pojednostavljivanje carinskih propisa (za izdavanje prekograničnih dozvola predviđeno najviše tri dana), uspostavljanje okvira za vanredne situacije ili „Evropskog sistema za unapređeni odgovor vojne mobilnosti“ (*European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System – EMERS*), koji treba da doprinese ubrzavanju procedura i da oružanim snagama, koje deluju u ime EU ili NATO-a, omogući pristup infrastrukturi. „Paket vojne mobilnosti“ takođe treba da ojača transportnu infrastrukturu i njenu otpornost, da sve kapacitete „vojne mobilnosti“ učini dostupnijim za države članice tako što će omogućiti stvaranje „Fonda solidarnosti“ (*Solidarity Pool*) i „Digitalnog informacionog sistema za vojnu mobilnost“ (*Military Mobility Digital Information System*). Plan je i da nova „Grupa za vojnu mobilnost i transport“ (*Military Mobility Transport Group*), zajedno sa unapređenim „Komitetom transevropske transportne mreže“ (*Trans-European Transport Network Committee*), radi na implementaciji koncepta uz pomoć nacionalnih koordinatora u svakoj državi članici EU (European Commission 2025).

Primećuje se da je u svim regulatornim i drugim aspektima „vojne mobilnosti“ od posebnog značaja saradnja sa partnerima, konkretno sa Severnoatlantskom alijansom koja ostaje „kamen temeljac kolektivne odbrane njenih država članica u Evropi. Saradnja EU i NATO-a je nezaobilazni stub razvoja evropske bezbednosti i odbrane“ (European Commission 2025). S druge strane, NATO u svom „Strateškom konceptu“ vidi EU kao „jedinstvenog i esencijalnog partnera“ a „vojnu mobilnost“ svrstava u zajedničke interese koji bi trebalo da osnaže partnerstvo (European Commission 2025).

Zapadni Balkan na koridorima vojne mobilnosti

Pojedine zemlje Zapadnog Balkana – geopolitičkog konstrukta nastalog iz potrebe za političkim, ekonomskim i vojno-bezbednosnim pozicioniranjem na postjugoslovenskom prostoru – zauzimaju važne položaje na koridorima vojne mobilnosti.

EU je u svojim dokumentima prvi put upotrebila izraz Zapadni Balkan 1998. godine u sklopu redefinisanja svojih odnosa sa zemljama Jugoistočne

Evrope koje nisu njene članice. Izraz se u početku odnosio na pet balkanskih zemalja: Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju, tada Bivšu Jugoslovensku Republiku (BJR) Makedoniju, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Hrvatsku i Albaniju (Đukanović 27, 2020). Okolnosti usled sticanja nezavisnosti Crne Gore 2006. godine i disolucije njene državne zajednice sa Srbijom, jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti tzv. Kosova u februaru 2008. godine i ulaska Hrvatske u EU 2013. godine dovele su do toga da se danas pod Zapadnim Balkanom podrazumevaju Srbija, Severna Makedonija, Albanija, Crna Gora, Bosna i Hercegovina i tzv. Kosovo (Ibid., 28). EU je 1999. godine u svom odnosu prema Zapadnom Balkanu utvrdila poseban mehanizam naširoko poznat kao „Proces stabilizacije i pridruživanja“. U načelu, ciljevi ovog mehanizma bili su uspostavljanje regionalne političke, ekonomske i bezbednosne stabilnosti, razvijanje i učvršćivanje međusobnih odnosa unutar Zapadnog Balkana i naravno punopravno članstvo u EU (Ibid., 68). Stabilizacija i pridruživanje predstavljaju dve faze procesa evrointegracija Zapadnog Balkana tokom kojeg dolazi do usaglašavanja nacionalnih zakonodavnih okvira sa zakonodavnim okvirom EU, što krajnje rezultuje potpisivanjem individualnih sporazuma. Prema profesoru Draganu Đukanoviću, „ono što treba posebno naglasiti jeste individualni pristup u okviru istovremeno osmišljenog „geopolitičkog“ paketa Zapadnog Balkana. On je podrazumevao da će svaka država biti pojedinačno ocenjivana u vezi sa napretkom ka članstvu i da neće biti neophodno „sačekati“ ostatak regiona kako bi došlo do članstva u Evropskoj uniji“ (Ibid., 70).

Mada punopravno članstvo u EU najpre zahteva ispunjavanje zvaničnih Kopenhaških kriterijuma, postoje geopolitički i geostrateški kriterijumi koji, u skladu sa regionalnim refleksijama globalne konkurencije (uglavnom SAD i Rusije, a poslednjih godina i SAD i Kine) često budu presudni. Nesumnjivo je da je rat u Ukrajini dodatno afirmisao pitanje geopolitike i geostrategije na agendi politike proširenja EU. Indikativna je činjenica da su aktuelizovana pitanja evropskih integracija Ukrajine, u trenucima dok se ona nalazi u ratu, i Moldavije, najsiriromašnije evropske zemlje, a čije kandidature za članstvo u EU čine delove istog paketa (zahtev za članstvo podnele 2022. godine) (Vignjević 2025, 114). Moldavija, „zemlja u kojoj se uveliko sudaraju geopolitički i geostrateški interesi Rusije i evroatlantizma“ i u kojoj bi „stisak“ razvučene „strateške anakonde“² mogao ili da se dodatno „stegne“ ili da se znatno „olabavi““ (Ibid., 110–111), u junu 2026. otpočela je pregovore sa EU o spoljnim

² Metafora koja označava strateško raspoređivanje NATO-a u blizini granica Rusije kako bi se onemogućila da izađe na „topla mora“.

odnosima u okviru Klastera 6. U deklaraciji sa tadašnjeg samita EU sa Moldavijom naglašava se i „ključna uloga transportnog povezivanja u produbljivanju integracija EU i Moldavije, uključujući i postepeno usklađivanje Moldavije sa Transevropskom transportnom mrežom“ (Joint Declaration following the second EU-Republic of Moldova Summit 2026). Isti paragraf ovog dokumenta prepoznaje i „strateški značaj unapređenog povezivanja sever-jug, posebno kroz koridor Baltičko more – Crno more – Egejsko more“³ (Ibid.,3).

Rusko-ukrajinski sukob je intenzivirao geopolitiku i geostrategiju EU i u odnosu prema Zapadnom Balkanu, što se može videti u sadržaju deklaracija sa godišnjih samita održanih u Briselu u decembru 2024. i 2025. godine. Na samom početku deklaracije iz 2024. iznosi se da „u kontekstu radikalnih promena globalne geopolitičke situacije, rata agresije Rusije protiv Ukrajine i sukoba na Bliskom istoku, te na početku novog ciklusa vođstva EU, strateško partnerstvo između Evropske unije i Zapadnog Balkana važnije je nego ikada“ (Samit EU-Zapadni Balkan – Deklaracija iz Brisela 2024). Godinu dana kasnije, u prvom paragrafu deklaracije stoji da „rat agresije Rusije protiv Ukrajine i sve veći geopolitički izazovi naglašavaju potrebu za sve jačim vezama između Evropske unije i Zapadnog Balkana“ (Samit EU-Zapadni Balkan – Deklaracija iz Brisela 2025). U obe deklaracije se ocenjuje da je „budućnost Zapadnog Balkana u našoj Uniji“ i potom konstatuje da „proširenje predstavlja geostrateško ulaganje u mir, bezbednost, stabilnost i prosperitet“ (Ibid., 1).

Zapadni Balkan je nesumnjivo važan i za Severnoatlantsku alijansu koja ovaj konstrukt percipira svojim strateškim instinktom prema Rusiji. NATO je od raspada SSSR-a imao aktivnu ulogu na postjugoslovenskom prostoru gde je, pravdajući svoje upitno postojanje, popunjavao vakuum moći na Balkanu krajem XX i početkom XXI veka. Agresija na SR Jugoslaviju 1999. godine u pozadini je bila strateški motivisana zauzimanjem prostora sa kog bi se lakše „manevrisalo“ prema Crnom moru, Kavkazu i Bliskom istoku, ali i potrebom da se opravda uloga Alijanse u svetu koja je dovođena u pitanje sa disolucijom SSSR-a. Danijele Ganzer (*Daniele Ganzer*) skreće pažnju da „ne smemo zaboraviti da se tada, posle raspada Sovjetskog Saveza i pucanja Varšavskog pakta 1. jula 1991, i NATO nalazio usred velike egzistencijalne krize pošto više nije bilo

³ Evropski transportni koridor koji povezuje zemlje članice EU na dalekom severu i krajnjem jugu sa lukama na Baltičkom, Crnom i Egejskom moru. Koridor prolazi kroz jedanaest zemalja članica EU (Finsku, Estoniju, Letoniju, Litvaniju, Poljsku, Slovačku, Mađarsku, Rumuniju, Bugarsku, Grčku i Kipar), Moldaviju i Ukrajinu (European Commission 2026).

razloga za njegovo postojanje“ (Ganzer 360, 2018). Geostrateški razlozi „širenja“ prema istoku, jačanje „južnog krila“, bezbednosna stabilizacija regiona, smanjivanje strateškog uticaja Rusije, sve su to interesi zbog kojih se NATO proširio i na Zapadni Balkan. Alijansa je u trećem talasu proširenja, primivši u članstvo Hrvatsku (2009), Albaniju (2009) i Crnu Goru (2017), sebi obezbedila izlaz na Jadransko more i veći uticaj na bezbednost Sredozemlja kao posebno važnog geostrateškog čvorišta (Vulević 2018, 43–44). Kasnije je primljena i Severna Makedonija (2020) čime je Alijansa stekla bolju geostratešku vezu između Jadranskog i Crnog mora i dodatnu kontrolu moravsko-varždarske doline (čuvana je rečenica velikog srpskog političara i državnika Nikole Pašića da „ko kontroliše Mačedoniju, kontroliše ceo Balkan“).

Prijem Hrvatske u EU 2013. godine, čime je ova zemlja izuzeta iz grupe Zapadnog Balkana, potvrdio je da članstvo u NATO-u nosi sa sobom i punopravno članstvo u EU. Talase geostrateške ekspanzije NATO-a u Srednjoj Evropi, na Balkanu i prema Baltiku pratila je politika proširenja EU u istim pravcima. Alijansa je u prvom talasu 1999. godine primila Češku, Mađarsku i Poljsku. U drugom talasu 2004. njene članice postale su Slovenija, Slovačka, Estonija, Letonija, Litvanija, Bugarska i Rumunija, a u trećem talasu NATO je obuhvatio već pomenute zemlje Zapadnog Balkana (Ibid., 42–43). Sve zemlje iz prvog talasa primljene su u EU na početku maja meseca 2004, kao i zemlje iz drugog talasa osim Rumunije i Bugarske koje su postale punopravne članice EU 2007. godine (prijem Rumunije i Bugarske u EU je najočigledniji primer geostrategije evropskih integracija). Među balkanskim zemljama tome svedoči i slučaj Grčke, koja je najpre primljena u NATO 1952. godine, a kasnije u EU 1981. u sklopu „mediteranskog proširenja“ kada su osamdesetih godina u EU primljene i Španija i Portugal.⁴ Grčka je, slično Rumuniji i Bugarskoj, primer supremacije geopolitike i geostrategije nad stvarnom sistemskom spremnošću jedne zemlje za članstvo u EU. Robert Kaplan (*Robert David Kaplan*) piše da „kao i članstvo u NATO-u, tako su i članstvo u Evropskoj uniji i kasnije prijem u evrozonu bile u potpunosti političke odluke zapadnog saveza. Zapravo, ni grčke administrativne ustanove ni njena ekonomija ni u jednom trenutku nisu bili dorasli standardima evropskog jezgra i Zapada. Ipak, smatralo se (ako i nije nikada javno priznato) da bi, s obzirom na ranjivi geografski položaj Grčke i njenu istorijski dugu nestabilnost, Zapad više ugrožavalo da je izostavi iz evropskih institucija

⁴ Uzeti u obzir i geografski položaj ovih zemalja, što uključuje njihov izlaz na Atlantski okean. U slučaju Španije potrebno je koncentrisati se dodatno na strateški značaj Balearskih i Kanarskih ostrva za kontrolu Sredozemnog mora.

nego da je uvede u sopstvene redove“ (Kaplan 326–327, 2023). Iz svega sledi da je srednjoevropsko, balkansko i baltičko proširenje EU neupitno korespondiralo sa geostrateškim interesima NATO-a u tim regionima.

Balkansko poluostrvo je u kontekstu potencijalno ojačanog uticaja Rusije u Crnom moru i odraza te okolnosti na „sanitarni kordon“ – „strateške linije ili pojasa čija je namena da spreči prodor ruskog uticaja dalje i dublje u Evropu“ (Vignjević 2025, 114) – posebno važno. Zbog očekivanih nastojanja evroatlantizma da nakon rata u Ukrajini još više učvrsti svoje pozicije na Balkanu, treba obratiti pažnju da „na „sanitarnom kordonu“ postoje „dva meka trbuha“, odnosno dve slabe tačke koje bi Rusiji omogućile da „kordon“ preseče ili probije. Prva slaba tačka je „Suvalski koridor“ (*Suwałki Gap*) koji, između Kalinjingradske oblasti (pod kontrolom Rusije) i Belorusije spaja Poljsku i Litvaniju, dok je druga tzv. „Kapija Fokšani“ (*Focșani Gate*) u jugoistočnom delu Rumunije, na prostoru između južnog dela Istočnih Karpata, s jedne strane, i Dunava, s druge strane“ (Ibid., 107). Fizičko-geografska pozicija „Kapije“ je takva da ona preko Dunava i Baraganske ravnice vodi telurokratskim i talasokratskim pravcima ka srednjim, zapadnim i jugoistočnim delovima Evrope, ka Egejskom moru i Sredozemlju, što su sve „za evroatlantsku geopolitiku i geostrategiju osetljivi koridori kojim bi ruski strateški uticaj dalje i dublje probijao „sanitarni kordon““ (Ibid., 116). Nekoliko koridora „vojne mobilnosti“ bi zato, u odnosu na ove slabosti, moglo da pomogne jačanje „istočnog krila“ NATO-a.

Ministri odbrane Holandije, Nemačke i Poljske potpisali su u januaru 2024. godine pismo o namerama za uspostavljanje prvog vojnotransportnog koridora. Zemlje potpisnice uspostaviće koordinaciju po pitanju dozvola i sredstava za prekogranično kretanje, infrastrukture i razmene informacija. Osim administrativno, ovaj koridor je od velike važnosti jer transportno spaja evropske luke u Severnom moru sa istočnim krilom NATO-a. Na njegovoj ideji se temelji i sledeći vojni koridor koji bi trebalo da poveže Egejsko i Crno more, a za čije uspostavljanje su ministri Grčke, Bugarske i Rumunije potpisali pismo o namerama na samitu NATO-a u Vašingtonu u julu 2024. godine (Clapp and Kiss and Gullentops 2025). Ministar odbrane Bugarske Atanas Zaprianov (*Atanas Dimitrov Zapryanov*), zemlje kroz koju prolaze dva strateški veoma bitna koridora, izjavio je da će „oni doprineti povećanju potencijala NATO-a za odvrćanje i odbranu, saradnji između zemalja u oblasti vojne mobilnosti, jačanju transportnih veza između njih kao glavnog faktora regionalnog ekonomskog razvoja i produbljivanju saradnje između NATO-a i EU“ (The Sofia Globe 2024).

Za stratešku vezu Jadranskog i Crnog mora od velikog značaja je „Koridor 8“ (*Corridor VIII*) koji se od Italije, preko Albanije i Severne Makedonije pruža do Bugarske. Ove zemlje su na Samitu NATO-a u Vašingtonu 2024. godine potpisale pismo o namerama o uspostavljanju „Harmonizovanog koridora vojne mobilnosti duž Panevropskog koridora VIII“ (*Harmonized Military Mobility Corridor along Pan-European Corridor VIII*). U „Zajedničkoj deklaraciji o Koridoru VIII“, koju su ministri spoljnih poslova Albanije, Bugarske, Severne Makedonije, Italije i Rumunije potpisali u Tirani u februaru 2026. godine, ocenjuje se da je ovaj koridor „od političkog, ekonomskog i bezbednosnog značaja koji doprinosi evropskoj koheziji, regionalnoj saradnji i postepenoj integraciji Zapadnog Balkana u Evropsku uniju“. Takođe se „izražava čvrsta posvećenost Koridoru VIII kao prioritetu za jačanje vojne mobilnosti, otpornosti i povezanosti, a u okviru ojačane saradnje između EU i NATO-a, što direktno doprinosi bezbednosti jugoistočnog i istočnog krila Alijanse“ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Italy 2026).

Albanija na ovom koridoru zauzima važnu poziciju jer se na njenoj teritoriji nalaze postojeća luka Drač i luka nadomak nje „Porto Romano“. Izgradnja poslednje se uveliko planira sa idejom da bude najveća trgovačka luka na Jadranu i pomorska baza NATO-a. Značaj ovih luka za vojnu mobilnost dopunjuje činjenica da najveći deo vojnih snaga kojim raspolaže NATO pomorski dolazi od SAD (Gaubert and Geay and Catala and Allard 2025). Prolazeći kroz Severnu Makedoniju, „Koridor 8“ se pruža dobrim delom prostora koji je Jovan Cvijić nazvao „Centralnom oblašću“ na Balkanu. Nju čini vojno-strateški, komunikaciono, politički i kulturno civilizacijski krucijalan četvorougao Skoplje–Priština–Niš–Sofija (Proroković 2012, 206). „Koridor 8“ u Severnoj Makedoniji ukršta se sa „Koridorom 10“ koji, idući dužinom cele teritorije Srbije, takođe preseca „Centralnu oblast“. Za „Koridor 10“, koji sa „Koridorom 8“ spada u „Transevropsku transportnu mrežu“, može se reći da predstavlja stratešku saobraćajnicu koja od Salcburga do Soluna povezuje Srednju Evropu sa Egejskim morem.

NATO je predvideo i kopneni koridor koji od Italije preko Slovenije, Hrvatske i Mađarske vodi prema Ukrajini (Barnes 2024). Albanija, Crna Gora, a delom i BiH, bile bi od važnosti za stratešku interkonekciju ovog i vojnotransportnog „Koridora 8“ koja bi se potencijalno uspostavila u jadranskom regionu. Pomenute zemlje Zapadnog Balkana se nalaze na trasi planirane „Jadransko-jonske magistrale“, koja se od Trsta u Italiji proteže do Peloponeza u Grčkoj. Interkonektivni potencijal leži i u postojećem transevropskom „Koridoru 5“ – od Venecije do Kijeva – na

čijem se veoma važnom kraku „5c“ – od Budimpešte do hrvatske jadranske luke „Ploče“ – nalazi BiH. Ulogu u jadranskoj intrerakonekciji mogao bi da ima i mehanizam „Američko-jadranske povelje“ (poznata i kao „Jadranska povelja“ ili „A5“) koju su ministri spoljnih poslova Hrvatske, Albanije i tada BJR Makedonije potpisali sa SAD u Tirani 2003. godine. Povelja je incijalno potpisana radi unapređenja saradnje na planu evroatlantskih integracija, ljudskih prava, demokratskih reformi i regionalne bezbednosti. Crna Gora i BiH su pristupile članstvu na marginama sastanka ministara spoljnih poslova država članica „Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju“ (*Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE*) koji je održan u Helsinkiju početkom decembra 2008. godine (Lopandić i Kronja 202–203, 2010).

Za vojnu mobilnost kao determinantu evrointegracija Zapadnog Balkana nije dovoljno sagledati samo geostrateški položaj činilaca zapadnobalkanskog konstrukta, već i stepen njihove usklađenosti sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom EU (*Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP*). Spoljnopolitička i bezbednosna perspektiva vojne mobilnosti usredsređena je na izazov i pretnje koje EU i NATO prepoznaju u Rusiji. Stepenu u kojoj su, na toj liniji, pojedini činioци Zapadnog Balkana usklađeni sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom EU (ZSBP) jeste i parametar u procenama njihove evroatlantske orijentacije.

Pomenuta briselska deklaracija iz decembra 2025. godine naročito ističe značaj ove usklađenosti sa politikom sankcija koje je EU preduzela prema Rusiji zbog rata u Ukrajini. „Usklađenost sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom EU, uključujući implementaciju i primenu restriktivnih mera EU i sprečavanje njihovog zaobilaženja, i dalje predstavlja jasan znak strateške orijentacije partnera. Pozdravljamo one partnere sa Zapadnog Balkana koji su već u potpunosti usklađeni i pozivamo one koji to još nisu učinili da slede njihov primer“ (Samit EU–Zapadni Balkan – Deklaracija iz Brisela 2025).

Prema francusko-nemačkom planu iz juna 2026. godine, u kom je uočljiva i veza između vojne mobilnosti i proširenja EU na Zapadni Balkan, jedan od „građivnih blokova“ politike proširenja je „pojačana saradnja u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane“ koja podrazumeva i projekte tzv. „Stalne strukturne saradnje“ (*Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO*) (Non-Paper by France and Germany). Radi se o posebnom bezbednosnom formatu EU među čije se projekte ubraja i vojna mobilnost. Iz vizure „Stalne strukturne saradnje“ projekat vojne mobilnosti „podržava posvećenost država članica da pojednostave i standardizuju procedure prekograničnog vojnog transporta u skladu sa zaključcima

(Evropskog) Saveta od 25. juna 2018. godine. Cilj mu je da omogući nesmetano kretanje vojnog osoblja i sredstava unutar granica EU. To podrazumeva izbegavanje dugih birokratskih procedura za kretanje kroz države članice EU, bilo železničkim, drumskim, vazdušnim ili morskim putem“ (Permanent Structured Cooperation 2026). Da bi se unapredila bezbednosna i odbrambena saradnja, francusko-nemački plan zahteva ispunjenje relevantnih kriterijuma i privremeno zatvaranje Poglavlja 31 (ZSBOP) (Non-Paper by France and Germany 2026).

Albanija, Severna Makedonija i Crna Gora su članice NATO-a sa visokim stepenom usklađenosti svojih spoljnih politika sa ZSBP EU. Albanija je u kontinuitetu i u potpunosti usklađena sa izjavama visokog predstavnika i svim restriktivnim merama koje je EU primenila prema Rusiji. Albanija je takođe glasala za Rezoluciju Generalne Skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija (*United Nations General Assembly*) pod nazivom „Unapređenje sveobuhvatnog, pravednog i trajnog mira u Ukrajini“ (*Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine*) (Albania Report 2025). Iste ocene stoje i u izveštaju za Crnu Goru, s tim što se u kontekstu malopredašnje Rezolucije navodi i da je Crna Gora istu kosponzorirala (Montenegro Report 2025). Severna Makedonija takođe beleži potpuno spoljopolitičko usklađivanje sa sankcionom politikom EU prema Rusiji, s tim što postoji vremenska diskrepanca između njenog usvajanja i stvarne primene (North Macedonia Report 2025).

BiH takođe beleži punu spoljopolitičku usklađenost, što uključuje i usklađivanje sa stavovima EU u međunarodnim organizacijama – UN, OEBS, Savet Evrope (BiH je bila među kosponzorima Rezolucije „Unapređenje sveobuhvatnog, pravednog i trajnog mira u Ukrajini“). Međutim, u izveštaju za 2025. godinu evidentirano je i da „vlasti Republike Srpske nastavljaju da održavaju česte kontakte sa Rusijom na najvišem nivou“. Usklađivanje BiH sa sankcionom politikom prema Rusiji ostaje sporno jer se, s jedne strane, srpski član Predsedništva zalagao za neutralan stav dok je bivši predsednik Republike Srpske Milorad Dodik, s druge strane podržao rusku agresiju prema Ukrajini (Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2025). Što se tiče Srbije, koja članstvo u EU ističe kao svoj strateški cilj bez aspiracija ka članstvu u NATO-u, predmetni izveštaj konstatuje da, pored приметnog povećanja u oktobru 2025. kada je zabeleženo da je njena spoljna politika bila usklađena 63% a prethodne 2024. godine 59%, usklađenost Srbije sa izjavama visokog predstavnika i politikom sankcija prema Rusiji ostaje generalno niska (Serbia Report 2025).

Zaključak

Koncept „vojne mobilnosti“ može biti jedna od važnih determinanti evropskih integracija zemalja Zapadnog Balkana. Uporednim pristupom, koji kriterijumski uvažava njihov geostrateški značaj za koridore „vojne mobilnosti“ i s tim neposredno vezanu usklađenost njihovih spoljnih politika sa ZSBP EU, moguće je pretpostaviti koje bi zemlje Zapadnog Balkana bile u najvećoj prednosti za punopravno članstvo u EU.

Rat u Ukrajini i njegovo rešenje, koje bi potencijalno dovelo do proširivanja ruskog uticaja u Crnom moru, imalo bi nesumnjivo geopolitičke i geostrateške posledice na „sanitarni kordon“ i, posledično, dodatno učvršćivanje evroatlantizma na Balkanskom poluostrvu. Jačanje pojasa od Baltičkog do Crnog mora predstavlja evroatlantsku stratešku neminovnost iz koje ideja administrativno i infrastrukturno efikasnog vojnog transporta iscrpljuje svoju suštinu i smisao. Na toj liniji je osnovano očekivati da saradnja NATO-a i EU u okvirima koncepta „vojne mobilnosti“ bude intenzivnija. Značaj ovog koncepta za ukupnu evropsku bezbednost i saradnju dva istaknuta evroatlantska formata, što proizlazi i iz strateško-bezbednosnih dokumenata razmatranih u ovom radu, kao i činjenica da je politika proširenja EU do sada sledila geostrategiju NATO-a prema Rusiji, sugerišu da o „vojnoj mobilnosti“ treba razmišljati i kao o jednoj od ključnih determinanti evropskih integracija Zapadnog Balkana.

Zapadni Balkan bi i sa talasokratskog i sa telurokratskog stanovišta evroatlantizma imao veoma važnu ulogu na koridorima za vojni transport koje su NATO i EU predvideli u kontekstu hipotetičkog sukoba sa Rusijom. Zapadni Balkan bi zahvaljujući Jadranskom moru mogao da ima dve geostrateški veoma važne integrativne uloge. Jedna se ogleda u tranzitnom povezivanju Jadranskog i Crnog mora, čemu u prilog govori projekat „Koridora VIII“, a druga u potencijalu za jadransku vezu između ovog i koridora koje je Severnoatlantska alijansa predvidela od Italije preko Slovenije, Hrvatske i Mađarske do Ukrajine. Jadranskim regionom se pruža i „Jadransko-jonska magistrala“ kao hipotetička integrativna dijagonala koja od Italije do Grčke i *vice versa* ide paralelno sa Jadranskim i Jonskim morem. Ono što može da bude indikativno za jadransku interkonekciju to je i stvaranje vojnog saveza između Hrvatske, Albanije i tzv. Kosova koje u „Američko-jadranskoj povelji“ ima status posmatrača. Položaj na svim ovim vojnotransportnim linijama mogao bi da odredi perspektivu evropskih integracija država koje zajedno sa tzv. Kosovom spadaju u geopolitičku konstrukciju Zapadnog Balkana.

Albanija i Crna Gora su, prema tom kriterijumu, u najvećoj prednosti za članstvo u EU. Obe zemlje, koje su članice NATO-a i „Američko-

jadranske povelje“, sa visokim stepenom usklađenosti sa ZSBP EU prema Rusiji, direktno izlaze na Jadransko more. Albanija, koja se nalazi na „Koridoru VIII“, talasokratski je pozicionirana kod Otrantskih vrata koja su važna za kontrolu Jadranskog mora i njegovu vezu sa Jonskim morem. U blizini Otrantskih vrata je i Crna Gora koja se zajedno sa Albanijom nalazi i na već pominjanoj „Jadransko-jonskoj magistrali“. Albaniju i Crnu Goru po važnosti sledi Severna Makedonija, takođe članica NATO-a usklađena sa ZSBP EU, ali koja je na „Koridoru VIII“ isključivo telurokratski pozicionirana.

Na drugoj strani su zemlje Zapadnog Balkana koje nisu članice NATO-a niti imaju izlaz na Jadransko more. Srbija i BiH su ipak nezaobilazne na koridorima „vojne mobilnosti“ jer su deo „Transevropske transportne mreže“. Srbija, koja teži EU bez konkretnih pretenzija prema članstvu u Severnoatlantskoj alijansi, nalazi se na „Koridoru X“ i „Koridoru VII“. U pogledu „Koridora VII“ važno je podvući da je to tzv. „Dunavski koridor“ na čiju bi vezu između Severnog i Crnog mora evroatlantizam mogao da se osloni sa obazrivim rezonom da ovaj koridor u sebi nosi i potencijal za stratešku integraciju Rusije i Nemačke. BiH bi svoju geostratešku važnost mogla da ima na postojećem transevropskom kraku „5c“, ali i na integrativnoj dijagonali „Jadransko-jonske magistrale“.

U konačnom, spoljna i bezbednosna politika Srbije bi pred sobom mogla da ima dva izazova. Naime, koncept „vojne mobilnosti“ ozbiljno bi doveo u iskušenje multivektorski pristup prema kojem su za Srbiju, pored SAD, EU i Kine, veoma važni i odnosi sa Rusijom i, drugo, otvorio mogućnosti da se tzv. Kosovo vojno-strateški afirmiše kroz različite regionalne inicijative koje bi pogodovala evroatlantskim vojnotransportnim planovima.

Bibliography

- Barnes, Joe. 2024. “Nato maps out plan to block Russian invasion: Pre-planned logistical routes could help stave off a potential Russian attack”. *The Telegraph*, 4 June. 19/02/2026. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/04/nato-land-corridors-us-troops-european-war/>.
- Clapp, Sebastian, Monika Kiss and Mathias Gullentops. 2025. “Military mobility”. European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775860/EPRS_BRI\(2025\)775860_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775860/EPRS_BRI(2025)775860_EN.pdf). 19/02/2026.
- Csurgai, Gyula. 2021. “The Main Components of Geopolitical Analysis”. In: *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*,

- David Criekemans (ed.). Brill, Leiden. 13–60. DOI: 10.1163/9789004432086_003.
- Đukanović, Dragan. 2020. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2020)*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd; JP „Službeni glasnik“.
- European Commission. 2025. “Albania Report 2025”. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/albania-report-2025_en. 23/02/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2025”. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2025_en. 23/02/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “Montenegro Report 2025”. European Commission, Brussels. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/montenegro-report-2025_en. 23/02/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “North Macedonia Report 2025”. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/267b368e-6b55-4a42-bb72-6395593de4da_en?filename=north-macedonia-report-2025.pdf. 23/02/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “Serbia Report 2025”. European Commission, Brussels. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2025_en. 23/02/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “Baltic Sea – Black Sea – Aegean Sea corridor”. European Commission. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/trans-european-transport-network-ten-t/baltic-sea-black-sea-aegean-sea-corridor_en. 22/07/2026.
- European Commission. 2025. “Commission moves towards ‘Military Schengen’ and transformation of defence industry”. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2724. 12/01/2026.
- European Commission. 2026. “Commissioner Tzitzikostas gives a Keynote Speech at the Opening of the Ministerial Session: Third Meeting of the Black Sea – Aegean Sea Corridor Platform”. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_1408. 24/07/2026.
- Gaubert, Clément, Freddy Geay, François Catala and Léonie Allard. 2025. “Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach”. Atlantic Council, Washington. <https://www.atlantic>

- council.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/enhancing-land-military-mobility-in-europe-advocating-a-pragmatic-approach/. 19/02/2026.
- Ganzer, Danijele. 2018. *Protivzakoniti ratovi: kako zemlje NATO-a podrivaju Ujedinjene nacije: hronika koja počinje od Kube i završava se sa Sirijom*. Laguna.
- Hudson, Valerie M., and Benjamin S. Day. 2020. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.
- "Joint Declaration following the second EU – Republic of Moldova Summit". 2026. European Council, Brussels.
- Kaarbo, Juliet, Jeffrey S. Lantis, Ryan K. Beasley and Michael T. Snarr (eds.). 2013. "The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective". In: *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*. SAGE Publications Ltd., London. 1–26.
- Kaplan, D. Robert. 2023. *Jadran: saglasje civilizacija krajem novog veka*. Laguna. Beograd.
- Kovačević, Marko, and Nikola Vujinović. 2014. „Socijalni konstruktivizam i međunarodni odnosi – Aleksandar Vent: Društvena teorija međunarodne politike“. *Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka* 8 (1): 147–151.
- Lopandić, Duško, and Jasminka Kronja. 2010. *Regionalne inicijative i multilateralna saradnja na Balkanu*. Evropski pokret u Srbiji. Beograd.
- Majchut, Ivan, Lubomir Belan and Jaroslav Varecha. 2026. "Military Mobility as a Challenge for Europe". *Transportation Research Procedia* 93: 1041–1048.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Italy. 2026. "Tirana Joint Declaration on Corridor VIII 18 February 2026". https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2026/02/dichiarazione-congiunta-di-tirana-sul-corridoio-viii-18-febbraio-2026/. 19/02/2026.
- Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2010. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge University Press.
- "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept". 2022. NATO Summit, Madrid.
- "Non-Paper by France and Germany". 2026. "A New Momentum for Enlargement – Contribution in view of the upcoming EU-Western Balkans summit (5 June 2026) and the EU-Moldova summit (22 June 2026)". Politico. <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/>

- 2026/06/04/Document-A-New-Momentum-for-Enlargement.pdf. 24/07/2026.
- Proroković, Dušan. 2013. „Geopolitički položaj (BJR) Makedonije“. *Srpska politička misao* 40 (2): 205–222.
- “Samit EU–Zapadni Balkan – Deklaracija iz Brisela, 18. decembar 2024. godine“. 2024. Evropski savet, Brisel.
- “Samit EU–Zapadni Balkan – Deklaracija iz Brisela, 17. decembar 2025. godine“. 2025. Evropski savet, Brisel.
- Stanić, D. Vladan. 2025. “Military force mobility as a challenge for the European Union in the field of defence”. *Progress* 6 (4): 81–96.
- Stepić, Milomir. 2016. *Geopolitika: ideje, teorije, koncepcije*. Institut za političke studije. Beograd.
- The Sofia Globe. 2024. “Bulgaria, Romania, Greece sign letter of intent on harmonised military mobility corridor”. The Sofia Globe, 11 July. <https://sofiaglobe.com/2024/07/11/bulgaria-romania-greece-sign-letter-of-intent-on-harmonised-military-mobility-corridor/>. 19/02/2026.
- Usewicz, Teresa, Andrzej Czekaj and Witold Bartoszek. 2022. “Military mobility: Ambition versus reality”. *Safety and Defense* 8 (1): 15–22. DOI: 10.37105/sd.173.
- Vignjević, Marko. 2025. “The Role of Moldova in the Face of Challenges at the ‘Focșani Gate’”. In: *Moldova and the Slavs, Zoran Milošević and Dajana Lazarević* (eds.). Institute for Political Studies. 105–118. DOI: 10.18485/ips_moldova_slavs.2025.ch6.
- Vignjević, Marko. 2024. „Model igre u geostrateškom rivalitetu Grčke i Turske“. *Srpska politička misao* 80 (2): 35–62.
- Vuletić, Dejan V. 2018. „NATO i Zapadni Balkan“. *Vojno delo* 70 (7): 41–52. DOI: 10.5937/vojdelo1807041V.
- Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origin of Alliances*. Cornell University Press.
- Whisker, Biser James, and Kevin R. Spiker. 2022. *Theories of Geopolitics*. Nova Science Publishers Inc.
- “White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030”. 2025. European Commission, Brussels.

UDC 327(536.2)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 219–249
Original scientific paper
Received: 12/6/2026
Revised: 30/7/2026
Accepted: 18/8/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.2
CC BY-SA 4.0

Lotfi SOUR¹

Small State Activism and the Limits of Strategic Autonomy: The United Arab Emirates and the Logic of Managed Regional Overstretch

SUMMARY

This article develops a neoclassical realist framework to explain how the United Arab Emirates (UAE), despite its small territorial size, limited manpower, and demographic constraints, has sustained an expansive pattern of regional activism across Yemen, Libya, and the Horn of Africa/Red Sea corridor. Situating the UAE within the post-2011 transformation of Arab regional order, the article introduces two interrelated conceptual innovations: managed strategic autonomy and managed regional overstretch. Managed strategic autonomy is distinguished from hedging, omnibalancing, and strategic diversification by its active intent to reshape the patron-client relationship rather than distribute risk or cultivate domestic legitimacy. Managed regional overstretch extends Kennedy's classical overstretch theory beyond great-power hegemonic overextension to small states whose strain emerges through dispersion and institutional proliferation rather than resource depletion alone. Empirically, drawing on a structured, diverse-case comparison of three theatres selected for their variation in the concentration versus dispersion of strategic commitment, the article documents the UAE's cyclical pattern of intervention, consolidation, and

¹ University of Mustapha Stambouli, Mascara, Algeria; email: l.sour@univ-mascara.dz;
ORCID: 0000-0001-8783-9340

calibrated disengagement, anchored in time-stamped evidence: the 2019 Yemen drawdown; the 2020 Libyan repositioning following Turkish military intervention; the 2021 al-Ula reconciliation process; the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi; the 2023–2024 Red Sea shipping crisis; and the 2023 Sudan conflict. The article contributes to small-state IR theory, Gulf foreign policy analysis, and the overstretch literature and addresses the following falsifiable predictions: the UAE will sustain post-overstretch postures through commercial-infrastructure and partner-substitution instruments rather than direct military redeployment, and distributed overstretch in the Horn will delay recalibration relative to concentrated kinetic overstretch in Yemen.

Keywords: United Arab Emirates (UAE), small state activism, strategic autonomy, regional overstretch, hedging, Gulf foreign policy.

Aktivizam malih država i granice strateške autonomije: Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati i logika kontrolisanog prekomernog regionalnog angažovanja

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad razvija neoklasično-realistički okvir za objašnjenje načina na koji su Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati (UAE), uprkos maloj teritorijalnoj veličini, ograničenim ljudskim resursima i demografskim ograničenjima, uspeli da održe ekspanzivan obrazac regionalnog aktivizma u Jemenu, Libiji i na Rogu Afrike i koridoru Crvenog mora. Polazeći od transformacije arapskog regionalnog poretka nakon 2011. godine, rad uvodi dva međusobno povezana konceptualna pojma: kontrolisanu stratešku autonomiju (*managed strategic autonomy*) i kontrolisano prekomerno regionalno angažovanje (*managed regional overstretch*). Kontrolisana strateška autonomija razlikuje se od hedžinga, sveobuhvatnog uravnotežavanja (*omnibalancing*) i strateške diverzifikacije po tome što podrazumeva preoblikovanje odnosa patron-klijent, umesto pukog raspoređivanja rizika ili nastojanja da se osigura domaći politički legitimitet. Pojam kontrolisanog prekomernog regionalnog angažovanja proširuje Kenedijevu klasičnu teoriju prekomernog angažovanja izvan okvira hegemonске prekomerne ekspanzije velikih sila, na male države čije se opterećenje ispoljava kroz prostornu disperziju angažmana i proliferaciju institucionalnih mehanizama, a ne isključivo kroz iscrpljivanje raspoloživih resursa. Empirijski, rad se oslanja na strukturisanu komparaciju različitih slučajeva, pri čemu su odabrana tri

regionalna poprišta zbog varijacija u koncentraciji, odnosno disperziji strateškog angažmana. Analizom se uočava ciklični obrazac delovanja UAE koji obuhvata intervenciju, konsolidaciju i povlačenje, oslanjajući se na vremenski precizno određene empirijske pokazatelje: smanjenje vojnog angažmana u Jemenu 2019. godine; promenu pozicioniranja u Libiji nakon turske vojne intervencije 2020. godine; proces pomirenja u okviru al-Ula sporazuma 2021. godine; napade Huta na Abu Dabi 2022. godine; krizu pomorskog saobraćaja u Crvenom moru 2023–2024. godine; kao i sukob u Sudanu od 2023. godine. Rad doprinosi teoriji međunarodnih odnosa malih država, analizi spoljne politike zemalja Zaliva i literaturi o prekomernom angažovanju, te razmatra sledeća proverljiva predviđanja: UAE će održavati obrasce delovanja nakon perioda prekomernog angažovanja prvenstveno putem instrumenata komercijalne infrastrukture i zamene partnerskih aktera, umesto neposrednog ponovnog vojnog angažovanja; dok će distribuirano prekomerno angažovanje na Rogu Afrike odložiti proces strateškog prilagođavanja u odnosu na koncentrisano kinetičko prekomerno angažovanje u Jemenu.

Ključne reči: Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati (UAE), aktivizam malih država, strateška autonomija, prekomerno regionalno angažovanje, hedžing, zalivska spoljna politika.

Introduction

Why does a small state with limited manpower, no conscript army, and a native population of under one million sustain simultaneous military, political, and infrastructural commitments across three distinct regional theatres over a decade? This question sits at the intersection of two undertheorised problems in International Relations scholarship: the sources of small-state foreign policy activism and the conditions under which external commitments generate structural strain sufficient to compel strategic recalibration (Antwi-Boateng et Alhashmi 2022, Almezaini et Rickli 2017). Accordingly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides a uniquely tractable case for examining both. Since 2011, the UAE has intervened militarily in Yemen and Libya, constructed an integrated logistics and basing network along the Red Sea western littoral, and managed an evolving posture of selective disengagement and partner substitution across all three theatres, all while operating under the material constraints conventionally associated with structural passivity.

Notwithstanding the volume of existing scholarship, it offers partial but inadequate accounts of this pattern. Structural realist frameworks treat small states as essentially reactive, their strategic options determined by dependency on external security guarantees and the distribution of

capabilities in the international system (Waltz 1979, Walt 2013, Handel 1981). While this tradition illuminates the constraints the UAE faces, it cannot explain the activist trajectory the UAE has chosen. A subsequent wave of scholarship on niche diplomacy (Henrikson 2005), asymmetric balancing (Paul 2005), and Gulf foreign policy diversification (Gause, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East 2011, Kamrava, Small State, Big Politics 2020) has demonstrated that small states can exercise meaningful agency under great-power ambiguity. However, these accounts have not theorised the limits of such agency or the mechanisms by which over-extension generates recalibration pressure. Most directly relevant are frameworks focused on hedging (Tessman et Wolfe 2011, Kuik 2016), omnibalancing (David 1991), and strategic diversification (Gause, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East 2011), all of which capture partial dimensions of UAE behaviour while missing a critical feature: the UAE's activism is not merely distributive or risk-minimising but constitutes a purposive effort to reshape the terms of its patron-client relationships and restructure the regional environment in its favour (Mason 2018).

In light of this gap, the article introduces two interrelated conceptual innovations within a neoclassical realist framework (Rose 1998, Lobell, Ripsman et Taliaferro 2009). The first, and arguably more foundational, is managed strategic autonomy: a goal-directed diversification of alignments and selective engagements through which a small state reduces structural dependency on any single external patron while preserving operational flexibility across multiple coalition contexts. Crucially, the "managed" qualifier signals that autonomy is not sought as an absolute condition but is continuously constructed through asymmetric information management, selective burden-sharing, and infrastructural independence. This distinguishes the concept from hedging, which is primarily risk-distributive, and from omnibalancing, which privileges domestic regime survival over outward-projecting strategic ambition. The second concept is managed regional overstretch: the accumulation of dispersed commitments across military, political, and infrastructural domains that cumulatively generate coordination costs, diminishing strategic returns, and recalibration pressures, even when no single theatre constitutes resource exhaustion. By extending Kennedy's classical overstretch logic beyond hegemonic powers to the small-state context, the article demonstrates that the strain from which the UAE periodically recalibrates emerges not from attempted dominance but from institutional proliferation and the interdependency of simultaneously maintained partner networks.

The interaction of these two concepts produces what the article terms a cyclical model of UAE foreign policy: four identifiable phases, Activation, Expansion, Diffuse Overstretch, and Recalibration, through which the UAE has moved across each of its three primary theatres. The empirical argument is grounded in time-stamped turning points: the 2019 Yemen military drawdown (Juneau 2020); the 2020 Libyan ceasefire and the decisive effect of Turkish military intervention (Kardaş 2020); the 2021 al-Ula reconciliation process (Kabalan 2021); the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi (Mutschler et Meininghaus 2024); the 2023–2024 Red Sea shipping crisis (Romaniuk 2024); and the 2023 Sudan conflict (H. Ali 2024). Together, these episodes constitute a longitudinal record of the cyclical model's operation and permit cross-case comparison of concentrated versus distributed overstretch, a theoretically significant distinction with direct implications for how and when recalibration is triggered.

The article makes three contributions to International Relations scholarship. First, it extends neoclassical realist theory to small-state activism in a non-European, non-great-power context, integrating systemic pressures with elite-level mediating variables traceable through triangulated empirical evidence. Second, it reconceptualises strategic autonomy from an EU-centric industrial sovereignty concept into a relational, operational strategy whose defining characteristic is active patron-client reshaping rather than mere risk distribution. Third, it extends overstretch theory beyond hegemonic overextension to the domain of small-state activism, introducing the analytically consequential distinction between concentrated single-theatre overstretch (Yemen) and diffuse multi-domain distributed overstretch (Horn of Africa), a distinction with direct implications for the timing and character of recalibration. The article is structured as follows. Section 1 develops the theoretical framework and operationalises both core concepts. Section 2 situates the argument within the existing IR literature on small-state behaviour, hedging, and overstretch. Sections 3 through 5 present the three empirical cases. Section 6 conducts a structured cross-case synthesis. Section 7 draws theoretical conclusions, addresses scope conditions, and charts directions for future research.

Constructing Autonomy under Constraint: A Neoclassical Realist Framework for Small-State Activism

The theoretical approach adopted here is grounded in neoclassical realism, which explains foreign policy behaviour through the interaction of systemic constraints and domestic-level mediating variables (Rose 1998, Lobell, Ripsman et Taliaferro 2009, Rathbun 2008, R. Schweller 2018).

Conversely, unlike structural realist accounts that treat state behaviour as a near-direct reflection of the distribution of capabilities, neoclassical realism emphasises that systemic pressures are filtered through elite perceptions, threat assessments, and state capacity constraints. Foreign policy outcomes are therefore the product of how decision-makers interpret external uncertainty and translate it into strategic choices under conditions of imperfect information and bounded rationality.

Notably, a critical enabling variable in the UAE case is the highly centralised federal structure, in which Abu Dhabi's political and economic predominance, and more recently the consolidation of strategic decision-making authority under MBZ, has produced a foreign policy apparatus with unusually high responsiveness to elite threat perceptions and an unusually low threshold for rapid strategic commitment (Lootah 2021, Antwi-Boateng et Binhuwaidin 2017, Miller et Verhoeven 2019).

This is an enabling condition rather than a fixed feature of the state: the model's institutional responsiveness, rapid activation, and rapid recalibration are bound to the continuity of a particular configuration of centralised leadership perception, and a future diffusion of decision-making authority or a generational leadership transition could alter the speed and character of both expansion and recalibration in ways the present framework does not independently predict.

Strategic autonomy, as developed in the European integration context, refers primarily to a state or organisation's capacity for independent action in defence, technology, and industrial policy without dependence on external actors (Biscop 2018, Zandee, et al. 2020, Franke et Varma 2018, Fiott 2021). In this conventional formulation, autonomy is principally about industrial and technological self-sufficiency, a great- or middle-power concern. The UAE's case differs structurally: what matters is not industrial sovereignty but coalition manoeuvrability and the ability to pursue operationally distinct objectives within nominally shared alliance structures (Kirmanj et Tofik 2023).

By contrast, managed strategic autonomy, as conceptualised here, refers to a goal-directed diversification of alignments and selective engagements through which a small state reduces structural dependency on any single external patron while preserving flexibility across multiple coalition contexts. The 'managed' qualifier is critical: autonomy is not sought as an absolute condition but is continuously constructed through asymmetric information management, selective burden-sharing, and infrastructural independence.

This concept is distinguished from adjacent frameworks as follows. Hedging (Tessman et Wolfe 2011, Kuik 2016) refers to risk distribution through simultaneous maintenance of ties with potentially competing great powers, designed to preserve optionality without committing to any side. Crucially, however, managed strategic autonomy goes further: the UAE is not merely hedging between patrons but actively using its cross-cutting partnerships to extract operational space unavailable to states fully aligned with a single patron (Guéraiche 2023). The distinction is observable: a pure hedger avoids alignment decisions; the UAE makes alignment decisions while preserving the capacity to deviate from coalition mandates on specific operational questions (e.g., southern Yemen, eastern Libya front).

Omnibalancing (David 1991) focuses on how leaders align externally to manage both external threats and domestic regime threats simultaneously, often privileging the latter. Notwithstanding the relevance of regime security to UAE decision-making, the primary driver of Emirati activism is outward-projecting threat assessment and the structuring of regional order to constrain ideological competitors, rather than domestic legitimization.

Strategic diversification (Gause 2011, Kamrava 2020) is the concept closest to managed strategic autonomy, denoting a Gulf state's broadening of security and economic partnerships beyond a single patron. It differs from managed strategic autonomy on the dimension of intent: diversification describes a portfolio of relationships without specifying what the state does with the resulting room for manoeuvre, whereas managed strategic autonomy specifies the purposive use of that manoeuvre space, operational divergence from coalition mandates and the construction of patron-independent infrastructure to actively renegotiate the terms of patron-client dependency rather than merely to hold a wider set of relationships in reserve. Stated concretely, managed strategic autonomy is autonomy from indispensability to any single patron, exercised over the choice of coalition partners, operational priorities, and infrastructural dependencies. It is measured through observable indicators of managed strategic autonomy, which include (1) simultaneous maintenance of operationally distinct partnerships with competing great powers (US security umbrella, French defence cooperation, Russian-linked interlocutors via Libya, and Chinese infrastructure investment); (2) demonstrated operational divergence from coalition mandates on discrete issues (UAE prioritisation of southern Yemen over Houthi rollback, UAE-STC support against Saudi-backed Islah party); and (3) acquisition of independent basing or logistics

infrastructure providing autonomous projection capacity independent of any single patron's permission (Assab base in Eritrea, Berbera port in Somaliland, and Camp Lemonnier adjacency in Djibouti) (Cannon et Rossiter 2017).

Classical overstretch theory, derived from Kennedy's analysis of great-power imperial overextension, posits that states decline when their external military commitments exceed their economic and productive capacity to sustain them (Kennedy 1988). While this formulation was designed for hegemonic powers, its application to small states requires modification because small-state overstretch does not arise from attempted hegemony but from the dispersion of limited resources across multiple simultaneously managed theatres. Layne and Posen extend the concept to US relative decline but retain the resource-depletion logic (Layne 2012, Posen 2014). The proxy warfare literature (Mumford 2013, Salehyan 2010, Tamm 2016, Rauta 2021, Marshall 2016) offers a closer approximation, documenting how external patrons face diminishing returns and escalating costs from local partner management in fragmented civil conflicts. Accordingly, managed regional overstretch is conceptualised here as the accumulation of dispersed commitments across military, political, and infrastructural domains that cumulatively generate coordination costs, diminishing strategic returns, and recalibration pressures, even when no single theatre constitutes resource exhaustion. What distinguishes this condition from a neutral accumulation of strategic burdens is the trajectory of marginal returns: overstretch obtains specifically when the marginal strategic value generated by each additional commitment declines while its coordination and reputational costs continue to rise, producing a widening gap between commitment and return rather than a merely larger but proportionate portfolio of engagements.

The 'managed' qualifier signals that recalibration occurs before systemic collapse.

Drawing on the preceding conceptualisation, operational criteria for diagnosing overstretch include (i) dispersion costs, the fiscal, institutional, and human capital burden of maintaining simultaneous multi-theatre engagement; (ii) coordination burden, the increasing difficulty of managing politically and militarily distinct partner networks simultaneously; (iii) diminishing returns, observable slippage between stated objectives and achieved outcomes per theatre; and (iv) substitution effects, increasing reliance on local proxies, private military/security contractors, and infrastructure firms (DP World, Abu Dhabi Ports) as substitutes for direct state deployment, indicating retrenchment of direct commitment.

Consequently, this operationalisation permits the concept to be distinguished from a vague narrative of 'becoming overstretched': overstretch is present when at least three of these four indicators co-occur. Recalibration is observed when a drawdown of direct deployments is accompanied by increased partner reliance and a diplomatic de-escalation signal towards at least one regional rival.

A three-of-four threshold is used rather than requiring all four indicators, since not every indicator is equally observable across theatres with uneven documentation (a constraint that affects the Horn of Africa case in particular), and rather than treating any single indicator as sufficient, since isolated cost pressures or routine policy adjustment could otherwise be mistaken for overstretch; convergence across a majority of independently observable indicators offers a conservative but attainable evidentiary bar.

Throughout the empirical analysis, UAE commitments are further distinguished by instrument type: direct military deployment (own forces and assets), proxy and partner-based commitment (financing, training, and arming local militias and allied forces), and commercial-infrastructural statecraft (port concessions, logistics investment, and basing arrangements pursued through state-linked commercial entities). The shift across these three instrument types, rather than uniform disengagement, is what the recalibration phase of the cyclical model is designed to capture.

Collectively, the interaction between managed strategic autonomy and managed regional overstretch produces a cyclical pattern in UAE foreign policy with four identifiable phases: (1) Activation, heightened elite perception of systemic fragmentation generates incentives for proactive engagement; (2) Expansion, diversified interventions across multiple theatres enhance strategic footprint and autonomy; (3) Diffuse Overstretch, cumulative coordination costs, diminishing returns, and external counter-escalation create recalibration pressure; (4) Recalibration, selective drawdown, proxy substitution, and diplomatic repositioning restore sustainable equilibrium.

It is worth stating the design's analytic architecture explicitly. Activism, the UAE's observable pattern of intervention across theatres, is the empirical phenomenon to be explained. Managed strategic autonomy is the elite strategic orientation that motivates activism. Managed regional overstretch is the intervening structural mechanism through which sustained activism generates cumulative strain. Recalibration, the selective drawdown, proxy substitution, and diplomatic repositioning observed at the close of each cycle, is the dependent variable: the outcome the

framework seeks to explain and the point at which the model's predictions are empirically tested. Separating these four terms in this way addresses the risk, noted above, of allowing the same episodes to serve simultaneously as evidence of overstretch and as evidence of recalibration; in the empirical sections that follow, overstretch is established first, through the co-occurrence of the indicators specified above, before recalibration is assessed as a subsequent and analytically distinct outcome.

The research design is a structured, diverse-case comparison within a single country, process-tracing the cyclical sequence across three theatres that constitute the units of analysis. Yemen, Libya, and the Horn of Africa/Red Sea corridor were selected because they vary systematically in the concentration versus dispersion of strategic commitment and in the dominant instrument type – direct military deployment, proxy warfare, and commercial-infrastructure statecraft, respectively – while holding the state, its elite decision-making structure, and the broader regional timeframe constant. This design permits comparison of concentrated kinetic overstretch (Yemen) against diffuse, multi-domain overstretch (the Horn), with Libya occupying an intermediate position, and is therefore suited to testing the framework's core distinction rather than to establishing population-level generalisation, a limitation addressed further in the concluding discussion of scope conditions.

Small-State Agency and Its Limits: Situating Managed Strategic Autonomy in the IR Literature

The study of small state behaviour in International Relations has long been shaped by structural assumptions that privilege the limiting effects of anarchy and relative power asymmetry on small state agency (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). Within this tradition, small states are conceptualised primarily through dependency and alignment logics: balancing against threats (Walt 2013), bandwagoning with dominant powers (R. L. Schweller 1994), or pursuing neutrality as existential insurance (Handel 1981). Notably, these approaches share a common limitation: they treat small states as essentially reactive to structural pressures rather than as agents capable of shaping their strategic environment (Mason 2018).

This literature's treatment of 'small states' as a single category also requires qualification before it can be applied to the UAE. Thorhallsson and Wivel distinguish size, a matter of territory, population, and conventional military capacity, from capability, the institutional, financial,

and administrative resources a state can bring to bear regardless of its physical scale (Thorhallsson et Wivel 2006).

Cooper and Shaw similarly frame small-state agency as a function of resilience rather than vulnerability alone (Cooper et Shaw 2009). On demographic and territorial criteria, the UAE is unambiguously small: a native population of under one million and no conscript army. On capability and positional criteria, however, it is not weak: sovereign wealth reserves, an integrated logistics and ports sector, and a location astride the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint give it the capacity to project influence and externalise operational costs onto proxies, partners, and commercial infrastructure unavailable to demographically comparable but resource- or position-poor small states. The UAE is therefore better categorised as a small-but-capable, geostrategically consequential state, and it is precisely this combination, rather than smallness alone, that renders its activism analytically distinctive.

Notwithstanding this deterministic inheritance, a significant body of subsequent scholarship has challenged its core premises. Research on niche diplomacy (Henrikson 2005), asymmetric balancing (Paul 2005), and small state foreign policy agency (Thorhallsson et Wivel, *Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?* 2006, Hey 2003) has demonstrated that small states can exercise meaningful agency, particularly in environments characterised by great power ambiguity, regional fragmentation, or institutional weakness. In the Gulf specifically, Gause and Kamrava have documented a post-2003 shift towards strategic diversification and autonomous regional engagement (Gause, *Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East* 2011, Kamrava, *Small State, Big Politics* 2020), while Roberts and Krieg have detailed the UAE's specifically assertive variant of this trend (Roberts, *Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World* 2020, Krieg, *Security Assistance to Surrogates – How the UAE Secures Its Regional Objectives* 2024).

The concept most directly adjacent to managed strategic autonomy is hedging. Tessman and Wolfe define hedging as a strategy of simultaneous engagement with potentially competing powers to preserve optionality (Tessman et Wolfe 2011), while Kuik distinguishes between return-maximising and risk-contingency hedging (Kuik 2016). Goh develops a related omni-enmeshment framework for Southeast Asian states managing China's rise (Goh 2008, Goh 2019). These formulations capture the UAE's maintenance of multiple great-power partnerships but do not account for its active operational deviation from coalition mandates or its

use of infrastructure diplomacy to construct independent leverage. In short, and most critically, the UAE is not merely distributing risk; it is actively reshaping the strategic environment to expand its operational autonomy (Abozaid 2020).

Omnibalancing (David 1991, Elisheva 2004) offers a different adjacent framework, arguing that developing-world leaders align externally primarily to neutralise domestic threats. The UAE's regional activism does not fit this pattern for the reasons articulated in Section 1.2.

The overstretch literature originates in Kennedy's thesis that great powers decline when military commitments outpace economic productive capacity (Kennedy 1988). The proxy warfare literature (Mumford 2013, Salehyan 2010, Tamm 2016) documents how external patrons face diminishing returns and escalating costs from local partner management in fragmented civil conflicts, including through principal-agent problems, monitoring costs, and moral hazard dynamics.

A dimension of the existing literature that the foregoing review has not yet addressed, but which bears directly on the theoretical positioning of managed strategic autonomy, concerns the conditions under which small states transition from reactive to constitutive actors in regional order-building (Thorhallsson et Wivel 2006, Cooper et Shaw, *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience* 2009, Williams, Lobell et Jesse 2025). The scholarship surveyed above largely frames small-state agency as a response to structural permissiveness, great-power retrenchment, regional fragmentation, or institutional weakness that create space that small states exploit. This framing systematically underspecifies the degree to which small-state activism itself reshapes the structural conditions to which it is ostensibly responding. In the Gulf context specifically, the UAE's interventions in Yemen and Libya did not merely respond to regional fragmentation; they selectively deepened it by empowering sub-state actors, fragmenting political opposition coalitions, and establishing facts on the ground that foreclosed negotiated settlements preferred by competing regional powers, notably Qatar and Turkey (Dogan-Akkas 2021, Krieg 2024). This constitutive dimension, the capacity to reshape rather than merely navigate the regional environment, is precisely what distinguishes managed strategic autonomy from the hedging and omnibalancing frameworks with which it is most frequently conflated, and it is what makes the UAE case theoretically generative beyond its immediate empirical domain. Paradoxically, however, this constitutive capacity also generates a structural feedback problem that neither the hedging nor the overstretch literature has adequately theorised:

the more successfully the UAE reshapes its regional environment, the more it creates dependencies, partner networks, and reputational commitments that constrain its subsequent freedom of manoeuvre. The activation of the Southern Transitional Council, the consolidation of Haftar's eastern Libyan authority, and the establishment of Red Sea port concessions are simultaneously achievements of managed strategic autonomy and new sources of structural constraint, binding the UAE to actors and outcomes whose trajectories it can influence but not control (Salisbury 2020, Pedde 2017). It is this recursive quality, whereby the instruments of autonomy-generation progressively constitute new forms of structural dependency, that the empirical cases in Sections 3 through 5 are designed to illuminate, and that the existing IR literature on small states has not yet systematically incorporated into its analytical frameworks.

Intervention, Concentration, and Recalibration: The UAE in Yemen

The Saudi-led coalition intervention launched in March 2015, following the Houthi capture of Sanaa and advance towards Aden, created the structural opportunity for Emirati engagement (Marieke 2017). The UAE's formally stated objective was coalition support for the restoration of Yemen's internationally recognised government under President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (Darwich, The Saudi intervention in Yemen: Struggling for status 2018). Paradoxically, however, from the outset, Emirati strategic behaviour revealed differentiated priorities that diverged from Saudi coalition leadership (Esfandiary 2023). UAE objectives can be reconstructed from triangulated sources: MBZ's documented concern about al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as a transnational threat (Hindmarsh 2023); field reporting on UAE-financed and trained forces concentrated in southern Yemen and coastal Hadramawt rather than on the Houthi front in the north (Juneau, The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration 2020, Dogan-Akkas 2021); and UN Panel of Experts reports documenting UAE operational conduct diverging from stated coalition objectives (Slijper 2017, UNSC 2017).

The UAE deployed a combination of instruments: direct military forces (estimated 3,500 troops at peak engagement, with air assets at Al Anad and naval forces in the Gulf of Aden) (Numan Telci et Öztürk Horoz 2018, Toomey 2025); financial and material support to allied militias (the Security Belt Forces and Elite Forces in southern Yemen); private military/security contractor deployments (Krieg 2022); and diplomatic support for southern Yemeni political actors (Salisbury 2020). Concurrently, the UAE prioritised Aden port rehabilitation and Socotra Island access, consistent with its

broader Red Sea logistics strategy pursued through Abu Dhabi Ports and DP World in parallel commercial channels (Ding 2024). By 2017–2018, the costs of sustained Yemen engagement had accumulated across multiple dimensions (Juneau, *The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration* 2020). Militarily, UAE forces suffered significant casualties relative to the country's small indigenous military population, with documented losses at Marib in September 2015 (over 50 killed in a single incident) creating acute domestic political sensitivity (The Guardian 2015, Hokayem et Roberts 2016). Furthermore, the UAE faced growing international scrutiny over civilian harm from coalition airstrikes, documented in UN Panel reports and Human Rights Watch investigations (Cumming-Bruce 2018, Human Rights Watch 2022), with direct implications for arms supply relationships with the UK and US (Bales et Mutschler, *A New Autocratic Way of War? Autocracy, Precision Strike Warfare and Civilian Victimization* 2026). In addition, the multiplication of armed factions under UAE patronage – the STC, the Hadrami Elite Forces, Shabwani Elite Forces, and counter-terrorism units – created coordination costs that strained central management (Bales 2023).

As a result of these converging pressures, the formal recalibration occurred in June–July 2019, when the UAE announced a withdrawal of significant forces from frontline positions (Roberts 2020, Stoddard et Toltica 2021). This was officially framed as a strategic reassessment towards 'naval and air capabilities', but it represented an observable shift from direct territorial engagement to maintaining indirect influence (Darwich 2020, Juneau 2021). Tellingly, the timing correlates with multiple simultaneous overstretch indicators: accumulating casualties, international reputational pressure, the beginning of STC-Saudi tensions, and parallel resource demands from Libya (Badi 2020). Subsequently, January 2022 provided a secondary recalibration trigger. Houthi drone and ballistic missile strikes on Abu Dhabi, targeting Abu Dhabi National Oil Company facilities and Al-Dhafra Air Base (Reuters 2022, Chulov 2022), represented the first significant successful attack on UAE territory, fundamentally altering the strategic cost calculus (Roberts 2025). Critically, the strikes demonstrated that sustained engagement with Yemen had generated retaliatory exposure to homeland vulnerability.

Consequently, post-2019 UAE-Yemen engagement has operated through indirect channels: continued financial and material support to STC forces; diplomatic backing for STC participation in the Riyadh Agreement process; and maintenance of maritime security presence in the Gulf of Aden without frontline territorial commitment (Brehony 2020, Stoddard et Toltica 2021). This posture reflects the recalibration

mechanism's logic: strategic interests are preserved through partner substitution and infrastructure leverage (Aden port, Socotra access) rather than direct military deployment, thereby reducing direct operational costs while preserving influence architecture. Assessed against the UAE's own stated minimal objective, securing southern Yemen and the port of Aden rather than achieving national reunification under Hadi's government, the Yemen theatre illustrates that recalibration and strategic success are compatible outcomes. Aden has remained under UAE-aligned STC control, and southern Yemen has continued to anchor UAE logistics and counter-terrorism cooperation well after the 2019 drawdown.

Consolidation and Counter-Escalation: Ideological Alignment, External Competition, and Strategic Repositioning in Libya

UAE engagement in Libya began in the 2014 Second Libyan Civil War (W. Ali 2025). Following the post-2011 collapse of Libyan state institutions, two competing governmental authorities emerged: the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA, Tripoli-based, backed by Turkey and Qatar) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar (Lacher 2020). The UAE's alignment with the LNA was rooted in elite threat perceptions centred on political Islam: LNA opponents in western Libya included Muslim Brotherhood-aligned factions and militias associated with networks the UAE classified as threats to regional governance stability (Litsas 2023). Notably, this ideological framing was explicit in UAE leadership statements. MBZ's documented reference to the Muslim Brotherhood as 'the greatest danger facing the Arab world' (Worth 2020) anchors the Libya intervention in elite cognitive framing. Paradoxically, however, as in Yemen, the purely ideational account is incomplete: Libya's proximity to European energy markets, its role in Mediterranean migration routes, and its position in sub-Saharan transshipment networks introduced commercial and positional dimensions to Emirati calculus (Melcangi et Mezran 2022).

UAE operational instruments in Libya included (1) direct arms transfers to LNA forces documented in UN Panel of Experts on Libya reports 2015–2021, constituting violations of the UN arms embargo (UNSC 2015, UNSC 2021); (2) air support missions from UAE-operated bases in eastern Libya and in Sudan (Krieg 2024); (3) financial transfers to LNA-aligned political actors; and (4) diplomatic backing for Haftar within Arab League settings (Bakir 2020). By 2019–2020, the Libya engagement had generated mounting overstretch pressures. The LNA's April 2019 offensive towards Tripoli,

which Haftar launched without full UAE endorsement, according to informed reporting, extended the engagement beyond Emirati comfort zones and increased exposure to a protracted conflict without a decisive outcome (Zoubir 2020, Melcangi et Mezran 2022).

The October 2020 Libya ceasefire and the preceding scale of Turkish military intervention constituted the critical external counter-escalation recalibration trigger (Kardaş 2020). The Turkish deployment of Bayraktar TB2 drones, which demonstrably neutralised UAE-supplied LNA armour, and the introduction of layered air defences that constrained UAE air operations effectively closed off the military escalation pathway (Besenyő et Málnácssy 2024). Accordingly, the recalibration choice, acceptance of the October 2020 ceasefire and subsequent diplomatic repositioning, reflects the cost-benefit logic of managed strategic autonomy: preserving influence through indirect means when direct military competition exceeds the optimal engagement threshold (Thomas 2020). Subsequently, the post-2020 UAE-Libya posture has shifted towards diplomatic and economic instruments (Krieg 2024). UAE participation in discussions within the Berlin Process on Libya, alongside selective reduction of overt LNA support, illustrates the mode-switching characteristic of recalibration (Hedges 2021).

An alternative reading would treat the October 2020 ceasefire as a straightforward military defeat rather than a voluntary strategic recalibration; the framework responds that the two are not mutually exclusive, external counter-escalation is one of the trigger mechanisms the model specifies, and what distinguishes recalibration from mere defeat is the UAE's subsequent substitution of diplomatic and commercial instruments to preserve influence rather than a full withdrawal from the theatre. On the UAE's minimal terms, the outcome remains favourable: Haftar's LNA continues to control eastern and much of southern Libya, including its oil-producing territory, preserving the core strategic asset the UAE's intervention was designed to secure.

Commercial Statecraft and Distributed Strain: The UAE in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Corridor

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea corridor represent the infrastructural and maritime extension of the UAE's regional strategy, combining security-commercial rationale in a configuration distinct from the Yemen and Libya theatres (Mansour et Ahmed 2019). The strategic logic is, in this instance, transparent: The Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb passage carries approximately 12–15% of global maritime trade and constitutes a critical energy export

corridor (Liyew 2024). Consequently, control over or influence within key nodes along this corridor provides the UAE with positional leverage that compensates for limited kinetic capabilities. UAE objectives in this theatre include securing reliable maritime access for Abu Dhabi/Dubai commercial shipping, establishing a network of logistics and basing nodes providing independent power projection capacity, countering competing Chinese, Turkish, and Iranian influence networks in the Horn, and shaping governance outcomes in Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland, and Sudan towards pro-UAE alignment (Pollack 2020).

The UAE's Horn of Africa engagement has been primarily infrastructural rather than kinetically military (Terefe et Tesfaye 2024). Key documented interventions include (1) the Assab, Eritrea, base operational from 2015, hosting UAE military aircraft and ground forces used in Yemen operations (Telci et Öztürk Horoz 2018); (2) the Berbera, Somaliland, port development agreement signed 2016, DP World 30-year concession (Stavis et Fitch 2016), including military facility components (Ali et Mumin 2025); (3) the Port Sudan development discussions, 2017 MOU (Walsh, Koettl et Schmitt 2023), subsequently complicated by Sudanese political transitions; and (4) the Bosaso, Puntland port agreement (DP World concession, 2017) (Dua 2023). These investments collectively constitute an integrated logistics and influence network along the Red Sea western littoral. This pattern reveals, at its clearest, the commercial-security interaction: DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports function simultaneously as commercial entities generating economic return and as strategic instruments providing the UAE with naval access, logistics hubs, and political leverage that no purely military basing strategy could deliver at comparable political cost (Mogielnicki 2021).

A case in point, the Horn of Africa engagement illustrates diffuse overstretch, a form of structural strain that emerges not from any single overcommitment but from the proliferation and coordination of multiple lower-intensity engagements across geographically dispersed nodes (Donelli et Gonzalez-Levaggi, *Crossing Roads: The Middle East's Security Engagement in the Horn of Africa* 2021). Observable indicators include (1) increasing management complexity as the UAE simultaneously administers Eritrea security cooperation, Somaliland port development, Puntland counter-piracy engagement, and Djibouti diplomatic competition (The Economist 2018); (2) political disruption of infrastructure agreements (Port Sudan suspended following the 2019 Sudanese revolution; Djibouti DP World dispute demonstrating host-state renegotiation risk) (Young et Khan 2022); (3) competitive pressure from Chinese infrastructure lending requiring UAE counter-investment (I. N.

Telci 2021); and (4) the 2023 Sudan civil war, which directly disrupted UAE plans for continued Port Sudan access (Soliman et Baldo 2025). Concurrent with these dynamics, the 2023–2024 Houthi campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, comprising over 100 documented attacks on vessels, conducted in declared solidarity with Gaza (The World Bank 2025, Sainz 2025), provides a direct stress test for the framework's claims about diffuse overstretch and recalibration mechanisms (Dennard, et al. 2024).

Furthermore, the April 2023 outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) introduced significant complications for UAE regional strategy. The UAE's reported links to the RSF through gold trade networks, private sector investment, and historical security cooperation created reputational exposure and diplomatic complexity (Soliman et Baldo 2025). Sudan had been an element of the UAE's Red Sea logistics architecture, and the conflict disrupted this dimension of the Horn of Africa portfolio (Donelli et Pericoli 2025). In this sense, Sudan 2023 functions as a diffuse overstretch materialisation: the cumulative commitments across the Horn, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan created a situation in which a single regional political disruption generated reputational, logistical, and diplomatic costs across the portfolio simultaneously (Mohammad 2023, Soliman et Baldo 2025). This confirms the framework's prediction that diffuse overstretch in the Horn of Africa theatre is qualitatively different from kinetic overstretch in Yemen: it emerges through institutional proliferation and network interdependency rather than battlefield attrition.

A further distinction is analytically necessary here. The Sudan conflict, the Djibouti DP World dispute, and the 2019 suspension of the Port Sudan MOU are exogenous shocks to the UAE's operating environment rather than instances of the UAE's own deliberate recalibration; they demonstrate the accumulation and materialisation of diffuse overstretch, but they do not by themselves show the UAE choosing to draw down or substitute instruments in response. The clearest available evidence of an endogenous recalibration signal in this theatre is commercial and geographic diversification away from politically compromised nodes, continued investment in Berbera and Bosaso alongside, and increasingly in place of, the stalled Port Sudan project, rather than a Yemen- or Libya-style shift from direct to indirect instruments, since the Horn engagement was predominantly commercial-infrastructural from its inception. This evidence is more provisional than the Yemen and Libya cases and is best read as an early and partial recalibration signal rather than a fully demonstrated one, a limitation consistent with the framework's own prediction that distributed overstretch produces recalibration that is harder

to diagnose and slower to materialise. Notwithstanding this evidentiary caveat, the theatre's minimal objective, securing durable maritime logistics nodes along the western Red Sea littoral, has been substantially achieved: the Assab and Berbera facilities have remained operational throughout the disruptions described above, continuing to generate commercial and strategic returns independent of any single host-state relationship.

Patterns of Strain and Adaptation: A Structured Cross-Case Synthesis

A structured comparison across the three cases against common indicators permits systematic assessment of the cyclical model; the following synthesises key findings. Across all three theatres, UAE's stated objectives at entry were broadly achieved in their minimal form: Aden was secured (Yemen), Haftar's eastern Libya authority was consolidated (Libya), and Red Sea logistics nodes were established (Horn). Furthermore, instruments became progressively more indirect across the cycle in each case, shifting from direct military deployment in Yemen's first phase to partner financing and infrastructural investment in Yemen's second phase and throughout the Horn. Notably, costs accumulated non-linearly: relatively contained in initial phases, then sharply elevated by external counter-escalation or domestic political disruption, Turkish intervention in Libya, the 2022 Houthis strikes on Abu Dhabi, and the 2023 Sudan civil war. Though recalibration triggers differed by case, they exhibited in all instances the common feature of multi-indicator co-occurrence within compressed time windows, a finding with direct implications for the operationalisation of recalibration thresholds.

The temporal sequence is consistent across cases even where its pacing differs: initial commitment (Yemen, 2015; Libya, 2014; the Horn, 2015-2017); accumulation of dispersion and coordination costs (Yemen, 2015-2018; Libya, 2019; the Horn, 2018-2023); a compressed strain signal that renders the accumulated costs newly salient (the Marib losses and mounting international scrutiny in Yemen, Turkish drone intervention in Libya, the Sudan civil war, and successive port disputes in the Horn); and recalibration (Yemen, mid-2019; Libya, late 2020; the Horn, partial and ongoing).

Drawing on this cross-case comparison, a theoretically consequential finding concerns the distinction between concentrated and distributed overstretch. In Yemen's first phase, overstretch pressures were concentrated in a single theatre; high kinetic intensity, high casualty exposure, high reputational cost, and recalibration were triggered by that single-theatre cost accumulation. In the Horn of Africa, by contrast,

overstretch is distributed: no individual commitment is unsustainable on its own, yet the aggregate coordination burden and the interdependency of simultaneously maintained partner relationships generate systemic fragility that resists conventional diagnosis. It should be emphasised that this distributed form of overstretch is analytically distinctive precisely because it may not be legible to decision-makers until the aggregate system approaches structural failure. As a result, states managing distributed overstretch may delay recalibration longer than those facing concentrated overstretch, since no single salient signal of unsustainability is present to trigger a strategic response. In light of this, the finding carries implications beyond the UAE case for how analysts and practitioners should monitor multi-theatre commitments in other small-state settings.

The preceding account does not claim that managed regional overstretch is the only force at work in these episodes, and several alternative explanations deserve explicit consideration. Regime-security concerns and anti-Islamist threat perception, most visible in Libya and, to a lesser extent, in the AQAP-focused rationale for the Yemen deployment, plausibly explain why the UAE entered each theatre. However, they do not explain why sustained engagement gave way to drawdown and instrument substitution at the specific junctures observed. Commercial statecraft considerations, particularly salient in the Horn of Africa, help account for the choice of infrastructural over kinetic instruments but do not explain the Yemen and Libya drawdowns, where commercial motives were secondary to security ones. The Saudi-UAE rivalry over the STC and southern Yemen (Alley 2026) and the permissive or constraining role of the United States in arms transfers and diplomatic cover, are plausible contributing pressures on the timing of the 2019 Yemen drawdown specifically, and are treated here as complementary rather than competing accounts: they help explain particular timing choices within a theatre, whereas the overstretch framework is addressed to the broader pattern, recurring across three heterogeneous theatres with different proximate causes, of expansion followed by multi-indicator strain followed by instrument substitution. Adjudicating more precisely between these complementary explanations and the proposed structural account is a task for future comparative research, most directly through the cross-national extension to Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia noted in the conclusion.

A further dimension of the cross-case synthesis that warrants explicit analytical attention concerns the relationship between recalibration and strategic learning, a dimension that the cyclical model implies but does not fully theorise. The evidence across the three cases suggests that recalibration is not merely reactive but cumulatively adaptive. Each

successive episode of overstretch-induced retrenchment has generated institutional adjustments in how the UAE structures its subsequent engagements. The post-2019 Yemen posture, characterised by proxy substitution and infrastructure leverage rather than direct military deployment, was not simply a response to accumulated costs in that theatre (Zoubir 2020); it served as a template that was consciously replicated in the post-2020 Libya repositioning and in the design of the Horn of Africa engagement from its inception (Young et Khan 2022).

This reading is inferred from the similarity of instruments across successive theatres rather than established directly from internal deliberation records or explicit elite statements referencing prior episodes; it is best treated as evidence consistent with strategic learning rather than as a conclusively demonstrated causal mechanism, and confirming it more directly is a task for future process-tracing research with access to such sources. With this qualification in place, the path-dependency observed in recalibration instruments suggests that the cyclical model, while analytically useful as a synchronic description of each theatre's trajectory, understates the diachronic learning dynamic that links the cycles across cases. Critically, however, this adaptive capacity carries its own systemic risk: the progressive standardisation of recalibration through commercial-infrastructure substitution has produced a strategic repertoire whose effectiveness is contingent on the continued permissiveness of host-state and great-power partners, a contingency that the Djibouti DP World dispute, the Port Sudan disruption, and the renegotiation pressures observable in Somaliland illustrate with growing frequency. In other words, the very instrument through which the UAE manages overstretch, the substitution of sovereign commercial leverage for direct military commitment, is itself subject to a form of second-order vulnerability: the concentration of recalibration capacity in a single modal instrument that competitors, host states, and international courts can target with increasing sophistication. This finding qualifies the optimistic reading of managed regional overstretch as a self-correcting system and introduces a countervailing proposition: that the accumulation of recalibration episodes may progressively narrow the UAE's available response repertoire, generating a meta-level overstretch of adaptive capacity that the existing framework does not directly address.

Conclusion

This article has addressed a theoretically generative puzzle: how does a structurally small, resource-constrained state sustain expansive multi-theatre foreign policy activism under conditions of patron dependency

and systemic instability? The answer, developed through a neoclassical realist framework and grounded in longitudinal analysis of UAE engagements in Yemen, Libya, and the Horn of Africa/Red Sea corridor, is that such activism reflects neither structural permissiveness nor unconstrained elite volition. Rather, it follows a cyclical logic – Activation, Expansion, Diffuse Overstretch, Recalibration – driven by the interaction of systemic uncertainty, elite threat perception, and the structural limits inherent in dispersed multi-theatre commitment. Key turning points, the 2019 Yemen drawdown, the 2020 Libyan ceasefire, the 2021 al-Ula normalisation, the 2022 Houthi escalation, and the 2023–2024 Red Sea and Sudan crises, provide evidence consistent with the model's operation across qualitatively distinct strategic contexts, lending it cross-case robustness that single-theatre accounts of Gulf foreign policy cannot provide, while the case-specific caveats noted above indicate that this evidence is preliminary and stronger for Yemen and Libya than for the Horn of Africa.

Collectively, three theoretical contributions emerge. First, the article extends neoclassical realist theory beyond its European great-power origins to small-state activism in the Gulf, demonstrating that elite perception functions as an empirically traceable mediating variable rather than a residual category. Second, it reconceptualises strategic autonomy, traditionally an EU-centric industrial sovereignty concept, as a relational, operationally purposive small-state strategy, distinguished from hedging by its active intent to reshape patron-client hierarchies and from omnibalancing by its outward-projecting ambition rather than domestic regime-survival logic. Third, it extends overstretch theory beyond hegemonic overextension to introduce an analytically productive distinction between concentrated single-theatre overstretch, which generates rapid, visible recalibration pressure, and diffuse multi-domain overstretch, which accumulates more gradually, resists diagnostic salience, and produces delayed, incremental adjustment. It should be emphasised that these are not taxonomic refinements; they generate distinct observable implications for the timing, character, and reversibility of strategic recalibration.

The framework's scope conditions are explicit: managed strategic autonomy obtains where liquid financial reserves, independent logistics infrastructure, a permissive patron environment shaped by great-power competition, and centralised decision-making structures converge. Their absence, as in Oman's deliberate restraint or Bahrain's structural dependency, should suppress the predicted cyclical pattern, offering a scope condition against which the framework's applicability can be assessed in future comparative work. Centralised decision-making is itself

the least stable of these conditions: as noted above, the model's institutional responsiveness is bound to a particular configuration of elite leadership perception under MBZ, and a future transition or diffusion of that authority constitutes a further scope condition on the framework's continued applicability to the UAE case itself, independent of its portability to other states. In this respect, comparative application to Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia represents the immediate research frontier.

The UAE case ultimately demonstrates that small-state activism is neither structurally determined nor strategically unlimited. Drawing on the preceding analysis, managed strategic autonomy captures this dynamic precisely because it treats autonomy as an achievement, overstretch as a structural process, and recalibration as a rational adaptation to accumulated systemic strain, thereby offering IR scholarship a portable, empirically tractable framework for analysing agency-constraint tensions across the Global South.

Bibliography

- Abozaid, Ahmed. 2020. "The Rise of Small States in the Arabian Gulf: The Case of UAE and Qatar: A Historical Sociology Perspective". *Journal of Rising Powers and Global Governance* 1 (2): 7–41.
- Ali, Hager. 2024. "The War in Sudan: How Weapons and Networks Shattered a Power Struggle". *GIGA Focus Middle East* 2. Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies. DOI: 10.57671/gfme-24022.
- Ali, Nasir M., and Sihaam A. Mumin. 2025. "Geopolitics–Ports Politics Nexus: The Case of Port of Berbera, Somaliland". In: *The Horn of Africa since 2018: Continuities, Transformations, and Prospects*, Jan Záhorkík and Aleksi Ylönen (eds.). London: Routledge. 242–258.
- Ali, Walid. 2025. "How Security Shaped Libya's Transition". *Democratization* 32 (4): 993–1015. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2024.2433090.
- Alley, April Longley. 2026. "A Rift Deferred? Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Limits of Gulf Unity". *The Middle East Journal* 79 (2): 157–163.
- Almezaini, Khalid S., and Jean-Marc Rickli. 2017. "The Foreign Policies of the Small Gulf States: An Exception in Small States' Behaviours?" In: *The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies before and after the Arab Spring*, Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli (eds.). London: Routledge. 182–218.

- Antwi-Boateng, Osman, and Amira Ali Alhashmi. 2022. "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates as a Global Soft Power: Current Strategies and Future Challenges". *Economic and Political Studies* 10 (2): 208–227. DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2021.1951481.
- Antwi-Boateng, Osman, and Mohammed Binhuwaidin. 2017. "Beyond Rentierism: The United Arab Emirates' Exceptionalism in a Turbulent Region". *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 10 (4): 522–536.
- Badi, Emadeddin. 2020. "Russia Isn't the Only One Getting Its Hands Dirty in Libya". *Foreign Policy*, 21 April. 11/05/2026.
- Bakir, Ali. 2020. "The UAE's Disruptive Policy in Libya". *Insight Turkey* 22 (4): 157–178.
- Bales, Marius. 2023. "Yemen: Civil War as a Driver of Regional Arms Dynamic". In: *The Arms Race in the Middle East: Contemporary Security Dynamics*, Mohammad Eslami and Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira (eds.). Cham: Springer. 209–224.
- Bales, Marius, and Max Mutschler. 2026. "A New Autocratic Way of War? Autocracy, Precision Strike Warfare and Civilian Victimization". *Defence Studies* 26 (1): 103–126. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2025.2522052.
- Besenyő, János, and András Málnácssy. 2024. "Geopolitical Dimension of Libyan Drone Warfare: The Use of Turkish Drones on the North African Battlefields". *Obrana a strategie* 24 (1): 3–17. DOI: 10.3849/1802-7199.24.2024.01.003-017.
- Biscop, Sven. 2018. "European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance". *Survival* 60 (3): 161–180. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1470771.
- Brehony, Noel. 2020. "The UAE's Role in the Yemen Crisis". In: *Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis*, Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony (eds.). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 131–148.
- Cannon, Brendon J., and Ash Rossiter. 2017. "Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa". *Rising Powers Quarterly* 2 (4): 7–29.
- Chulov, Martin. 2022. "Suspected Drone Attack in Abu Dhabi Kills Three and Raises Tensions". *The Guardian*, 17 January. 12/05/2026.
- Cooper, Andrew F., and Timothy M. Shaw. 2009. *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cumming-Bruce, Nick. 2018. "War Crimes Report on Yemen Accuses Saudi Arabia and U.A.E." *The New York Times*, 28 August. 12/05/2026.

- Darwich, May. 2018. "The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status". *Insight Turkey* 20 (2): 125–142. DOI: 10.25253/99.2018202.08.
- Darwich, May. 2020. "Escalation in Failed Military Interventions: Saudi and Emirati Quagmires in Yemen". *Global Policy* 11 (1): 103–112. DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12781.
- David, Steven R. 1991. "Explaining Third World Alignment". *World Politics* 43 (2): 233–256. DOI: 10.2307/2010472.
- Dennard, Haydee, Bela Koshy, Ana Kristian Gil, Coates Ulrichsen, and Jim Krane. 2024. *Blowback From Gaza: Geopolitics of the Houthis Red Sea Campaign*. Issue Brief. Houston, Texas: Baker Institute for Public Policy.
- Ding, Long. 2024. "The Evolving Roles of the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa". *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 18 (1): 1–14. DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2024.2340332.
- Dogan-Akkas, Betul. 2021. "The UAE's Foreign Policymaking in Yemen: From Bandwagoning to Buck-Passing". *Third World Quarterly* 42 (4): 717–735. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2020.1842730.
- Donelli, Federico, and Altea Pericoli. 2025. "Foreign Aid, Identities and Interests: Qatar and the UAE in Sudan". *The International Spectator* 60 (3): 57–79. DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2024.2416892.
- Donelli, Federico, and Ariel Gonzalez-Levaggi. 2021. "Crossing Roads: The Middle East's Security Engagement in the Horn of Africa". *Global Change, Peace & Security* 33 (1): 45–60. DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2021.1877650.
- Dua, Jatin. 2023. "Ambergris, Livestock, and Oil: Port-Making as Chokepoint Making in the Red Sea". *Ethnos* 88 (2): 226–245. DOI: 10.1080/00141844.2019.1696861.
- Elisheva, Rosman-Stollman. 2004. "Balancing Acts: The Gulf States and Israel". *Middle Eastern Studies* 40 (4): 185–208.
- Esfandiary, Dina. 2023. *New Order in the Gulf: The Rise of the UAE*. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Fiott, Daniel. 2021. *European Defence and the Demands of Strategic Autonomy*. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Franke, Ulrike, and Tara Varma. 2019. *Independence Play: Europe's Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy*. ECFR 293. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Gause, F. Gregory. 2011. *Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East*. Special Report. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

- Goh, Evelyn. 2008. "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies". *International Security* 32 (3): 113–157. DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.113.
- Goh, Evelyn. 2019. "Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia". *Security Studies* 28 (3): 614–644. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1604989.
- Guéraiche, William. 2023. "The UAE's Innovative Diplomacy: How the Abraham Accords Changed (or Did Not Change) Emirati Foreign Policy". In: *The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Reform and Innovation*, Paul Webster Hare, Juan Luis Manfredi Sánchez and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 545–558.
- Handel, Michael I. 1981. *Weak States in the International System*. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited.
- Hedges, Matthew. 2021. "Small State Security Engagement in Post-Arab Spring MENA: The Case of the United Arab Emirates". *Asian Affairs* 52 (2): 412–425. DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2021.1916248.
- Henrikson, Alan K. 2005. "Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena". In: *The New Public Diplomacy*, Jan Melissen (ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 67–87.
- Hey, Jeanne A. K. 2003. *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hindmarsh, Mike. 2023. "Is Military Strategy Useful or Just an Improbable Quest for Certainty?" *National Defence* 10: 8–9.
- Hokayem, Emile, and David B. Roberts. 2016. "The War in Yemen". *Survival* 58 (6): 157–186. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1257202.
- Human Rights Watch. 2022. "Yemen: Latest Round of Saudi-UAE-Led Attacks Targets Civilians". 18 April. 13/05/2026.
- Juneau, Thomas. 2020. "The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration". *Survival* 62 (4): 183–208. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2020.1792135.
- Juneau, Thomas. 2024. "How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47 (3): 278–300. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1954353.
- Kabalan, Marwan. 2021. "The Al-Ula GCC Summit: An End to Gulf Rivalry or Just Another Truce?" *Insight Turkey* 23 (1): 51–59.
- Kamrava, Mehran. 2020. *Small State, Big Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

- Kardaş, Şaban. 2020. "Turkey's Libya Policy: Militarization of Regional Policies and Escalation Dominance". *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2): 325–336. DOI: 10.1007/s42533-020-00060-w.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1988. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House.
- Kirmanj, Sherko, and Ranj Tofik. 2023. "The UAE's Foreign Policy Drivers". *Middle East Policy* 30 (4): 56–71.
- Krieg, Andreas. 2022. "The UAE's 'Dogs of War': Boosting a Small State's Regional Power Projection". *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33 (1–2): 152–172. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2021.1951432.
- Krieg, Andreas. 2024. "Security Assistance to Surrogates – How the UAE Secures Its Regional Objectives". *Mediterranean Politics* 29 (4): 454–477. DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2023.2183659.
- Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2016. "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior Towards China". *Journal of Contemporary China* 25 (100): 500–514. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714.
- Lacher, Wolfram. 2020. *Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Layne, Christopher. 2012. "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana". *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1): 203–213.
- Litsas, Spyridon N. 2023. *Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory: The Case of the United Arab Emirates*. Cham: Springer Nature.
- Liyew, Estifanos Balew. 2024. "Geopolitics of the Red Sea: Implications of Foreign Military Bases Expansion to the Horn of Africa Security". *African Security Review* 33 (3): 294–306. DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2024.2340015.
- Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lootah, Maryam Sultan. 2021. "The UAE as a Successful Model for the Behavior of Small Countries at the External Level". *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues* 24 (Special Issue 1): 1–21.
- Mansour, Shady Ahmed, and Yara Yehia Ahmed. 2019. "Saudi Arabia and UAE in the Horn of Africa: Containing Security Threats from Regional Rivals". *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 12 (3): 99–118.

- Marieke Brandt. 2017. *Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190673598.001.0001.
- Marshall, Alex. 2016. "From Civil War to Proxy War: Past History and Current Dilemmas". *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27 (2): 183–195. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1129172.
- Mason, Robert. 2018. "Breaking the Mold of Small State Classification? The Broadening Influence of United Arab Emirates Foreign Policy through Effective Military and Bandwagoning Strategies". *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 24 (1): 95–112. DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2018.1427123.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Melcangi, Alessia, and Karim Mezran. 2022. "Truly a Proxy War? Militias, Institutions and External Actors in Libya between Limited Statehood and Rentier State". *The International Spectator* 57 (4): 121–138. DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2022.2061225.
- Miller, Rory, and Harry Verhoeven. 2020. "Overcoming Smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Strategic Realignment in the Gulf". *International Politics* 57 (1): 1–20. DOI: 10.1057/s41311-019-00180-0.
- Mogielnicki, Robert. 2021. *A Political Economy of Free Zones in Gulf Arab States*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mohammad, Talal. 2023. "How Sudan Became a Saudi-UAE Proxy War". *Foreign Policy*, 12 July. 12/05/2026.
- Mumford, Andrew. 2013. *Proxy Warfare*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mutschler, Max, Marius Bales, and Esther Meininghaus. 2024. "The Impact of Precision Strike Technology on the Warfare of Non-State Armed Groups: Case Studies on Daesh and the Houthis". *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 35 (7): 1123–1150. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2024.2319216.
- Ispravka: Telci, İsmail Numan, and Tuba Öztürk Horoz. 2018. "Military Bases in the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates". *Insight Turkey* 20 (2): 143–166. DOI: 10.25253/99.2018202.11.
- Paul, Thazha Varkey. 2005. "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy". *International Security* 30 (1): 46–71. DOI: 10.1162/0162288054894652.
- Pedde, Nicola. 2017. "The Libyan Conflict and Its Controversial Roots". *European View* 16 (1): 93–102. DOI: 10.1007/s12290-017-0447-5.
- Pollack, Kenneth M. 2020. *Sizing Up Little Sparta: Understanding UAE Military Effectiveness*. Report. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

- Posen, Barry R. 2014. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Rathbun, Brian. 2008. "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism". *Security Studies* 17 (2): 294–321. DOI: 10.1080/09636410802098917.
- Rauta, Vladimir. 2021. "Proxy War – A Reconceptualisation". *Civil Wars* 23 (1): 1–24. DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2021.1860578.
- Reuters. 2022. "Yemen's Houthis Say They Fired Ballistic Missiles Towards Air Base in Abu Dhabi". 24 January. 12/05/2026.
- Roberts, David B. 2020. "Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World". *Security Studies* 29 (2): 301–334. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1722852.
- Roberts, David B. 2025. "The Gulf's Evolving Security Mosaic: Balancing the Manifest Retrenchment and Latent Influence of the United States". *International Affairs* 101 (6): 2193–2214. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiaf183.
- Romaniuk, Scott, and Christian Kaunert. 2024. "Red Sea Shipping Crisis: What's at Stake?" *Geopolitical Monitor*, 8 January. 12/05/2026.
- Rose, Gideon. 1998. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy". *World Politics* 51 (1): 144–172.
- Sainz, Victoria. 2025. *The Red Sea Shipping Crisis (2024–2025): Houthi Attacks and Global Trade Disruption*. Report. London: Atlas Institute for International Affairs.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2010. "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (3): 493–515. DOI: 10.1177/0022002709357890.
- Salisbury, Peter. 2020. *Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy*. Research Paper. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.
- Schweller, Randall L. 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In". *International Security* 19 (1): 72–107. DOI: 10.2307/2539149.
- Schweller, Randall. 2018. "Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations". *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11 (1): 23–48. DOI: 10.1093/cjip/poy003.
- Slijper, Frank. 2017. *Under the Radar: The United Arab Emirates, Arms Transfers and Regional Conflict*. Report. Utrecht: PAX.

- Soliman, Ahmed, and Suliman Baldo. 2025. *Gold and the War in Sudan*. Research Paper. London: Chatham House. DOI: 10.55317/9781784136406.
- Stavis, Matina, and Asa Fitch. 2016. "Dubai's DP World Agrees to Manage Port in Somaliland for 30 Years". *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 May. 12/05/2026.
- Stoddard, Ed, and Sorina Tolteca. 2021. "Practising Remote Warfare: Analysing the Remote Character of the Saudi/UAE Intervention in Yemen". *Defence Studies* 21 (4): 447–467. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2021.1994395.
- Tamm, Henning. 2016. "Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion". *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (4): 599–610.
- Telci, Ismail Numan. 2022. "The Horn of Africa as Venue for Regional Competition: Motivations, Instruments and Relationship Patterns". *Insight on Africa* 14 (1): 73–87. DOI: 10.1177/09750878211034153.
- Terefe, Fekade, and Mulugeta Tesfaye. 2024. "Les implications sécuritaires de la militarisation de la Corne de l'Afrique". *Alternatives Sud* 31 (1): 91–107. DOI: 10.3917/syll.cetri.2024.04.0091.
- Tessman, Brock, and Wojtek Wolfe. 2011. "Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy". *International Studies Review* 13 (2): 214–240. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2011.01022.x.
- The Economist. 2018. "The UAE Is Scrambling to Control Ports in Africa". *The Economist*, 19 July. 11/05/2026.
- The Guardian. 2015. "UAE Forces Bomb Yemen Rebels after Coalition Troop Deaths". *The Guardian*, 5 September. 12/05/2026.
- The World Bank. 2025. *The Deepening Red Sea Shipping Crisis: Impacts and Outlook*. MENA FCV Economic Series Brief. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group.
- Thomas, Aude. 2020. *The Turkey-UAE Race to the Bottom in Libya: A Prelude to Escalation*. Recherches & Documents. Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique.
- Thorhallsson, Baldur, and Anders Wivel. 2006. "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (4): 651–668. DOI: 10.1080/09557570601003502.
- Toomey, Bridget. 2025. "UAE 'Likely' Building Airstrip on Strategic Island in Red Sea". *Long War Journal*, 27 October. 12/05/2026.

- UNSC. 2015. *Letter from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)*. 23 February. 12/05/2026.
- UNSC. 2017. *Letter from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council*. 27 January. 12/05/2026.
- UNSC. 2021. *Letter from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)*. 8 March. 12/05/2026.
- Walsh, Declan, Christoph Koettl, and Eric Schmitt. 2023. "Talking Peace in Sudan, the U.A.E. Secretly Fuels the Fight". *The New York Times*, 29 September. 12/05/2026.
- Walt, Stephen M. 2013. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
- Williams, Kristen P., Steven E. Lobell, and Neal G. Jesse. 2025. *Small States in a Shifting International Order*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Worth, Robert F. 2020. "Mohammed bin Zayed's Dark Vision of the Middle East's Future". *The New York Times*, 9 January. 19/05/2026.
- Young, Karen E., and Taimur Khan. 2022. "Extended States: The Politics and Purpose of United Arab Emirates Economic Statecraft in the Horn of Africa". In: *Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, Influences and Instability*, Simon Mabon and Robert Mason (eds.). Manchester: Manchester University Press. 99–126.
- Zandee, Dick, Bob Deen, Kimberley Kruijver, and Adája Stoetman. 2020. *European Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence: Now the Going Gets Tough, It's Time to Get Going*. Clingendael Report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. 23.
- Zoubir, Yahia H. 2020. "The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers". *Insight Turkey* 22 (4): 11–28.

UDC 327.56(100):341.123
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 251–281
Original scientific paper
Received: 08/02/2026
Revised: 13/07/2026
Accepted: 25/07/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.3
CC BY-SA 4.0

Uroš POPADIĆ¹

Liberal Peacebuilding and Its Limitations in the Case of the Failed UN Mission in Mali

SUMMARY

The failure of the United Nations mission in Mali clearly reflects the crisis in contemporary peacebuilding. Rather than creating security and stability, the mission deteriorated within an increasingly hostile political and security environment and could not prevent the breakdown of democratic governance. The mission was based on liberal peacebuilding principles, but the approach was combined with a stabilisation mandate. The article uses this mission as a case study to examine the limits of such peacebuilding and the consequences of the stabilisation turn and increased mandate hybridisation. Through process tracing of Security Council records and mission reports, the analysis explores how the mission was designed around an internally contradictory mandate that combined liberal state-building objectives with stabilisation priorities and examines the consequences of hybrid design. The results show that this hybrid design diluted political leverage, enabled illiberal behaviour, and prevented the mission from addressing the structural root causes of conflict. This indicates that liberal peacebuilding is obstructed when security-first stabilisation is prioritised and that hybrid mandates produce paralysis rather than complementarity. An argument is thus made for the need to reform liberal peacebuilding by integrating elements of the local

¹ PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade; President of the Research forum, The European Movement, Email: popadics.uros@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0002-2660-848X.

turn with greater context-sensitivity and offers a theoretical contribution by clarifying the conditions under which it can remain viable.

Keywords: United Nations, peacebuilding, stabilisation, liberal institutionalism, conflict prevention, peacekeeping.

Ograničenja liberalne izgradnje mira: slučaj neuspjele misije Ujedinjenih nacija u Maliju

SAŽETAK

Neuspjeh misije Ujedinjenih nacija u Maliju predstavlja izrazitu manifestaciju krize savremene izgradnje mira. Umjesto da doprinese uspostavljanju bezbjednosti i političke stabilnosti, misija je djelovala u sve nepovoljnijem političkom i bezbjednosnom okruženju, pri čemu nije uspjela da spriječi urušavanje demokratskog poretka. Iako je bila zasnovana na načelima liberalne izgradnje mira, njen mandat istovremeno je uključivao i snažnu stabilizacionu komponentu. Polazeći od ovog slučaja, članak ispituje ograničenja savremenih pristupa izgradnji mira, kao i posljedice stabilizacionog zaokreta i sve izraženije hibridizacije mandata mirovnih misija. Primjenom metode praćenja procesa, zasnovane na analizi dokumenata Savjeta bezbjednosti Ujedinjenih nacija i izvještaja misije, istražuje se način na koji je mandat koncipiran kao unutrašnje protivrečna kombinacija ciljeva liberalne izgradnje države i bezbjednosnih prioriteta stabilizacije, kao i posljedice koje je takva institucionalna postavka proizvela. Rezultati pokazuju da je hibridni karakter mandata oslabio politički uticaj misije, stvorio prostor za neliberalno djelovanje domaćih aktera i ograničio njenu sposobnost da se suoči sa strukturnim uzrocima sukoba. Nalazi ukazuju na to da su mogućnosti liberalne izgradnje mira ozbiljno ograničene kada se prednost daje stabilizaciji zasnovanoj na primatu bezbjednosti. Istovremeno, hibridni mandati ne dovode nužno do međusobnog dopunjavanja različitih funkcija, već mogu proizvesti institucionalnu paralizu i stratešku nedosljednost. Na toj osnovi, članak zagovara reformu liberalne izgradnje mira kroz snažnije uključivanje elemenata „lokalnog zaokreta“ i veću osjetljivost prema specifičnostima političkog i društvenog konteksta. Teorijski doprinos rada ogleda se u preciziranju uslova pod kojima liberalna izgradnja mira može zadržati relevantnost i održivost.

Ključne reči: Ujedinjene nacije, izgradnja mira, stabilizacija, liberalni institucionalizam, prevencija konflikta, održavanje mira.

Introduction

The failure of the United Nations (UN) mission in Mali is a clear example of the current crisis in international peacebuilding. It raised questions about the planning and conduct of the mission itself, as well as about the wider direction of contemporary peacebuilding. After more than a decade during which the UN mission, supported by extensive international engagement, actively attempted to end the crisis in the country, Mali did not experience the stability, security, political reform, or democratic consolidation the mission was expected to provide. Rather, the political system collapsed, security deteriorated across large parts of the country, and the relationship between the mission and the local government gradually broke down. This outcome is highly significant because the mission was conceived at a moment when liberal peacebuilding had come under criticism and when international peacebuilding had taken a turn towards prioritising stabilisation. Even where security concerns and stabilisation are prioritised, expectations regarding liberal democracy continue to shape the formal objectives of UN missions. This fact represents an interesting basis for analysing the model's limits and hybrid attempts to combine it with stabilisation. As liberal theory is the foundation of this model of peacebuilding, the article relies on it as a central framework for understanding the process. As such, the article examines the Mali mission's mandate, character, and process through the lens of its own theoretical presuppositions.

The analysis explores the Mali mission from its beginning to its conclusion, taking into account the preconditions for the successful achievement of the mission's objectives. It does so by examining how the mission attempted to fulfil its mandate in practice. The main question of the article is how the hybrid peacebuilding-stabilisation mandate undermined the potential for a positive outcome of the mission. As the mission in Mali had a hybrid mandate that brought together the liberal peacebuilding model and a stabilisation approach, the main argument is that these two approaches are mutually exclusive, resulting in an incoherent and inconsistent strategy that would undermine the mission's goals and the mechanisms for achieving them. Through this examination, the case study serves not only as an evaluation of a failed mission but also as an examination of the transformation of peacebuilding itself. The failure of the Mali mission should not be seen only as a failure of liberal peacebuilding as such, but rather as a failure to apply it consistently and coherently and to adapt it properly to the local context. This analysis is expected to provide insight into the development of peacebuilding and the limitations of both

established models and their derivative hybrids. The article begins with a section contextualising the crisis in Mali and the mission, followed by a theoretical review of liberal peacebuilding and its resulting theoretical framework. This is followed by an extensive empirical analysis of the mission, leading to a theoretical discussion and the conclusion.

An Overview of the Crisis in Mali

The structural and conflict dynamics in Mali before and during the mission need to be outlined to contextualise the contradictions that later undermined the mission. The crisis in Mali occurred despite earlier expectations that it would democratise, and its destabilisation was rather abrupt. In fact, Mali's preconditions were not specifically suitable for liberal democracy. The northern desert region was undeveloped and never well integrated into the state. Its population had staged several rebellions in the past, which ended in failed peace agreements, leading to its increased marginalisation by the government (Chauzal and Van Damme 2012). As the region was prone to crisis, international support was generally directed towards security rather than socio-economic development (Okon 2015). Mali's weak social cohesion and lack of national unity resulted from this lack of integration of minorities and the lack of representation of the entirety of society in government. This internal instability worsened as several regional crises and unstable neighbouring states contributed to it (Ritter 2014). Effective government control over the north was extremely limited until the mission started. The north of Mali was the most unstable region for a long time (Okyere 2015). In such a volatile internal and external context, various internal conflicts emerged. This led to a lack of democratic consolidation, and state institutions became weak and fragile (Vermeig 2015), which undermined the preconditions necessary for the mission's goals to be achieved.

The acute phase of instability began when an ethno-religious insurgency led by the Tuareg people broke out in the north in early 2012. They proclaimed an independent "Azawad", causing the central government to collapse (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015). That led the authorities to ask France for help, which in turn led to an international intervention led by the UN. The UN established a mission in the country but also enabled the African Union (AU) to participate in conflict resolution, while France provided military assistance (Ramsbotham et al. 2024). This was supposed to be a multidimensional stabilisation mission that would primarily support state authority and maintain security and stability, while at the same time fostering dialogue, reconciliation, and the

rule of law (Ritter 2014). The mission was necessary as regional organisations, including the AU and ECOWAS, failed to stabilise the situation on their own (Francis 2013), especially in the north, which was suffering from a debilitating crisis and experiencing severe intercommunal violence (Guichaoua 2016). The extent of the crisis justified a broad and interventionist mandate for the UN. UN peacebuilding during this period was transitioning towards stabilisation as the main focus, making support for reconciliation, human rights, and political reforms secondary to security concerns (Daniel 2017), and thereby becoming more pragmatic than transformative.

The UN was welcomed due to its ability to mandate and undertake complex peace operations, despite internal debate within the UN about the character of its mission, local concerns over interventionism, and the post-colonial complexities of the legacy of intervention (Avezov and Smit 2014). France framed the intervention and mission as promoting freedom and democracy, even with the obvious turn towards stabilisation (Charbonneau and Sears 2014). Liberal values served as a principled justification for the mission, which increased support. That is important as missions with broad multilateral support generally have greater success than unilateral ones, and only the UN was able to stabilise the region (Oluwadare 2014). The situation became critical after regional organisations failed to resolve it due to their limited capacity and authority to undertake large-scale action (Okon 2021). The initial optimism was moderated by a lack of trust, as well as by the lack of credibility and legitimacy of the government, giving the rebels a justification to continue their militancy and refuse dialogue, even with the new UN presence (Boas and Torheim 2013). This discontent with the fragile government and its lack of openness to compromise enabled the inter-ethnic conflict to continue and militias to proliferate (Hickendorff 2019).

The government was unstable and fragile, with unconsolidated and weak institutions underpinning a shallow democracy. It expressed low commitment and accountability to the population, as well as an apparent disinterest in compromising with the rebels (Wing 2013). The mission's focus on ensuring security harmed the UN's credibility as a liberal peacebuilder. Its focus seems to have been more on state-building so that a strong government could physically restrain insurgents than on addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency (Bere 2017). The mission's mandate to ensure free and inclusive elections was sidelined, promoting a culture of irresponsibility masquerading as stability, as the government was not making good on its promises (Cold-Ravnkilde 2013). Low state capacity and legitimacy, dissatisfaction with governance, and a

lack of dialogue eventually led to an increase in inter-ethnic and religious conflict that the mission had to manage (Tobie 2017). Progress towards stabilisation and state-building was minimal in such circumstances, and the state remained fragile and undemocratic (Strydom 2019), making the mission even more necessary. As stabilisation was directed towards strengthening the failing government through state-building, rather than addressing the needs of the wider population, it failed to resolve the underlying sources of instability. A sustainable peace requires broader political and social transformation. Charbonneau argues that peace is harder to achieve without reconciliation and dialogue and that the security situation will deteriorate accordingly (Charbonneau 2022).

According to Karlsrud, strong support for the central government, despite its mistakes, combined with tacit support for its pressure on the rebel forces, deviated from previous UN peacekeeping practices, which were meant to use minimal force and remain impartial, rather than intervene on one side (Karlsrud 2019). Even with significant international support, Mali's security situation deteriorated, along with its effective governance and rebel militancy, while the financial aid it received was misused and the democratic process stagnated (Tronc, Grace and Nahikian 2019). As the UN used force directly for the sake of stabilisation rather than focusing on democratisation and liberalisation, its reputation suffered. Building democracy in post-conflict societies depends on the reconstruction of trust and reconciliation, which was sidelined in this case for the sake of short-term stability (Bratton 2016). The unfocused approach of the mission led to disunity within the UN, compounded by the diverging national interests of regional and contributing countries, further harming the coherence of the mission (Albrecht and Cold-Ravnkilde 2020). The peacebuilding process itself seems to have been more accountable to external than local aspirations, and the local government was oriented more towards satisfying the mission rather than being accountable to its population. Raineri argues that the government focused on retaining international support through shallow reforms, resulting in an undemocratic government without wide legitimacy (Raineri 2016).

In fact, the distinction between war and peace in Mali was blurred, and state violence was justified by the struggle for peace and counter-terrorism. The population was divided into those with whom peace was possible and those who had to be defeated by force (Charbonneau, Ricard and Moe 2022). This corresponds to the issue of stabilisation missions mixing liberal and illiberal goals and strategies and focusing on strengthening state authority, even while the government was actively repressing multiple social groups (Duarte and Souza 2014). While the presence of peacekeepers

generally makes locals more optimistic about other groups reciprocating cooperation, this requires peacekeepers to be in direct contact with locals, which Nomikos argues was lacking there (Nomikos 2021). Gazeley argues that the peacekeepers acted more like peace enforcers, who used force to maintain stability rather than pressing for political reforms and democratic legitimacy, thus normalising force and setting the conditions for the eventual capture of the state (Gazeley 2022). Thereby, stabilisation was undermined as one of the few positive effects of the mission. These dynamics show the contradictions inherent in mixing stabilisation and liberal peacebuilding and in the expectation that one would follow the other. The following section examines the theoretical approaches behind these practices in order to delineate and operationalise them.

The Limitations of Contemporary Peacebuilding Approaches

Liberal peacebuilding, previously the norm in peacebuilding practice, has been under continual criticism from multiple perspectives due to many failures, leading to repeated attempts to adjust or revise it. The approach is based on the idea that peace can best be built through the imposition of liberal-democratic norms based on Western models in conflict-affected states (Lemay-Hebert 2013), aiming to address the sources of hostility after a peace has been negotiated or imposed by building local capacities for conflict resolution and stronger state institutions (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has been blurred as missions increasingly receive wide mandates to use force and impose solutions rather than reduce tensions and mediate (Ramsbotham 2005). A notable supporter of the model, Paris, criticises anti-liberal views and argues against the romanticisation of local practices, noting that they often reinforce existing power structures and impose social conformity. He claims that there is no real alternative to liberal values in peacebuilding despite claims of West-centrism (Paris 2010). Likewise, he argues that the international liberal normative environment shapes the design of peacekeeping operations so that they conform to the established norms even when alternative strategies might be required (Paris 2003), which calls for greater contextual sensitivity and flexibility.

A leading supporter of the approach that prioritises the local perspective is MacGinty, who argues against the universal applicability of liberalism and its values (MacGinty 2010). He criticises liberalism for its interventionism, which undermines the sovereignty of its recipients, and for imposing Western models of statehood through state-building (MacGinty 2011). Richmond argues that the liberal approach neglects local

agency and the particular needs of local societies, imposing foreign values on them in a hegemonic way (Richmond 2006). He argues that any attempt to ignore local context and impose just one model in different contexts would fail, especially in the Global South (Richmond 2013). The view promotes peacebuilding through local efforts and direct reconciliation, which would give local actors ownership over the process, while liberal norms could play a secondary and supportive role (MacGinty and Richmond 2013). While liberal approaches have been criticised for their Western-centric bias, they include concepts such as democracy, human rights, free markets, and the rule of law, which are widely accepted as useful for war-torn and struggling countries. However, the main criticism is not aimed at the norms *per se* but rather at the top-down interventionist method employed by liberal peacebuilding, so that the norms could be salvaged and a more heterogeneous conception of peace based on local characteristics, with international influence, could be attempted (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren, and Boedeltje 2012).

Apart from the critics of the local position, Selby takes a revisionist stance, arguing that peace interventions during this period were not primarily driven by liberal norms but by power politics and strategic interests, leading to peacebuilding practices that instrumentalised liberalism to legitimise outcomes rather than democratise societies (Selby 2013). Paffenholz offers another perspective, arguing that peacebuilding is limited by the constraints imposed by the binary understanding of the local and the international as the only relevant locations of power and resistance, generating an unrealistic view of local contexts and overstating local resistance (Paffenholz 2015). These two views therefore consider that the liberal character of peacebuilding is either misleading or constraining, offering possible reasons for the mission's failure, given that it both included a liberal mandate and had a problematic relationship with local actors. Hameiri argues that, despite these criticisms, the liberal paradigm can outlast its apparent decline and that statebuilding as a tool and process is not in crisis or being superseded. While stabilisation and a focus on security are replacing the model, support based on liberal norms is still widely accepted (Hameiri 2014).

De Coning offers another position, arguing that international peacebuilding is experiencing a pragmatic turn, in which peace is being interpreted on a context-specific basis. He suggests an approach to adaptive peacebuilding, focused on reactive support rather than direct state-building through the UN (De Coning 2018). This would integrate the local approach but still give a large role to liberal institutions, while pragmatism would not be value-free like stabilisation. Finkenbusch

considers that this would undermine peacebuilders' intentions to create socially transformative projects in the Global South, as in liberal peacebuilding (Finkenbusch 2016), and this corresponds to the major critiques of the approach. Karlsrud argues that the stabilisation turn is the paradigm that truly replaced the liberal one, noting that such a turn is counterproductive. That leads to more oppressive governments and disillusionment in the long run, which undermines the UN as a liberal institution, harming its missions by extension (Karlsrud 2019). Since the international environment became generally liberal, civil wars were more likely to end in negotiated settlements. However, as the international environment changed, stabilisation became more favoured over democratisation, weakening the effect of liberal norms (Howard and Stark 2018) and necessitating a more hybrid approach if the positive effects were to be carried over.

As for state-building, while a strong state can act as a barrier to inter-group violence, it can also be instrumentalised as a tool of violence itself, potentially leading to separatism and opposition to centralisation. For stable peace in a multiethnic state, centralisation is discouraged, while durable peace has been found to be possible even without resolving all outstanding issues, provided the political process is considered legitimate, and third-party mediation and support are available (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001). Downs and Monten find that regime change imposed from abroad by democracies does not generally lead to significant democratic gains, as democratisation depends on domestic conditions being favourable rather than on external conditionality (Downs and Monten 2013). This creates a persistent tension between peacebuilders, who have a vested interest in promoting democracy, and local elites, who seek to preserve privileges that democratisation may disrupt, leading to pragmatism and opportunism (Barnett, Fang, and Zurcher 2014). Liberal peacebuilding might not reliably produce democratisation, but it can improve prospects for peace, provided the strategy is designed to fit the conflict and local context (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), which would connect it directly to the local turn.

Such approaches have also been proposed. Liden identifies attempts to revise the liberal model through a more open approach that integrates the local turn with greater respect for local norms and institutions, proposing a form of social peacebuilding that combines cosmopolitan human rights advocacy with respect for local cultural diversity and political autonomy (Liden 2009). This aligns with Paris's view that peacekeeping during this period was not only a method of conflict management but also a product of a global culture marked by liberalism.

He also notes that the liberal model cannot function where societies are overly heterogeneous and unaccustomed to democracy (Paris 2003). Finkenbusch similarly argues that greater emphasis must be placed on the socio-cultural preconditions of democratic institutions and on assessing the feasibility of transforming conflict-generating local institutions (Finkenbusch 2016). De Coning likewise contends that peacebuilding has struggled because it relied on linear, externally driven models that underestimate the complexity of conflict-affected societies, warning that externally imposed, top-down approaches focused on state capacity can regulate conflict but not resolve it (De Coning 2016).

These inadequacies of the liberal model contributed to a pragmatic turn towards stabilisation, which, according to Hunt and Curran, puts too much focus on strengthening host governments and fails to address the root causes of conflict or to include the population to a significant extent (Hunt and Curran 2020). This criticism is in line with Autesserre, who argues that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without the agreement of local parties to resolve their differences and without taking into account their interests. She recommends combining efforts that integrate top-down and bottom-up approaches as most likely to produce a positive peace (Autesserre 2017). In relation to democratisation, Downes and Monten argue that peacebuilding has generally failed when the preconditions for democratisation are poor, namely, a lack of economic development, heterogeneous populations, and a lack of democratic experience. Aligning with the aforementioned critiques, they found that interventions had a poor track record both regarding imposing democracy and achieving stable peace (Downes and Monten 2013). Karlsrud similarly argues that the weakening of enthusiasm for the liberal model is the main reason for its phasing out, which itself was caused by the difficulty of achieving peace in light of increasing authoritarianism in host states and in the international order (Karlsrud 2019).

Connecting liberal peacebuilding to the liberal paradigm, Finkenbusch argues that the problems of liberal peace are rooted not only in operational failures but also in an erosion of confidence in liberal universalism itself. However, he notes that while critics have noted the limitations of his argument, they also undermined the capacity to formulate guiding norms for collective action, contributing to the formation of a cautious and risk-averse governance stance focused on harm avoidance rather than transformation (Finkenbusch 2021). Ikenberry contextualises this within the crisis of the liberal international order, characterised by the rise of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism, yet argues that liberal internationalism remains reformist in orientation, grounded in institutions

and cooperation, and historically linked to the expectation that external conditions can support domestic political development (Ikenberry 2018). MacGinty similarly contends that the liberal peace, understood as a framework shaping international peacebuilding, has fragmented rather than collapsed, leading to a hybrid peace system characterised by overlapping and often contradictory norms, actors, and practices, reinforced by a retreat from transformative peacebuilding towards stabilisation and short-term containment (MacGinty 2025).

Richmond situates the evolution of peacebuilding within a layered international peace architecture that has progressively shifted away from peace as reconciliation and justice towards peace as management and control. This movement intensified as the liberal order weakened, so that peace has become increasingly linked to stabilisation, regime security and state-building, weakening the relationship between peace and justice and producing authoritarian outcomes in many post-conflict contexts (Richmond 2021). He developed this critique by arguing that both liberal peacebuilding and stabilisation-oriented conflict management have converged on producing stalemated peace processes, characterised by formal agreements without political resolution, elite consolidation of power and the suppression of justice claims, often with international acquiescence in the name of stability (Richmond 2025). Even so, despite extensive criticism of its top-down and interventionist tendencies, inflexible practices and limited local sensitivity, liberal peace provisions remain widely embedded in post-war settlements and are, on average, associated with longer durations of peace when implemented consistently (MacGinty, Joshi, and Lee 2019). This suggests that the problem lies less in liberal norms themselves than in partial, selective or inconsistent implementation, and that a stalemate peace emerges when liberal peacebuilding is undermined by stabilisation mandates that hollow out its normative foundations.

Theoretical Framework

The framework is based on liberal institutionalist theory and peacebuilding literature and tests their expectations in practice to refine the theoretical framework. The mission is analysed as having an incomplete and inconsistent liberal mandate, based on the expectation that liberal-democratic norms can reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict, especially when supported by international engagement. This approach connects peace to political transformation, democratisation, and reconciliation, attempting to address the underlying causes of conflict. It

depends on consistent political pressure from the mission on local authorities, with credible conditions. The stabilisation elements of the mission are assessed by focusing on short-term security, state authority, and stabilisation rather than political transformation, as well as by supporting local authorities regardless of their adherence to liberal norms if they can provide security. The argument is that these two approaches are rather contradictory than complementary, as the former relies on normative pressure and credible conditionality, while the latter weakens both by prioritising security over political transformation.

The main argument and proposed mechanism are that hybrid mandates reduce the credibility of political conditionality, weakening the mission's political leverage over local elites. As leverage declines, local authorities become more likely to engage in symbolic rather than substantive compliance with reform commitments, while illiberal practices become increasingly difficult for the mission to challenge effectively. It is therefore expected that, as stabilisation is increasingly prioritised over the course of the mission, political leverage and legitimacy will decline, preventing both meaningful liberalisation and long-term stabilisation. The focus on stability would also make the mission's credibility depend on success in security matters, while disincentivising local elites from undertaking substantive reforms. This focus, which incorporates insights from the local turn in peacebuilding, alongside critiques of the liberal model, allows for an in-depth examination of the flaws and limitations of liberal peacebuilding by contrasting its theoretical approach with its actual implementation. The expected results are also meant to show whether such hybrid mandates produce paralysis and a failure to transform the political and security situation, particularly in contexts characterised by weak democratic institutions.

Method

To examine the mission's full duration and complexity, this study uses theory-testing causal-process tracing. It enables an analysis of how the mandate, instruments, and political effects of the UN mission have evolved and how this evolution affected the mission's capacity to achieve either political transformation or lasting stabilisation. It also allows the reconstruction of causal sequences and the examination of the mechanisms through which peacebuilding operates in practice. The analysis therefore follows the implementation of the mandate, its subsequent adjustments, and their effects on ensuing changes in the political and security situation and the mission itself. The empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive

documentary examination of UN Security Council reports and meeting records related to the mission, as these sources constitute the most authoritative and extensive body of evidence available for providing a full account of the mission. The timeline covers the full duration of the crisis and the mission, beginning immediately before its establishment in 2012 and extending all the way to its termination in 2023.

The analysis focuses on how liberal peacebuilding and stabilisation were implemented within the mission mandate, examining political mediation, diplomatic pressure, support for institutional reform, electoral processes, and security cooperation as the principal mechanisms through which international engagement was translated into political effects. It traces how changes in their prioritisation, credibility, and enforcement affected the mission's political leverage and how this corresponded to changes in the behaviour of local political elites, particularly in terms of compliance with reforms, resistance, and symbolic adaptation. The reconstructed causal sequence is then compared with the expectations derived from the theoretical framework, linking changes in mandate design and implementation to changes in elite behaviour, reform, security practices, and local legitimacy. This enables the proposed causal mechanism to be assessed within the specific political and institutional context of Mali to examine the conditions under which liberal peacebuilding was constrained, diluted, or rendered ineffective through a mandate that prioritised stabilisation.

The Practice of UN Peacebuilding in the Mali Mission

The Sahel region, in which Mali is located, was generally unstable during this period and was further destabilised by the civil war in nearby Libya in 2011. The acute crisis in Mali began in 2012 with a rebellion by the Muslim Tuareg minority in the north, which proclaimed the independent state of Azawad and entered into conflict with the central authorities in Bamako, followed by Islamist militant groups seizing control of northern areas and causing deterioration in the humanitarian situation. This destabilisation culminated in a coup in Bamako that removed the president from power and installed a military government unwilling to accept ECOWAS involvement. The UN was surprised by the rapid unravelling of central authority and immediately attempted to mediate together with the AU and ECOWAS to resolve the crisis and restore the country to a democratic path (Security Council 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Mali was in the midst of a political, socioeconomic, and security crisis marked by ineffective governance, fragile social cohesion, weak institutions, and

abuse of power, a situation that both produced the crisis and was further exacerbated by it (Security Council 2012d). This regional deterioration and state collapse highlight the absence of structural preconditions for democratisation and the need for an urgent international response due to limited local capacities.

The UN and AU pressured the new government to restore constitutional rule, demanding an inclusive national dialogue with all political forces and elections within a year. The pressure led the government to appoint an interim president, Traore, who subsequently formed a national unity government in the summer. He claimed to be willing to cooperate with the UN, while the rebels and Islamist militias continued to consolidate their control in the north (Security Council 2012e; 2012f; 2012g). The UN's initial goals were to support the government in establishing a political dialogue and restoring constitutional order, with a negotiated settlement with non-terrorist rebel groups. It did so while threatening intervention, which made some rebel groups more open to dialogue. However, there were deep internal political divisions in the country, which precluded a common vision. The government was primarily interested in the UN's help in restoring military control of the north, focusing on the security crisis, and offered to address the grievances of the Tuareg people while claiming that they were not marginalised and had no cause for rebellion (Security Council 2012h). The initial response was consistent with liberal peacebuilding, centred on political conditionality and a return to constitutional order. However, limited territorial control and rebellion had already weakened international leverage and local governance, thereby requiring stabilisation.

While the UN initially provided mediation and support, the collapse of state authority in the north under the insurgency led it to mandate an initial support mission to protect the population and restore national unity and constitutional order (Security Council 2012i). The Security Council stressed the need for a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping to facilitate peacebuilding and prevent a relapse into conflict, preparing the ground for a full mission (Security Council 2013a). The government established a commission for dialogue and reconciliation but limited the dialogue to rebel groups that respected territorial integrity and the secular nature of the state. The governance crisis exposed by the conflict further weakened the state and political system, leading the UN to focus primarily on strengthening state capacity and political legitimacy through long-term reforms and free elections within a constitutional order, an approach undermined by high political and social polarisation and low public confidence in the democratic process (Security Council 2013b). Pressure

from the Security Council and UN support for the state and overall security led the interim government to promise presidential elections with international assistance and commit to inclusiveness and plurality. At the same time, the UN demanded the participation of marginalised groups in socio-political life in line with liberal values (Security Council 2013c). Liberal norms were still being integrated into peacebuilding alongside efforts to stabilise the state, but limited dialogue, weak legitimacy, and persistent polarisation constrained international leverage.

With the situation unresolved, the Security Council decided to establish a full peacekeeping mission in Mali, with the government promising to cooperate. The mission was mandated to facilitate security and stability alongside democracy and civil liberties through support for national political dialogue, inclusion, transparent elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, reconciliation, and human rights protection (Security Council 2013d). Despite this mandate, the country continued to face major political challenges undermining social cohesion, including social polarisation, political antagonism, and intercommunal tensions, even as the government followed UN instructions and engaged in dialogue with northern groups, supported by the mission through political facilitation, technical assistance for democratic consolidation and election preparation, and increased UN pressure following failed regional mediation efforts (Security Council 2013e; 2013f). After several difficult months of diplomatic negotiations and UN pressure, a presidential election was held with UN support and oversight, resulting in Keita's victory and the formation of a new government that included a ministry for reconciliation and the development of the northern regions (Security Council 2013g). This success was limited, as the elections did not immediately lead to reconciliation and former coup leaders retained political influence, despite the renewed government's commitments to reform and democratisation in line with liberal norms in a united and peaceful Mali (Security Council 2013h). The early period was marked by enthusiasm for liberal goals, as electoral support, political conditionality, and normative expectations briefly aligned. However, weak institutions, unreformed power structures, elite resistance, and limited commitment indicated that these achievements were shallow.

The implementation of the promises was slow and limited. Inclusive and credible negotiations with the rebels were still not underway after several months, even though the remaining rebels had offered to disarm upon the signing of a comprehensive peace accord. President Keita claimed that Mali would be fully in charge of the reconciliation process rather than accepting UN support, since it now had legitimate institutions.

He demanded the disarming of the rebels as a precondition for negotiations and said that Mali did not need mediation to create a new peace agreement (Security Council 2014a). The UN demanded negotiations and reform implementation without preconditions and stressed the danger of delay in the peace process, since the growing lack of trust between the sides created the risk of radicalisation. State authority was still not fully established in the north, where violent intercommunal outbursts occurred as many communities felt under-represented in the limited dialogue (Security Council 2014b).

Despite government reluctance, the UN mission mediated between the authorities and the rebels, pressuring both parties to come to the negotiating table and demanding urgent measures to be addressed – not only security but also governance and socio-economic issues. In response, the government held a national conference in the north to promote reforms, development and unity (Security Council 2014c). The rebels demanded federalisation as a solution to the conflict, while the government offered only decentralisation and rejected these demands, increasing volatility and putting progress towards peace at risk. The UN continued to push for reforms in line with liberal norms such as social inclusion, the rule of law, impartial governance and stable democracy, presenting them as essential to peace and arguing that international support and mediation were necessary to prevent a relapse into crisis (Security Council 2014d). Progress remained limited, which the government blamed entirely on the rebels, while the rebels maintained a low-level insurgency that resulted in serious ceasefire violations in the north (Security Council 2014e). The prime minister subsequently resigned, citing the government's failure to address core challenges, deliver reforms and advance inclusive dialogue (Security Council 2014f). Throughout this period, the UN pressed the government to prioritise political dialogue over security measures, criticising its reliance on security forces in response to the rebellion (Security Council 2014g). The lack of credible enforcement behind the UN's pressure to conform to liberal reforms resulted in ineffective conditionality, and the government's instrumentalisation of negotiations, refusal to accept responsibility, and prioritisation of security ultimately undermined its long-term effectiveness.

The UN mission prevented an immediate worsening of the situation by mediating an urgent ceasefire, but the government remained focused on achieving security through military force and on prioritising stabilisation before dialogue rather than addressing the causes of the conflict (Security Council 2014h; 2014i). The first major result was the signing of the Algiers Agreement between the government and the

Azawad rebels with international mediation, which formally institutionalised the peace process but excluded some rebel groups and failed to stop ceasefire violations (Security Council 2014j). Nevertheless, the negotiations produced partial agreement on certain principles, including the secular and unitary nature of the state, decentralisation, recognition of cultural diversity and reconciliation, even as the institutional framework remained unresolved because the rebels continued to demand federalism rather than the limited regionalism offered by the government (Security Council 2014k). As a result, the security situation deteriorated further, the ceasefire was not respected, and the peace process stalled with little implementation of the agreement (Security Council 2015a). The situation worsened amid growing communal polarisation and instability within the central authorities, as governments failed in quick succession (Security Council 2015b). The period reflects a stabilisation logic in which temporary ceasefires and formal agreements substituted for political resolution and elite agreement, weakening the UN's leverage for institutional reform.

Several months passed with both sides consolidating their positions until several rebel groups signed a provisional peace and reconciliation agreement with the government. At this stage, the UN focused more on peacebuilding and state-building. Despite formal agreements, there was almost no implementation, and security and political conditions remained unfavourable (Security Council 2015c). The government continued to establish reconciliation committees without making progress, failing even to maintain a lasting ceasefire (Security Council 2015d). Governments collapsed in succession, leading political elites to postpone regional and local elections due to a claimed lack of the necessary conditions, while socio-economic development stalled and insecurity deepened (Security Council 2015e). Successive governments ignored the root causes of the conflict, implementing limited decentralisation poorly and prioritising hard security measures. Peace agreements were not enforced, dialogue was delayed, and limited consultations produced no results due to persistent disagreements and a lack of compromise (Security Council 2016a). Trust eroded as the security situation deteriorated and rebel groups expressed growing dissatisfaction with the government's lack of political reform. The reconciliation process was stalled, and the agreement was not implemented (Security Council 2016b). The government increasingly treated the UN as a military support mission to resolve security problems, conditioning reforms on such support, while the UN insisted that political measures had to precede military solutions and urged renewed political dialogue (Security Council 2016c; 2016d). The period revealed growing

mandate incoherence, as rhetorical commitments to peacebuilding coexisted with a stabilisation-driven reliance on UN security provision and persistent non-compliance in practice.

Security problems increasingly overshadowed other issues, and disagreements between signatory parties intensified as local elections were delayed due to a lack of security (Security Council 2016e). Intense international engagement failed to reduce tensions, with rebels decrying exclusion from decision-making and the government refusing to compromise (Security Council 2017a). The government demanded peace on its terms, rejecting rebel demands as illegitimate and pursuing its programme without inclusivity (Security Council 2017b; 2017c). To prevent repeated government collapse, a draft constitution was proposed that concentrated excessive power in the presidency, including control over the judiciary, while offering no clear vision for implementing the peace agreement or decentralisation. At the same time, the UN mission faced serious capability constraints due to mandate overextension, while the government remained unable to ensure security or implement necessary reforms (Security Council 2017d). As international pressure weakened, the transitional period without elections extended, and dialogue failed to halt hostilities or generate reconciliation, with governments constrained by internal mistrust, rivalries and limited state capacity, and the UN exercising only limited influence (Security Council 2017e). The period reflects a consolidation of stabilisation logic, in which security priorities prevailed, international leverage eroded through elite resistance, and the mission's legitimacy and capacity for political pressure declined.

The situation in Mali continued to deteriorate as the peace dialogue stagnated, marked by social unrest, protests against the government, absence of constitutional reform, and violent clashes in the north between armed groups and the government, and among armed actors themselves (Security Council 2017f). Both the government and the rebels increasingly lost patience with the peace and reconciliation process and became more resistant to foreign pressure. Presidential elections were held in 2018, resulting in Keita's re-election, while all other elections and constitutional reform were delayed. The UN expressed serious concern over the lack of progress and instability, as well as the absence of reforms in line with liberal norms, as the government failed to establish authority, ensure minority inclusion, or advance decentralisation (Security Council 2018a; 2018b). The government also failed to follow the UN electoral timetable, raising concerns within the Security Council over whether future elections would be peaceful and credible, as implementation of the agreement became a political struggle and Malian representatives grew less receptive to international guidance

(Security Council 2018c; 2018d). Mistrust between the government and the opposition deepened after delays in regional and local elections, leading to increased polarisation and a breakdown of dialogue. At the same time, the UN mission remained overstretched, understaffed and under-resourced, bearing the burden of stabilisation efforts and suffering unusually high casualties among peacekeepers (Security Council 2018e). In response, the UN placed greater emphasis on the peace process itself, demanding inclusive political dialogue and political dispute settlement to prevent further erosion of institutional legitimacy (Security Council 2018f). In this way, the UN sought to recover fading leverage through renewed commitments while tolerating only minimal democratisation and liberal norm internalisation in favour of stability and security, thereby enabling elite compliance without substantive reform.

UN pressure resulted in elections, but they were marked by political tensions, incidents, very low turnout and a lack of transparency, which the UN nonetheless accepted as credible while continuing to work with the government and press for reform. As part of this pressure, the government signed a “pact for peace” with the UN, reaffirming its commitments to the peace process, the rule of law, decentralisation, inclusive political reform, national reconciliation, and security and economic reform (Security Council 2018g; 2018h). The government formally complied by attempting to relaunch national reconciliation. However, rebels refused to cooperate and questioned the elections’ validity, while progress stalled and the political opposition boycotted the process because it was not inclusive (Security Council 2018i). Polarisation deepened as regions developed parallel political processes and entrenched ethno-religious divisions, with central authorities rapidly losing legitimacy and the peace dialogue collapsing as rebel demands remained unmet (Security Council 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). The situation further unravelled in 2020 as peace implementation remained slow and uneven, key decisions were postponed, elections and constitutional reform were delayed, the rebels continued to refuse disarmament, and the government offered only the appearance of dialogue without applying or enforcing reforms (Security Council 2020a). Under renewed internal and international pressure, elections were again permitted but were marred by violence and armed interference, leading the UN to press for constitutional reform and continued dialogue while increasingly prioritising security concerns, further tilting the mandate towards stabilisation (Security Council 2020b; 2020c). The period thus marked a shift from liberal conditionality to stabilisation-driven accommodation, as formal compliance and managed elections substituted for substantive reform and inclusive dialogue, deepening fragmentation.

The fragility of central authority and democracy, combined with widespread protests and dissatisfaction with the president, culminated in the overthrow of the government, which was removed in a violent coup in August. The president and prime minister were imprisoned and forced to resign and dissolve the assembly, after which Colonel Goita installed himself as head of a military government, promising to end poor governance and restore security. The coup was internationally condemned, with ECOWAS suspending Mali and imposing sanctions. The new authorities promised elections following a transition period. They established transitional institutions, including a small appointed assembly, while Goita blamed the deposed leadership for failing to resolve the security crisis and for the population's loss of faith in state institutions (Security Council 2020d; 2020e). The UN tolerated the change of government on the condition that elections would be held within one and a half years and that implementation of the peace agreement would continue (Security Council 2020f; 2020g). The junta ruled by decree amid criticism from both the former government and the opposition, as governance weakened, reforms were suspended, and peace implementation stalled. Goita subsequently consolidated full power by removing the transitional president and prime minister he had appointed and assuming the presidency himself (Security Council 2021a). The UN's tolerance of an unconstitutional transfer of power in exchange for promised elections reflected stabilisation-driven accommodation, marking a decisive breakdown of liberal leverage by suspending conditionality and enabling undemocratic elite consolidation.

The UN maintained that only an inclusive, civilian-led government chosen through credible elections could restore social cohesion and public trust in state institutions. The government instead prioritised security and continued to rule by decree, increasing repression without reducing intercommunal violence (Security Council 2021). It blamed the UN for the country's problems, accusing the mission of failing to provide security (Security Council 2021c). The government then announced that elections would not take place as planned and refused to cooperate with the UN and ECOWAS, prompting sanctions and border closures (Security Council 2022a). Although the UN mission continued to operate, it became clear that it had lost influence and could no longer mediate effectively. Tensions intensified as the transition deadline passed, democratisation plans were halted, and northern rebel signatories resumed their arming and recruitment activities (Security Council 2022b). The government attributed instability to foreign interference, pursued stabilisation through force and central authority, and rejected international mediation, leaving the UN

without a local partner and unable to continue as before (Security Council 2022c; 2023a). As authoritarian consolidation deepened, democratic norms were openly rejected, and the government demanded the mission's departure, leading the UN to close the mission amid worsening security, failed democratisation, and sustained hostility (Security Council 2023b; 2023c). The mission's termination marked the consolidation of stabilisation logic, as the loss of political conditionality and local partnership removed the remaining leverage necessary for liberal peacebuilding.

Discussion

The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical framework's expectations by showing that the hybridisation of liberal peacebuilding and stabilisation did not produce complementarity. They rather weakened the mechanisms through which the mission was expected to achieve its objectives. It further shows that, as stabilisation priorities increasingly took precedence in the implementation of the mandate, the credibility of political conditionality declined, reducing the mission's leverage over local political elites. That, in turn, incentivised shallow and formal compliance with reform demands. Although the mission initially combined political pressure, electoral support, mediation and security cooperation with some degree of success, this balance was unsustainable as insecurity increased and the need for cooperation with state authorities became prioritised over normative pressure on it. As a consequence, liberal commitments remained declaratory, while security cooperation became sufficient to maintain international engagement despite delays in implementing liberal-democratic reforms. The causal mechanism proved correct because the weakening of normative conditionality through stabilisation disincentivised political transformation and allowed local political elites to adapt discursively to the mission's demands without undertaking substantive reforms. Likewise, the findings suggest that the limitations of liberal peacebuilding in this case did not result simply from the incompatibility of liberal norms with the local context but from the weakening of the political mechanisms required for their implementation, which was inherent to the hybrid design.

Conclusion

As the concept of liberal peacebuilding has come under increasing pressure and critique, and there is widespread disillusionment with it, it is important to examine its recent practice and adaptations. Accordingly, this article examines a paradigmatic mission as one of the most notable

peacebuilding missions in recent times. The mission did not have a purely liberal mandate but a hybrid one. It appears that the true cause of its failure was not in its theoretical foundation. The results indicate that this hybridisation did not provide complementarity between the two approaches. Instead, it produced tensions that weakened the mission's ability to pursue both democratic reform and security. The mission operated under unfavourable structural conditions, yet it also failed to provide consistent pressure within a coherent normative framework and under clearly defined conditionality. As the mission failed to achieve transformative or stabilisation goals, it increasingly resorted to accommodation with the local government's formal compliance to maintain security. This led to an abandonment of its normative liberal goals of resolving the root causes of the ongoing conflict, which, combined with the failure to achieve security, led to a loss of trust between the mission and the government. Thus, the prioritisation of short-term stability proved detrimental to both long-term stability and liberalisation.

Extrapolating the mission's results to the wider theoretical debate, it appears that the hybridity of the liberal approach and stabilisation contains fundamental tensions that challenge the assumption that these approaches can be easily combined. Stabilisation is harder to achieve if the symptoms are treated rather than the underlying causes. When stabilisation is prioritised, it can marginalise the normative goals required for this very purpose. Such an approach would then reduce the leverage of the international mission, which is required to compensate for weak institutions, limited democratic experience, and fragmented authority. Therefore, the conclusion is that the two approaches are conceptually contradictory rather than complementary, as stabilisation systematically weakens the political mechanisms on which liberal transformation depends, undermining the latter rather than enabling it. The mission's tolerance of a government turning towards authoritarianism and its acceptance of symbolic compliance with demands for political transformation undermined its legitimacy and contributed to the loss of its remaining influence. This happened in Mali's case. Therefore, the mission's failure should not be considered as caused by an abrupt or unexpected event but as a predictable outcome of a mandate that prioritised short-term stability over normative consistency. In the end, the mission failed to provide both political transformation and genuine stable security. It should be noted that the Mali crisis occurred in a specific local and regional context, so the findings concerning its mission, while providing useful insight, remain specific to the case. The results of the analysis therefore suggest the need for greater caution in the design of

hybrid peacebuilding mandates. Further research could examine whether similar dynamics emerge across other stabilisation-oriented international missions, as well as across similar hybrid mandates.

Bibliography

- Albrecht, Peter & Cold-Ravnkilde, Signe. 2020. "National Interests as Frictions: Peacekeeping in Somalia and Mali". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14 (2): 1–17.
- Autesserre, Séverine. 2017. "International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness". *International Studies Review* 19 (1): 114–132.
- Avezov, Xavier & Smit, Timo. 2014. "The Consensus on Mali and International Conflict Management in a Multipolar World". *SIPRI Policy article*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Barnett, Michael, Fang, Songying & Zürcher, Christoph. 2014. "Compromised Peacebuilding". *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3): 608–620.
- Berre, Mathieu. 2017. "Armed Rebellions, Violent Extremism, and the Challenges of International Intervention in Mali". *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 7 (2): 60–84.
- Bratton, Michael. 2016. "Violence, Displacement and Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies: Evidence from Mali". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 34 (4): 437–458.
- Bøås, Morten & Torheim, Liv Elin. 2013. "The Trouble in Mali: Corruption, Collusion, Resistance". *Third World Quarterly* 34 (7): 1279–1292.
- Charbonneau, Bruno & Sears, Jonathan. 2014. "Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 8 (2–3): 192–213.
- Chauzal, Grégory & van Damme, Thibault. 2015. "The Roots of Mali's Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis". *CRU Report*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
- Charbonneau, Bruno, Ricard, Martin & Moe, Louise Wiuff. 2022. "Counterinsurgency and Peacebuilding in Somalia and Mali". In *Routledge Handbook of African Peacebuilding*, edited by Bruno Charbonneau & Martin Ricard. London: Routledge.
- Charbonneau, Bruno. 2022. "The Climate of Counterinsurgency and the Future of Security in the Sahel". *Environmental Science & Policy* 138: 97–104.

- Cold-Ravnskilde, Signe Marie. 2013. "War and Peace in Mali: Background and Perspectives". DIIS Report 2013 (33). *Danish Institute for International Studies*.
- Daniel, Joachim. 2017. "Building Sovereignty? UN Peacekeeping and the Strengthening of State Authority in Lebanon and Mali". *Global Change, Peace & Security* 29 (3): 229–247.
- Downes, Alexander B. & Monten, Jonathan. 2013. "Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratisation". *International Security* 37 (4): 90–131.
- Doyle, Michael W. & Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis". *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 779–801.
- Duarte, Guilherme & Souza, Marcos. 2014. "Illiberal Peacebuilding in UN Stabilization: Peace Operations and Peace Agreements in the CAR, the DRC and Mali". *International Peacekeeping* 21 (2): 157–185.
- De Coning, Cedric. 2016. "From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability". *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 4 (3): 166–181.
- De Coning, Cedric. 2018. "Adaptive Peacebuilding". *International Affairs* 94 (2): 301–317.
- Finkenbusch, Peter. 2016. "'Post-Liberal' Peacebuilding and the Crisis of International Authority". *Peacebuilding* 4 (3): 247–261.
- Finkenbusch, Peter. 2021. "Liberal Peace: From Civilising Mission to Self-Doubt". *Global Change, Peace & Security* 33 (2): 163–176.
- Francis, David J. 2013. "The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali". *NOREF Policy Brief. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*.
- Gazeley, Jack. 2022. "The Strong Weak State: French State-Building and Military Rule in Mali". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 16 (3): 269–286.
- Guichaoua, Yvan. 2016. "A Northern Knot: Untangling Local Peacebuilding Politics in Mali". *Peace Insights*. University of Kent.
- Hameiri, Shahar. 2014. "The Crisis of Liberal Peacebuilding and the Future of Statebuilding". *International Politics* 51 (3): 316–333.
- Hartzell, Caroline, Hoddie, Matthew & Rothchild, Donald. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables". *International Organization* 55 (1): 183–208.

- Howard, Lise Morjé & Stark, Alexander. 2017/2018. "How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors". *International Security* 42 (3): 127-171.
- Hunt, Charles T. & Curran, David. 2020. "Stabilization at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations: More than Just a Phase?" *Global Governance* 26 (1): 46-68.
- Hickendorff, Annelies. 2019. Civil Society White Book on Peace and Security in Mali. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. "The End of the Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94 (1): 7-23.
- Karlsrud, John. 2019. "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism". *International Peacekeeping* 26 (1): 1-21.
- Lidén, Kristoffer. 2009. "Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding". *International Peacekeeping* 16 (5): 616-634.
- Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2013. "Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding". *Civil Wars* 15 (2): 242-252.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace". *Security Dialogue* 41 (4): 391-412.
- Mac Ginty, Roger & Richmond, Oliver P. 2013. "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace". *Third World Quarterly* 34 (5): 763-783.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mac Ginty, Roger, Joshi, Madhav & Lee, SungYong. 2019. "Liberal Peace Implementation and the Durability of Post-war Peace". *International Peacekeeping* 26 (4): 457-486.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. 2025. "The Liberal Peace Is Over and It Is Not Coming Back: Hybridity and the Emerging International Peace System". *Third World Quarterly* 46 (16): 1999-2018.
- Nomikos, William G. 2021. "Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali". *The Journal of Politics* 84 (1): 194-208.
- Okon, Emmanuel N. 2021. "ECOWAS Responses to the Conflict in Mali, 2012-2021". *Conflict Studies Quarterly* 37: 23-41.
- Chauzal, Grégory & Van Damme, Thibault. 2015. Roots of Mali's Conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 Crisis. CRU Report. *Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations*.

- Okyere, Felix K. 2015. Statebuilding, Local Governance and Organized Crime in Mali. *International Peace Institute*.
- Oluwadare, Adewumi. 2014. "African Union and the Conflict in Mali: Extra-Regional Influence and the Limitations of a Regional Actor". *African Journal of Governance and Development* 3 (1): 1–18.
- Paffenholz, Thania. 2015. "Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment towards an Agenda for Future Research". *Third World Quarterly* 36 (5): 857–874.
- Paris, Roland. 2010. "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding". *Review of International Studies* 36 (2): 337–365.
- Paris, Roland. 2003. "Peacebuilding and the Constraints of Global Culture". *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (3): 441–473.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2006. "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'". *Conflict, Security & Development* 6 (3): 291–314.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2013. "Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation". *Cooperation and Conflict* 48 (3): 378–400.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2021. "Towards a Peace with Global Justice? The Struggle within the International Peace Architecture". *Asian International Studies Review* 22: 1–29.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2025. "A Prelude to Revisionism? The Stalelated Peace Model and the Emergence of Multipolarity in International Order". *Contemporary Security Policy* 46 (2): 197–225.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, Miall, Hugh & Toros, Harmonie. 2024. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. 5th ed. Polity.
- Raineri, Luca. 2016. "Mali: The Short-Sightedness of Donor-Driven Peacebuilding". *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 11 (1): 88–92.
- Ritter, Nora. 2014. "Mali: A New Challenge for Peacekeeping". *AARMS* 13 (1): 59–72.
- Selby, Jan. 2013. "The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building". *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (1): 57–86.
- Security Council. 2012a. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6709th meeting, S/PV.6709, 26 January 2012.
- Security Council. 2012b. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6741st meeting, S/PV.6741, 26 March 2012.
- Security Council. 2012c. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6745th meeting, S/PV.6745, 4 April 2012.
- Security Council. 2012d. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. Document S/2012/894, 28.11.2012.

Security Council. 2012e. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6798th meeting. Document S/PV.6798, 05.07.2012.

Security Council. 2012f. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6804th meeting. Document S/PV.6804, 11.07.2012.

Security Council. 2012g. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6846th meeting. Document S/PV.6846, 17.9.2012.

Security Council. 2012h. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6879th meeting. Document S/PV.6879, 5.12.2012.

Security Council. 2012i. Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6898th meeting. Document S/PV.6898, 20.12.2012.

Security Council. 2013a. Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 6903rd meeting. Document S/PV.6903, 21.01.2013.

Security Council. 2013b. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. Document S/2013/189, 26.03.2013.

Security Council. 2013c. Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 6946th meeting. Document S/PV.6946, 15.4.2013.

Security Council. 2013d. Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 6952nd meeting. Document S/PV.6952, 25.4.2013.

Security Council. 2013e. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. Document S/2013/338, 10.6.2013.

Security Council. 2013f. Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 6985th meeting. Document S/PV.6985, 25.6.2013.

Security Council. 2013g. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. Document S/2013/582, 1.10.2013.

Security Council. 2013h. Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 7043rd meeting. Document S/PV.7043, 16.10.2013.

Security Council. 2014a. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/1, 2.1.2014.

Security Council. 2014b. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/1, 2.1.2014.

Security Council. 2014c. Report of the Security Council mission to Mali, 1–3 February 2014. Document S/2014/173, 11.3.2014.

Security Council. 2014d. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/229, 28.3.2014.

Security Council. 2014e. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year, 7158th meeting. Document S/PV.7158, 23.4.2014.

- Security Council. 2014f. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year, 7179th meeting. Document S/PV.7179, 20.5.2014.
- Security Council. 2014g. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/403, 9.6.2014.
- Security Council. 2014h. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year, 7210th meeting. Document S/PV.7210, 25.6.2014.
- Security Council. 2014i. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year, 7227th meeting. Document S/PV.7227, 28.7.2014.
- Security Council. 2014j. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/692, 22.9.2014.
- Security Council. 2014k. Security Council, Sixty-ninth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2014/943, 23.12.2014.
- Security Council. 2015a. Security Council, Seventieth year, 7378th meeting. Document S/PV.7378, 6.2.2015.
- Security Council. 2015b. Security Council, Seventieth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2015/219, 27.3.2015.
- Security Council. 2015c. Security Council, Seventieth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2015/426, 11.6.2015.
- Security Council. 2015d. Security Council, Seventieth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2015/732, 22.9.2015.
- Security Council. 2015e. Security Council, Seventieth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2015/1030, 24.12.2015.
- Security Council. 2016a. Security Council, Seventy-first year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2016/281, 28.3.2016.
- Security Council. 2016b. Security Council, Seventy-first year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2016/498, 31.5.2016.
- Security Council. 2016c. Security Council, Seventy-first year, 7719th meeting. Document S/PV.7719, 16.6.2016.
- Security Council. 2016d. Security Council, Seventy-first year, 7727th meeting. Document S/PV.7727, 29.6.2016.
- Security Council. 2016e. Security Council, Seventy-first year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2016/1137, 30.12.2016.
- Security Council. 2017a. Security Council, Seventy-second year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2017/271, 30.3.2017.
- Security Council. 2017b. Security Council, Seventy-second year, 7864th meeting. Document S/PV.7864, 18.1.2017.

Security Council. 2017c. Security Council, Seventy-second year, 7917th meeting. Document S/PV.7917, 6.4.2017.

Security Council. 2017d. Security Council, Seventy-second year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2017/478, 6.6.2017.

Security Council. 2017e. Security Council, Seventy-second year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2017/811, 28.9.2017.

Security Council. 2017f. Security Council, Seventy-second year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2017/1105, 26.12.2017.

Security Council. 2018a. Security Council, Seventy-third year, 8163rd meeting. Document S/PV.8163, 23.1.2018.

Security Council. 2018b. Security Council, Seventy-third year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2018/273, 29.3.2018.

Security Council. 2018c. Security Council, Seventy-third year, 8229th meeting. Document S/PV.8229, 11.4.2018.

Security Council. 2018d. Security Council, Seventy-third year, 8266th meeting. Document S/PV.8266, 23.5.2018.

Security Council. 2018e. Security Council, Seventy-third year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2018/541, 6.6.2018.

Security Council. 2018f. Security Council, Seventy-third year, 8298th meeting. Document S/PV.8298, 28.6.2018.

Security Council. 2018g. Security Council, Seventy-third year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2018/866, 25.9.2018.

Security Council. 2018h. Security Council, Seventy-third year, 8376th meeting. Document S/PV.8376, 19.10.2018.

Security Council. 2018i. Security Council, Seventy-third year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2018/1174, 28.12.2018.

Security Council. 2019a. Security Council, Seventy-fourth year, 8497th meeting. Document S/PV.8497, 29.3.2019.

Security Council. 2019b. Security Council, Seventy-fourth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2019/454, 31.5.2019.

Security Council. 2019c. Security Council, Seventy-fourth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2019/782, 1.10.2019.

Security Council. 2020a. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/223, 20.3.2020.

Security Council. 2020b. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/476, 2.6.2020.

- Security Council. 2020c. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/625, 2.7.2020.
- Security Council. 2020d. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/867, 1.9.2020.
- Security Council. 2020e. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/952, 29.9.2020.
- Security Council. 2020f. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year, 8765th meeting. Document S/PV.8765, 8.10.2020.
- Security Council. 2020g. Security Council, Seventy-fifth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2020/1281, 28.12.2020.
- Security Council. 2021a. Security Council, Seventy-sixth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2021/519, 1.6.2021.
- Security Council. 2021b. Security Council, Seventy-sixth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2021/844, 1.10.2021.
- Security Council. 2021c. Security Council, Seventy-sixth year, 8794th meeting. Document S/PV.8794, 14.6.2021.
- Security Council. 2021d. Security Council, Seventy-sixth year, 8893rd meeting. Document S/PV.8893, 29.10.2021.
- Security Council. 2021c. Security Council, Seventy-sixth year, 8794th meeting. Document S/PV.8794, 14.6.2021.
- Security Council. 2022a. Security Council, Seventy-seventh year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2021/1117, 4.1.2022.
- Security Council. 2022b. Security Council, Seventy-seventh year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2022/446, 2.6.2022.
- Security Council. 2022c. Security Council, Seventy-seventh year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2022/731, 3.10.2022.
- Security Council. 2023a. Security Council, Seventy-eighth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2023/36, 16.1.2023.
- Security Council. 2023b. Security Council, Seventy-eighth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2023/236, 30.3.2023.
- Security Council. 2023c. Security Council, Seventy-eighth year. Report of the Secretary-General. Document S/2023/480, 30.6.2023.
- Strydom, Hennie. 2019. "Mali and the Sahel: Making Peace in Another Rough Neighbourhood". *Netherlands International Law Review* 66: 1–19.
- Tobie, Aurélien. 2017. "Central Mali: Violence, Local Perspectives and Diverging Narratives". *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*.

- Tronc, Emmanuel, Rob Grace & Anahi Nahikian. 2019. "Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development and Humanitarian Action in Mali". *Harvard Humanitarian Initiative*.
- Van Leeuwen, Mathijs, Willemijn Verkoren & Freerk Boedeltje. 2012. "Thinking Beyond the Liberal Peace: From Utopia to Heterotopias". *Acta Politica* 47 (3): 292–316.
- Vermeig, Loïc. 2015. "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground". *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)*.
- Wing, Susanna D. 2013. "Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict". *United States Institute of Peace*.

UDK 341.222(497.16+497.5)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, br. 1197, str. 283–330
Originalni naučni rad
Primljen: 21. 07. 2026.
Revidiran: 22. 08. 2026.
Prihvaćen: 25. 08. 2026.
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.4
CC BY-SA 4.0

Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ¹

Otvorena granična pitanja Crne Gore i Hrvatske

SAŽETAK

Nasilni raspad Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) rezultirao je transformacijom administrativnih republičkih granica u međunarodne granice primenom međunarodnog principa *uti possidetis*. Zbog odsustva administrativnih granica između jugoslovenskih republika na Jadranskom moru, taj princip nakon sukcesije SFRJ nije bio primenjiv za pomorsko razgraničenje. U slučaju Crne Gore i Hrvatske, kao država sukcesorki SFRJ, situaciju je dodatno komplikovala činjenica da administrativna granica u zaleđu Jadranskog mora nije bila jasno definisana u vreme bivše Jugoslavije, zbog čega nije ni bilo moguće napraviti neki pozitivni pomak u cilju pomorskog razgraničenja. Međutim, Hrvatska tvrdi suprotno budući da iznosi stav da je granica sa Crnom Gorom u oblasti poluostrva Prevlake nesporno povučena u vreme bivše Jugoslavije, dok Crna Gora ovu tvrdnju negira ističući pravno-istorijske razloge koji govore njoj u prilog. Iako između strana u sporu nije postojao minimum saglasnosti u vezi sa nasleđenom kopnom administrativnom linijom, u želji da doprinesu trajnom miru i stabilnosti, dve države su u međuvremenu ipak napravile izvesni pomak u svrhu

¹ Naučni savetnik, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd. E-mail: dimitrijevicd@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3375-7280.

Rad je nastao u okviru naučnoistraživačkog projekta „Srbija i izazovi u međunarodnim odnosima 2026“, koji finansira Ministarstvo nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije, a realizuje Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu tokom 2026 (evidencioni broj: 451-03-33/2026-03/200041).

razvoja dobrosusedskih odnosa zaključenjem Protokola o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu 2002. godine. Protokolom je utvrđena privremena granica teritorijalnog mora, ali njime nisu prejudicirana konačna rešenja u vezi međunarodnopravnog razgraničenja. Pregovori o razgraničenju, koji su do tada vođeni, zapali su u međuvremenu u „ćorsokak“, zbog donošenja niza jednostranih pravnih akata kojima su strane proglasile svoje teritorijalne zahteve na različitim delovima Jadranskog mora. Pitanje međusobnog razgraničenja vraćeno je na političku agendu tek pošto su na prostorima morskog dna i podzemlja Jadranskog mora otkrivana nalazišta nafte i gasa. Delimitacija je tako postala jedna od gorućih tema u bilateralnim odnosima, jer su ova otkrića intenzivirala teritorijalni spor pretvarajući Jadransko more u region geoekonomske nadmetanja. To, međutim, nije značilo da Crna Gora i Hrvatska nisu mogle postići odgovarajući kompromis, već da su to uporno odbijale pravdajući njegov izostanak oportunističkim razlozima. Da bi došle do pravičnih i izbalansiranih rešenja, ove dve države moraju postići dogovor o razgraničenju koji bi bio utemeljen na međunarodnom pravu. To pretpostavlja odricanje od voluntarističkih odluka i politike međusobnog uslovljavanja, ali i dobru volju i veću fleksibilnost u primeni već postignutih rešenja iz Protokola o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu, kao i drugih rešenja koja su prisutna u savremenoj međunarodnoj praksi, a koja ne isključuju uspostavljanje zajedničkih razvojnih zona ili hibridnih režima upravljanja prirodnim resursima.

Ključne reči: Sukcesija SFRJ, granice, princip *uti possidetis*, Crna Gora, Hrvatska, Jadransko more, međunarodno pravo, delimitacija

Open Border Issues of Montenegro and Croatia

SUMMARY

The violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) resulted in the transformation of the republics' administrative borders into international borders through the application of the international legal principle of *uti possidetis*. Due to the absence of administrative borders between the Yugoslav republics at the Adriatic Sea, this principle was not applicable for maritime delimitation after the succession of the SFRY. In the case of Montenegro and Croatia, as the successor states to the SFRY, the situation was further complicated by the fact that the administrative border in the hinterland of the Adriatic Sea was not clearly defined during the time of the former Yugoslavia, making it impossible to achieve substantive progress with regard to maritime delimitation. However, Croatia claims the opposite, maintaining that the

border with Montenegro in the area of the Prevlaka Peninsula was undisputedly drawn during the time of the former Yugoslavia, while Montenegro denies this claim, citing legal and historical reasons in support of its position. Although there was no minimum agreement between the parties to the dispute concerning the inherited land administrative line, in their desire to contribute to lasting peace and stability in the meantime, the two states nevertheless made some progress towards the development of good neighbourly relations by concluding the Protocol on the Interim Regime along the Southern Border in 2002. The Protocol established the temporary border of the territorial sea, but it did not prejudice the final decisions regarding international delimitation. Negotiations on delimitation, which had been ongoing until then, subsequently reached an impasse due to the adoption of a series of unilateral legal acts through which the parties declared their territorial claims over different parts of the Adriatic Sea. The issue of mutual delimitation returned to the political agenda only after oil and gas deposits were discovered on the seabed and subsoil of the Adriatic Sea. Delimitation thus emerged as a contentious issue in bilateral relations, as these discoveries exacerbated the territorial dispute and transformed the Adriatic Sea into a region of geo-economic competition. However, this did not mean Montenegro and Croatia could not reach an appropriate compromise; rather, both states have persistently failed to do so, justifying the absence of an agreement for opportunistic reasons. To reach equitable and balanced solutions, these two states must agree on demarcation based on international law. This presupposes the renunciation of voluntarist decisions and the policy of mutual conditioning, but also goodwill and greater flexibility in the application of the already achieved solutions from the Protocol on the Interim Regime along the Southern Border, as well as other solutions that are present in contemporary international practice and do not exclude the establishment of joint development zones or hybrid natural resource management regimes.

Keywords: succession of the SFRY, borders, principle of *uti possidetis*, Montenegro, Croatia, Adriatic Sea, international law, delimitation.

Uvodna razmatranja

Od kraja osamdesetih godina XX veka u Jugoslaviji su bila karakteristična sve veća sporenja republičkih elita o načinima rešavanja najvažnijih državnih i nacionalnih problema (Dimitrijević, 1998, 147-169). Unutrašnjim antagonizmima uveliko je doprinelo i republičko zakonodavstvo, koje je godinama bilo u neskladu sa saveznim zakonodavstvom utemeljenim na asimetričnom konstitucionalnom modelu podele nadležnosti (Jovičić, 1992, 98-99). Ovaj model poslužiće

devedesetih godina prošlog veka kao idealan mehanizam političkog revizionizma (Buzadžić, 1994, 92–240).² Tada je, naime, posle niza bezuspešnih pregovora oko redefinisanja odnosa u jugoslovenskoj federaciji, usledila separacija Slovenije i Hrvatske, a potom i Makedonije i Bosne i Hercegovine iz sastava SFR Jugoslavije (Guskova, 2003, I, 131–434; II, 390–413, Marković, 200, 5–28). Otcepljenje od SFRJ za posledicu je imalo raspad (disoluciju) njenog državnopravnog subjektiviteta. Budući da je raspad države bio uglavnom praćen upotrebom sile i da se odvijao uporedo sa ostvarivanjem prava na samoopredeljenje, čitav proces bio je pod monitoringom vodećih međunarodnih organizacija (Weller, 1991, 569–607; UN Documents A/51/95; A/50/910; A/51/95; A/50/930; A/508928).³ Traženje rešenja za nastalu političku krizu bilo je zaoštreno, jer jugoslovenski konstitucionalni model nije predviđao način ostvarivanja prava na secesiju, a poštovanju teritorijalnog integriteta od strane zaštitnika saveznog ustavnog poretka pridavan je značaj peremptorne norme međunarodnog prava (*jus cogens*) (Perazić, 1990, 220; Kreća 1992, 178–193; 1994, 39; Milojević, 1993, 562–573; *Međunarodna politika*, 1991).⁴

² Od 1989. godine ubrzano je započeto sa nulifikacijom, to jest sa separacijom od unutrašnjeg pravnog poretka. Ustavni sud Jugoslavije, u skladu sa svojim ovlašćenjima, poništio je i ukinuo niz akata federalnih jedinica koji su bili u koliziji sa saveznim Ustavom.

³ Pokušaj Generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija da Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju karakteriše za identičnu državu sa SFRJ izazvao je žučne proteste zapadnih zemalja, naročito SAD. Nakon pomenutog događaja u Ujedinjenim nacijama usledila je formalna korekcija ovog stava.

⁴ Iz sporazumnog osnivanja jugoslovenske federacije izvučen je zaključak o obavezi postizanja međusobne saglasnosti, zajedničkog izjašnjavanja svih federalnih jedinica SFRJ o nameri bilo koje od njih za njenim napuštanjem. Ističući da je savezna vlast prema Ustavu SFRJ jača od vlasti republika, te da su u njenoj nadležnosti promene državnih granica, odnosno očuvanje teritorijalnog integriteta, konstitucionalisti su tvrdili da su odluke i druga konkretna pravna akta i akcije koje su ih pratile jednostrano realizovane, pa da se ne mogu smatrati legitimnim ni legalnim. To su, naime, prema zaštitnicima saveznog ustavnog poretka bila teška krivična dela po unutrašnjem pravu, iako pravo na otcepljenje nije samo po sebi osporavano, ali se zahtevalo da njegovo ostvarenje bude „mirno i sporazumno“ prihvaćeno od strane federalnih organa. Sledstveno tome, samostalni akti o nezavisnosti proglašeni su neustavnim, jednostranim oružanim secesijama. Na taj način su, polazeći od nepotpunih ustavnih odredbi koje nisu predviđale ni postupak za postizanje sporazuma o otcepljenju, niti donošenje konkretne odluke o tome aktu, kao i od krivičnog zakona koji je inkriminisao neustavne izmene federativnog uređenja i povrede teritorijalnog integriteta SFRJ, odstranjene sve mogućnosti legalizacije novog stanja stvorenog secesionim aktima. Opravdanje za ovakvo shvatanje traženo je u stanovištu da međunarodno pravo nema primat niti da se automatski može nadrediti ustavnom pravu u slučaju ako bi ono suspendovalo ili isključilo pravo na otcepljenje

S druge strane, secesionističke republike insistirale su na imperativnoj prirodi prava na samoopredeljenje čiji se legalitet nije mogao dovesti u pitanje tumačenjem unutrašnjeg prava, a čija se opšteobavezna snaga izvodila iz međunarodnog prava nezavisno od činjenice postojanja ili nepostojanja unutrašnjih pravnih pravila o realizaciji tog prava u praksi putem otcepljenja (Šahović, 1996, 22–23, 34).⁵

Kada je proces raspada došao u kritičnu fazu, na međunarodnom planu pokrenuto je pitanje sukcesije SFRJ. Prvi zvanični pregovori oko sukcesije započeli su pod pokroviteljstvom Mirovne konferencije Evropske ekonomske zajednice (EEZ), 27. avgusta 1991. godine, na vanrednom sastanku ministara inostranih poslova u Briselu. Na istom sastanku konstituisana je Arbitražna komisija, kao savetodavno telo za iznošenje mišljenja svim zainteresovanim stranama u jugoslovenskom političkom procesu o sadržini i dometu pozitivnih pravila međunarodnog prava (Račić, 2000, 102; Obradović, 1996, 285; *International Legal Materials*, 1992, 1421).⁶ Često su se konstatacije i preporuke Arbitražne komisije u delovima poklapale sa zvaničnim stavovima i savetima najviših organa međunarodnih organizacija, što ne treba da čudi budući da je Arbitražna komisija predstavljala sastavni deo međunarodnog sistema nadzora procesa raspada jugoslovenske federacije (*Međunarodna politika*, 1992, 13–

iz nacionalnog ustavnog poretka. Budući da Povelja UN ne poznaje termin „secesije“, jer je taj pojam u dubokoj ontološkoj suprotnosti sa filosofijom i normativnom konstrukcijom ovog osnovnog pravnog akta svetske organizacije, zauzeto je stanovište po kojem je poštovanje teritorijalnog integriteta norma *jus cogens*. Što se tiče ostvarenja prava na samoopredeljenje, istaknuto je da ono pripada narodima, a ne republikama, te da napuštanje federacije oružanom secesijom znači svojevrstu zloupotrebu prava.

⁵ Prema secesiji (otcepljenju) zauzeto je gledište kao prema „indiferentnom aktu“, prema kojem međunarodno pravo nema ni pozitivan ni negativan stav. Suštinski se nije pokretalo pitanje nezakovitosti i nelegitimnosti prava na secesiju iz aspekta međunarodnog prava. Konfuzija koja je nastala ovako suprotstavljenim tumačenjem pravila o poštovanju teritorijalnog integriteta i prava na samoopredeljenje i secesiju u jugoslovenskoj krizi bila je očevidno inspirisana političkim razlozima, koji se ne mogu smatrati konstruktivnim doprinosom u razumevanju odnosa između ova dva pravila međunarodnog prava.

⁶ U široj javnosti, Arbitražna komisija Mirovne konferencije EEZ, nazvana je *Badenterovom komisijom* – prema njenom predsedniku – Robertu Badenteru, koji je bio ugledni francuski konstitucionalista i predsednik Ustavnog saveta Francuske. Pored Badentera, u Arbitražnu komisiju imenovani su i predsednici Ustavnih sudova Nemačke (Roman Hercog), Italije (Aldo Korasaniti), Španije (Fransisko Tomas Valijente) i Belgije (Iren Petri). Zanimljivo je da je Badenterova komisija pribegla rešenjima za koja u ranijoj praksi nisu postojali pravni presedani. Iako suštinski nije težila uvođenju nekih novina, ona je postojeća pravila i principe „prilagođavala“ uslovima u kojima se odvijao proces sukcesije SFRJ.

19; 1993, 26–28; *International Legal Materials*, 1992, 1572–1592; 1993, 1586–1593). Primena političkih kriterijuma prilikom formulisanja mišljenja Arbitražne komisije, otud je bila neminovnost koja je imala velikog uticaja na rešenja prihvaćena u praksi (Kreća, 1993, Obradović, 1993, 287).⁷

Za razumevanje situacije u kojoj se našla SFRJ izbijanjem političke krize bitno je Mišljenje br. 1 Arbitražne komisije od 29. novembra 1991. godine. U Mišljenju je konstatovano da se SFRJ nalazi u procesu raspada.⁸ Kako je ovaj proces trajao i razvijao se izvesno vreme, Arbitražna komisija je u Mišljenju broj 8, od 4. jula 1992. godine, našla da je većina novih država, stvorenih od nekadašnjih jugoslovenskih republika, pristupila uzajamnom priznavanju nezavisnosti. Time je stavila do znanja da je okončana svaka savezna vlast na teritoriji novoosnovanih država. Ovakva konstatacija polazila je od zatečenog stanja, odnosno od odsustva efektivnog vršenja državne vlasti na celokupnoj teritoriji federacije, što je u predmetnom slučaju dovelo do zaključka da „zajednički savezni organi, u okviru kojih su zastupljene sve jugoslovenske republike, više ne postoje i da od tada nijedan organ ove vrste ne funkcioniše“. Iz te premise, Arbitražna komisija je izvela zaključak da će ubuduće „bivša nacionalna teritorija i stanovništvo federacije SFRJ potpasti u potpunosti pod suverenu vlast novih država“. Konačno, Arbitražna komisija je zaključila i da se proces raspada okončao, odnosno da je „proces došao do kraja, pa da valja konstatovati da SFRJ više ne postoji“.

Budući da raspad SFRJ nije usledio na dobrovoljnoj osnovi (kao u slučajevima SSSR-a i Čehoslovačke), već je bio praćen upotrebom sile (izuzimajući Makedoniju), Arbitražna komisija je našla da sukcesiju SFRJ valja ceniti u svetlosti okolnosti u kojima su države sukcesorke nastajale (bez ulaženja u procenu legitimiteta i legalnosti secesionističkih akata koji su doveli do državnog raspada). Navedena Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije

⁷ SR Jugoslavija prihvatala je nadležnost Arbitražne komisije sve do donošenja Mišljenja br. 8, 9, i 10 od 4. jula 1992. godine. U mišljenju br. 8 vidi se da je SR Jugoslavija odbila da prihvati nadležnost Arbitražne komisije već 8. juna 1992. godine. To je potvrđeno u nekoliko navrata i kasnije. Nakon 4. jula 1992. godine Vlada SRJ zvanično je izjavila da je Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije ne obavezuju, odnosno, da ne predstavljaju pravni osnov za meritornu odluku, te da ih stoga smatra doktrinarnim u smislu čl. 38(d) Statuta Međunarodnog suda pravde. Kako SR Jugoslavija nije bila dosledna u svom stavu, jer se i dalje upuštala u delovanje Arbitražne komisije, Arbitražna komisija se proglasila nadležnom s obzirom na prirodu funkcija koje su joj dodeljene. Najeksplicitniji primer predstavlja Mišljenje od br. 11 do br. 15.

⁸ Mišljenje Arbitražne komisije br. 1 usledilo je na pitanje lorda Karingtona, predsednika Konferencije o Jugoslaviji, od 20. novembra 1991. godine, povodom suprotstavljenih stavova Srbije, s jedne strane, i ostalih republika, s druge strane, u vezi sa pravnom prirodom sukcesije SFRJ.

(uz odluke Ujedinjenih nacija o prijemu država sukcesorki SFRJ u njeno članstvo), imale su krucijalni značaj na nasleđivanje državnih granica prema starim jugoslovenskim susedima.⁹ Istovremeno, ova Mišljenja pružila su oslonac za redefinisane postojećih pravila međunarodnog prava u odnosu na pravni status nasleđenih granica između bivših jugoslovenskih republika. To se najpre očitovalo u Mišljenju broj 2, od 11. januara 1992. godine, u kojem je Arbitražna komisija limitirala domet prava samoopredeljenja u „kontekstu nejasne i nestabilne situacije“, da bi potom apostrofirala značaj principa o očuvanju granica koje postoje u trenutku sticanja nezavisnosti (*uti possidetis juris*).¹⁰

U skladu sa iznetim stanovištem, a u cilju prevazilaženja jugoslovenske krize, Arbitražna komisija je u Mišljenju broj 3, donesenom istog dana 1992. godine, zaključila: „Ako se ne dogovori suprotno, ranije granice poprimaju karakter granica koje štiti međunarodno pravo“. Zaključak Komisije proizašao je iz principa poštovanja teritorijalnog *statusa quo* i naročito principa *uti possidetis juris qui*, koji je prvobitno priznat i prihvaćen prilikom rešavanja problema dekolonizacije na američkom i afričkom kontinentu. Prema shvatanju Arbitražne komisije, ovaj princip stekao je opšti karakter saobrazno stavu Međunarodnog suda pravde iznetog u odluci od 22. decembra 1986. godine, povodom rešavanja graničnog spora između Burkin Faso i Republike Mali (Pellet, 1992, 178–185; *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1986, paras. 20–21).¹¹

⁹ Za međunarodno priznate granice SFRJ prema starim jugoslovenskim susedima, Arbitražna komisija je u Mišljenju broj 3 potvrdila princip nepovredivosti koji je konsakriran u članu 11. Bečke Konvencije o sukcesiji država u odnosu na ugovore, u Završnom aktu, kao i u Deklaraciji Konferencije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (KEBS), donetim u Helsinkiju 1975. godine, potom u Deklaraciji o principima međunarodnog prava o prijateljskim odnosima i saradnji među državama od 24. oktobra 1970. godine (u odnosu na demarkacione linije), i u Pariskoj Povelji za novu Evropu iz 1990. godine. Ovaj princip koincidirao je kolektivni konsenzus unutar Evropske zajednice u vezi priznanja novih država na prostorima SFRJ, koji je usledilo nakon donošenja Deklaracije sa smernicama o kriterijumima za priznanje država u Istočnoj Evropi i Sovjetskom Savezu i Deklaracije o Jugoslaviji od 16. decembra 1991. godine.

¹⁰ Mišljenje Arbitražne komisije broj 2 usledilo je povodom pitanja predsednika Konferencije za implementaciju mira u Jugoslaviji – lorda Karingtona, o pravu srpskog stanovništva na samoopredeljenje u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Komisija je iznela stanovište da „u trenutnoj fazi razvoja međunarodno pravo ne precizira sve posledice prava na samoopredeljenje. Ipak, utvrđeno je da ma kakve bile okolnosti pravo na samoopredeljenje ne može dovesti do izmena granica koje postoje u trenutku nezavisnosti (*uti possidetis juris*), osim u slučaju da se zainteresovane države suprotno dogovore“.

¹¹ Pregledom navedene odluke veća Međunarodnog suda pravde, kojim je predsedavao sudija Mohammed Bedjaoui, može se utvrditi da je na osnovu specijalnog sporazuma od

Stav o prihvatanju administrativnih, odnosno unutrašnjih granica za međudržavne granice „koje štiti međunarodno pravo“, a čija dispozitivnost proizilazi iz činjenice da iste prema mišljenju Arbitražne komisije predstavljaju „demarkacione linije koje će moći da se menjaju putem slobodnog i međusobnog dogovora“, dodatno je potvrđen kroz tumačenje principa o poštovanju teritorijalnog *statusa quo*, koji je bio propisan u Ustavu SFR Jugoslavije iz 1974. godine (alineja 2. i 4. člana 5). Naime, navedenom ustavnom odredbom bila je obezbeđena nepromenljivost unutrašnjih granica bez slobodno izražene saglasnosti federalnih jedinica (*Službeni list SFRJ*, 1974).¹² Konstatujući da u uslovima oružanog sukoba ne postoji saglasnost volja sukobljenih strana oko utvrđivanja međudržavnih granica, Arbitražna komisija je, s jedne strane, privremeno skinula ovo pitanje sa dnevnog reda, dok je, s druge strane,

16. septembra 1983. godine, između parničnih strana: Burkine Faso (bivše Gornje Volte) i Republike Mali (bivšeg francuskog Sudana), primenjuje isključivo princip o nepromenljivosti granica nasleđenih iz doba kolonizacije, a koji se oslanja na princip naveden u Rezoluciji Organizacije Afričkog Jedinstva iz Kaira iz 1964. godine. Smatrajući da princip *uti possidetis* nema karakter posebnog pravila, već da predstavlja opšti princip koji je logično povezan sa sticanjem nezavisnosti, Sud je u stvari naglasio činjenicu da su nove afričke države poštovale administrativne granice i granice koje su ustanovile kolonijalne vlasti, s tim da takva praksa nije ograničena u pogledu doprinosa postepenom nastanku običajnog pravila međunarodnog prava. Sud je konstatovao da princip nadmoćno pokriva pravnu prazninu do uspostavljanja efektivne vlasti kao osnove suvereniteta. Njegov primarni cilj jeste da obezbedi teritorijalne granice koje postoje u momentu sticanja nezavisnosti. Kada su ove delimitirane od strane istog suverena između kolonija ili različitih administrativnih celina, onda se primena principa ogleda u pretvaranju administrativnih granica u međunarodne granice, a što se i desilo u konkretnom slučaju povodom sticanja nezavisnosti navedenih francuskih teritorija u Zapadnoj Africi. Primenom principa *uti possidetis juris* sprečava se da bratoubilačke borbe dovedu u opasnost nezavisnost i stabilnost novih država. Imajući u vidu njegovu ulogu u obezbeđenju stabilnosti (i kada dođe u konflikt sa pravom na samoopredeljenje), princip će biti najmudriji kurs koji pokazuje promišljenost afričkih država da očuvaju teritorijalni *status quo*. Konačno, i pored činjenice da su strane u sporu zahtevale da Sud spor reši na osnovu principa o nepromenljivosti granica nasleđenih iz doba kolonijalizma (*uti possidetis iuris*), s pravom se može konstatovati da je Sud pribegao njegovoj primeni kroz primenu principa pravičnosti *infra legem*.

¹² Ustavom iz 1974. godine u članu 5. propisano je da: „Teritorija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije je jedinstvena i sačinjavaju je teritorije socijalističkih republika. Teritorija republike ne može se menjati bez pristanka republike, a teritorija autonomne pokrajine – ni bez pristanka autonomne pokrajine. Granica Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije ne može se menjati bez saglasnosti svih republika i autonomnih pokrajina. Granica između republika može se menjati samo na osnovu njihovog sporazuma, a ako se radi o granici autonomne pokrajine – i na osnovu njene saglasnosti“.

očuvala teritorijalni *status quo* novonastalih država u njihovim međusobnim odnosima.

Međutim, valja uvideti da iako se Arbitražna komisija trudila da istakne bezbednosnu funkciju usvojenog principa u uslovima u kojima bi moglo doći do rasplamsavanja oružanih sukoba koji bi doveli u opasnost tek stečenu državnu nezavisnost, Komisija nije uspela zaustaviti negativne posledice zaoštavanja političke krize na terenu (Šahović, 1996, 34).¹³ Sledstveno je to ukazalo na činjenicu da primena principa *uti possidetis*, koji je bio priznat i prihvaćen prilikom procesa dekolonizacije, u slučaju raspada SFRJ nije u potpunosti moguć.

Sticanje nezavisnosti novih država nastalih sukcesijom SFRJ, koja je bila stari subjekt međunarodnog prava i jedna od država osnivača Ujedinjenih nacija, ne može se pravno porediti sa slučajem sticanja nezavisnosti bivših kolonija. Konačno, iako je Arbitražna komisija svojim mišljenjima o primeni principa *uti possidetis* doprinela procesu „zamrzavanja“ postojećeg teritorijalnog stanja u momentu sticanja nezavisnosti bivših jugoslovenskih republika, ona nije uspela definitivno da reši sva granična pitanja koja su ostala nerešena nakon sukcesije SFRJ (Antonopoulos, 1996, 83, etc).¹⁴ Nepouzdanost nasleđenih administrativnih linija, nedostatak dokaza koji bi potvrđivao njihovo postojanje i mnogobrojna otvorena granična pitanja doprinela su utisku da su mišljenja i preporuke Arbitražne komisije povodom primene ovog principa prevazilazišla njegovu pravnu prirodu i političku svrhu (Torres Bernardes, 1994, 435; Ratner, 1996, 590; Brownlie, 1998, 19, 132).

¹³ Primenom principa *uti possidetis*, Arbitražna komisija je obezbedila teritorijalni integritet, ali je dalje, kroz princip efektiviteta, prihvatila i novu situaciju, prejudicirajući na taj način konačno političko i pravno rešenje teritorijalnog pitanja. Time je ujedno zaoštrila pitanja ostvarivanja prava na samoopredeljenje i poštovanja suvereniteta država dajući primat ovome drugom. Tako je izbegla i da definiše položaj srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini kao konstitutivnom, postupajući „pitijski“, priznajući mu kao i ostalim etničkim zajednicama status manjina sa svim pravima koja slede proglašavajući zaštitu ovih prava za *jus cogens*, i izjednačavajući pravo pojedinaca na izjašnjavanje o nacionalnom identitetu sa pravom na samoopredeljenje, dajući prioritet poštovanju teritorijalnog integriteta novih država.

¹⁴ Primena principa *uti possidetis* u slučaju SFRJ bila je nesrećna i potpuno neprimerena. Nesrećna zbog toga što je došla pre priznanja nezavisnosti secesionističkih republika i što je, kao takva, kontradiktorna sa odlukom Međunarodnog suda pravde u slučaju graničnog spora između Burkine Faso i Malija koja potvrđuje mogućnost primene principa tek nakon sticanja nezavisnosti i neretroaktivno. Neprimerena je zbog toga što je slučaj SFRJ stavila u kvazi-kolonijalni kontekst i što je to bilo potpuno strano interesima svih konstitutivnih naroda bivše Jugoslavije. Ako se smatralo da će princip biti u funkciji osiguranja mira, očigledno je da je takva procena bila pogrešna.

Otvorena granična pitanja između Hrvatske i Crne Gore

U crnogorsko-hrvatskim odnosima nakon disolucije SFRJ postavilo se kao sporno pitanje teritorijalne pripadnosti poluostrva Prevlaka s rtom Oštro, koje zajedno sa Bokokotorskim zalivom predstavlja jedinstvenu prirodnu celinu.¹⁵ Sukcesijom SFRJ Hrvatska je nasledila Prevlaku i celu Dubrovačku oblast, iako postojeća granična linija između nje i Crne Gore nije bila praćena odgovarajućim saveznim propisima. To se desilo ne zbog činjenice što uspostavljanje međurepubličkih granica u SFRJ nije imalo neki poseban značaj, već, generalno, zbog toga što bi to značilo pokretanje nacionalnog pitanja i drugih „tabu tema“ koje su opterećivale Jugoslaviju od samog njenog nastanka (Lekić, 1992, str. 147).¹⁶ Stoga je povlačenje ovih granica ostalo isključivo u funkciji podele administrativno-teritorijalnih nadležnosti republika o kojima su odluke donesene na visokom političkom nivou, ali ne i od strane konstitucionalno nadležnih organa jugoslovenske federacije (Zečević & Lekić, 1991, 25; Zečević, 1994, 127–132; Dimitrijević, 2012, 125; 2024, 775, etc.).¹⁷

¹⁵ Prevlaka se završava s rtom Oštro (južnim rtom), koji sa rtom Mirišta (Arza) na poluostrvu Luštica (na istočnoj strani) čini moreuz, kao spoljni ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv, širine 1,6 nautičke milje (3 km). Prema Hercegovskom zalivu more se sužava između rta Kobila (severnog rta) i rta Đurov kam (Kabala) na poluostrvu Luštica na manje od jedne nautičke milje (1,6 km). Prostor između linije rt Oštra – rt Mirišta i rt Kobila – rt Đurov kam, dužine je 1,8 nautičke milje (3,3 km) i između poluostrva Vitaljine (zapadno) i Luštice (istočno) naziva se Bokokotorska vrata. Prema geografskim pokazateljima poluostrvo zauzima površinu od 5,24 km kvadratnih, dužine oko 2,5 km i širine oko 460 m na njegovoj najzapadnijoj strani.

¹⁶ Ustanovljavanje međurepubličkih granica pokrenulo bi osetljiva politička pitanja koja su zaostala iz prošlosti, poput pitanja načina povlačenja administrativnih linija nakon Drugog svetskog rata, njihovih aktera, načina revizije prema poznatim međunarodnim kriterijumima, pitanja promene nacionalnog sastava stanovništva usled ratnih zločina i genocida izvršenog nad Srbima, Jevrejima i Romima u NDH itd.

¹⁷ Iz istorijske dokumentarne građe ne može se zaključiti ko je, kako, kada i na osnovu kojih kriterijuma uspostavio granice između republika bivše Jugoslavije. Ono što je sigurno, one nisu nastale tokom „rata i revolucije“ (odlukama AVNOJ-a), a nijedan nadležni federalni organ nakon rata nije doneo pravni akt kojim se utvrđuju administrativne granice između ovih federalnih jedinica. U fazi izrade prvog posleratnog Ustava, Ustavotvorni odbor pokrenuo je ovo pitanje iznoseći inicijativu da se granice između federalnih jedinica ozakone. Ista je odbijena s obrazloženjem „da su granice nastale prirodnim putem“. Nakon što je usvojen prvi Ustav Jugoslavije iz 1946. godine, u njemu je bilo propisano da „razgraničenje teritorija narodnih republika vrši Narodna skupština FNRJ“ i da se „granice narodne republike ne mogu se menjati bez njenog pristanka“. Ostaje nejasno koji su razlozi opredelili politički vrh Jugoslavije da se pravno ne ozakone granice između federalnih jedinica? Budući da su republike nakon rata krenule sa usvajanjem propisa o teritorijalno-administrativnoj podeli prateći zatečeno

Istini za volju, nakon sukcesije SFRJ nasleđena administrativna granica između Crne Gore i Hrvatske poklopila se sa pravno manjkavom linijom razgraničenja takozvane *Banovine Hrvatske*, koja je Uredbom Kraljevskog namesništva od 26. avgusta 1939. godine, neposredno pred izbijanje Drugog svetskog rata, proglašena administrativno-teritorijalnom jedinicom Kraljevine Jugoslavije (*Politika*, 1939; *Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, 1939; Tasić, 1938, 228–257; Kostić, 1939, 449; Vladislavljević, 1940, 130–135; Lukić, 1940, 113–130; Vesović, 1992, 255; Boban 1993, 40–42).¹⁸ Budući da je ova linija razgraničenja faktički prihvaćena i u federativnoj Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svetskog rata, nakon disolucije SFRJ, ista je pod dejstvom principa *uti possidetis*, pretvorena *via facti* u međudržavnu

teritorijalno stanje (po nekim tezama – prateći teritorijalno delovanje nacionalnih ogranaka Komunističke partije pre i u toku Drugog svetskog rata), administrativne linije razdvajanja jurisdikcija republičkih organa vlasti, posredno su identifikovane sa unutrašnjim međurepubličkim granicama.

¹⁸ Obrazovanje Banovine Hrvatske bilo iznuđeno popuštanjem jugoslovenskog Kraljevskog namesništva predstavnicima hrvatskog nacionalnog pokreta. Zbog uverenja da se približava svetski rat i da u takvim prilikama pod pritiskom velikih sila (Nemačke, Italije, ali i Velike Britanije) nije moguće očuvati integritet države, Kraljevsko namesništvo na čelu sa Knezom Pavlom i predsednikom Vlade Dragišom Cvetkovićem ušlo je u pregovore sa predsednikom Hrvatske seljačke stranke Vlatkom Mačekom, što je nakon kraćeg oklevanja, 23. avgusta 1939. godine, dovelo do potpisivanja „Sporazuma Cvetković-Maček“, koji, iako nije imao „državnopravnu snagu“, imao je „političko značenje“ jer je doveo do prekrajanja državne teritorije. Doduše, povlačenje administrativne granice Banovine Hrvatske bilo je privremenog karaktera, budući da je sam Sporazum predviđao da teritorijalni obim nadležnosti tek treba da se odredi prilikom „preuređenja države“. U pravnom smislu ovaj Sporazum dobio je na značaju kada je Kraljevsko namesništvo, nakon raspuštanja Narodne skupštine i Senata, donelo Uredbu o Banovini Hrvatskoj – 26. avgusta 1939. godine. Uredbom je predviđeno priključenje Savske i Primorske banovine, kao i srezova – Dubrovnik, Šid, Ilok, Brčko, Gradačac, Derventa, Travnik i Fojnica (kao delova dotadašnje Dunavske, Vrbaske, Drinske i Zetske banovine) Banovini Hrvatskoj. Priključenje Dubrovačkog sreza Banovini Hrvatskoj obuhvatilo je i područje Prevlake koja je do tada bila u sastavu Zetske banovine. Zanimljivo je da je Uredba doneta s pozivom na član 116. Ustava Kraljevine Jugoslavije iz 1931. godine, koja je po svojoj pravnoj prirodi predstavljala „Uredbu po nuždi“, a koju kralj donosi u kontekstu preduzimanja izvanrednih mera i nezavisno od ustavnih i zakonskih propisa. U Uredbi, međutim, nigde se decidno ne pominje ovaj kontekst koji prema članu 116. Ustava podrazumeva rat, mobilizaciju, neredu i pobunu „koje bi dovele u pitanje javni poredak i sigurnost države“, već se *lato sensu*, navodi „obezbeđenje učešća Hrvata u životu države“ kako bi se očuvali javni interesi (iz čega logično proizilazi da su „javni interesi“ zbog toga bili do te mere ugroženi da su pretili javnom poretku i sigurnosti države). Budući da je čitav postupak zaključivanja Sporazuma i donošenja Uredbe o Banovini Hrvatskoj kao *corpus separatum*-u prošao bez parlamentarnog odobrenja koje je prema Ustavu bilo striktno predviđeno, unutrašnje administrativno razgraničenje teritorije Kraljevine Jugoslavije nije moglo proizvesti valjane pravne posledice.

granicu, što nije bilo pravno prihvatljivo za Crnu Goru. Ovo, ne samo zbog činjenice što je ta administrativna linija prvobitno uspostavljena na pravno manjkav način, već takođe i zbog činjenice što se administrativna linija pružala duž područja Prevlake koja je od nastanka Jugoslavije imala poseban vojno-strateški značaj (Perazić, 1995, 20).¹⁹ O tome, uostalom, svedoči i činjenica da je Prevlaka odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata pretvorena u artiljerijsku postaju Jugoslovenske narodne armije (JNA), da bi nakon toga, 1953. godine, na njoj bili uspostavljeni strateški vojni objekti (radarski centar, protivavionska i raketna baza). Iz odbrambenih i bezbednosnih razloga poluostrvo je nacionalizovano, a nepokretnosti privatnih vlasnika bile su eksproprisane. Zemljište na Prevlaci registrovano je kao državna imovina pod direktnom upravom i kontrolom JNA.²⁰ Takvo stanje ostalo je sve do konačnog razrešenja političke krize u SFRJ i demilitarizacije ovog područja.

Sa pitanjem razgraničenja Crne Gore i Hrvatske na Prevlaci povezan je problem njihovog razgraničenja na Jadranskom moru. S obzirom na to

¹⁹ Od tridesetih godina XX veka vojska se sve više zanimala za Prevlaku. Na njenom području bila je smeštena baterija tvrđavske artiljerije. U sredini poluostrva izgrađeno je nekoliko baraka. Rt Oštro imao je stalnu vojnu posadu, svetionik i reflektore za motrenje neba iznad Konavla i Boke Kotorske. Vojska je bila i na rtu Kobilu, a 1932. godine proširena je cesta od Kobile do Prevlake, da bi se 1935. godine izgradila tvrđava na Klačini.

²⁰ Nacionalizacija i eksproprijacija izvršene su u periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine. Tadašnji Državni sekretarijat za poslove narodne odbrane (DSNO) formalno je preuzeo delove Prevlake poput zemljišta na rtu Oštro koje je eksproprisano od lokalnog stanovništva sela Vitaljina i predato na korišćenje i upravljanje JNA i Jugoslovenskoj ratnoj mornarici (JRM). Rešenjem Kotarskog suda u Dubrovniku, od 12. januara 1969. godine, uknjiženo je pravo vlasništva na nepokretnostima na Prevlaci kao državna imovina DSNO u Beogradu (kasnije preimenovanog u Savezni sekretarijat za poslove narodne odbrane – SSNO). Vojni kompleks na Prevlaciji bio je nadograđivan nizom sukcesivnih akata i naredbi SSNO-a i Saveznog izvršnog veća (SIV-a) tokom sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka. Faktički i pravno time je uspostavljena teritorijalna vojna zona savezne države, gde vlasti Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske nisu imale nikakve nadležnosti. Bezbednost, kontrolu pristupa i plovidbu u neposrednoj blizini vojnih objekata na Prevlaci kontrolisala je isključivo komanda JNA, odnosno JRM u skladu sa saveznim propisima. Ona je kontrolisala spoljni i unutrašnji morski pojas oko Prevlake radi zaštite vojnog kompleksa i ulaza u Bokotorski zaliv. Nakon sticanja nezavisnosti, Republika Hrvatska je donela Zakon o naknadi za imovinu oduzetu za vrijeme jugoslovenske komunističke vladavine, 30. oktobra 1996. godine (*Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, 1996). Pozivajući se na razloge nacionalne i vojne bezbednosti, Hrvatska je odugovlačila sa naturalnom restitucijom, što je dovelo do dugotrajnih i iscrpljujućih sudskih postupaka sa ranijim privatnim vlasnicima zemljišta. Za delove zemljišta na kojem su bili fortifikacijski objekti, Hrvatska je ustupila zamensko zemljište ili je isplatila novčane naknade.

da je prema zakonodavstvu SFRJ Jadransko more tretirano kao deo jedinstvene državne teritorije, za razgraničenje Crne Gore i Hrvatske u ovoj teritorijalnoj oblasti nužno je prethodno utvrditi granicu na kopnu.²¹ Ova delimitacija stoga pretpostavlja analizu pravnih činjenica koje mogu biti od koristi za utvrđivanje linije razgraničenja. Između ostalog, to podrazumeva i utvrđivanje efektivnih nadležnosti ovih bivših jugoslovenskih republika u kontekstu zakonodavstva koje je važilo u državi prethodnici.

Primeru radi, u članu 3. Zakona o obalnom moru Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije (FNRJ) iz 1948. godine, navodi se da unutrašnje morske vode FNRJ obuhvataju i „Boku Kotorsku od veze Rt Veslo – Rt Oštro“. Pritom, odredba jasno definiše da Prevlaka predstavlja sastavni deo Boke Kotorske. Štaviše, u odredbi člana 4. Zakona navodi se i da: „Svi propisi FNRJ važe i primenjuju se u unutrašnjem morskom pojasu“, što je konkretno značilo da su se na vršenje republičke administrativne jurisdikcije u Jadranskom moru pored zakonskih primenjivali i određeni podzakonski akti koji su imali relevantnu snagu za određivanje pravca pružanja administrativne granice između Crne Gore i Hrvatske (*Službeni list FNRJ*, 1948).

U navedenom smislu, značajna je Uredba Vlade FNRJ o osnivanju pomorskih oblasti od 1. januara 1952. godine (*Službeni list FNRJ*, 1952, 9–10). Njome se utvrđuje da je Prevlaka, kao i čitav Bokokotorski zaliv sve do reke Bojane i Skadarskog jezera, pod jurisdikcijom Uprave pomorske oblasti južnog Jadrana sa sedištem u Kotoru.²² Potonjim podzakonskim

²¹ Prema članu 1. Zakona o obalnom moru i epikontinentalnom pojasu (*Službeni list SFRJ*, 1987, 1989, 1994 i 1996), suverenitet SFRJ na moru prostirao se na obalno more SFRJ (koje sačinjavaju unutrašnje morske vode i teritorijalno more), vazdušni prostor iznad njega i na morsko dno i podzemlje.

²² Uredbom su osnovani teritorijalno-administrativni organi Ministarstva pomorstva FNRJ, i to: 1) Uprava Pomorske oblasti severnog Jadrana sa sedištem u Rijeci; 2) Uprava Pomorske oblasti srednjeg Jadrana sa sedištem u Splitu i, 3) Uprava Pomorske oblasti južnog Jadrana sa sedištem u Kotoru. Svi upravni poslovi u oblasti pomorstva koji su do ove Uredbe bili u nadležnosti direkcija luka preneti su u nadležnost uprava pomorskih oblasti. Uprave pomorskih oblasti kao teritorijalni organi pomorske uprave bile su zadužene da se neposredno ili posredno preko lučkih kapetanija staraju o bezbednosti pomorskog saobraćaja i plovidbe po moru, o redu i poretku u lukama i obalnom moru FNRJ, o pravilnom funkcionisanju pomorske rasvete i balisažnih znakova u obalnom moru FNRJ, kao i o zaštiti ljudskih života na moru. Unutrašnju organizaciju i teritorijalnu nadležnost uprava pomorskih oblasti imao je da odredi Ministar za pomorstvo FNRJ, u saglasnosti sa Predsednikom Saveta za zakonodavstvo i izgradnju narodne vlasti Vlade FNRJ. Uredba je stupila na snagu danom donošenja, 1. januara 1952. godine, a potpisali su je predsednik Vlade FNRJ i

aktom – Rešenjem Ministarstva pomorstva FNRJ br. 1724 o teritorijalnoj nadležnosti uprava pomorskih oblasti od 14. aprila 1952. godine, potvrđuje se ranija usvojena regulacija sadržana u pomenutoj Uredbi, čime je *ipso iure*, određena administrativna granica između uprava Srednjeg i Južnog Jadrana u delu obale i obalnog mora FNRJ (*Službeni list FNRJ*, 1952, 546; Arhiv Jugoslavije, 552, F-551, poverljiv broj 280).²³

Tokom osamdesetih godina XX veka Crna Gora je usvojila Zakon o pomorskoj i unutrašnjoj plovidbi i Zakon o morskom ribarstvu (*Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore*, 1978, 1979. i 1987). Hrvatska je usvojila Zakon o bezbednosti plovidbe na moru i u unutrašnjim vodama i Zakon o pomorskom ribarstvu (*Narodne novine Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske*, 1978 i 1980). Ovim propisima utvrđene su granice njihove jurisdikcije u oblasti pomorske plovidbe i ribarstva. U tom smislu, u crnogorskim zakonima jasno je definisano da Crna Gora vrši jurisdikciju u čitavom Bokokotorskom zalivu uključujući unutrašnje more uz Prevlaku (rt Oštro), dok u paralelnim hrvatskim zakonima ovo pitanje nije regulisano verovatno iz razloga što je u tom periodu, na osnovu saveznih propisa, JNA kontrolisala i spoljni i unutrašnji morski pojas oko Prevlake radi zaštite vojnog kompleksa i ulaza u Boku Kotorsku.²⁴

Ministar narodne odbrane, Maršal Jugoslavije Josip Broz Tito i ministar pomorstva FNRJ Maks Baće.

²³ Ministar pomorstva FNRJ Maks Baće, pozivajući se na Uredbu o osnivanju pomorskih oblasti, uz saglasnost Predsednika Saveta za zakonodavstvo i izgradnju narodne vlasti Vlade FNRJ, Edvarda Kardelja, doneo je 14. aprila 1952. godine Rešenje br. 1724 o teritorijalnoj nadležnosti uprava pomorskih oblasti prema kojem, „teritorijalna nadležnost Uprave pomorske oblasti južnog Jadrana, sa sedištem u Kotoru, obuhvata područje obale i teritorijalnog mora FNRJ, koje se prostire unutar granice koja ide do uvala Prevlake, uključivši poluostrvo Prevlaka, morskom obalom i teritorijalnim vodama sve do ušća reke Bojane, a odatle državnom granicom FNRJ uz reku Bojanu i Skadarsko Jezero, uključivši reke i kanale plovne za morske brodove“. Tokom 1952. godine nadležni organi Republike Crne Gore vršili su efektivnu vlast u Upravi pomorske oblasti južnog Jadrana, što je potvrđeno i zahtevom za izgradnju luke u uvali Bigovo (zalivu Trašte – 10 km severozapadno od Budve), koji je podneo Okružni narodni odbor Kotor – Ministarstvu pomorstva FNRJ. U obrazloženju zahteva, između ostalog se navodi: „Zaliv Trašte – zaliv Bigovo služi kao zaštitna luka i manjim brodovima u slučaju lošeg vremena, jer nema drugog skloništa na području od rta Oštra do Budve. Sa ovim se složila i uprava luke Kotor.

²⁴ Činjenica da je JNA imala imovinska prava na Prevlaci i da je efektivno vršila vlast na njenom kopnenom i pomorskom području, za Hrvatsku nije značilo da je to područje izuzeto iz njene jurisdikcije. Naime, ona je to područje administrativno i katastarski tretirala kao deo područja Vitaljine i Pločice u Konavlima, koja su u sastavu opštine Dubrovnik, a što se vidi iz teksta Zakona o područjima općina i kotara u Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj (*Narodne novine NR Hrvatske*, 1962, 1965, 1967, 1973, 1974, 1986. i 1988).

Pitanje Prevlake otvoreno je nakon izbijanja jugoslovenske krize pred Savetom bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija gde je svake godine razmatrano pod tačkom: „Situacija u Hrvatskoj“. U cilju prevazilaženja bezbednosnih problema, poluostrvo Prevlaka stavljeno je pod kontrolu Zaštitnih snaga Ujedinjenih nacija (*United Nations Protection Force* – UNPROFOR) na osnovu Rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti br. 743 od 21. februara 1992. godine, s ciljem uspostavljanja demilitarizovanih zona u spornom području. Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (SRJ) i Hrvatska postigle su Sporazum o demilitarizaciji Prevlake, 30. septembra 1992. godine (UN Documents S/24476 i S/23280; Nikolić, 2022, 217–244).²⁵ Ubrzo potom, 6. oktobra 1992. godine, Savet bezbednosti doneo je Rezoluciju br. 779, kojom je potvrdio obavezu strana u sporu da vojno napuste ovo područje (Vukasović, 1998, 197). Nakon demilitarizacije Prevlake, područje je bilo izdvojeno na dve oblasti. U „žutoj“ su boravile policijske snage strana u sporu, dok su u „plavoj“ superviziju obavljale posmatračke misije svetske organizacije (Šahović, 2002, 4). Nakon isteka mandata UNPROFOR-a, Savet bezbednosti doneo je novu Rezoluciju br. 981, od 31. marta 1995. godine, kojom je uspostavio mirovnu misiju – „Operaciju Ujedinjenih nacija za obnavljanje poverenja u Hrvatskoj“ (*United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia* – UNCRO), koja je nadgledala proces demilitarizacije. Konačno, Rezolucijom br. 1038, od 15. januara 1996. godine, Savet bezbednosti odobrio je mandat nove posmatračke misije na Prevlaci (*UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka* – UNMOP), koji je obnavljan na šestomesečnoj bazi, sve do 15. decembra 2002. godine.

Pošto je priroda spora bila izuzetno komplikovana s vojnog, političkog, istorijskog i pravnog aspekta, a imajući u vidu da granice na kopnu nisu *de iure* priznate kao polazna osnova za razgraničenje na moru, Crna Gora i Hrvatska su nakon zaključenja Sporazuma o normalizaciji odnosa, 23. avgusta 1996. godine, prihvatile obavezu da pristupe regulisanju spora

²⁵ Demilitarizacija Prevlake zvanično je pokrenuta Zajedničkom deklaracijom koju su u Ženevi potpisali predsednik Republike Hrvatske Franjo Tuđman i predsednik Savezne Republike Jugoslavije Dobrica Ćosić 30. septembra 1992. godine. Ovaj dokument, sastavljen pod pokroviteljstvom Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji uz posredovanje Sajrusa Vensa i lorda Dejvida Ovena. Isti se temeljio na tzv. *Vensovom planu* i mirovnom planu za Hrvatsku, koji su predviđali povlačenje JNA sa poluostrva Prevlaka i uspostavljanje zone pod kontrolom Ujedinjenih nacija. Konačan dogovor o samom povlačenju JNA, koji je precizirao predaju objekata posmatračima Ujedinjenih nacija, utanačen je novim sastankom istih lidera 20. oktobra 1992. godine u Ženevi. Tada je predviđeno da se formira zajednička međudržavna komisija koja bi razmatrala sva bezbednosna pitanja u Bokokotorskom zalivu i području Dubrovnika koje se graniči sa Prevlakom.

oko Prevlake „vodeći međusobne pregovore u duhu Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija i dobrosusedstva“ (*Službeni list SRJ, Međunarodni ugovori*, 1996; UN Documents A/51/318, S/1996/706).²⁶ Međutim, nakon ratifikacije ovog Sporazuma (20. septembra u Hrvatskoj i 27. septembra 1996. godine u SRJ), kada je došlo do obostranog priznanja, pitanje Prevlake i dalje je ostalo otvoreno opterećujući njihove međusobne odnose.

Argumentacija u vezi pripadnosti Prevlake

U pregovorima sa Hrvatskom, Crna Gora je u okviru jugoslovenske delegacije isticala argument da teritorijalni spor neminovno pokreće i niz bezbednosnih pitanja, jer Prevlaka i rt Oštro prirodno zatvaraju ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv. Da to nije sporno govori i činjenica da je za vreme SFRJ Prevlaka bila pod isključivom kontrolom JNA, te da nije bila pod administrativnom upravom Hrvatske. U kasnijoj argumentaciji, Crna Gora je tvrdila da bi prepuštanje rta Oštro Hrvatskoj ugrozilo bezbednost i suverenitet Crne Gore, jer bi Hrvatska kontrolisala jedini pomorski ulaz u njenu najveću pomorsku luku. Da bi zaštitila svoje geopolitičke interese, Crna Gora je insistirala na teritorijalnoj celovitosti Bokokotorskog zaliva koji predstavlja nedeljivu geografsku i ambijentalnu celinu. Stoga se i granica na Jadranskom moru, prema njenom shvatanju, ne bi smela povući na način da preseca sam ulaz u ovaj zaliv.

S druge strane, Hrvatska je u pregovorima sa Crnom Gorom insistirala ne samo na bezbednosnom aspektu graničnog problema Prevlake, već i na „istorijskim granicama“. U tom smislu, ona se pozvala na princip o nepromenljivosti republičkih granica (*uti possidetis*) kojeg je apostrofirala Arbitražna komisija Mirovne konferencije EEZ u svojim mišljenjima, a čiji je *fons et origo* proizašao iz procesa dekolonizacije u kojem je ovaj princip imao prevashodno preventivnu ulogu u pogledu obezbeđenja mira i stabilnosti nakon sticanja nezavisnosti bivših kolonija. Prema hrvatskom stanovištu, poluostrvo Prevlaka je još od rimskog doba, preko doba Dubrovačke Republike, vlade Napoleona, Habsburške monarhije, Kraljevine Jugoslavije do komunističke Jugoslavije pripadala hrvatskom Konavlu (Prevlaka Fact Sheets, 2004). Ovakvim pristupom Hrvatska je prejudicirala svoj „državno-istorijski kontinuitet“ u pogledu kopnene granice na Prevlaci, negirajući bilo kakvu mogućnost promene provizorne

²⁶ U članu 4. Sporazuma navodi se: „Ugovorne strane saglasne su da reše sporno pitanje Prevlake međusobnim pregovorima. Dok se ne postigne međusobni dogovor o Prevlaci, ugovorne strane su saglasne da poštuju postojeći bezbednosni režim uspostavljen kroz monitoring Ujedinjenih nacija.“

granične linije iz vremena dok je bila u sastavu Jugoslavije. U pogledu delimitacije na Jadranskom moru, Hrvatska je zahtevala doslednu primenu Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982 (UNCLOS III) (*UN Treaty Series*, 1994, Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983).²⁷ Prema njenom mišljenju, to bi značilo da ona ima pravo da jednostrano i po automatizmu povuče liniju razgraničenja koja polazi od ulaza u Bokokotorski zaliv između ostrva Mamule i rta Oštro u dužini od 12 nautičkih milja od najisturenije tačke administrativne granice na rtu Kobila, zatvarajući na taj način ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv.²⁸

Navedeno mišljenje koje se temelji na principu ekvidistance (linije sredine), nije bilo prihvatljivo za Crnu Goru koja je smatrala da jednostrano povlačenje granične linije od rta Oštro do Mamule, faktički zatvara ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv. Pomenuto nastojanje predstavljalo je kršenje njenog prava na slobodan izlaz na otvoreno more, zbog čega je Crna Gora zahtevala od hrvatske strane da linija razgraničenja bude pomerena zapadno od rta Oštro, uz uvažavanje relevantnih okolnosti i geografskog položaja Bokokotorskog zaliva čiji ulaz zajedno sa rtom Oštro ima stratešku važnost za bezbednost i privredu Crne Gore.

Tokom 1998. godine Crna Gora je formirala ekspertsku komisiju sa zadatkom da putem pregovora iznađe optimalno rešenje oko regulisanja pitanja Prevlake. Međutim, započinjanjem pregovora između strana postavljeno je pitanje pravne pripadnosti poluostrva. Dok je Hrvatska iznela stav da polaže teritorijalna prava na osnovu tapija i katastarskih premera, Crna Gora je tvrdila da su tapije izdate od opštinskih organa Herceg Novog i Kotora, što je ukazivalo na stvarno vršenje jurisdikcije nad spornim područjem. Istovremeno, Crna Gora je podsetila da je celo ovo

²⁷ Konvencija o pravu mora iz 1982 (UNCLOS III), predstavlja kodifikaciju i progresivni razvoj međunarodnog prava mora. Istom su preuzeta i dopunjena pravila sadržana u ranije usvojenim Ženevskim konvencijama iz 1958. godine: *Konvenciji o teritorijalnom moru i spoljnom pojasu*, *Konvenciji o otvorenom moru*, *Konvenciji o ribolovu i očuvanju živih bogatstava otvorenog mora* i *Konvenciji o epikontinentalnom pojasu*.

²⁸ Republika Hrvatska preuzela je Zakon o obalnom moru i epikontinentalnom pojasu SFRJ, Zakonom o preuzimanju saveznih zakona u oblasti pomorske i unutarnje plovidbe koji se u Republici Hrvatskoj primjenjuju kao republički zakoni (*Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, 1991). Iako ovim Zakonom nisu bile utvrđene međurepubličke granice na Jadranskom moru, Hrvatska je tvrdila da ima pravo da jednostrano povuče graničnu liniju u pravcu od završetka kopnene granice na poluostrvu Prevlaka. Ovakvo hrvatsko stanovište bilo je predmet oštih pravno-političkih sporenja i različitih tumačenja tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka. Tako, ni samim prestankom primene jugoslovenskog Zakona o obalnom moru i epikontinentalnom pojasu, i donošenjem prvog hrvatskog Pomorskog zakonika, 7. marta 1994. godine, ovo pitanje nije bilo rešeno (*Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, 1994).

područje u Jugoslaviji bilo izuzeto iz jurisdikcije Hrvatske zbog svog vojno-bezbednosnog značaja. Uz navedeno, ona je istakla i činjenicu da su u bivšoj Jugoslaviji Lučke kapetanije Crne Gore u Zeleniki i Herceg Novom bile nadležne za carinsku kontrolu u Pomorskom regionu Južnog Jadrana. Nadležnost Lučke kapetanije u Zeleniki prostirala se na područje ograničeno granicom koja ide od Prevlackog zaliva do rta Oštro, Hercegnovskim zalivom, Kumborskim moreuzom, duž obale do svetionika na rtu Turski, zatim pravcem koji čini granicu Kotorske kapetanije, kroz sredinu moreuza Verige do sela Petrovići i dalje duž obale do rta Kočište i linije koja spaja taj rt sa selom Petrovići na suprotnoj strani. Nadležnost Lučke kapetanije u Herceg Novom prostirala se od zaliva Prevlaka do rta Oštro, zaliva Herceg Novi do granice Lučke kapetanije Zelenika, uključujući Rose, duž obale do rta Kočište i dalje do sela Petrovići (Perazić, 1996, 16).

S obzirom na suprotstavljena stanovišta koja su počivala na suštinski različitim pravnim pristupima (katastarskom – privatnopravnom i administrativnom – javnopravnom), princip *uti possidetis* kojeg je predložila Arbitražna komisija za Jugoslaviju o pretvaranju međurepubličkih granica u državne nije bilo moguće automatski sprovesti. Ovo zbog toga, što sporazum o razgraničenju nije bilo moguće lako postići, pa je pitanje Prevlake ostalo da i dalje opterećuje odnose između Crne Gore i Hrvatske.

Prolongiranje postizanja rešenja o Prevlaci

Uprkos postepenoj normalizaciji odnosa, pregovori o Prevlaci bili su u više navrata prolongirani. Razlozi za to bili su u događanjima koji su sledili. Naime, Hrvatska je 18. juna 1998. godine iznela jednostrani predlog delimitacije „na osnovu postojeće kopnene granice“ (S/1998/533, June 18, 1998). Iste godine, 10. jula, SRJ je predložila razgraničenje duž autoputa Herceg Novi – Sutorina – Dubrovnik (S/1998/632, July 10, 1998). Tokom parafiranja Opšteg okvirnog mirovnog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini u vojnoj bazi Rajt Peterson kod Dejtona 21. novembra 1995. godine, a potom i prilikom njegovog potpisivanja 14. decembra 1995. godine u Parizu, hrvatska strana nije prihvatila jugoslovenski predlog o razmeni teritorija. SRJ je 28. decembra 1998. godine podnela Savetu bezbednosti Memorandum o svojoj pregovaračkoj poziciji u vezi sa regionom Prevlake i očuvanjem sistema bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija (S/1998/1225, Annex II, December 28, 1998, 4–6).

U Memorandumu je istakla da „SRJ smatra Prevlaku svojom teritorijom na osnovu principa *uti possidetis de facto*, što je u potpunosti u

skladu sa međunarodnim pravom, Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i dokumentima Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS)". Ovo tim pre jer, istorijski gledano, u ovom području „nikad nije došlo do razgraničenja”.²⁹ Sledstveno navedenom, otpravnik poslova stalne misije SRJ pri Ujedinjenim nacijama uputio je 8. februara 2000. godine pismo predsedniku Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, u kojem je istakao niz argumenata kojima se „dokazuje da je Bokokotorski zaliv, uključujući poluostrvo Prevlaka kao njegov sastavni deo, zajedno sa komunikacijama i instalacijama (poštanskim i energetske), koje ga povezuju sa kopnenom masom Crne Gore, sastavni deo SRJ” (S/2000/95, February 9, 2000).³⁰

U nastavku pregovaračkog procesa sa Republikom Hrvatskom, na inicijativu predstavnika Crne Gore, Skupština SRJ je na sednici Veća republika od 13. novembra i Veća građana od 14. decembra 2002. godine donela Deklaraciju o zaštiti interesa SRJ u procesu razgraničenja sa Republikom Hrvatskom u području Bokokotorskog zaliva (*Službeni list SRJ*, 2002). Deklaracijom se obavezuje Savezna Vlada da oformi stručnu komisiju za pregovore u čijoj će nadležnosti biti priprema teksta ugovora o razgraničenju „u području Bokokotorskog zaliva (Južni sektor SRJ)”, u skladu sa Ustavom i međunarodnopravnom regulativom (*Politika*, 2002). Budući da je misiji mirovnih snaga Ujedinjenih nacija isticao mandat na Prevlaci krajem 2002. godine i da se posle toga nije znalo kakav će biti njen status, strane u pregovorima su u skladu sa obavezom obaveštavanja Saveta bezbednosti iz Rezolucije 1387, i željom da doprinesu trajnom miru i stabilnosti u regionu iskoristile pogodan trenutak da definišu osnovne principe identifikacije državne granice, nagoveštavajući time da će budući dogovor o granici uključivati i regulisanje pograničnog režima na Jadranu. Nakon što je u dva navrata produžio mandat međunarodnoj mirovnoj misiji, Savet bezbednosti 11. novembra 2002. godine usvojio je Rezoluciju 1437 kojom je okončao mandat UNOMOP-a na Prevlaci.

²⁹ U Memorandumu se precizira da „činjenica da nikada u istoriji nije sprovedeno razgraničenje u spornom regionu dokazuje da tvrdnja Republike Hrvatske da SRJ želi da promeni „međunarodno priznate granice” nije tačna. SRJ želi samo da uspostavi međudržavnu granicu sa Republikom Hrvatskom u južnom sektoru na osnovu međunarodnog prava i principa jednakosti, jer je to obaveza dve države od međunarodnog značaja”.

³⁰ Interesantno je da se u ovom pismu konstatuje da „Mišljenje br. 3 Arbitražne komisije u potpunosti isključuje period pre 1918. godine, to jest, pre Pariske mirovne konferencije, tako da je direktno ili indirektno polaganje prava hrvatske strane na državni i pravni kontinuitet Austro-Ugarske, to jest, Dubrovačke Republike, irelevantno”.

Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu

Sa okončanjem međunarodne misije Ujedinjenih nacija na Prevlaci, pregovarački proces bio je intenziviran u okviru međudržavne diplomatske komisije formirane u januaru 2002. godine. Komisija je pripremila tekst Protokola o načelima za identifikaciju – utvrđivanje granične linije i pripremu Ugovora o državnoj granici koji je potpisan od strane ministara spoljnih poslova dve strane 23. aprila 2002. godine.³¹ Naponi međudržavne komisije doveli su do zaključenja Protokola o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu 10. decembra 2002. godine (*Službeni list SRJ, Međunarodni ugovori*, 2002; *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske, Međunarodni ugovori*, 2002; S/2002/1348, December 11, 2002).³² Režim uspostavljen Protokolom ima svrhu da olakša pronalaženje konačnog rešenja za identifikaciju zajedničke državne granice na Jadranskom moru. Protokolom se uvažavaju uzajamna prava i naglašava se potreba sprovođenja obaveza na bazi uzajamnog poveranja (*bona fides*). Uz navedeno, njime se potvrđuje i princip nepriznavanja jednostrano preduzetih akata sa bilo čije strane. Protokol predviđa da je njegov pravni režim „samo privremen do zaključenja konačnog sporazuma o razgraničenju“ (član 1), i da „odredbe o povlačenju granične linije na moru ne prejudiciraju konačno rešenje pitanja međusobnog razgraničenja“ (član 2).

Privremeno razgraničenje teritorijalnog mora utvrđeno je u kablama – mernim jedinicama koje predstavljaju 1/10 nautičke milje ili 185, 2 metra. Prema Protokolu, granična linija tako ide od tačke udaljene tri kabla (555, 6 metara), od rta Oštro, na spojnici rt Oštro – rt Veslo, te se nastavlja pravom linijom 12 milja pod azimutom 206°, do otvorenog mora (član 6).³³

³¹ Protokolom je dogovoreno da se pregovori o kopnenoj i pomorskoj delimitaciji vode odvojeno u okviru posebnih podkomisija, budući da za njih važe različita pravna pravila i načela. Tako je za identifikaciju i utvrđivanje granice na kopnu dogovoreno da se kao polazna osnova uzmu nasleđene republičke granice, dok je za utvrđivanje granica u Jadranskom moru dogovoreno da se rešenja traže u skladu sa Konvencijom o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III). Pregovori o utvrđivanju granica na kopnu i granica na moru trebalo bi da se vode u duhu dobrosusedstva i dobre vere (*bona fides*). Svaki jednostrani akt ili pokušaj promene stanja na terenu pre nego što se postigne konačan ugovor o državnoj granici, ništavi su *ab initio*. Nakon što je SRJ promenila ime u Državnu zajednicu SCG 2003. godine, rad međudržavne diplomatske komisije počeo je polako da jenjava da bi 2006. godine, nakon odvajanja Crne Gore od Državne zajednice, bio definitivno okončan.

³² Tekst Protokola dostavljen je u prevodu predsedniku Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija u pismu jugoslovenskih i hrvatskih predsednika od 11. decembra 2002. godine.

³³ Postignuto rešenje znači da je ulaz u zaliv, kao i u vreme bivše SFRJ, prava osnovna linija od Rta Oštro na najjužnijem delu poluostrva Prevlaka do Rta Veslo u Crnoj Gori.

Razgraničenje na kopnu i moru praćeno je određenim topografskim i pomorskim kartama (Aneksi I,II, III i V).

Protokolom je došlo do distribucije državnih nadležnosti vezano za prelazak granice, pogranični režim, policijsku i carinsku upravu i druga granična pitanja. SR Jugoslaviji (danas Crnoj Gori kao njenom sukcesoru), priznaje se pravo jurisdikcije na severnom području od Konfina, dok se Hrvatskoj ustupa isto pravo na njegovom jugozapadnom delu. Demilitarizacija kopnenog područja predstavlja obavezu za obe strane, i to sa hrvatske strane u širini od 5 km, a sa crnogorske u širini od 3 km, u dubinu od pomenute linije. Nadzor nad demilitarizacijom se sprovodi u prostupku predviđenom u Aneksu VI Protokola. Na pravcu zapadno od prave linije, koja se proteže od Konfina na kopnu do tačke udaljene tri kabla od rta Oštro na liniji koja spaja rt Oštro – rt Veslo, isključeno je prisustvo policijskih i vojnih snaga samo jedne države. Za ovaj pojas, tzv. *Zonu*, predviđeno je formiranje mešovitih policijskih timova koji će ordinirati sa redovnim i posebnim policijskim ovlašćenjima uređenim Aneksom IV i članom 5. Protokola. Ovim rešenjem, strane su ugovorno uvele svojevrzni *coimperium* nad delom mora (tzv. *kumulaciju suverenosti*). Značajno je da se Protokolom dopušta sportski ribolov, pogranični saobraćaj, kao i da se na kopnu određuju granični prelazi Karasovići – Sutorina, Vitaljina – Njivice do konačnog uređenja ovih pitanja po osnovu aneksa Sporazuma o graničnim prelazima i pograničnom prometu iz 1997. godine. Strane su se sporazumele i oko olakšavanja prelaza stanovništva s područja Dubrovačke Župe, Konavla i Dubrovnika, s jedne strane, te opština Herceg Novi, Kotor i Tivat, s druge strane. Saradnja se predviđa i u slučajevima zagađivanja mora, traganja i spašavanja na moru, te na planu turističkog i vazdušnog saobraćaja.

Prema Konvenciji o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (član 15), čije su sukcesorke u pogledu članstva SFRJ – SR Jugoslavija (Srbija i Crna Gora) i Hrvatska, države koje se graniče nemaju ovlašćenje da proširuju svoje teritorijalno more preko linije sredine osim na sporazumnoj osnovi (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, 2001).³⁴ S tim

Vode unutar Bokokotorskog zaliva tako su stekle status „unutrašnjih voda“, a širina teritorijalnog mora meri se od prave osnovne linije koja zatvara zaliv.

³⁴ SRJ je dala notifikaciju o sukcesiji 12. marta 2001. godine, a isto je učinila i Hrvatska notifikacijom od 5. aprila 1995. godine. Na osnovu čl. 310. Konvencije o pravu mora, SRJ je istom prilikom dala izjavu da kao obalna država zadržava pravo da uređuje režim prolaska stranih brodova teritorijalnim morem. Konvencija ne predviđa pravila o delimitaciji spoljnog pojasa država sa suprotnim obalama ili država čije se obale dodiruju zbog čega je po SRJ bilo neophodno prihvatiti međunarodno običajno pravilo iz čl. 24. st. 3. Ženevske konvencije o teritorijalnom moru i spoljnjem morskom pojasu iz 1958. godine.

u vezi, proizilazi da Protokol ne prati kodifikovano pravilo o povlačenju linije sredine, što ne znači *per se* da to nije pravno dopušteno, s obzirom na dispozitivni karakter odredbi Konvencije. Utvrđujući graničnu liniju od rta Kobila, pravom linijom od 555,6 metara od Prevlake (rta Oštro), pa preko linije koja povezuje rt Oštro – rt Veslo, dve strane očigledno su iskoristile pravo da privremeno urede granicu na moru na drugačiji način od onog konvencionalno prihvaćenog. Ovakav pristup imao je pozitivnu ulogu u deblokiranju spora i režima finansiranja koji će omogućiti normalizaciju života u ovom delu Jadranskog mora nakon ratnih događanja. Zaključivanje Protokola pomoglo je u smanjenju političkih tenzija, jer rukovodstva dve države nisu bila u stanju da pronađu trajna rešenja. Privremeno određivanje granice na Jadranskom moru takođe je značio da Protokol ne prejudicira konačnu odluku o razgraničenju kopnene granice (Kovačević, 2004, 320).³⁵

Moguća međunarodnopravna rešenja za razgraničenje Crne Gore i Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru

Zbog nedostatka fleksibilnosti u međusobnim pregovorima o razgraničenju, svi pokušaji mirnog rešavanja teritorijalnog spora u oblasti poluostrva Prevlaka između Crne Gore i Hrvatske u prethodnom periodu nisu doveli do pozitivnih rešenja. Ove dve države sukcesorke SFRJ ne mogu da izađu iz „začaranog kruga“ dok ne pokažu jasnu političku volju da reše sva otvorena granična pitanja. Mogućnost prevazilaženja graničnih problema postoji, jer opšte međunarodno pravo i pravna praksa poseduju pravila i principe koji bi mogli da nadoknade nedostatke u primeni principa *uti possidetis* u spornom području između dve države. Ova činjenica je od posebnog značaja za njihovo međusobno razgraničenje u Jadranskom moru, gde pre sukcesije SFRJ nisu postojale međurepubličke granice i zbog čega primena principa *uti possidetis* nije moguća. Budući da je na području Prevlake njegova automatska primena osporena od strane Crne Gore, značenje principa *uti possidetis* moralo bi da bude preispitano, ne samo u istorijskom i retrospektivnom smislu, već i u međunarodnopravnom smislu, budući da konačno povlačenje granične

³⁵ Sva rešenja usvojena Protokolom privremena su i ne prejudiciraju konačno rešenje delimitacije koje bi trebalo utvrditi ugovorom o granici. Kad se zna kakva je snaga fakticiteta, privremenost Protokola je u suštini trajna kad se radi o dosad usaglašenim rešenjima. Privremena rešenja mogu imati veoma pozitivnu ulogu, s jedne strane u deblokiranju spora i nalaženju režima koji omogućuje da se život normalizuje, a, s druge strane, u smanjivanju političkih tenzija kad društva nisu još spremna za konačna rešenja.

linije na poluostrvu Prevlaka, predstavlja suštinski preduslov za definisanje pomorskih granica između Crne Gore i Hrvatske. Tim pre, jer se i prema običajnom pravilu sadržanom u članu 2. Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), suverenitet države nad kopnenim delom teritorije proteže na unutrašnje morske vode, teritorijalno more duž obale, a zatim i na vazdušni prostor iznad njega, kao i na morsko dno i podzemlje mora.³⁶

Sledstveno, navedeno pravilo potvrđuje da je suverenitet nad morskim područjima zavisao od suvereniteta nad kopnom, na osnovu čega more i predstavlja njegov akcesorij ili pripadak (*Mare est ejus, cujus est terra*).³⁷ Budući da je odsustvo kompromisa o razgraničenju između Crne Gore i Hrvatske onemogućilo sprovođenje pomenutog kodifikovanog običajnog pravila u Jadranskom moru, biće potrebno prethodno regulisati ovo pitanje da bi se došlo do konačnih rešenja o razgraničenju u Jadranskom moru. Crna Gora i Hrvatska morale bi prvo utvrditi krajnju tačku njihove kopnene granice da bi zatim odredile i početnu tačku za utvrđivanje granica na Jadranskom moru (Dimitrijević, 2004, 312–354).

Ne bi trebalo zaboraviti i da se Protokol zaključen 2002. godine između SRJ i Hrvatske, koji Crna Gora primenjuje na osnovu sukcesije sa SRJ, odnosi samo na područje unutrašnjih voda i teritorijalnog mora i da se ne primenjuje na epikontinentalni pojas, isključivu ekonomsku zonu ili *sui generis* pomorske zone (Caligiuri, 2016, 12–13). Protokol, kao što je već prethodno pomenuto, privremeno reguliše ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv, koji je, kao i u vreme bivše SFRJ, zatvoren pravom polaznom linijom koja spaja rt Oštro na najjužnijem delu poluostrva Prevlaka sa rtom Veslo u Crnoj Gori, tako da vode unutar zaliva imaju status unutrašnjih voda, dok se širina teritorijalnog mora meri od prave polazne linije koja zatvara zaliv.

Prilikom razmatranja mogućih rešenja za pomorsko razgraničenje, potrebno je uzeti u obzir činjenicu da je ulaz u Bokokotorski zaliv morsko

³⁶ Konvencija o pravu mora otud daje primat geografskom susedstvu (adjacenciji) u odnosu na princip efektiviteta pri deobi mora. U tom smislu, Konvencija za različite delove mora, morskog dna i podzemlja ustanovljava različite pravne režime, tako da isti predstavljaju sastavne delove državne teritorije (unutrašnje morske vode, teritorijalno more, arhipelaško more), ili oblasti u kojima država ima određena prava (spoljni morski pojas, isključiva ekonomska zona i epikontinentalni pojas), odnosno, koji se nalaze van granica nacionalne jurisdikcije (otvoreno more i međunarodna zona).

³⁷ Za pomorske države ovo pravilo je ujedno polazna osnova od koje polazi međunarodnopravni zahtev za uspostavljanjem državnih granica na moru. Videti: "Beagle Channel Arbitration" (Argentine v. Chile), *International Law Reports*, 1979, 52, 93.

područje Prevlake i Luštice, odnosno rta Oštro i Mirišta, rta Kobila i rta Kabala (Đurov kam) koje su najisturenije tačke te dve susedne geografske formacije. Razmatrajući hipotetički, ako bi obale ove dve kontinentalne formacije pri konačnoj delimitaciji sa Hrvatskom pripale isključivo Crnoj Gori, onda bi Bokokotorski zaliv ispunjavao uslov iz člana 10(1) Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III) koji se odnosi na zalive čije obale pripadaju samo jednoj državi. U tom pogledu, Bokokotorski zaliv ispunjavao bi i drugi uslov iz člana 10(2), ove Konvencije, jer predstavlja „jasno istaknutu uvalu koja zadire u kopno u takvoj srazmeri prema širini svog ulaza da obuhvata vode zatvorene kopnom i da tvori više nego što je obično zavijanje obale. Pritom, takva „uvala jeste zaliv samo ako je njena površina jednaka ili veća od površine polukruga čiji je prečnik linija povučena od jednog do drugog kraja ulaza u uvalu“ (Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983).

U svrhu merenja, odredba člana 10(3) Konvencije precizira da, „površinom uvale smatra se površina obuhvaćena između linije niske vode duž obale uvale i linije povučene između linije niske vode na njenim prirodnim ulaznim tačkama. Gde, zbog prisustva ostrva uvala ima više od jednog ulaza, polukrug se povlači tako da njegov prečnik predstavlja zbir linija koje zatvaraju razne ulaze. Površina ostrva unutar uvale računa se kao deo morske površine uvale“ (Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983).

Prilikom primene pomenute odredbe Konvencije trebalo bi uzeti u obzir prisustvo ostrva Mamula, zbog kojeg Bokokotorski zaliv ima dva prirodna ulaza. Pri međusobnom razgraničenju Crne Gore i Hrvatske, polukrug se može povući tako da njegov prečnik predstavlja zbir linija koje zatvaraju ove ulaze, pri čemu se površina ostrva uključuje u ukupnu površinu zaliva.

Odredba iz člana 10(4) Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III) još precizira da:

„Ako rastojanje između linija niske vode na prirodnim ulazima zaliva nije veće od 24 nautičke milje, može se povući granična linija između ove dve linije niske vode, a vode koje su njome zatvorene smatraju se unutrašnjim morskim vodama“ (Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983).

Budući da rastojanje između linija niske vode na prirodnim ulazima Bokokotorskog zaliva nije veće od 24 nautičke milje, bilo bi moguće povući graničnu liniju koja bi obuhvatila morske površine između ovih linija u pravcu obale, što bi omogućilo Crnoj Gori da ih proglasi svojim unutrašnjim morskim vodama. Pomenuta mogućnost bila bi najpovoljnija

varijanta razgraničenja za Crnu Goru budući da bi takvo rešenje sledilo ono rešenje koje je već postojalo u Zakonu o obalnom moru FNRJ iz 1948. godine, prema kojem je Bokokotorski zaliv pokriven unutrašnjim morskim vodama na takav način da je prava osnovna (polazna) linija povučena direktno između rta Oštro (na poluostrvu Prevlaka) i rta Veslo (na poluostrvu Luštica) (*Službeni list FNRJ*, 1948; *Službeni list SFRJ*, 1965, 1979, 1987. i 1989).³⁸ U tom slučaju, Crna Gora bi, pored pozivanja na odredbe Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), mogla da se poziva i na retroaktivno dejstvo principa *uti possidetis* na kopnenom području Prevlake, što bi iziskivalo i iznošenje relevantnih pravnih, geografskih i istorijskih argumenata (S/2000/95, February 9, 2000).³⁹

³⁸ Pomenuta osnovna linija ostala je polazna osnova za određivanje unutrašnjih morskih voda i u svim kasnijim jugoslovenskim zakonima (iz 1965. i 1987. godine), a njen značaj i danas predstavlja ključnu tačku u definisanju pomorskih granica i režima plovidbe na ulazu u zaliv.

³⁹ U pogledu iznošenja pravno-istorijske argumentacije, Otpisnik poslova stalne misije SRJ pri Ujedinjenim nacijama uputio je 8. februara 2000. godine pismo predsedniku Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija u kojem je istakao: „Hrvatska nikada u svojoj istoriji nije vladala poluostrvom Prevlaka i Bokom Kotorskom čiji je ona sastavni deo. Najjužnija tačka na jadranskoj obali srednjovekovne hrvatske države (koja je prestala da postoji 1102. godine), nalazila se između Splita i Omiša. Područje jadranske obale južno od Omiša naselila su srpska plemena u vreme vizantijskog cara Iraklija (610–641. godine nove ere), koja su formirala svoje prve srednjovekovne okruge/države na tom području: Paganiju, Zahumlje, Travuniju, Duklju (Zetu). U IX i X veku teritorija Kneževine Travunije prostirala se na istok od Dubrovnika do Boke Kotorske i obuhvatala je Prevlaku sa rtom Oštro. Od 1038. do 1077. godine Boka Kotorska sa Prevlakom bila je deo Kneževine, a od 1077. godine do 1183. Kraljevine Duklje (Zete). Od 1183. do 1371. godine Boka Kotorska sa Prevlakom kao sastavnim delom bila je deo srpske srednjovekovne države dinastije Nemanjića (Kneževina; Kraljevstvo od 1217. i Carstvo od 1346. godine). Slabljenje Srpskog carstva i uspon autoriteta lokalnog srpskog plemstva doveli su do toga da su od 1360. godine Prevlakom, kao delom Boke Kotorske, vladali lokalni vazali Vojinovići, Altomanovići i Balšići. Od 1377. godine područje je pripadalo srpskoj srednjovekovnoj bosanskoj državi (Kraljevini Bosni). Godine 1420. cela oblast Boke Kotorske pala je pod Mletačku Republiku koja je njome vladala do Kampoforimijskog mira 1797. godine. Od 1797. do 1807. godine Prevlakom je vladala Austrija. Od Tilzitskog mirovnog sporazuma 1807. do 1813. godine Prevlaka je bila deo Ilirskih provincija pod francuskom vlašću. U međuvremenu, u ratnim okolnostima, Prevlakom su kratko vreme vladale Rusija i Engleska (1813) i Crna Gora (od odluke Skupštine u Dobroti o ujedinjenju Crne Gore i Boke od 12. novembra 1814. do odluke Bečkog kongresa 1815. godine kada je Boka Kotorska data Austriji). Nakon stvaranja Banovine Hrvatske (26. avgusta 1939. godine), uspostavljanje njene administrativne granice na području Prevlake ostavljeno je za naknadno preuređenje zemlje, do čega nikada nije došlo. Sam Sporazum iz kojeg je nastala Banovina Hrvatska nikada nije verifikovan u Skupštini Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Tokom Drugog svetskog rata Prevlakom je nezakonito vladala fašistička

S obzirom na aktuelni status granične linije predviđen privremenim Protokolom, konačno razgraničenje bilo bi moguće izvršiti i primenom metode središnje linije. Ovakvo rešenje omogućilo bi Hrvatskoj proširenje teritorijalnog mora do samog ulaza u Bokokotorski zaliv (Pavić, 2011, 261–262).⁴⁰ Od pomenutog rešenja Crna Gora ne bi imala nikakve koristi. U cilju pronalaženja izbalansiranih rešenja koja bi doprinela geostrateškoj bezbednosti regiona, ali i nepovredivosti i stabilnosti državne granice (dela koji je prekludiran principom *uti possidetis*, ali i dela koji još nije definisan), moguće je, pored napred navednih, isticati i druga rešenja.⁴¹ Ako bi se pak

Italija od aprila 1941. do septembra 1943. godine, a od septembra 1943. do novembra 1944. godine nacistička Nemačka. Nakon vojnog poraza Trećeg rajha, Prevlaka je bila deo Jugoslavije i njene sastavne Republike Crne Gore u periodu od 1945. do 1991. godine. Nakon oružanog otcepljenja Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske od Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Prevlaka je ostala deo celine Boke Kotorske u Crnoj Gori, odnosno Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Postoje pravni akti zajedničke države Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije doneti na saveznom nivou na osnovu kojih je očigledno da je, u vreme secesije Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske i usvajanja Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije Roberta Badentera, poluostrvo Prevlaka bilo deo Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore, koja je danas jedna od konstitutivnih republika Jugoslavije. Dakle, sa svim pripadajućim objektima i komunikacijama koje ga povezuju sa crnogorskim zaleđem, poluostrvo Prevlaka ima status sastavnog dela Savezne Republike Jugoslavije“.

⁴⁰ Radovan Pavić za navedeno rešenje daje i konkretna uputstva: „Hrvatska mora inzistirati da se kao naravna fizičko-geografska međa Boke kotorske na jugu (ona sjeverna između rta Kobila i rta Đurov kam nije prijeporna) prihvati spojnicu rta Oštra u Hrvatskoj i rta Mirište u Crnoj Gori, i to ne samo zbog objektivnih zemljopisnih razloga nego i zato što svaka drugačija međa koja bi se upirala na neku točku jugoistočnije od rta Mirište – posve nepravedno i izričito favorizira Crnu Goru kada se postavlja i sljedeće pitanje razgraničenja, a to je ono o granici hrvatskog i crnogorskog teritorijalnog mora izvan zaljeva Boke kotorske. Naime drugačije postavljena međa (koja povećava akvatorij Boke kotorske), uz načelo primjene *okomice* u razgraničenju teritorijalnih mora obiju država, favorizira Crnu Goru na štetu hrvatskog teritorijalnog mora. Zato Hrvatska mora inzistirati na logičnoj južnoj međi vanjskog zaljeva Boke kotorske, a to je spojnica rta Oštra s rtom Mirište. Hrvatska i tu mora inzistirati na međunarodnom pravu, dakle na uspostavljanju crte sredine (medijan) kao najboljeg, najlogičnijeg i najpravednijeg rješenja koje jasno razgraničuje državne teritorije, ali ne zadire ni u kakve druge plovidbene funkcije, također osigurane međunarodnim pravom“.

⁴¹ Po oceni Međunarodnog suda pravde, kada princip *uti possidetis* postigne cilj u trenutku sticanja nezavisnosti, pretvaranjem administrativnih granica u međunarodne, to ne znači da su iste postale i bezbedne. Kod donošenja sudske odluke u obzir se uzimaju i drugi argumenti poput principa efektiviteta ili postojanja pravnih naslova na kojima se bazira princip *uti possidetis* u momentu sukcesije. Efektivnost državne vlasti na spornom delu teritorije može potvrditi, negirati ili dopuniti pravni osnov. Pri analizi dokaza *rationae temporis* efektivitet se ceni u momentu nastanka države i nakon toga, uz obaveznu ocenu

ostalo pri trenutnom statusu, onda bi graničnu liniju bilo moguće povući po opštem pravilu o razgraničenju teritorijalnog mora država čije se obale graniče bočno, a čije državne granice izbijaju pod ostrim uglom. To bi praktično omogućilo povlačenje prave linije ne u smeru kopnene granice, već od krajnje tačke na kojoj kopnena granica susednih država izbijaja na obali (sada je to rt Kobila ili Konfin) (Novaković, 1996, 561). Time bi se predupredila primena srednje linije za međusobno razgraničenje i mogućnost da se hrvatsko teritorijalno more proteže ispred crnogorske obale, što bi ograničavalo Crnu Goru u vršenju njenih suverenih prava.

U Konvenciji o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III) ne postoji odredba koja bi obvezivala države da povuku pravu liniju paralelnu sa linijom prirodnog ulaza u zaliv što omogućava povlačenje linija spajanjem prikladnih tački na obali i ostrvima (na primer, od ostrva Mamula do rta Mirište).

Prema odredbi člana 15. Konvencije:

„Kad su obale dve države naspram ili se dodiruju, nijedna od te dve države nema pravo, ukoliko se drugačije ne sporazumeju, proširiti svoje teritorijalno more preko srednje linije čija je svaka tačka jednako udaljena od najbližih tačaka na osnovnim linijama od kojih se meri širina teritorijalnih mora svake od te dve države. Ova se odredba, međutim, ne primenjuje tamo gde je zbog istorijskog naslova ili drugih posebnih okolnosti neophodno razgraničiti teritorijalno more dve države na drugačiji način“ (Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983; Evans, 1991, 1–33).⁴²

ponašanja strana u sporu. Videti: „Gulf Fonesca Case“ (El Salvador v. Honduras), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1992, 388, 586–587.

⁴² Posebne ili specijalne okolnosti iskristalisane su u međunarodnoj praksi pomorske delimitacije. Često se poistovećuju sa značenjem tzv. *relevantnih okolnosti*. Dok su prve u funkciji adaptacije principa ekvidistance, druge navedene okolnosti treba da ukažu na moguće drugačije metode razgraničenja koji bi doveli do pravičnih rezultata. U tom smislu, u praksi se ukazuje na različite faktore koji mogu biti tretirani kao relevantne okolnosti (geografski faktori poput opšte konfiguracije obale, dužine obale, prisustva ostrva koja dovode do efekta „odsecanja“; geološki i geomorfološki faktori kao što su prirodni produžeci obala; socio-ekonomski faktori koji ukazuju na prisustvo i raspodelu prirodnih resursa itd.). U jurisprudenciji Međunarodnog suda pravde u tom smislu razvijen je „trostepeni postupak“ (*three-step approach*), u kojem se prvo utvrđuje privremena središnja linija razgraničenja, zatim se vrši provera ili indiciranje mogućih metoda delimitacije zbog relevantnih okolnosti, a na kraju se radi test proporcionalnosti kako bi se postigao pravičan rezultat delimitacije. Videti: „Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea“ (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, *International Court of Justice Reports*, 2009, pp. 61, etc.

S obzirom na to da je trenutni režim unutar Bokokotorskog zaliva „zamrznuo“ s jedne strane takozvanu *Zonu*, koja je formalno pod hrvatskom jurisdikcijom, ali sa zajedničkim izvršnim ovlašćenjima sa Crnom Gorom, dok je drugi deo Bokokotorskog zaliva pod isključivom jurisdikcijom Crne Gore, neophodno je poštovati pravilo iz člana 15. Konvencije da, u odsustvu drugačijeg sporazuma, dve strane nemaju pravo da proširuju svoje teritorijalno more izvan srednje linije, što odražava postojeće međunarodno običajno pravilo. To konkretno znači da je krajnja linija do koje treba da ide državna granica, po pravilu, srednja linija gde je svaka tačka podjednako udaljena od najbližih tačaka pravih osnovnih linija od kojih se meri širina teritorijalnih mora (princip ekvidistance). Jasno je otud da srednja linija vodi do spajanja pravih osnovnih linija što, zbog geografske konfiguracije obale može dovesti do promena u pravcu razgraničenja. U međunarodnoj praksi postoje pokušaji da se takve situacije izbegnu smanjenjem broja tačaka gde se granica menja ili broja tačaka od kojih počinju prave osnovne linije koje se koriste za merenje širine teritorijalnog mora (Birnie, 1987, 15–37; Blake, 1987, 111–118; Charney, 1994, 227, etc).

Iz tumačenja drugog dela odredbe člana 15. Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III) proizilazi da je u praksi moguće praviti i određene izuzetke od primene srednje linije, koji se odnose na slučajeve postojanja takozvanih „istorijskih naslova“ ili „drugih posebnih okolnosti“. Ovi slučajevi omogućavaju razgraničenje teritorijalnog mora dve strane na nešto drugačiji način. Naime, prvi izuzetak koji se odnosi na postojanje istorijskih naslova nema neki valjan osnov u međunarodnom pravu, budući da takvi naslovi po pravilu sežu duboko u prošlost i nemaju neku jasnu pravnu snagu. U slučaju da razgraničenje između Crne Gore i Hrvatske bude išlo u pravcu pozivanja na istorijske naslove, svaka od strana morala bi da dokaže da je u ovom delu Jadranskog mora, u vreme pre disolucije SFRJ, postojala njena stvarna i kontinuirana suverena vlast neometana od drugih strana. Drugim rečima, strane bi morale da dokažu da je njihovo efektivno vršenje vlasti bilo prećutno tolerisano i da druge strane nisu isticale bilo kakve prigovore. U predmetnom slučaju, verovatnoća da bi Crna Gora i Hrvatska mogle da dokažu ovako nešto malo je verovatno, budući da je Jadransko more u istorijskom periodu neposredno pre sukcesije SFRJ pravno tretirano kao deo jedinstvene jugoslovenske teritorije na kojoj je SFRJ imala suverenu jurisdikciju i na kojoj je uživala suverena prava. Istovremeno, u administrativnom smislu, Jadransko more je predstavljalo i zbir teritorijalnih nadležnosti svih jugoslovenskih obalnih republika u sklopu jugoslovenske federacije. Ako bi se išlo dalje od toga i ako bi se koristila pravna argumentacija iz ranijih

istorijskih perioda (pre nastanka Jugoslavije), onda bi potencijalni istorijski naslov mogao dobiti značenje „istorijskih granica“ koje se oslanjaju na „stečena prava“ čije bi se postojanje i pravni kontinuitet morao pravno dokazivati. *A contrario*, bilo bi moguće da potencijalni istorijski naslov bude tumačen kao stvarno i efektivno vršenje vlasti na spornom području koje je vremenom dovelo do transformacije faktičkog u pravno stanje (*ex facto jus oritur*) (Jennings, 1963, 23–28; UN Doc. A/CONG.13/1, 1957, 102).⁴³ U odnosu na drugi izuzetak od primene srednje linije, koji se odnose na slučajeve postojanja „drugih posebnih okolnosti“, Crna Gora i Hrvatska morale bi da dokažu da u konkretnom slučaju postoje neke posebno neuobičajene konfiguracije obala, ostrva ili plovnih puteva čije postojanje objektivno ide njima u prilog (YILC, 1956, II, 300, etc.).

Iz međunarodne prakse proizilazi mogućnost da dve države u slučaju bočnog razgraničenja (tzv. *lateralnog razgraničenja*) zaključe poseban sporazum kojim bi regulisale proširenje granice svojih teritorijalnih mora. Crna Gora i Hrvatska mogle bi to učiniti međusobnim pregovorima prvo koristeći metodu ekvidistance, a zatim razmatrajući postojanje svih drugih posebnih okolnosti. Takođe, mogle bi korigovati smer međudržavne granice u pravcu koji bi bio najoptimalniji za obe strane. Dve države imaju mogućnost da koriste i druge metode razgraničenja svojih teritorijalnih mora. Koji metod bi trebalo primeniti može se samo pretpostaviti, ali nije sasvim isključeno da definitivno povlačenje granice prati oštar ugao pod kojim kopnena granica dve zemlje izlazi na obalu Boke Kotorske. Takođe, nije nemoguće da se primeni neka vrsta kombinovanog metoda koji bi omogućio povlačenje vertikalne linije u odnosu na opšti pravac obale, a koja bi bila na jednakoj udaljenosti od najistaknutijih tačaka na obali ili ostrvima (tzv. *perpendikularni metod*) (Gidel, 1934, III, 768–770; La Pradelle, 1928, 18–51, 215–216).⁴⁴

⁴³ Poseban slučaj predstavljaju takozvani „istorijski zalivi“ čije značenje nije utvrđeno kodifikacijama o pravu mora, već je prepušteno običajnom međunarodnom pravu koje je dosta fluktuirajuće u ovoj oblasti. Njihovo postojanje države u konkretnim slučajevima priznaju pomorskim državama ako one ta prava uspeju i da dokažu. Obično se zahteva da države koje pretenduju na istorijske zalive unutar njenih obala moraju da efektivno vrše vlast u dužem vremenskom periodu, te da po tom osnovu postave i odgovarajuće formalne zahteve koji neće biti osporeni od strane drugih država. Pritom je bitno i da, kao takvi, dodatno ne ometaju međunarodnu plovidbu. Videti: „Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case“ (El Salvador v. Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1992, 601.

⁴⁴ Kod razgraničenja Norveške i Švedske u području Grisbadarna, Stalni arbitražni sud je, polazeći od potrebe da se granica utvrdi na nedvosmislen način i uz uvažavanje državnih interesa, u odluci od 23. oktobra 1909. godine, potvrdio da je neophodno

Konačno, nije isključena ni mogućnost zaključenja višenamenskog sporazuma o pomorskim granicama, kojim bi se regulisale granice teritorijalnih mora Crne Gore i Hrvatske, kao i granice njihovih epikontinentalnih pojaseva, isključivih ekonomskih zona i drugih *sui generis* zona. Ovim sporazumom mogla bi biti obuhvaćena i pitanja plovidbe, prava na ribolov, zaštite životne sredine, prava na istraživanje i eksploataciju prirodnih resursa uvođenjem klauzula o ležištu resursa, klauzula o jedinstvu resursa i drugih klauzula kojim se inače regulišu pitanja međusobne saradnje (*Handbook of the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries*, 2000, 77–84).

Što se tiče bočnog ragraničenja epikontinentalnih pojaseva i isključivih ekonomskih zona Crne Gore i Hrvatske, važno bi bilo pomenuti da od perioda kada su ove dve zemlje bile konstitutivne republike bivše SFRJ linija koja je razgraničavala njihovu suverenu jurisdikciju pratila je liniju azimuta od 231°. Međutim, Hrvatska odbacuje ovu liniju jer tvrdi da je Protokolom o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu iz 2002. godine uspostavljena linija razgraničenja duž linije azimuta od 206°. U tom smislu, Hrvatska je preduzela ili odobrila niz jednostranih akata i aktivnosti u pomorskom području Jadranskog mora južno od linije azimuta od 231°. Da bi se izbegle štetne posledice od ovakvih jednostranih akata, koji, istina, ne doprinose postizanju efikasnog i održivog rešenja za međusobno razgraničenje na Jadranskom moru, dve strane bi morale uvažiti odredbe iz članova 74. i 83. Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III). Njima se predviđaju jednaka rešenja za razgraničenje isključive ekonomske zone i epikontinentalnih pojasa (Rudolf, 1985;1988; Kreća, 1990; 23–30; Bugarčić, 2011, 43–53).⁴⁵

liniju razgraničenja povući vertikalno na opšti smer obale. Videti: *American Journal of International Law*, 23(S5), 1929, 275. U slučaju razgraničenja između Danske i Norveške u oblasti između Grenlanda i Jan Majena, Međunarodni sud pravde odbio je primenu perpendikularnog metoda čiju je primenu zahtevala Danska, ali i striktnu primenu linije sredine koju je tražila Norveška. Iako je Sud u razmatranju predmeta spora krenuo od linije sredine, istu je korigovao pomerivši je na istok, bliže vulkanskom i nenaseljenom ostrvu Jan Majen. To je opravdao relevantnim okolnostima koje proizilaze iz nesrazmerne dužine obala strana u sporu. Videti: "Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen" (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1993, 38.

⁴⁵ Treba naglasiti da se, za razliku od prava na epikontinentalnom pojasu koja postoje *ipso facto* i *ab initio*, i koja se pružaju sve do spoljne ivice kontinentalnog ruba ili do udaljenosti od 200 nautičkih milja, prava na isključivu ekonomsku zonu (EEZ) uspostavljaju proglašavanjem od strane dotičnih država do granice od 200 milja od polaznih linija za merenje širine teritorijalnog mora. Dok u epikontinentalnom pojasu države vrše suverena prava radi iskorišćavanja i istraživanja morskog dna i podzemlja, u EEZ države imaju

Tako, u stavu 1. članova 74. i 83. navodi se da: „Razgraničenje isključive ekonomske zone (odnosno epikontinentalnog pojasa), između država sa suprotnim obalama ili obalama koje se dodiruju vrši se sporazumom na osnovu međunarodnog prava, kako je navedeno u članu 38. Statuta Međunarodnog suda pravde, kako bi se postiglo pravično rešenje“.

U stavu 2. navedenih članova još se utvrđuje da „ako se sporazum ne može postići u razumnom roku, dotične države pribegavaju postupcima predviđenim u delu XV Konvencije“, što *inter alia* uključuje postupke pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde, Međunarodnim tribunalom za pravo mora ili *ad hoc* arbitražom.

U stavu 3. članova 74. i 83. Konvencije navodi se i da do postizanja sporazuma kako je predviđeno u stavu 1, dotične države imaju mogućnost da „u duhu razumevanja i saradnje, učine sve napore da zakluče privremene aranžmane praktične prirode, te da tokom ovog prelaznog perioda, ne ugroze ili ometu postizanje konačnog sporazuma“. Pritom, „privremeni aranžmani ne mogu prejudicirati konačno razgraničenje“.

U stavu 4, navodi navedenih članova Konvencije, još se propisuje da „kada između strana postoji sporazum na snazi, razgraničenje isključive ekonomske zone (odnosno epikontinentalnog pojasa) uređuje se u skladu sa odredbama tog sporazuma“ (Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, 1983).

Budući da konačni sporazum o razgraničenju ovih morskih pojaseva nije postignut (niti bilo kakav privremeni sporazum koji bi regulisao pravac granične linije), razgraničenje će zahtevati primenu pravila i principa opšteg međunarodnog prava i prava mora. S obzirom na to da podela pomorskog prostora uvek ima međunarodnopravni aspekt, razgraničenje između Crne Gore i Hrvatske ne može zavisiti isključivo od njihove volje ili od njihovog unutrašnjeg prava. Da bi se postiglo pravično rešenje, strane moraju koristiti sve relevantne kriterijume kao što su princip prirodnog produžetka/ nezadiranja, princip proporcionalnosti, kao i druga relevantna pravila. Suprotno delovanje ne bi doprinelo postizanju pravičnih rešenja o razgraničenju na Jadranskom moru, što bi svakako uticalo na udaljavanje ovih susednih država od jedinstvenih bezbednosnih interesa uključenih u njihove članske obaveze u NATO-u, što *per se* otvara prostor za dalja međusobna neslaganja i politička trvenja.

suverena prava da istražuju i iskorišćavaju, da se brinu o očuvanju i upravljanju živim i neživim prirodnim bogatstvima mora, dna i podzemlja, te da vrše i druge delatnosti propisane Konvencijom. U pogledu njihove međunarodnopravne delimitacije, međunarodna praksa potvrđuje da je EEZ praktično pokrila epikontinentalni pojas, jer se radi o suštinski istim i preklapajućim zonama.

Posledice jednostranih akata o razgraničenju

Odluka Hrvatske o proširenju jurisdikcije na Jadranskom moru usvojena je 3. oktobra 2003. godine (*Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, 2003). Odlukom hrvatskog Sabora proglašen je Zaštićeni ribolovno-ekološki pojas (ZERP), čija granica, u odnosu na teritorijalno more Crne Gore, ide od spoljne granice teritorijalnog mora u pravcu privremene linije razgraničenja prema Protokolu iz 2002. godine. Prema ZERP-u živi prirodni resursi u vodama van spoljne granice teritorijalnog mora mogu se istraživati, eksploatisati, čuvati i upravljati. Prigovori Evropske unije izazvali su kašnjenja u sprovođenju ove Odluke, koja je više puta menjana (*Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, 2003, 2004, 2006 i 2008; Barić Punda, 2007, 177–198).⁴⁶ Crna Gora nije prihvatila Odluku Hrvatske o uspostavljanju ZERP-a, smatrajući da Hrvatska nema pravo da jednostrano definiše spoljnu granicu svoje jurisdikcije izvan linije utvrđene Protokolom iz 2002. godine koja razgraničava samo njihova teritorijalna mora na privremenoj osnovi. Sledstveno, ona je smatrala da nije dužna da poštuje spoljnu granicu ZERP-a (koja je određena nizom koordinata koje je Hrvatska podnela Ujedinjenim nacijama 2. septembra 2005. godine). Budući da Protokol predviđa „neprihvatljivost jednostranih akata“, Crna Gora je podnela protestnu notu Vladi Hrvatske 15. oktobra 2003. godine. U tom smislu, ona je smatrala da jednostrano proglašenje ZERP-a od strane Hrvatske predstavlja kršenje međunarodnog prava, koje zabranjuje jednostrano prisvajanje epikontinentalnog pojasa, isključive ekonomske zone ili druge zone njene funkcionalne jurisdikcije. Ovakav zaključak proizašao je iz činjenice prema kojoj između nje i Hrvatske nije postojao nikakav sporazum, niti sudska odluka doneta na osnovu međunarodnog prava kojima bi se ovo pitanje prethodno regulisalo.

Godinu dana nakon sticanja nezavisnosti, 21. maja 2006. godine, Crna Gora je usvojila Zakon o moru kojim se utvrđuju pravila za teritorijalne vode van privremene granične linije (*Službeni list Crne Gore*, 2007 i 2008).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Hrvatska je donela novu Odluku 3. juna 2004. godine kojom se odlaže primena režima ZERP-a, za države članice EU sve do zaključenja međusobnog ugovora o ribarstvu. Ova Odluka doživela je izmene i dopune 2006. godine. Primena ZERP-a na ribarske brodove iz EU počela je momentalno (bez zaključenja ugovora sa EU), 1. januara 2008. godine, da bi bila suspendovana 14. marta 2008. godine. Kada je Hrvatska postala punopravna članica EU, 1. jula 2013. godine, prostor ZERP-a, u pravnom smislu, automatski je postao deo zajedničkih voda EU pod režimom Zajedničke ribarske politike (ZRP). Zanimljivo je da je ZERP bio inkorporiran u Pomorski zakonik Republike Hrvatske iz 2004. godine i u njegove novele iz 2008. godine.

⁴⁷ U članu 14. Zakona o moru propisano je sledeće: „Teritorijalno more Crne Gore je morski pojas širok 12 nautičkih milja, računajući od osnovne linije u smjeru mora. U teritorijalnom moru, u cilju održivog razvoja i valorizacije prirodnih resursa morskog

Zakonom u članu 12. propisuje se da: „Do konačnog rješenja razgraničenja na moru između Crne Gore i Republike Hrvatske u cjelosti se primjenjuju odredbe Protokola i aneksi Protokola o privremenom režimu na Prevlaci, potpisani između bivše SRJ i Republike Hrvatske“ (*Ibid*).

Zanimljivo je da je ovim Zakonom Crna Gora definisala i svoj epikontinentalni pojas koji, prema članu 36, obuhvata, „morsko dno i podmorje iza spoljne granice teritorijalnog mora u pravcu otvorenog mora do granica epikontinentalnog pojasa sa susednim zemljama, utvrđenih međunarodnim sporazumima“. Crna Gora je na ovaj način planirala da ostvari svoja suverena prava da istražuje i eksploatiše prirodne resurse u tom delu Jadranskog mora. Kao što je prethodno pomenuto, u vreme SFRJ linija koja je razdvajala jurisdikcije Hrvatske i Crne Gore išla je duž linije azimuta od 231°, zbog čega je Crna Gora zauzela stav da bi pomenuta linija trebalo da se koristi za bočno razgraničenje njihovih epikontinentalnih pojaseva. Kako je u članu 26. Zakona utvrđeno da Skupština Crne Gore ima mogućnost jednostranog proglašenja isključive ekonomske zone „ceneći saradnju sa zemljama koje imaju suverenitet nad delovima Jadranskog mora“, u tom smislu, njena isključiva ekonomska zona obuhvatila je morske prostore „od spoljne granice teritorijalnog mora u pravcu otvorenog mora do njene spoljne granice utvrđene sporazumom, na osnovu međunarodnog prava, a sa zemljama čije su obale suprotne ili se dodiruju“ (*Ibid*). U ovoj zoni Crna Gora je u skladu sa odredbom člana 27. pomenutog Zakona, nameravala da ostvari svoja suverena prava da istražuje, eksploatiše, čuva i upravlja živim i neživim prirodnim resursima, da proizvodi energiju koristeći more, morske struje i vetrove.

Međutim, valja zapaziti da iako su pomenuta pravna rešenja jednostrano usvojena od strane nadležnih organa Hrvatske i Crne Gore, ista nisu mogla da utiču na odluku o konačnom razgraničenju. Jednostrana

i kopnenog dijela obalnog područja, primjenjuju se mehanizmi integralnog upravljanja obalnim područjem. Osnovnu liniju teritorijalnog mora čine: 1) linije niske vode duž obale kopna i ostrva; 2) prave linije koje zatvaraju ulaze u zalive; 3) prave linije koje spajaju tačke na obali kopna i na obali ostrva: Najduži vrh Ade Bojane – Hrid Đeran; Hrid Đeran – Hrid V. Kamen; Hrid V. Kamen – Rt Mendra; Rt Mendra – Rt Platamuni; Rt Platamuni – Rt Veslo; Rt Veslo – do tačke koja se nalazi na razdaljini tri kabla od Rta Oštra na spojnici Rt Oštra – Rt Veslo; Tačka koja se nalazi na razdaljini tri kabla od Rta Oštra na spojnici Rt Oštra na Rt Veslo do Rta Konfin. Osnovne linije su ucrtane u pomorskoj karti koju izdaje organ nadležan za hidrografsku djelatnost. Pri određivanju osnovne linije teritorijalnog mora, dijelom obale smatraće se i najisturenije stalne lučke građevine koje su sastavni dio lučkog sistema.“ U članu 15. definiše se spoljna granica teritorijalnog mora tako da je to „linija čija je svaka tačka udaljena 12 nautičkih milja od najbliže tačke osnovne linije“.

rešenja su u međusobnim odnosima dovela do dodatnih političkih tenzija, što nije bilo u skladu sa Konvencijom o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), koja propisuje obavezu saradnje država u poluzatvorenim morima (član 103). Na odnose Crne Gore i Hrvatske značajno je uticalo i odsustvo sporazuma o razgraničenju epikontinentalnih pojaseva. Ovo pitanje postalo je posebno aktuelno nakon što je Vlada Crne Gore, 3. marta 2011. godine, donela Odluku o određivanju blokova za istraživanje i proizvodnju ugljovodonika, čije bočne granice prema Hrvatskoj značajno odstupaju od linije koja razgraničava pomorska područja dve zemlje prema odredbama Protokola o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu (*Službeni list Crne Gore*, 2011). Hrvatska je, naime, smatrala da je Crna Gora ovim aktom nezakonito pomerila liniju razgraničenja utvrđenu Protokolom, koja ide duž azimuta od 206°. S druge strane, Crna Gora je tvrdila da je linija razgraničenja nasleđena iz vremena SFRJ i da se proteže duž linije azimuta od 231°. Pošto je Crna Gora ovom akcijom povećala svoj pomorski prostor za skoro 2.020 km² (128 km² teritorijalnog mora i 1.892 km² morskog prostora van granice teritorijalnog mora do linije razgraničenja epikontinentalnog pojasa prema Sporazumu između SFRJ i Italije iz 1968. godine), Hrvatska je 2011. godine uputila protestnu notu u kojoj je zatražila ispravljanje ovih nepravilnosti. Vlada Crne Gore je 30. oktobra 2014. godine, donela Odluku o izmeni Odluke o određivanju blokova za istraživanje i proizvodnju ugljovodonika (*Službeni list Crne Gore*, 2014). Iako je ovom Odlukom Crna Gora učinila određene ustupke smanjujući površinu svog teritorijalnog mora za 128 km² i odustajući od ranije raspisanog tendera za dodelu koncesije za eksploataciju nalazišta gasa i nafte, ona je ostala pri ranijoj liniji razgraničenja koja se proteže duž azimuta od 231° (Barić Punda & Filipović, 2015, 74).

Tokom 2014. godine Vlada Hrvatske objavila je javni tender za izdavanje dozvola za istraživanje i eksploataciju ugljovodonika u Jadranu, kojim je odredila 29 istražnih područja. Iako je Hrvatska proglasila da pravac bočne granice prema Crnoj Gori ostaje isti kao i iz Protokola o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu, odnosno da se proteže duž linije razgraničenja koja ide duž azimuta od 206°, dala je nekim stranim zakupcima pravo da istražuju i eksploatišu ugljovodonike u blokovima 23, 26, 27, 28 Jadranskog mora, koji se nalaze u pomorskom području na koje Crna Gora polaže pravo. Ovo je dodatno otežalo situaciju između strana, te je Crna Gora, preko svoje stalne misije pri Ujedinjenim nacijama, najpre 1. decembra 2014. godine uputila zvaničnu protestnu notu Odeljenju za okeanska pitanja i pravo mora Ujedinjenih nacija, da bi potom 18. maja 2015. godine, uputila protestnu notu i generalnom sekretaru UN

kao depozitaru Konvencije UN o pravu mora (Communication from the Government of Montenegro, 2014, 2015).⁴⁸

U protestnim notama Crna Gora je upozorila da je Hrvatska prekršila Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu i odredbe Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), davanjem jednostranog odobrenja seizmičkih istraživanja i licenci za istraživanje i eksploataciju ugljovodonika u blokovima koji pripadaju Crnoj Gori. Ona se usporotivila i u zaključivanju koncesionih ugovora za istraživanje i eksploataciju ugljovodonika na spornim područjima blokova koji su obuhvatali oko 1800 km² morskog prostora (epikontinentalnog pojasa), koje ona smatra predmetom budućeg razgraničenja. Podsećajući da je počev od 2003. godine slala brojne note Vladi Hrvatske, zatim UN i konačno svim uključenim i zainteresovanim kompanijama (između ostalog, Marathon Oil Netherlands/OMV, Marathon Oil Netherlands ONE.BV i OMV Croatia), Crna Gora je izrazila oštar protest zbog odluke Hrvatske o jednostranom proširenju jurisdikcije na području Jadranskog mora južno od linije azimuta od 231°, na kojem ima dugogodišnja suverena prava još od vremena kada je bila republika u sastavu SFRJ. Apostrofirajući da su istraživački blokovi 23, 26, 27, 28 u doba SFRJ bili razdvojeni linijom azimuta od 231°, Crna Gora je insistirala da se i dalje poštuje ova linija, budući da su je dve države sukcesorke nasledile nakon sukcesije SFRJ. Ona se formalno pozvala i na odredbe članova 74(3) i 83(3) Konvencije o pravu mora (UNCLOS III), kojima se obavezuju države da se u spornim oblastima uzdrže od poteza koji mogu ugroziti ili ometati postizanje konačnog sporazuma o razgraničenju. Pošto strane u sporu nisu postigle nikakav privremeni obostrano prihvatljiv sporazum kojim bi drugačije definisale ovu situaciju, Crna Gora je naglasila da bi sporno pitanje trebalo

⁴⁸ Crna Gora je svojim protestnim saopštenjima istakla da je došla do saznanja da je norveška kompanija „Spektrum“ sprovedla geološko-seizmička istraživanja u spornom području jadranskog dna južno od azimuta od 231° od septembra 2013. do januara 2014. godine. Pritom, ni Republika Hrvatska kao naručilac istraživanja, ni „Spektrum“ kao ugovorna kompanija, nisu obavestili Crnu Goru o tim aktivnostima. Crna Gora, u datim okolnostima, koristi svoje pravo na osnovu odgovarajućih odredbi UNCLOS-a, da obavesti da je izrazila žaljenje i uložila zvanični protest Republici Hrvatskoj zbog ovog jednostranog čina, i o tome obavestila Vladu Norveške i norvešku kompaniju „Spektrum“, koja je preduzela gore navedena istraživanja. Istovremeno, Crna Gora je naglasila da se ovim činom krši međunarodno pravo i Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu zbog čega obaveštava Ujedinjene nacije da je od Hrvatske i norveške kompanije zatraženo da dostave originale seizmičkih snimaka sa obrađenim i interpretiranim podacima koji se odnose na područje južno od azimuta 231°, koji su dati potencijalnim koncesionarima putem hrvatske nacionalne „baze podataka“ bez njenog pristanka.

rešiti pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde, što je inače i dogovoreno u njihovim ranijim pregovorima (Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas, 2016, 82–83).

I pored navedenih protesta Crne Gore, Hrvatska nije odustala od dodele licenci za istraživanje i eksploataciju ugljovodonika u spornim pomorskim blokovima. Međutim, konzorcijum Marathon Oil Netherlands/OMV povukao se iz projekta istraživanja i eksploatacije nafte i gasa, a kao ključni razlog naveden je nerešeni granični spor između Crne Gore i Hrvatske (*Balkan Insight*, 2015).

Zaključna razmatranja

Iz napred navedene analize može se zaključiti da određene preporuke i principi koje je iznela Arbitražna komisija Mirovne konferencije EEZ (tzv. *Badenterova arbitražna komisija*) u svojim mišljenjima nisu bili do kraja primenjivi na slučaj sukcesije SFRJ. Taj zaključak naročito važi za primenu principa *uti possidetis juris*, koji je prvobitno priznat i prihvaćen prilikom rešavanja problema dekolonizacije, a kojeg je, u preteranoj pravnoj doslednosti, ali bez potpunog i valjanog pravnog tumačenja jurisprudencije Međunarodnog suda pravde preporučila Arbitražna komisija, bez sagledavanja bitne činjenice da je SFRJ bila stari subjekt međunarodnog prava i jedna od država osnivača Ujedinjenih nacija. U tom smislu, iz analize proizilazi da iako je Arbitražna komisija svojim mišljenjima o primeni principa *uti possidetis* doprinela procesu političke stabilizacije, to jest, „zamrzavanja“ postojećeg teritorijalnog stanja u momentu sticanja nezavisnosti bivših jugoslovenskih republika, ona nije uspeła definitivno da reši sva otvorena granična pitanja koja su ostala da do danas optererećuju međusobne odnose država sukcesorki SFRJ. Jedno od takvih pitanja jeste i razgraničenje na Prevlaci između Crne Gore i Hrvatske.

Hrvatska je nakon disolucije SFRJ nasledila Prevlaku i celu Dubrovačku oblast, linijom razgraničenja sa Crnom Gorom koja je faktički pratila administrativno-teritorijalnu podelu predratne Kraljevine Jugoslavije i granicu tzv. Banovine Hrvatske. Budući da su u posleratnoj socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji administrativne granice bile isključivo u funkciji distribucije administrativno-teritorijalnih nadležnosti republika o kojima su odluke donesene na visokom političkom nivou, ali ne i od strane konstitucionalno nadležnih organa federacije, one su pod dejstvom principa *uti possidetis*, nakon disolucije SFRJ, *via facti* pretvorena u međudržavne granice.

Zbog navedene činjenice, kopnena granica između Hrvatske i Crne Gore na Prevlaci nije bila pravno prihvatljiva za Crnu Goru. Ovo, ne samo zbog toga što je ta administrativna linija uspostavljena na pravno manjkav način, već takođe i zbog činjenice što se administrativna linija pružala duž područja koje je od nastanka socijalističke Jugoslavije imalo poseban strateški značaj i kojim je efektivno upravljala i raspolagala JNA. Prepuštanje Prevlake i rta Oštro Hrvatskoj, otud bi za Crnu Goru značilo ugrožavanje njene bezbednosti i suvereniteta, jer bi time Hrvatskoj bilo prepušteno da kontroliše jedini pomorski ulaz u njenu najveću pomorsku luku. Da bi zaštitila svoje geopolitičke interese, Crna Gora je u prethodnom periodu insistirala na teritorijalnoj celovitosti Bokokotorskog zaliva koji predstavlja nedeljivu geografsku i ambijentalnu celinu. Granica na Jadranskom moru, prema njenom shvatanju, ne bi se smela povući na način da preseca sam ulaz u ovaj zaliv, a na čemu Hrvatska insistira pozivajući se na odredbe Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982 (UNCLOS III) i princip *uti possidetis* kojim ona potvrđuje svoj „državno-istorijski kontinuitet“ u pogledu kopnene granice na Prevlaci, negirajući bilo kakvu mogućnost promene provizorne granične linije iz vremena dok je bila u sastavu Jugoslavije.

Zbog nedostatka fleksibilnosti u međusobnim pregovorima o razgraničenju, svi pokušaji mirnog rešavanja teritorijalnog spora u oblasti poluostrva Prevlaka između Crne Gore i Hrvatske u prethodnom periodu nisu doveli do pozitivnih rešenja. Ove dve države sukcesorke SFRJ ne mogu da izađu iz „začaranog kruga“ dok ne pokažu jasnu političku volju da reše sva otvorena granična pitanja. Mogućnost prevazilaženja ovog graničnog problema ipak postoji, jer opšte međunarodno pravo i pravna praksa poseduju pravila i principe o delimitaciji koji bi mogli da nadoknade nedostatke principa *uti possidetis* kojeg je u svojim mišljenjima apostrofirala Badenterova arbitražna komisija, a čiju primenu u spornom području nije bilo moguće sprovesti po automatizmu. Ova okolnost je od posebnog značaja i za razgraničenje dve države na Jadranskom moru, gde pre sukcesije SFRJ nisu postojale međurepubličke granice i zbog čega primena principa *uti possidetis* nije bila moguća. Budući da je na području Prevlake njegova automatska primena osporena od strane Crne Gore, značenje principa *uti possidetis* moralo bi biti pravno preispitano, budući da konačno povlačenje granične linije na poluostrvu Prevlaka predstavlja suštinski preduslov za definisanje državnih granica na Jadranskom moru.

Na osnovu dosadašnje studije proizilazi da su dve zemlje potvrdile dobru volju da mirnim putem reše svoja otvorena granična pitanja. Naime, uprkos donošenju mnogobrojnih jednostranih akata, one su sklopile Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu 10. decembra 2002.

godine, koji je zaključen u svrhu pronalaženja konačnog rešenja za identifikaciju zajedničke državne granice na Jadranskom moru. Ova okolnost je od velikog značaja za očuvanje mira i bezbednosti u ovom regionu, na šta inače ukazuje i činjenica da su početkom 2008. godine Crna Gora i Hrvatska započele pregovore o usaglašavanju teksta sporazuma o upućivanju teritorijalnog spora Međunarodnom sudu pravde u Hagu. U tu svrhu, 27. marta 2008. godine formirana je međuvladina Komisija za utvrđivanje i razgraničenje državne granice, a kojom predsedavaju ministarstva spoljnih poslova obe zemlje (*Službeni list Crne Gore*, 2008; BETA News, 2008).⁴⁹ Iako se Komisija sastajala u više navrata, poslednjih godina došlo je do zastoja u njenom radu zbog zaoštavanja spora o međusobnom razgraničenju na poluostrvu Prevlaka. Sledstveno tome, nije bilo moguće ni inicirati postizanje konačnih rešenja u pogledu delimitacije njihovih teritorijalnih mora, isključivih ekonomskih zona i epikontinentalnih pojaseva na Jadranskom moru.

Kako bi se postigao izvestan napredak, ove dve države bi, kao strane Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), morale da pokažu veću spremnost da reše sva otvorena granična pitanja. U slučaju daljeg odlaganja, pretpristupni pregovori između Crne Gore i EU mogli bi zapasti u „ćorsokak“. Naime, iako EU zadržava neutralan stav o samom razgraničenju na Jadranskom moru, ona zahteva da države kandidati reše sve bilateralne sporove pre stupanja u članstvo. Rešavanje ovog pitanja ključno je za planirani proces evrointegracija Crne Gore i ona, kao kandidat za članstvo u EU, trebalo bi da posveti posebnu pažnju ovom pitanju budući da Hrvatska⁵⁰ kao članica EU ima pravo veta u procesu pristupanja novih članica. Kompromis sa Hrvatskom stoga predstavlja jedini način da se regulišu sva otvorena granična pitanja (na kopnu i na Jadranskom moru), a u skladu sa pravilima i principima međunarodnog prava (Bickl, 2021, 304).

U tom smislu, kompromisno rešenje graničnog spora pretpostavlja mogućnost sporazumnih ispravki granične linije na kopnu, uz transpoziciju određenih odredaba Protokola o privremenom režimu duž južne granice i njihovu eventualnu modifikaciju kroz zaključenje sporazuma o razgraničenju u kojem bi se jasno navele koordinate graničnih linija koje

⁴⁹ Prvobitna ideja da se teritorijalni spor iznese pred Međunarodni sud pravde nastala je na sastanku hrvatskog premijera Iva Sanadera i crnogorskog premijera Mila Đukanovića u martu 2008. godine.

⁵⁰ Hrvatska je svoju poziciju prema Crnoj Gori zbog otvorenih pitanja među kojima je i međusobna delimitacija demonstrirala kroz nedavnu blokadu zatvaranja Poglavlja 14 (Saobraćajna politika) i Poglavlja 31 (Spoljna, bezbednosna i odbrambena politika).

razdvajaju teritorijalna mora, Crne Gore i Hrvatske, kao njihove epikontinentalne pojaseve, isključive ekonomske zone i druge *sui generis* zone, vodeći pri tome računa o prirodnoj konfiguraciji Bokokotorskog zaliva i održanju funkcionalnosti pomorskog saobraćaja, bezbednosti plovidbe i upravljanja pomorskim resursima. Takođe, kompromisno rešenje pretpostavlja i regulisanje svih drugih otvorenih pitanja vezanih za određene delove Jadranskog mora kroz zaključenje višenamenskog sporazuma koji bi obuhvatao pitanja plovidbe, prava na ribolov, zaštite životne sredine, prava na istraživanje i eksploataciju prirodnih resursa uvođenjem klauzula o ležištu resursa, klauzula o jedinstvu resursa i drugih klauzula kojim se regulišu pitanja međusobne saradnje.

Budući da dve strane imaju preklapajuće teritorijalne zahteve nad morskim dnom i podzemljem bogatim naftom ili gasom, strane imaju i mogućnost da, koristeći se primerima dobre međunarodne prakse, uspostave zajedničku razvojnu zonu ili hibridni režim upravljanja prirodnim resursima prebacujući teret teritorijalnog spora na zajedničko sticanje profita i ostvarivanje ekonomske dobiti (Deng, 2023, 123, etc; Agbu & Akpan, 2023, 1–15).⁵¹

U svakom slučaju, Crna Gora i Hrvatska imaju mogućnost da, pozivajući se na član 279. Poglavlja XV Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine (UNCLOS III), primene neka od mirnih sredstva rešavanja teritorijalnih sporova navedenih u članu 33. Povelje UN (kroz pregovore, pružanje dobrih usluga, posredovanje, istragu, pomirenje, arbitražu ili sudsko rešavanje spora u postupku pred Međunarodnim tribunalom za pravo mora ili Međunarodnim sudom pravde). To naravno ne isključuje i druga moguća sredstva u vezi primene i tumačenja ove Konvencije shodno odredbi iz člana 280. Pritom, u cilju postizanja pravičnih rešenja razgraničenja isključivih ekonomskih zona i epikontinentalnih pojaseva, Crna Gora i Hrvatska mogu primeniti i odredbe iz članova 74(1) i 83(1) Konvencije kako bi postigle sporazum utemeljen na međunarodnom

⁵¹ Kada je Istočni Timor stekao nezavisnost 2002. godine, nasledio je nerešen problem pomorske granice sa Australijom. Područje između dve zemlje poznato kao *Timor Gap* izuzetno je bogato naftom i prirodnim gasom. Budući da rešenje o delimitaciji nije bilo moguće lako postići, dve strane su zaključile sporazum o zajedničkoj razvojnoj zoni uspostavivši istovremeno hibridni režim upravljanja naftnim izvorima. Konačno, ovaj privremeni hibridni režim do postizanja trajnog rešenja o pomorskoj delimitaciji, omogućio je Istočnom Timoru da zaradi milijarde dolara i stabilizuje svoju ekonomiju, dok je Australiji obezbedio energetska sigurnost. Slično rešenje primenjeno je i u slučaju teritorijalnog spora u Gvinejskom zalivu između Nigerije i Sao Tome i Principe.

pravu, a kako je to bliže izloženo u članu 38. Statuta Međunarodnog suda pravde u Hagu (Degan, 1989, 113).⁵²

Bibliografija

- Agbu, Andrew David, Akpan, Ben Jones. 2023. "Legal appraisal of the Nigeria And Sao-Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone Agreement". *Cavendish Univeristy Law Journal*, 3, 1-15.
- Antonopoulos, Constantine. 1996. "The Principle of Utī Possidetis Iuris in International Law". *Revue Hellénique de Droit International*, 49 (1), 83, etc.
- Barić Punda, Vesna, Filipović, Valerija. 2015. „Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu s posebnim osvrutom na odluke Vlada Republike Hrvatske i Crne Gore o istraživanju i eksploataciji ugljikovodika u Jadranu“. *Poredbeno pomorsko pravo*, 54 (69), 74.
- Barić Punda, Vesna. 2007. „Zaštićeni ekološko ribolovni pojas Republike Hrvatske i međunarodno pravo mora“. U: *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Mostaru*. 17, 177-198.

⁵² U tom smislu valja se podsetiti stava kojeg je zauzeo Međunarodni sud pravde u sporu koji se ticao delimitacije epikontinentalnog pojasa u Severnom moru, kada su SR Nemačka, s jedne strane, i Holandija i Danska, s druge strane, na osnovu specijalnih sporazuma zatražile od Suda da uvrdi principe i pravila međunarodnog prava primenjiva na ranije utvrđene granične linije. Tom prilikom, Međunarodni sud pravde istakao je da strane imaju obavezu da uđu u pregovore sa stvarnim ciljem da se postigne sporazum, a ne da svaka od njih insistira na svojoj poziciji bez razmišljanja da istu promeni. Takođe, strane imaju obavezu da deluju na način da principi pravičnosti budu primenjeni, što ne isključuje primenu principa središnje linije (metoda ekvidistance), kao i drugih metoda. Pritom, Sud je zaključio da upotreba ekvidistance kao metoda delimitacije nije obavezan između strana u svakom slučaju. Delimitacija treba da se izvrši u skladu sa principima pravičnosti i uz uzimanje u obzir svih relevantnih okolnosti. Pozivanje na principe pravičnosti (budući da se odbija postojanje obaveznih metoda delimitacije), ukazuje pre na autonomnu pravičnost (pravičnu delimitaciju kao krajnji cilj), nego na korektivnu pravičnost (u okviru prava koje valja izmeniti shodno posebnim okolnostima). U slučaju da delimitacijom dođe do preklapanja zahteva, pomorske oblasti treba da budu podeljene između strana u dogovornim proporcijama, a u odsustvu sporazuma, jednako, osim ukoliko se ne dogovore o režimu zajedničke jurisdikcije, korišćenja ili eksploatacije. Tokom pregovora, strane treba da uzmu u obzir činjenice koje *inter alia*, uključuju opštu konfiguraciju obala, kao i prisustvo bilo koje specijalne ili neuobičajene karakteristike u meri u kojoj se to može lako prikazati, fizičku i geološku strukturu i prirodne resurse epikontinentalnog pojasa, kao i stepen proporcionalnosti između pojasa koji pripada svakoj od država, dužinu obale merene u opštem pravcu obale, uz uvažavanje stvarnih ili očekivanih efekata drugih delimitacija epikontinentalnog pojasa u istoj oblasti. Videti: "North Sea Continental Shelf Cases" (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1969, paras. 81, 85, 101.

- Bickl, Thomas. 2021. *The Border Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia – The Stages of a Protracted Conflict and Its Implications for EU Enlargement*. Springer, Cham.
- Birnie, Patricia, 1987. "Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: Emergent Legal Principles and Problems" In: *Maritime Boundaries and Ocean Resources*, G. Blake (ed.). Croom Helm, London, 15–37.
- Blake, Gerald. 1987. "Mediterranean Micro-Territorial Disputes and Maritime Boundary Delimitation". In: *Il regime giuridico internazionale del Mare Mediterraneo: atti del Convegno internazionale (Castelgandolfo, 18–19 ottobre 1985)*, Umberto Leanza (ed.), A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 111–118.
- Boban, Ljubo. 1993. *Hrvatske granice 1918–1993*. Školska knjiga, HAZU, Zagreb.
- Brownlie, Ian. 1998. *Principles of Public International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bugarčić, Bojan. 2011. *Doprinos Međunarodnog suda pravde i arbitražnih tribunala razvoju pravila delimitacije u pravu mora*. Pravni fakultet, Beograd.
- Buzadžić, Milovan. 1994. *Secesija bivših jugoslovenskih republika u svetlosti odluka Ustavnog suda Jugoslavije*. Službeni list, Beograd.
- Caligiuri, Andrea. 2016. "The Maritime Boundaries in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas". In: *Governance of the Adriatic and Ionian Marine Space*, A. Caligiuri (ed.), Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2016, 12–13.
- Charney, Jonathan I. 1994. "Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law". *American Journal of International Law*, 88 (2), 227, etc.
- Degan, Vladimir, Đuro. 1989. *Međunarodno pravo mora, izvori međunarodnog prava*. Informator, Zagreb.
- Deng, Niya. 2023. "Joint Development Between Australia and Timor-Leste". *Chinese Journal of International Law*. 22 (1), 123, etc.
- Dimitrijević, Duško. 2004. „Međunarodno pravno razgraničenje na Jadranskom moru“. *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke*, 2004, 63(2–3), 312–354.
- Dimitrijević, Duško. 2012. *Državne granice nakon sukcesije SFR Jugoslavije*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd.
- Dimitrijević, Duško. 2024. "Boundary disputes between the successor states of the SFR Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea". *American Yearbook of International Law*, 3, 766–937 DOI:<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14295969>.

- Dimitrijević, Vojin. 1998. "The Construction of States: Nationalism and the Definition of Nation-States in Post-Communist European Countries". In: *Dissolution, Continuation and Succession in Eastern Europe*, B. Stern (ed.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague/Boston/London, 147-169.
- Evans, Malcolm. 1991. "Maritime Delimitation and Expanding Categories of Relevant Circumstances". *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 40(1), 1-33.
- Gidel, Gilbert. 1934. *Le droit international public de la mer*. III, Etablissements Mellottée, Paris.
- Guskova, Jelena. 2003. *Istorija jugoslovenske krize 1990-2000*. I, II. Igam, Beograd.
- Jennings, Robert Y. 1963. *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Jovičić, Miodrag. 1992. *Državnost federalnih jedinica*. Izdavačka zadruga Politika i društvo, Naučna knjiga, Beograd.
- Kostić, Laza. „Proishodne norme“. *Pravna misao*, 1939, 449.
- Kovačević, Živorad. 2004. *Međunarodno pregovaranje*. Diplomatska akademija MSP. Beograd.
- Kreća, Milenko. 1992. "Succession and Continuity of Yugoslavia". *Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo*, (2-3), 178-193.
- Kreća, Milenko. 1990. *Pravo mora, naučna istraživanja i prenos pomorske tehnologije*. Naučna knjiga, Beograd.
- Kreća, Milenko. 1993. *Badenterova arbitražna komisija – kritički osvrt*. Jugoslovenski pregled, Beograd.
- Kreća, Milenko. 1994. „Osnovna pitanja sukcesije u jugoslovenskom slučaju“. U: *Nasleđe i naslednici Jugoslavije*, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 1994.
- La Pradelle, Paul de Geouffre de. 1928. *La Frontière*, Etude de droit international. Éditions international, Paris.
- Lekić, Bogdan. 1992. „Administrativne granice u Jugoslaviji posle Drugog svetskog rata“. *Istorija 20. veka*, (1-2), 147.
- Lukić, Radomir. 1940. „Član 116. Ustava i Uredba o Banovini Hrvatskoj“. *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke*, (2), 113-130.
- Marković, Brana. 2000. *Jugoslovenska kriza i svet, hronologija događaja januar 1990 – decembar 1995*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd.
- Milojević, Momir. 1993. „Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije o Jugoslaviji“. *Analiza Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu*, (3), 562-573.

- Nikolić, Kosta. 2022. „Povlačenje Jugoslovenske narodne armije/vojske Jugoslavije iz Hrvatske“. U: *Jugoslavija – između ujedinjenja i razlaza: Institucije jugoslovenske države kao ogledalo srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa 1918–1991*, Bojan Dimitrijević, Hrvoje Čapo (Urs). Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, II, 217–244.
- Novaković, Stojan. 1996. „Boko Kotorska“. *Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo*, 1996, (3), 561.
- Obradović, Konstantin. „Problemi vezani za sukcesiju SFRJ“. U: *Međunarodno pravo i jugoslovenska kriza*, Milan Šahović (ur.). Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 285–287.
- Pavić, Radovan. 2011. „Problem hrvatsko-crnogorske granice na moru“. *Analiza Hrvatskog politikološkog društva* 8(1), 261–262.
- Pellet, Alain. 1992. „The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples“. *European Journal of International Law*, 3(1), 178–185.
- Perazić, Gavro. 1990. „Međunarodnopravni aspekt prava na samoopredeljenje, *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke*, (1–2), 320.
- Perazić, Gavro. 1995. *Bokotorska Prevlaka – Međunarodni pravni problem*. Stručna knjiga, Beograd.
- Perazić, Gavro. 1996. „Međunarodnopravni status Prevlake“. *Vojno delo*, 48(2), 16.
- Račić, Obrad. 2000. „Relevantno pravo sukcesije država u oblasti državne imovine, arhiva i dugova“. U: *Sukcesija i kontinuitet Savezne Republike Jugoslavije*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 102.
- Ratner, Steven. 1996. „Drawing a Better Line: *Uti Possidetis* and the Borders of New States“. *American Journal of International Law*, 90(4), 590, etc.
- Rudolf, Davorin. 1985. *Međunarodno pravo mora*. Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umetnosti, Zagreb.
- Rudolf, Davorin. 1988. *Morski gospodarski pojas u međunarodnom pravu*. Pravni fakultet, Split.
- Šahović, Milan. 1996. „Raspad SFRJ i stvaranje novih država“. U: *Međunarodno pravo i jugoslovenska kriza*, Milan Šahović (ur.). Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 22–23, 34.
- Šahović, Milan. 2002. „Spor oko Prevlake i međunarodno pravo“. *Republika*, (278), 4.
- Tasić, Đorđe. 1938. „L’histoire constitutionnelle de la Serbie“ *Revue d’histoire politique et constitutionnelle*, (2), 228–257.

- Torres Bernardes, Santiago. 1994. "The 'Uti Possidetis Principle' in Historical Perspective". In: *Völkerrecht zwischen normativen Anspruch und politischer Realität*, Festschrift für Karl Zemanek. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 435, etc.
- Vesović, Milan. 1992. „Hronologija o granicama Jugoslavije 1918–1922“. *Istorija 20. veka*, (1–2), 255.
- Vladislavljević, Milan. 1940. „Banovina Hrvatska“, *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke*, (2), 130–135.
- Vukasović, Vid. 1998. „Neke kritičke primedbe na ulogu UN tokom jugoslovenske krize“. *Međunarodni problemi*, (2), 197.
- Weller, Marc. 1991. "International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". *American Journal of International Law*, 86(3), 569–607.
- Zečević Miodrag, Lekić Bogdan. 1991. *Frontiers and Internal Territorial Division in Yugoslavia*. Srboštampa, Belgrade.
- Zečević, Miodrag. 1994. *Jugoslavija 1918–1992*. Prosveta, Beograd.

Pravni izvori i dokumenti

- American Journal of International Law*, 1929, 23 (S5), 275.
- Arhiv Jugoslavije, 552, F-551, poverljiv broj 280.
- BETA News, 22. mart 2008.
- "Beagle Channel Arbitration" (Argentina v. Chile), *International Law Reports*, 1979, 52, 93.
- "Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute" (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 December 1986, *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1986, paras. 20–21, 565.
- "Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 1 December 2014, concerning exploration and exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia", Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Montenegro. https://www.un.org/depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/communications/MNG_note20141201en.pdf
- "Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 18 May 2015 concerning exploration and exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia", The Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the United Nations. https://www.un.org/depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/communications/MNG_note20150619en.pdf

- “Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, Final act of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea”, *UN Treaty Series*, 1994, 1833, 3, etc.
- „Deklaracija o zaštiti interesa Savezne Republike Jugoslavije u procesu razgraničenja sa Republikom Hrvatskom u području Bokotorskog zaliva“, *Službeni list SRJ*, br. 61/2002.
- “Gulf Fonesca Case” (El Salvador v. Honduras), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1992, 388.
- Handbook of the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries*. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, 2000.
- „Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora sa Završnim aktom Treće konferencije UN o pravu mora“. 1, Pravni fakultet sveučilišta u Splitu.
- “Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case” (El Salvador v. Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1992, 601.
- “Letter dated 10 December from the representatives of Croatia and Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/2002/1348, December 11, 2002.
- “Letter dated 8 february 2000-from the Chargé d’affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, February 9, 2000, S/2000/95.
- “Letter dated 1 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council – Annex – Geneva Joint Declaration”, S/24476, September 30, 1992.
- “Letter dated 10 July 1998 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/1998/632, July 10, 1998.
- “Letter dated 18 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/1998/533, June 18, 1998.
- “Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway)”, Judgment, *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1993, 38.
- “Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea” (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, *International Court of Justice Reports*, 2009, 61, etc.
- “Memorandum on the negotiating position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the region of Prevlaka and the

- preservation of the security system of the United Nations", S/1998/1225, Annex II, December 18, 1998.
- „Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije od br. 1 do br. 7“. 1992. *Međunarodna politika* (1001), 13–19.
- „Mišljenja Arbitražne komisije od br. 8 do br. 10“. *Međunarodna politika* (1005–6), 26–28.
- “Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31. December 2001”,
- Vol. I, Part I, Ch. I to XI and Vol. II, Part I, Ch. XII to XXIX, and Part II. ST/LEG/SER.E/20. 247. etc.
- “North Sea Continental Shelf Cases” (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1969, paras. 81, 85, 101.
- „Ocene i stavovi Predsedništva SFRJ povodom proglašenja samostalnosti Republika Hrvatske i Slovenije“. 1991. *Međunarodna politika*, 995/997.
- „Odluka o dopuni Odluke o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 157/2003; 7/2004.
- „Odluka o formiranju Komisije za utvrđivanje i razgraničenje državne granice“, *Službeni list Crne Gore*, br. 24/2008; 62/2008.
- „Odluka o izmeni Odluke o određivanju blokova za istraživanje i proizvodnju ugljovodonika“, *Službeni list Crne Gore*, br. 51/2014.
- „Odluka o izmjeni i dopunama Odluke o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 138/2006.
- „Odluka o izmjeni Odluke o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 31/2008.
- „Odluka o određivanju blokova za istraživanje i proizvodnju ugljovodonika“, *Službeni list Crne Gore*, br. 17/2011.
- „Odluka o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 157/2003.
- “Oil Firms Quit Croatia Over Montenegro Border Row”. *Balkan Insight*, July 29, 2015. <https://balkaninsight.com/2015/07/29/oil-companies-drop-out-due-croatia-montenegro-border-dispute/bi/all-balkan-countries/>
- “Opinions No. 1 to No. 10 of the Arbitration Commission”, *International Legal Materials*, 1992, 31 (6), 1421, 1572–1592.

- “Opinions No. 11 to No. 15 of the Arbitration Commission”, *International Legal Materials*, 1993, 32 (6), 1586–1593.
- “Prevlaka Fact Sheets – Geography and History”. 2004. Croatian Mission to the United Nations. http://www.un.int/croatia/statement/doc/doc_011299.htm
- Politika*, 27. avgust 1939.
- Politika*, 14. decembar 2002.
- „Pomorski zakonik Republike Hrvatske“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 181/2004.
- „Pomorski zakonik“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 17/1994.
- „Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske, Međunarodni ugovori*, br. 13/2002.
- „Protokol o privremenom režimu uz južnu granicu“, *Službeni list SRJ, Međunarodni ugovori*, br. 12/2002.
- “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721”, S/23280, December 11, 1991.
- “Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas”. 2016. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 82–83.
- „Rešenje Ministarstva pomorstva Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije br. 1724 o teritorijalnoj nadležnosti uprava pomorskih oblasti“, *Službeni list FNRJ*, br. 28/1952.
- „Sporazum o normalizaciji odnosa između Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Hrvatske“, *Službeni list SRJ, dodatak Međunarodni ugovori*, br. 5/1996.
- Summary of practice of Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties*, 1994. (Doc. A/51/95).
- „Uredba o Banovini Hrvatskoj“, *Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, br. 194-A-68.
- „Uredba o osnivanju pomorskih oblasti“, *Službeni list FNRJ*, br. 1/1952.
- „Ustav SFRJ“, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 9/1974.
- “UN General Assembly Memorandum concerning Historic Bays”, Doc. A/CONG.13/1, 1957, p. 102.
- United Nations Documents, A/50/910; A/51/95; A/50/930; A/508928. YILC (*Yearbook of International Law Commission*), 1956, II, 300, etc.
- „Zakon o obalnom moru Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije“, *Službeni list FNRJ*, br. 106/1948.

- „Zakon o obalnom moru, spoljnom morskom pojasu i epikontinentalnom pojasu Jugoslavije“, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 22/1965 i 25/1979.
- „Zakon o obalnom moru i epikontinentalnom pojasu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije“, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 49/1987; 57/1989; 24/1994; 28/1996.
- „Zakon o pomorskoj i unutrašnjoj plovidbi Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore“, *Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore*, br. 19/1978 i br. 19/1987.
- „Zakon o morskom ribarstvu Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore“, *Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore*, br. 10/1979.
- „Zakon o moru Crne Gore“, *Službeni list Crne Gore*, br. 17/2007; 6/2008.
- „Zakon o područjima općina i kotara u NR Hrvatskoj“, *Narodne novine NR Hrvatske*, br. 39/1962; 13/1965; 13/1967; 11/1973; 8/1974; 42/1974; 5/1986 i 27/1988.
- „Zakon o bezbednosti plovidbe na moru i u unutrašnjim vodama Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske“, *Narodne novine Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske*, br. 40/1978.
- „Zakon o pomorskom ribarstvu Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske“, *Narodne novine Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske*, br. 64/1980.
- „Zakon o preuzimanju saveznih zakona u oblasti pomorske i unutarnje plovidbe koji se u Republika Hrvatskoj primjenjuju kao republički zakoni“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 53/1991.
- „Zakon o naknadi za imovinu oduzetu za vrijeme jugoslovenske komunističke vladavine“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 92/1996.
- „Zakon i izmjenama i dopunama Pomorskog zakonika“, *Narodne novine Republike Hrvatske*, br. 146/2008; 146/2008.

UDC 355.356(100)(091)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 331–355
Original scientific paper
Received: 18/01/2026
Revised: 11/05/2026
Accepted: 22/05/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.5
CC BY-SA 4.0

Miroslav GLIŠIĆ¹, Nevena GLIŠIĆ²

Analysing Lord Ismay's Dictum, "Out, In, and Down", During NATO's Early Development³

SUMMARY

This paper examines the research question of whether NATO, during its early development, was successful in fulfilling the aims articulated in Lord Ismay's famous dictum that NATO should keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. The authors analyse Euro-Atlantic relations after the Second World War and the origins and development of NATO. The research hypothesis tested in this paper is that a thorough analysis of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 cannot confirm the complete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum but rather that the majority of its aspects were inevitably reflected during the first years of the Alliance's evolution.

Using theories of international public administration and international relations, as well as historical lessons, this paper demonstrates that a detailed review of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 does not fully support Lord Ismay's well-known dictum. Specifically, NATO fulfilled the first two aims: keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. However, it

¹ Miroslav Glišić, Research Associate, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia, e-mail: miroslav.glicic@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0003-0829-6873.

² Nevena Glišić, Undergraduate student, Princeton University, USA, e-mail: nevena.glicic2006@gmail.com.

³ The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions they are affiliated with.

did not achieve its objective of keeping Germany down. Instead, NATO significantly contributed to the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany, which proved essential for NATO's continued existence.

Keywords: NATO, Lord Ismay, Euro-Atlantic relations.

Analiza izreke Lorda Ismeja „Napolje, unutra i dole” tokom ranog razvoja NATO

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad se fokusira na istraživačko pitanje da li je NATO, tokom svog ranog razvoja, bio uspješan u ispunjavanju ciljeva izraženih u čuvenoj izreci lorda Ismeja da NATO treba da drži Ruse napolju, Amerikance unutra, a Nemce pod kontrolom. Autori sagledavaju evroatlantske odnose nakon Drugog svetskog rata, kao i nastanak i razvoj NATO-a. Istraživačka hipoteza koja se u ovom radu testira jeste da detaljna analiza nastanka i razvoja NATO-a do 1957. godine ne može da potvrdi potpunu primenu gore navedene izreke lorda Ismeja, ali je većina njenih aspekata neminovno bila zastupljena tokom prvih godina razvoja Alijanse.

Koristeći teorije međunarodne javne administracije i međunarodnih odnosa, kao i istorijske lekcije, ovaj rad pokazuje da detaljan pregled porekla i razvoja NATO-a do 1957. godine ne podržava u potpunosti dobro poznatu izreku lorda Ismeja. Konkretno, NATO je ispunio prva dva cilja: držanje Rusa napolju, a Amerikanaca unutra. Međutim, nije postigao svoj cilj da obuzda Nemačku. Umesto toga, NATO je značajno doprineo obnovi Savezne Republike Nemačke, što se pokazalo neophodnim za dalji opstanak NATO-a.

Ključne reči: NATO, lord Ismej, Evroatlantski odnosi.

Introduction

Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay was born in India on June 27, 1887, and passed away in the United Kingdom on December 17, 1965. He was a British military officer and statesman and the first NATO Secretary-General from 1952 to 1957. While studying various research papers, theses, and scholarly books on NATO, one often comes across a frequently cited dictum attributed to Lord Hastings Ismay. It is a famous description of the newborn Alliance's function at the time: "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".

However, there is no evidence that Ismay actually said this. As Jamie Shea points out, this statement has become such a fitting characterisation

of the post-war situation that few pundits bother with its historical authenticity (2023). This argument seems plausible. Furthermore, Sayle, while explaining the “Pax Atlantica” as a broad pattern of international affairs regarding NATO, cited what Lord Ismay is said to have quipped: that NATO existed to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down, but he also emphasised that there is no official record of that dictum. However, he agreed that this dictum is the best explanation of NATO’s function and made a very interesting observation: “Indeed, we do not have to take Ismay’s word for it, for his dictum was repackaged in countless policy documents over the alliance’s long history as an explanation of NATO’s purpose” (2019, 3). Although scholars can access numerous official reports published by NATO, including NATO Archives Online, which grants access to thousands of declassified and publicly disclosed Alliance documents, as well as other primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, they may struggle to find the specific time and place at which Lord Ismay made his famous dictum. They might also face difficulty determining whether he uttered the dictum only once or on several appropriate occasions. It is more likely that Ismay uttered his famous dictum privately before he became Secretary-General. At that time, he frequently analysed and criticised the newly formed Alliance. A similar claim is also made by Peter Hennessy, who quoted a legend from the Ministry of Defence that “Ismay produced this unforgettable job description while explaining NATO’s functions to a private meeting of Conservative backbenchers in 1949” (Hennessy 1989, 412 and 794). Additionally, the NATO website states that Lord Ismay coined the aforementioned dictum before becoming Secretary-General, during his earlier political career (NATO d). To conclude, the dictum coined by Lord Ismay is authentic, but it predates his appointment as NATO Secretary-General.

In any case, Ismay’s dictum is a useful guide to the purpose and development of NATO throughout its history. But the question is: was this dictum implemented in full or in part by NATO during its early development? Undoubtedly, the Alliance achieved the goals of keeping the Russians out and the Americans in, but failed to achieve the third goal of keeping Germans down. Also, during NATO’s development, many scholars and politicians have rephrased Ismay’s dictum in several different ways.

The paper consists of several interconnected parts that examine the origins and development of NATO to test the aforementioned research hypothesis. In addition to the introduction, theoretical framework, and conclusion, the paper consists of four parts. The first part, titled “The Birth of NATO”, outlines the circumstances leading to the establishment of the Alliance. The second part, “NATO’s early years of development”, provides

an overview of NATO's evolution from its establishment in 1949 up to Lord Ismay becoming Secretary-General. The third part, titled "Lord Ismay, first Secretary-General of NATO", describes the establishment of the position of Secretary-General, as well as the election of this British official to head the Alliance. Finally, the fourth part, entitled "NATO during Lord Ismay's tenure as Secretary-General", outlines the political and administrative challenges faced by the Alliance and how they were addressed. Throughout the four parts mentioned, Lord Ismay's dictum "Out, In, and Down" and NATO's success in fulfilling this triad are discussed.

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

To confirm the research hypothesis, the field of international public administration was applied in the paper, mainly drawing on its concepts from historical institutionalism, particularly the principal-agent theory (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, Tierney, 2006), and the organisational theory of international organisations (Barnet, Finnemore, 2004). The principal-agent theory was especially useful for analysing NATO's decision-making processes and their development and the relationship between member states and the NATO administration. Meanwhile, the organisational theory of international organisations helped examine NATO's strategic concepts and evolution.

The research conducted under the auspices of international public administration definitely required the use of different theories of international relations, namely, a combination of classical realism, neorealism, and liberal institutionalism (Weber and Hyde-Price, 2016). This combination of theoretical approaches was made possible by the application of analytical eclecticism developed by Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). By connecting various mechanisms created under the auspices of the above-mentioned theories through analytical eclecticism, a solid analytical framework was established to explain the origin of NATO as a response to the shift in the balance of power after the Second World War, its institutionalisation for managing collective defence, and the gradual development of organisational structures and procedures. This approach allowed verification of the research hypothesis and examination of NATO's success in implementing Lord Ismay's dictum to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" during its founding and development from 1949 to 1957. Applying classical realism helped identify the circumstances of NATO's origin, such as the development of the Soviet threat, fears of a return to US isolationism, the need for US power in

Europe, and the importance of deterrence and balance. Johnston (2025, 117) highlights the fact that Ismay's dictum is essentially based on a realist approach. Neorealism provided an understanding of bipolarity, Europe's asymmetric dependence on the United States, and the core of NATO's collective defence, especially in the context of the Korean War. From the perspective of liberal institutionalism, the conditions of the establishment of NATO's Secretary-General position, SHAPE, the joint procedures, and an integrated military structure were examined.

A case study of NATO's development from 1949 to 1957 and an analysis of relevant documents were used as research methods. For a better understanding of Lord Ismay's position regarding NATO, several books and articles have been consulted, including Whitehall (Hennessy 1989), Political Leadership in NATO (Jordan 1979), and several of Ismay's autobiographical works, such as Insurance for Peace (1953), Atlantic Alliance (1954), and NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (1955). In addition, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957 – a Study in International Administration (Jordan 1967) and I am the Servant of the Council: Lord Ismay and the Making of the NATO International Staff (Risso 2019) were used to define NATO's development and institutionalisation in its early stages. Finally, to analyse NATO's success in implementing Lord Ismay's dictum "Out, In, and Down", the overall strategic context during the early stages of NATO's development was reviewed using NATO strategy documents and influential works by Kaplan (2007), Sayle (2019), and Rynning (2024), as well as numerous well-known articles published in the Routledge Handbook of NATO, The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security, and The Oxford Handbook of NATO.

The Birth of NATO

The establishment of NATO was influenced by the circumstances that arose after the Second World War. These circumstances were primarily reflected in the Soviet Union's expansionist policy, the need to protect Western European countries, and the United Nations' inadequate response to the problems of the time.

According to Lord Ismay (1955, 3), the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and the Allies' victory did not lead to the peace and prosperity they anticipated. The Charter was built on two flawed assumptions. The first was that the five permanent members of the Security Council would reach enduring agreements on major issues. This proved false. The second assumption was that none of

these powers, aside from Russia's known claims on Japan, sought territorial expansion. Sadly, this was mistaken as well, since the Soviet Union, supported by the Red Army and global communism, pursued an expansionist strategy, which Western European nations had to confront.

The complexity of the situation was evident from the fact that all efforts at reconciliation failed despite numerous international conferences. One such conference was the 1947 Moscow Conference, which unfortunately marked the end of post-war cooperation between the Soviet Union and democratic countries. After the Moscow Conference's failure, a confrontation phase ensued that lasted until 1962, when *détente* was adopted to reduce tension between the two sides. The initial period in the confrontation phase was marked by the dominance of the United States in terms of the advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union ended the US nuclear monopoly in 1949, a bipolar arrangement of military power with enormous conventional and nuclear capabilities emerged, and the two world powers began to expand their networks of allies.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union's expansion into Europe and Asia grew increasingly, and the situation worsened. As Kaplan (2007, 5) notes, "the United States recognised that the survival of Western democracies threatened by Communist internal subversion or external aggression was vital to the security of the United States itself". On the other side, as argued by Geoffrey Wheatcroft (2011), "...most Americans accepted that the goal of keeping the Russians out was worth the price, which meant that the Americans picked up a disproportionate share of the tab". In any case, as Kori Schake and Erica Pepe (2019) argue, if there had been no threat of Soviet aggression after the Second World War, there would have been no Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, or NATO.

To address the challenging situation in Greece and Turkey, the US Government approved a \$400 million aid package until June 1948. This was based on President Truman's address to the US Congress on March 12, 1947, which is known as the Truman Doctrine. In addition to the financial aid, civil and military missions were also sent to these two countries. However, it is important to note that the Truman Doctrine was explicitly designed to address the threats posed on Greece and Turkey and not the other Western European countries, where the situation was also becoming increasingly alarming. This observation was also made by Lord Ismay (1955, 6).

In response to the complex economic conditions in Western Europe at the time, George C. Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, launched the European Recovery Programme in June 1947. The Economic

Cooperation Act, better known as the Marshall Plan, was signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on April 3, 1948, to provide non-military, economic reconstruction and development aid to Europe. However, the Soviet Union viewed this initiative as a tool of American imperialism. Apart from the dire economic situation, Western European countries were also facing significant military threats posed by the Soviet Union. Lord Ismay (1955, 7) provided an assessment that the armed forces of the West were weak, uncoordinated, and severely lacking in modern equipment, leaving nothing but America's possession of the atomic bomb to deter the Soviets from overrunning Western Europe. Moreover, the only hope for restoring the balance of power lay in the free European countries combining together. In this sense, the idea of a defensive alliance among like-minded nations within the United Nations had already been raised by several statesmen, such as Mr Churchill, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Ernest Bevin, and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr Louis S. St Laurent. Baylis (2024, 17) emphasises that St Laurent's speech on September 18, 1947, was the first public statement by any Western leader calling for "creating some form of Western Atlantic security association". In these circumstances, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948. As noted by Baylis (2024, 19), the founding five nations considered the Brussels Pact an essential step towards securing American support for the defence of Western Europe.

After that, the United States Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948. As noted by Lord Ismay (1955, 10), "This marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in a time of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter into an Atlantic Alliance". Following the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty member countries began preliminary talks on the North Atlantic Treaty. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal were formally invited to accede to the Treaty on March 15, 1949, and the North Atlantic Treaty was finally signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 15-16), "When the Foreign Ministers of the founder countries met in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, they started an experiment in international relations unprecedented in peacetime. The Treaty has become the framework for the common defence of over 380 million people on both sides of the Atlantic".

It can be said that during the establishment of NATO, Lord Ismay's dictum was entirely relevant and that future member states were on the right track to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans

down. It was crucial to prevent the spread of communism and protect Western Europe from Russian expansion by keeping the Russians out. Indeed, the Russians have been kept out thanks to the strengthening of Western European states, with significant support from the United States under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, the Vandenberg Resolution was a decisive step in building further capacity to keep the Russians out.

Apart from that, in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was widely feared that the United States might do the same as it did after the First World War. Therefore, it was necessary to dissuade the United States from returning to an isolationist policy and to give it a critical role in establishing a permanent Euro-Atlantic bond. With the adoption of the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States took a decisive step towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Together with the obligations arising from the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States was using resources to strengthen European states under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, paving the way for irreversible Euro-Atlantic integration. There was no longer any doubt that the Americans would be in.

Also, after the Second World War, the major powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, learned from their mistakes in 1919 and decided to keep significant forces in Germany as occupying armies rather than leaving Germany to fend for itself. Jamie Shea (2023) explains that Germany's catastrophic defeat in 1945, resulting in its unconditional surrender and occupation by four countries, including the Soviet Union's occupation of East Germany until 1991, led to the creation of a new and different Germany. This new Germany was divided into two separate states, one capitalist in the west and one communist in the east. It is essential to note that the division of Germany facilitated the broader division of Europe. On the one hand, the Americans, the British, and the French combined their occupation zones to establish a new nation, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, albeit with limited sovereignty, primarily in foreign affairs and defence. On the other hand, Stalin responded by expanding the Soviet zone to include the German Democratic Republic. As a reminder, West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) was established on May 23, 1949, and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) on October 7, 1949. It is quite certain that an occupied and divided Germany could not be a resurgent Germany. By occupying and dividing Germany into two parts, the conditions were created to keep the Germans down.

NATO's Early Years of Development

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, and its ratification by Congress on July 25, 1949, US President Truman signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Act on October 6, 1949. This Act followed the Marshall Plan. After that, the United States supported the European NATO member states, which submitted a formal request for military and financial assistance, effectively creating the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme, which was an essential tool for the containment of Soviet expansion.

Apart from this, the North Atlantic Council began on September 17, 1949, by holding regular sessions and making significant decisions concerning the establishment of an organisational structure, such as the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, the Military Production and Supply Board, and the Council Deputies. Despite NATO's initial efforts, in the year after the Treaty's signing, the situation in Europe was growing increasingly complex, and the Soviet Union possessed far superior armaments to those of the European NATO members.

As Richardson (1966, 18) noted, before the Korean War, it was unclear whether NATO would become a full-fledged military alliance or remain only a political guarantee that the United States would intervene if any of its members were attacked. On the one hand, European leaders were unwilling to increase their armaments efforts at the cost of delaying economic recovery and were even more reluctant to contemplate German rearmament. Also, the US Government, eager to save money, was unwilling to increase the defence budget significantly above the existing level. On the other hand, NATO was forced to adopt a Forward Strategy, even though it significantly lacked the strength to implement it. However, within the United States administration, the balance was shifting in favour of the military strengthening of NATO, especially after the Soviet Union's nuclear test in August 1949.

Apart from the mentioned Soviet nuclear test, the Korean War served as a significant catalyst in accelerating the further development of NATO since June 25, 1950, when the conflict on the rim of East Asia started. Wells (2010, 19) argues that Europe's defences were inadequate to address the Soviet threat, and NATO was a new organisation without any central staff or a single commander. He illustrated that allies had only 10 divisions instead of 54 in West Germany. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York from September 16 to 18, 1950, one of the main topics of discussion was determining the best approach to defending NATO territory against aggression similar to the attack on the Korean Peninsula.

On that occasion, the establishment of integrated forces under centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe, using a Forward Strategy to resist any attack as far as possible to the east, was also considered. Without a doubt, a significant development occurred during the mentioned meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York. The United States proposed that West Germany participate in the integrated forces, with some limitations. This meant that each German unit could not exceed a division level and had to be integrated into larger allied forces. Lord Ismay (1955, 32) observed that the United States' proposal indicated a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany. It is important to note that Germany's participation in the defence of Western European countries had been considered before. However, the Korean War brought this issue to the forefront, underscoring the importance and urgency of deciding on Germany's role within NATO. As Lord Ismay (1955, 33) states, "from a military point of view, the main argument in favour of participation was that NATO's Forward Strategy made it imperative to defend Europe on German soil: this was hardly conceivable without the military and political participation of the German Federal Republic".

All member states were ready to accept the US proposal regarding German participation in NATO, except for France, which believed that rebuilding the German army at this stage would do more harm than good. Since no agreement could be reached, the North Atlantic Council adjourned the meeting to allow member states, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to review the issue. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 33), the Foreign Ministers of the countries mentioned above, after separate consultations, declared that they would increase and strengthen their forces in Germany and that any attack on the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin from any side would be considered an attack on them. They also expressed the view that creating a German national army would not be in line with the interests of Germany and Europe and that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the common defence of Europe was under consideration.

When the North Atlantic Council reconvened on September 26, 1950, apart from the approval of the concept of the integrated forces, representatives of the mentioned countries stated that Germany should be allowed to contribute to the defence of Western Europe, so the Defence Committee was invited to provide recommendations on how this should be done (Ismay 1955, 33). Subsequently, France presented a proposal for creating a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe. According to the proposal, European forces would be at NATO's

disposal and act in accordance with the Washington Treaty's contractual obligations. The proposal was presented to the NATO Defence Committee on October 28, 1950, as an alternative to the US proposal. However, due to significant differences between the US and France, the Defence Committee was unable to reach a final decision. As a result, they tasked the Military Committee and the Council Deputies to continue considering this proposal. On December 13, 1950, the Council Deputies and the Military Committee sent a report to the Defence Committee and the North Atlantic Council. The report was a compromise between the US's and France's proposals. Lord Ismay (1955, 34) explained that the report recommended that Germany's participation was necessary for a realistic and acceptable defence of Western Europe. The report also discussed the maximum size of future German units and other restrictions that should be placed on their defence contributions. The report confirmed that any German participation must be within the NATO structure. This means that German units should be included in the Alliance's integrated defence forces (as proposed by the United States) or in the united European Army (as proposed by France).

In accordance with the joint proposal from the Council Deputies and the Military Committee, during the North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels on December 18-19, 1950, as explained by Lord Ismay (1955, 34), the stance was that allowing German participation would enhance Europe's defence while maintaining the purely defensive nature of NATO. Also, on that occasion, the North Atlantic Council took the first steps regarding German participation in NATO. As Lord Ismay notes (1955, 34), on the one hand, the North Atlantic Council invited the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to continue further consultation and consideration of this issue with the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, France's intention to convene a conference of European powers to organise a united European army was acknowledged. Furthermore, the Council appointed General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander (North Atlantic Council, 1950).

On the one hand, it cannot be said that the Korean War decisively influenced NATO's development as an organisation. Kaplan (2013, 152) notes that "the Korean War was unnecessary to convert the alliance into an organisation. It already existed on June 25, 1950". Therefore, the idea that NATO's structure was created as a result of the Korean War is incorrect. On the other hand, the Korean War had a significant impact on speeding up NATO in overcoming some obstacles to its further development. According to Kaplan (2013, 149), NATO faced several issues in its first year of establishment. France had doubts about the intentions

of Anglo-Americans, including Germany's membership in the Alliance. Smaller NATO member states were unsatisfied with their exclusion from the decision-making process. The United Kingdom was concerned about its position in the "special relationship" with the United States. The United States was impatient with Europe's slow responses, while Europe was dissatisfied with the US's dominance in NATO. The Korean War accelerated West Germany's NATO membership, but it still was not as fast as the United States had hoped. Four years of French objections delayed Germany's entry into NATO, and even then, it had to enter through the back door of an enlarged Brussels Pact, as Kaplan (2013, 148) noted. It can be concluded that the Korean War did not significantly affect NATO's organisational development. However, it certainly affected the approach to defending NATO territory against aggression, similar to that on the Korean Peninsula, which was already widely discussed at the aforementioned meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in New York in September 1950.

During the Lisbon meeting from February 20 to 25, 1952, the North Atlantic Council again considered the issue of German participation in the defence of Western Europe. As negotiations between the three Occupying Powers and Germany failed, the Paris Conference on the European Army resulted in a national treaty drafted by representatives of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 47), the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon had four documents on the plan for the European Defence Community: the report of the Paris Conference, the report by the Occupying Powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the report of the Council of Deputies, and the report of the Military Committee. The North Atlantic Council approved all four reports and recommended that the NATO member states sign a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees to be given by the member states of the European Defence Community. These actions underscored the need to defend Western Europe. Consequently, the Treaty on the European Defence Community was signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, alongside the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty mentioned earlier. Additionally, the Brussels Council agreed to operate continuously by appointing Permanent Representatives and a Secretary-General to lead a unified international secretariat, which would support the Council in managing its growing responsibilities (North Atlantic Council, 1952).

In addition to the development of NATO shown above, it is important to emphasise that the first Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North

Atlantic Area was adopted by the Defence Committee on December 1, 1949, and approved by the North Atlantic Council on January 6, 1950, defining the primary mission of NATO as deterring aggression. (NATO b) The main aim of this Strategic Concept, titled DC 6/1, was "To coordinate, in time of peace, our military and economic strength with a view to creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening the peace, independence and stability of the North Atlantic family of nations." This strategy was characterised by a chronic shortage of conventional forces and a reliance on nuclear weapons. The United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union on conventional weapons. In the "Sword and Shield Strategy", the US nuclear forces played the role of a sword, which was supposed to come into effect if the shield formed by NATO conventional forces in Europe was breached.

Unlike the previously analysed period that was related to the birth of NATO, the first years of the Alliance's development, from the signing of the Washington Treaty to the establishment of the position of Secretary-General, cannot be characterised as a period where Lord Ismay's dictum was fully applied. The Russians were kept out during the early years of NATO's development by applying the Forward Strategy, which included, among other things, the deployment of European conventional forces as far to the east as possible; all necessary measures were taken to keep the Russians as far away from the North Atlantic Alliance as possible. Furthermore, the first NATO Strategic Concept provided a solid basis for subsequent planning to enhance member states' defence and keep the Russians out to the east as far as possible.

On the other hand, with the implementation of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme and the aforementioned Strategic Concept, the United States became increasingly involved in shaping the concept of Euro-Atlantic security under NATO's auspices. Also, the appointment of American General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander should not be left out here. With NATO's development, the United States became increasingly involved.

However, we need to address Germany in detail because NATO failed to fully implement Lord Ismay's dictum regarding keeping Germans down during its early years. As noted by Jordan (1979, 39), West Germany's participation in Western defence was one of the most important political issues facing the Allies in the early 1950s. Although it was a matter of direct concern to NATO as a whole, the specific responsibility for Germany rested with the United States, the United

Kingdom, and France (as the Occupying Powers). Therefore, many discussions regarding Germany took place outside of NATO. The heavy economic and military burden that the Korean conflict placed on the Allies, above all on the United States, was the immediate event that prompted these discussions. The United States government wanted Germany to provide twelve divisions for the defence of Europe to free up American troops for use in Korea. However, the French opposed the re-establishment of the German army, and the Germans wanted their sovereignty restored if they were to contribute to the defence of the West. Besides, Germany was indispensable in implementing NATO's Forward Strategy, which the United States of America very well recognised. Nevertheless, the American proposal, which explains Germany's significant role in the fight against the Soviet Union, was not well received by some countries, primarily France, which opposed its rearmament and strengthening. As a result of this division among the Allies, the issue of Germany's NATO membership remained unresolved during the period under consideration.

It can be concluded that Lord Ismay's dictum becomes less applicable when it comes to Germany. This is due to the outbreak of the Korean War and the growing need to implement the Forward Strategy. The experience from the Korean War and the Forward Strategy required West Germany's involvement in the defence of democratic Europe. This would not have been possible if the Germans had remained down.

Lord Ismay, First Secretary-General of NATO

As mentioned, the North Atlantic Council established the post of Secretary-General in February 1952 during its meeting in Lisbon, and the Council Deputies approved Lord Ismay's appointment on March 12, 1952 (North Atlantic Council Deputies, 1952 NATO c). Lord Ismay was part of the group of public officials who developed, managed, and maintained the British Empire. The experience and respect Ismay gained during the war were major factors in his appointment as the first Secretary-General of NATO. Additionally, as cited by Jordan (1967, 17), using several sources, Lord Ismay held various positions, including military staff officer, high-level aide, coordinator, expeditor, and diplomat. He attended conferences in Cairo, Malta, Tehran, Quebec, Moscow, and Yalta before becoming a Cabinet minister. Also, he had dealings with the Russians, the French, and the Americans at the highest level. The aforementioned was of great importance to NATO, especially given the problems it had to face, such as the use of nuclear weapons and the German question.

In addition to Lord Ismay's personal qualities and experience, it is essential to emphasise that he had a negative and rather critical attitude towards NATO, considering that this Alliance was insufficient, too narrow in scope, and inadequately organised to respond to the global challenge posed by Soviet power. He often described NATO as: "Rather a lot of harness and too little horse" (Jordan 1979, 28). In this context, as Risso (2019, 347) mentioned, just a month before he was asked to take over as NATO Secretary-General in January 1952, Lord Ismay accompanied Churchill to visit President Truman to discuss the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. On this occasion, Lord Ismay became very concerned about the slowness of progress and divisions within the Alliance, and he saw NATO as an "overly bureaucratic and inefficient" organisation. Additionally, an interesting event that took place before Lord Ismay was appointed the Secretary-General of NATO. It occurred after he participated in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952. Although the Lisbon meeting produced many important results, Lord Ismay did not like the particular style of mass diplomacy used. He found the arguments unpleasant, so he left Portugal with the remark, "This is the first that I have seen of NATO, and thank heaven it's the last" (Ismay, 2014, Loc. 7,593).

In any case, Lord Ismay took up office on April 4, 1952, as both Secretary-General of the Organisation and Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, on the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. He retired from his post as Secretary-General on May 16, 1957, and was succeeded by Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium (NATO a). As Jordan (1967, 3) observed, when Lord Ismay assumed the office of Secretary-General of NATO in April 1952, he had the opportunity to take on an entirely new role in the history of international organisations. Namely, the creation of the position of Secretary-General of NATO introduced a new model and approach to international administration, given the role and responsibilities of the position. While experiences and practices from the League of Nations and the United Nations could be considered, they could not be entirely relied upon. Unlike his predecessors in other international organisations, the Secretary-General of NATO served in a dual capacity as head of the International Staff and Vice-Chairman (later Chairman) of the North Atlantic Council, as Jordan noted (1967, 45). Accordingly, the Secretary-General's role combined political and administrative functions. It was good for Lord Ismay, who believed that having full and unrestricted authority was essential to be an effective leader in reorganising NATO's civilian structure. He feared that without this authority, he would have less influence than the Chairman of Council Deputies, and the reorganisation

efforts would suffer from the start. On the other side, as noted by Jordan (1967, 47), "Lord Ismay decided not to adopt an aggressive and independent role as Secretary-General. Though he had thought it necessary to claim unfettered authority at the time of his appointment, he did not assume the attitude of a full member of the Council, even though, in a sense, he was one (especially after December 1956). He preferred to regard himself as an international servant of NATO, whose function was stewardship". Also, "the roles of arbiter, mediator, conciliator, and coordinator seemed to fit more appropriately his situation, his experience, and his personality" (Jordan 1967, 48). Furthermore, as Risso (2019, 343) stated, while serving in NATO, Lord Ismay did not see himself as a political leader aiming to make the Alliance an independent and strong actor on the world stage. Instead, he viewed himself as a facilitator. In Lord Ismay's opinion, the Secretary-General's primary responsibility was to help countries understand one another and collaborate effectively to deter aggression.

NATO during Lord Ismay's Tenure as Secretary-General

Lord Ismay, when he became NATO's Secretary-General, believed that NATO should not be based solely on a military structure. At that time, NATO's organisation was ad hoc. He recognised that in the event of war, military and civilian administrations would be interdependent. To address this issue, he established several working groups within NATO to examine various aspects of warfare-related problems. According to Jordan (1967, 85-86), during Lord Ismay's early years in office, the Council had 12 committees and working groups divided into six categories. By 1957, the number of committees had increased to 25. As observed by Risso (2019, 343), "It demonstrates the pivotal role that he played in shaping the early development of the alliance and how his decisions had long-term effects on the history of NATO".

In addition to being involved in the development of NATO's organisational structure, Lord Ismay was also deeply involved in addressing fundamental political and security issues that concerned NATO and the wider international community. The most important issues were certainly the resolution of the German question and the Federal Republic of Germany's membership in NATO, the Cyprus crisis, and the Suez crisis.

As noted by Jordan (1979, 40), the North Atlantic Council had already adopted the text of the draft protocol on reciprocal guarantees to be established by the European Defence Community and NATO at its second weekly meeting after Lord Ismay took office as Secretary-General,

which was held on May 6, 1952. However, the protocol, which extended the guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to West Germany, could not be signed until the treaty on the European Defence Community was ratified. After the arrival of Lord Ismay as Secretary-General, the United States continued to support the European Defence Community; i.e., it was still the position of France that the integration of smaller units would aim for the majority of German forces to come under French command. The above would imply that Germany would not enter NATO as a separate power but under the auspices of France. As Wintage (1970, 194) notes, this French attitude persisted throughout most of Ismay's tenure in NATO as Secretary-General, and the problem was finally resolved in an unexpected way.

In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom were nearing the end of their Allied occupation of West Germany. Likewise, these two countries increasingly supported West Germany's rearmament and viewed NATO as a framework for the unified defence of the Western world against the Soviet Union. Similar to the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, Lord Ismay realised that NATO was not a temporary solution against an immediate threat. Instead, he saw that NATO would become a permanent factor in European security in the future. To ensure NATO's future, Lord Ismay decided in mid-1953 to play a more significant role and to increase consultations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Apart from that, a meeting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France was to be organised in the second half of 1953 in the Bermuda Islands to consider the German question. Lord Ismay secured his presence at this crucial event for NATO's future due to US support. As Wintage (1970, 203) notes, Lord Ismay's contribution to the outcome of the Bermuda Conference, which took place on December 4, 1953, was significant and perhaps his greatest triumph. Lord Ismay's proposals that NATO should remain the main framework for Western politics and security and that the European Defence Community would be an integral part of NATO were accepted. Consequently, the goals he set, which included strengthening NATO's position in the international arena, bringing Germany into the alliance, promoting equality and unity among member countries, and enhancing the Atlantic European front to counter the Soviet Union, were also accepted.

The ratification of the European Defence Community agreement was crucial to Western defence policy. Lord Ismay believed that the European Defence Community was the best way to integrate German forces into the defence of Western Europe. He considered looking for an alternative

solution only as a last resort if the European Defence Community project failed. Otherwise, according to Jordan (1979, 41), this was a typical attitude among Western leaders, and there was no official alternative programme planning for the European Defence Community. However, by the end of 1953, there were indications of French reluctance towards the idea of a supranational army within the European Defence Community. The North Atlantic Council, which met in Paris on April 23, 1954, at the ministerial level, reaffirmed its support for the European Defence Community (North Atlantic Council, 1954). However, with the emergence of negative sentiment against the European Defence Community in France, it became apparent that the agreement would not be ratified, and other alternatives began to be considered more seriously. As Jordan (1979, 41) notes, the possibility of West Germany's direct membership in NATO was discussed during Lord Ismay's official visit to the United Kingdom in the early summer of 1954. After France rejected ratification of the agreement on August 29, 1954, the solution to the problem of German participation in Western European defence through direct NATO membership seemed the most likely path. Jordan (1979, 41) argues that the collapse of the European Defence Community project led to the disappearance of differences between the main Western powers. The United States' desire to replace its troops with German units decreased after the Korean armistice was signed. French concerns about a reinvigorated Wehrmacht subsided. Germany's aspiration for equal treatment was received more favourably as political and economic progress proceeded smoothly under Konrad Adenauer's strong leadership.

After the Bermuda Conference, President Eisenhower of the United States was hopeful that France would ratify the agreement on the European Defence Community. This would have immediately brought Germany into NATO. However, as we saw, his assumptions proved wrong. As mentioned before, in August 1954, France refused to ratify the agreement signed in May 1952. However, regardless of the circumstances, the United States and Europe continued to act vigorously. Negotiations regarding the terms of West Germany's participation in NATO mainly occurred outside the North Atlantic Council within the Nine Powers. At the Conference of Nine Powers in the autumn of 1954, it was agreed to end the occupation of Germany and its membership in NATO. On October 23, 1954, with the signing of the London and Paris Agreements, the German occupation regime ended, and the Federal Republic of Germany received an invitation to join NATO. After that, at the North Atlantic Council meeting on May 9, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to NATO. According to Wintage (1970, 205), Lester Pearson,

speaking on behalf of Canada, indirectly paid tribute to Lord Ismay's work at this meeting.

Therefore, despite the reluctance and opposition of certain European countries, particularly France, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. Some European countries did not want to see Germany rearm, even as an ally. However, the United States believed that the remilitarisation of West Germany was essential to contain Soviet expansion.

It is interesting to note that during Lord Ismay's term as Secretary-General, his famous dictum "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" became less relevant compared to the earlier years of NATO's establishment from 1949 to 1952. In fact, it can be argued that NATO did not achieve its goal of keeping Germany down. To ensure its survival and effectiveness, NATO decided to admit the Federal Republic of Germany as a member, which ultimately strengthened Germany across all aspects.

Moreover, during his tenure as Secretary-General, Lord Ismay strongly advocated for West Germany's membership in NATO. Also, during his mandate, the Soviet Union's proposal of March 10, 1952, on the unification of Germany was not accepted. As a reminder, until 1955, this was the main issue in German politics, and the Western refusal to negotiate based on the Soviet offer led to the thesis of "lost opportunity". According to Richardson (1966, 25), it was widely believed in Germany that reunification could be achieved when the Soviet offer was open, i.e., between 1952 and 1955. On the other hand, supporters of Adenauer's policy saw the Soviet proposal as only a tactical manoeuvre to prevent ratification of the agreement on the European Defence Community. It is quite certain that Germany would be closer to Lord Ismay's dictum, taking into account the proposal of the Soviet Union, than it would be in the case of the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO.

It can be noted that Lord Ismay was firmly committed to the preservation and further development of NATO, regardless of his earlier criticisms of the organisation's effectiveness before taking up the post of Secretary-General. Thus, his paper, published in the *International Journal* entitled "Atlantic Alliance", clearly pointed out that "All political systems have their weaknesses. The measure of their success is their capacity to recognise and overcome these weaknesses. I often think that the greatest weakness of the democratic nations is their inability to come together except in times of mortal danger, and sometimes this is too late. We failed to come together before 1914, and we failed again before 1939. Let us not fail a third time. The year 1949 was a time of mortal danger. The events

leading up to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April of that year are so well-known that they are in danger of being forgotten. In the constantly shifting sands of political developments since the war, these events seem to me to acquire a greater rather than a lesser importance as time goes on" (Ismay 1954, 79).

Also, Lord Ismay admitted that before he became Secretary-General, he did not understand the importance or the full significance of NATO. In his article titled "Insurance for Peace", published in *World Affairs*, he states the following: "It was not until I had studied it closely and had seen for myself the results which it had already achieved that I became convinced, as I certainly am convinced, that it provides the best hope of avoiding the unspeakable horrors of a third world war – that it is, in fact, the best insurance for peace" (Ismay 1953, 104-105).

Therefore, Lord Ismay was fully committed to NATO and its further development. Even with the increase in his power, after the adoption of the "Three Wise Men Report" in the circumstances arising from the Suez crisis, he had no intention of returning to his positions given in his famous dictum, that is, to keep the Germans down. On the contrary, he was aware of the significance of the Federal Republic of Germany's participation in NATO. Also, Clarke (2025, 66) demonstrates that allies knew well that NATO could only be viable with Germany at its territorial heart.

In contrast to Germany, Lord Ismay's dictum remains entirely relevant to the Soviet Union and the United States. Further improvement of the NATO Strategic Concept at the end of 1952, i.e., with the beginning of more intensive integration of nuclear policy into the NATO strategy, ensured a significant balance of forces that kept the Russians out. With NATO's further development of its military and civilian structures, the United States became increasingly part of the Euro-Atlantic bond. As explained by Rynning (2024, 67), NATO's military build-up, with the infusion of US military leadership, included the full package of desired NATO reform, such as an integrated command and integrated forces, substantial US forces stationed in Europe, and German rearmament.

Conclusion

Lord Ismay proved very successful as the Secretary-General of NATO. He managed to build an efficient International Staff and other supporting organisational structures of NATO, as well as to find optimal ways to solve the pressing political and security problems of the time. With his political and administrative powers, which were undoubtedly strong, especially

after the adoption of the "Three Wise Men Report", he managed to establish considerable trust among the member states, which certainly facilitated the making of important decisions on sensitive topics. As the first Secretary-General of NATO, he put the organisation on the right track and ensured its stability and long-term perspective.

Lord Ismay, who had previously expressed doubts about NATO's effectiveness, became a staunch supporter of the Alliance after becoming Secretary-General. During his five-year tenure, he worked diligently to improve NATO's effectiveness and ensure its future. He often referred to himself as a "Servant of the Council". If we consider NATO's evolution during the Cold War, we can see that it began slowly but gained momentum during and after the Korean War. Lord Ismay's tenure as the Secretary-General of NATO was characterised by the rapid evolution of the Alliance. The aforementioned circumstances demanded that Lord Ismay make greater efforts. At the same time, they offered him an opportunity to become more visible among the member states and to increase the significance of the position of Secretary-General.

Based on the information presented, it can be inferred that Lord Ismay was the most fervent supporter of NATO. However, the paper examines whether NATO, during its early development, was successful in fulfilling the aims articulated in Lord Ismay's famous dictum: NATO should keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Considering the already analysed Euro-Atlantic relations after World War II, as well as the origin and development of NATO until 1957, it can be concluded that NATO implemented the mentioned dictum of Lord Ismay entirely only during its establishment. Thus, this paper has proven the research hypothesis that a thorough analysis of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 cannot confirm the complete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum. However, some of its aspects were inevitably reflected during the first years of the Alliance's evolution. In other words, regarding Lord Ismay's famous dictum, NATO succeeded in achieving the first two objectives: keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. However, when it came to the goal of keeping the Germans down, NATO failed to achieve it. Rather, NATO played a vital role in rehabilitating the Federal Republic of Germany, which was necessary for its survival.

It can be concluded that NATO was not entirely successful in implementing the objectives outlined in Lord Ismay's dictum due to the following circumstances. In the early years of NATO's development, Lord Ismay's proposal to keep Germany down was challenged, as the Korean War accelerated the implementation of the Forward Strategy. The United

States started to recognise the importance of West Germany in implementing the Forward Strategy and NATO's Strategic Concept at that time. Consequently, West Germany's participation in NATO has become an increasingly significant topic since the North Atlantic Council's meeting in New York in September 1950. The aforementioned trend also continued when Lord Ismay assumed the post of Secretary-General of NATO. Moreover, with his efforts, he also significantly contributed to the Federal Republic of Germany's admission to NATO in May 1955. It is quite certain that the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO cancelled the relevance of Lord Ismay's dictum in the part where he advocated keeping the Germans down. Germany has significantly strengthened its role in regional and global affairs through NATO membership and European integration, contradicting Lord Ismay's dictum. However, the fact that the German state was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany during the Cold War should not be ignored, which certainly kept the Germans partly down in the Bloc World. Also, as noted in one of the US reports from 1966 and cited by Sayle, NATO served as a politically acceptable receptacle for resurgent German military strength without full independence, lest Germany run amok again (2019, 3).

However, the other two parts of the dictum, uttered by Lord Ismay, NATO has fulfilled entirely. By adopting and implementing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States entered ever deeper into Euro-Atlantic relations. It thus reduced the possibility of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy towards Western European states. The aforementioned approach continued and was strengthened with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, i.e., the establishment of NATO. On the other hand, Western Europe was relying heavily on the United States to bear the disproportionate burden of its defence costs. As a result, Americans were paying about 75% of NATO's expenses. This has become a recurring trend. It can be concluded that during the period covered by this research, from 1949 to 1957, the United States became increasingly part of Euro-Atlantic integration. Sloan (2024, 211) argues that without the United States, NATO would not have been created in 1949, would not have overcome the Soviet challenge during the Cold War, would not have remained a vital alliance in the post-Cold War world, and would not have endured into the future. On the other hand, with NATO's development, which implied the United States' increasing participation, and the application of the then-current Strategic Concept, the Allies successfully kept the Soviet Union as far east as possible.

Without a doubt, NATO helped prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Germany and other Western European countries.

Despite NATO's incomplete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum in its early years, the dictum remains relevant today. As Hanhimäki explains, this dictum neatly sums up the multiple rationales behind NATO's founding and helps put some of the Alliance's present-day concerns into proper perspective (2010, xiv). Given the current security situation globally, it is crucial to keep Russians out and Americans in. Also, we should consider limiting Franco-German aspirations to create a European defence system as an alternative to NATO. There is no doubt that in the current circumstances, NATO members are facing an external threat from a more assertive Russia and internal uncertainty from the current US administration. Different threat perceptions among allies, together with internal uncertainty, lead some member states to engage in soft balancing against the United States and intra-alliance hedging to pay closer attention to the European Union's strategic autonomy in the security and defence domain.

Bibliography

- Barnet, Michael, Finnemore, Martha. 2004. *Rules for the World – International Organization in Global Politics*. Cornell University Press.
- Baylis, John. 2024. "The Origins of NATO". In: *Routledge Handbook of NATO*, Olsen, Andreas, John (ed), Routledge: 15-27.
- Clarke, Michael. 2025. "What Is NATO for (Redux)?" In: *The Oxford Handbook of NATO*, Sperling, James and Webber, Mark (eds), Oxford University Press: 59-76.
- Hanhimäki, Jussi. 2010. "Introduction". In: *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Hanhimäki, Jussi, Soutou, Georges-Henri, Germond, Basil (eds), Fondation Pierre du Bois and Routledge: pp xiv-xviii.
- Hawkins, Darren G, Lake, David, A, Nielson, Daniel, L, Tierney, Michael, J. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hennessy, Peter. 1989. *Whitehall*. New York: A Division of Macmillan, Inc.
- Ismay, Lord. 1953. "Insurance for Peace". *World Affairs*, 116 (4) (Winter), 104-105. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20668806>.
- Ismay, Lord. 1954. "Atlantic Alliance". *International Journal*, 9 (2) (Spring), pp. 79-86. www.jstor.org/stable/40197987.

- Ismay, Lord. 1955. *NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954*. Utrecht: Bosch, https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/216977/NATO-The_first_5_years_1949-1954_by_Lord_Ismay_.pdf.
- Ismay, Lord. 2014. *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*. Potomac, Maryland: Pickle Partners Publishing, Kindle edition.
- Johnston, Seth A. 2025. "Realism". In: *The Oxford Handbook of NATO*, Sperling, James and Webber, Mark (eds), Oxford University Press: 113-128.
- Jordan, Robert S. 1967. *The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957 – a Study in International Administration*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Jordan, Robert S. 1979. *Political Leadership in NATO*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. 2007. *NATO 1948 – The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. 2013. *NATO before the Korean War*. Kent: The Kent State University Press.
- North Atlantic Council. 1950. *Final Communiqué*, Sixth Session, December 18-19.
- North Atlantic Council. 1952. *Final Communiqué*, Ninth Session, February 20-25.
- North Atlantic Council. 1954. Ministerial Meeting, *Final Communiqué*, April 23.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (a). "NATO Secretary General", last updated: Jun 20, 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_7294.htm?
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (b). "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969", <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf>.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (c). "North Atlantic Council Deputies", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (d). "Organization, NATO declassified, Lord Ismay", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm#:~:text=NATO%20%2D%20Declassified%3A%20Lord%20Ismay%2C%201952%20%2D%201957.
- Richardson, James L. 1966. *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Risso, Linda. 2019. "I am the Servant of the Council': Lord Ismay and the Making of the NATO International Staff." *Contemporary European History*, 28, 342-357. <https://doi:10.1017/S0960777319000055>.

- Rynning, Sten. 2024. *NATO – From Cold War to Ukraine, a History of the World's Most Powerful Alliance*. Yale University Press.
- Schake, Kori, and Pepe, Erica. 2019. *70 Years of NATO: The Strength of the Past, Looking into the Future*, ETH Zurich, May 6, 2019, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1097618a-96c9-45b2-89f7-092198f84a7c>.
- Sayle, Andrews, Timothy. 2019. *Enduring Alliance – A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. Cornell University Press.
- Shea, Jamie. 2023. "Germany, more Wende and less Zeit, please," *Friends of Europe*, March 23, 2023, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/germany-more-wende-and-less-zeit-please/>.
- Sil, Rudra, and Katzenstein Peter, J. 2010. *Beyond Paradigms – Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sloan, Stanley, R. 2024. "NATO and the United States". In: *Routledge Handbook of NATO*, Olsen, Andreas, John (ed), Routledge: 211-222.
- Weber, Mark, Hyde-Price, Adrian. (Eds.). 2016. *Theorising NATO – New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*. Routledge.
- Wells, Samuel, F, Jr. 2010. "The Korean War – Miscalculation and Alliance transformation". In: *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Hanhimäki, Jussi, Soutou, Georges-Henri, Germond, Basil (eds), Fondation Pierre du Bois and Routledge: 17-31.
- Wheatcroft, Geoffrey. 2011. "Who Needs NATO?", *The New York Times*, June 15, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/opinion/16iht-edwheatcroft16.html>.
- Wintage, Ronald. 1970. *Lord Ismay: a biography*. London: Hutchinson & Co.

UDC 314.7:316.77(497.11+497.7)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 357–379
Original scientific paper
Received: 12/01/2026
Revised: 18/04/2026
Accepted: 20/04/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.6
CC BY-SA 4.0

*Mitko ARNAUDOV¹, Sanja JELISAVAC TROŠIĆ²,
Marjan GJUROVSKI³*

Media Securitisation of the Migration Process on the So-Called Balkan Route: A Case Study of Serbia and North Macedonia

SUMMARY

Using the example of the Balkan Route, the paper aims to show how the migrant issue in regional relations has taken an important place in national and regional security strategies and how it has been securitised by the media in the Western Balkans. The theoretical viewpoint is presented through an examination of the media's role in identifying and securitising contemporary security challenges, using migration as a case point. The empirical viewpoint is presented through a case study of the so-called Balkan Route, in which the authors examine the role of the media in the process of securitisation of contemporary migrant flows as a cross-border security challenge and threat. The case study of the Balkan migrant route shows the role of the media in the process of securitisation of migrant flows, as well as the verbal or political securitisation of migration as a real security phenomenon. Did the media contribute to alleviating the migrant crisis, or did they exacerbate its severity? The research concludes that the media have positioned themselves as an

¹ Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, mitko@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3274-347X>.

² Principal Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, sanja@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0949-7052>.

³ Professor, The Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9283-3733>.

instrument in the hands of interest groups, and the journalistic profession has failed to maintain its integrity or to influence the creation and implementation of policies in which people and their well-being come first as the primary European values. In that context, the leading research question is as follows: What is the purpose of media securitisation of the migrant crisis, and how much does such a phenomenon reposition the social place of the media sector from the perspective of current challenges, risks, and threats? The main hypothesis of the paper is as follows: The empirical example of the Balkan Route shows that media securitisation of the migrant crisis represents an ongoing instrumentalisation of media outlets for political interests, particularly in weak institutional states and populist decision-making frameworks. Based on the main hypothesis, there are two specific ones: First, using the media sector as a securitising mechanism endangers the media and journalism as a profession. Second, the examples of Serbia and North Macedonia demonstrate inverse tendencies within the phenomenon of populism, whereby the continued weakening of public institutions is accompanied by the strengthening of the media sector.

Keywords: migration, Serbia, North Macedonia, media, securitisation.

Medijska sekuritizacija procesa migracije na takozvanoj Balkanskoj ruti: Studija slučaja – Srbija i Severna Makedonija

SAŽETAK

Cilj rada je da se, koristeći primer Balkanske rute, pokaže kako je migrantsko pitanje u regionalnim odnosima zauzelo važno mesto u nacionalnim i regionalnim bezbednosnim strategijama i kako se ovo pitanje sekuritizuje od strane medija na Zapadnom Balkanu. Teorijsko gledište je u procesu objašnjavanja uloge medija u oblasti identifikacije i sekuritizacije savremenih bezbednosnih izazova, u ovom slučaju na primeru migracija. Empirijsko gledište je kroz studiju slučaja o takozvanoj Balkanskoj ruti, gde autori otvoreno postavljaju pitanje o ulozi medija u procesu sekuritizacije savremenih migrantskih tokova, kao prekograničnog bezbednosnog izazova i pretnje. Studija slučaja Balkanske migrantske rute pokazuje ulogu medija u procesu sekuritizacije migrantskih tokova, kao i verbalnu, odnosno političku, sekuritizaciju migracija kao stvarnog bezbednosnog fenomena. Da li su mediji doprineli smirivanju migrantske krize ili su podstakli migrantsku krizu i njene razmere? Zaključak istraživanja je da su se mediji pozicionirali samo kao instrument u rukama interesnih grupa, a novinarska profesija nije održala svoj integritet niti uticala na kreiranje i sprovođenje politika u kojima su ljudi i njihova dobrobit na prvom mestu, kao primarne evropske vrednosti. U tom kontekstu, primarno istraživačko pitanje bi bilo: Koja je svrha medijske sekuritizacije migrantske krize i koliko takav fenomen repozicionira društveno mesto medijskog sektora iz

perspektive aktuelnih izazova, rizika i pretnji. Glavna hipoteza rada bi bila: Medijska sekuritizacija migrantske krize na empirijskom primeru balkanske rute predstavlja primer kontinuirane instrumentalizacije medijskih kuća u političke interese, posebno u slabim institucionalnim državama i populističkim okvirima donošenja odluka. Na osnovu glavne, postoje dve specifične hipoteze: Korišćenje medijskog sektora kao mehanizma sekuritizacije ugrožava medijsku i novinarsku profesiju po definiciji; Primeri Srbije i Severne Makedonije pokazali su obrnute tendencije unutar fenomena populizma, gde nastavak slabljenja javnih institucija prati jačanje uticaja medijskog sektora.

Ključne reči: migracije, Srbija, Severna Makedonija, mediji, sekuritizacija.

Introduction

The refugee and migrant crisis, which has been ongoing for more than ten years on the so-called Balkan Route in Serbia and North Macedonia, has contributed to an increasing number of vulnerable people left stranded in a legal vacuum throughout the Balkans. Serbia and North Macedonia have become a “sink” for a large number of refugees and migrants whom no one wants to accept. As stated in an Amnesty International report, the situation was further aggravated by the fact that refugees and migrants were turned back or deported at every border, denied access to asylum, and forced to travel to the European Union by a route that was neither safe nor legal. Consequently, refugees and migrants were exposed to violence, became victims of human trafficking, were used as tools by organised crime, and were often forced to bribe local customs officials and police officers to secure the possibility of potential continuation of the journey to Western Europe (Al Jazeera 2015). An interesting assessment by Amnesty International is that the growing number of refugee migrations along the Balkan Route is a consequence of the broader failure of the European Union’s migration policy, over which Serbia and North Macedonia have no control whatsoever (Al Jazeera 2015). In essence, Serbia and North Macedonia could contribute more to ensuring respect for the rights of migrants and refugees. However, it is impossible to separate this fact from the increasing pressure generated by refugee and migrant flows towards the European Union and the failed EU migration system. It is, in fact, evident that an increasing number of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants are becoming trapped in the Balkan no-man’s land, which further complicates the position and increases the pressure on both Serbia and North Macedonia. In this context, both Balkan states signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Fight against Human Trafficking in 2019 (Zakon o potvrđivanju sporazuma između Vlade Republike Srbije i Vlade Republike Severne Makedonije o saradnji u oblasti borbe protiv trgovine

ljudima 2021). It is important to note that in 2015, when the migrant crisis was at its peak, more than one million people passed through the so-called Balkan Route, travelling from Greece through North Macedonia, Kosovo*, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the countries of Western Europe, primarily Germany (Anđelković 2020).

Geographically, the Balkan Route covers the land route from Turkey through Greece and Bulgaria to the north and west, including North Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia in the main direction. Alternatively, auxiliary routes also include other European countries; however, the most common destination for migrants is Western and Northern Europe (Petrović and Bukvić 2017, 83).

In the statistical context, it is important to note that migration to EU countries from outside Europe has changed significantly in recent years. The numbers have been constantly increasing over the past decade. From 2008 to 2010, an average of 250,000 migrants entered the EU annually. In 2011 and 2012, the figures were over 300,000 annually. However, in 2013, they amounted to around 430,000, and in 2014, to as many as 630,000 (Petrović and Bukvić 2017, 84). The record years were 2015 and 2016, when the number of migrants entering the European Union reached around 1,250,000 to 1,350,000 annually (The Ohio State University 2024).

Essentially, the migrant crisis has greatly contributed to the change in the security mosaic in the Balkans, especially in Serbia and North Macedonia. The Balkan countries are dominantly used for migrant transit (Jelisavac Trošić and Arnaudov 2023, 166). The multi-year intensive waves of migrants who tried to transit through Serbia and North Macedonia in various ways contributed to the revision of the national security strategies and plans of these two countries in order to provide a threefold response: first, to ensure the safety of the local population and the citizens of Serbia and North Macedonia who, due to various mass media narratives and sensationalist reporting, did not have a clear picture of what and who migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are and what separates and unites these three groups; second, to ensure the safety of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees temporarily located in the territories of Serbia and North Macedonia or transiting through them; and third, to ensure the sustainability of the regional security mosaic in terms of the instrumentalisation of this security problem by various regional organised crime groups and individuals.

From the media's point of view, it appears that its role in addressing the aforementioned security challenges is largely marginalised because media coverage of the so-called Balkan Route, as well as of the problem of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the territory of Serbia and North Macedonia, was primarily sensationalist, focusing on the tragedies

faced by migrants, but also political, instrumentalising threats and difficulties on the so-called Balkan migrant route for the purpose of internal political discourse.

The paper is structured into four leading chapters. The first chapter focuses on the linkage between the concept of securitisation and the role of the media as a tool of instrumentalisation within the securitisation processes. This is important for a profound understanding of the essence of the paper. The second and third chapters focus on the case study states, including the flows along the Balkan Route and the European Union's contribution. The fourth chapter focuses on the media securitisation role of the so-called Balkan Route and the negative implications that the securitisation process has brought about. From a methodological perspective, the main scientific goal of the work is to provide a scientific explanation as a "higher scientific goal that leads to scientific knowledge about the relationships, causalities, and regularities of a certain phenomenon or process" (Arežina 2021). In this case study, the causality between the created media and political perception of the migration process, based on the securitisation of the issue and the ways and methods through which the countries in question manage the challenges of the Balkan Route, as well as the resulting social perception, is explained. By using basic synthetic methods such as synthesis (connecting the concept of securitisation with the role of the media and the case study), concretisation (using a specific politically defined and geographically determined case study), generalisation, and induction (placing migration as a general security problem on the political agendas of the Western Balkans), as well as through the analysis of existing research, the authors will attempt to achieve the aforementioned scientific result.

Media, Securitisation and Migrations: Between Objectivity and Populism

As part of the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitisation theory states that security is constructed as a domain of action through communicative acts performed by significant actors within a political system and is especially effective at the nation-state level. The main argument of securitisation theory is that security is an (illocutionary) speech act and that, solely by uttering "security", something is being done (Taureck 2006). "It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one" (Taureck 2006, 3).

Regarding migration, Lutovac explains that these movements include irregular/illegal migratory movements of different categories of people: refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, victims of human

trafficking, smuggled migrants, and other vulnerable categories of people, including women, children, and unaccompanied minors. Among the most numerous groups involved in the migration crisis, which escalated during 2015, were refugees from war-torn areas, people from countries with non-democratic regimes where they were persecuted, the poor, whose motive was to preserve their bare existence, and economic migrants in search of a better life (Lutovac 2016). The purpose of such a comprehensive definition of migration lies in the explanation of the “manoeuvring space” that media outlets have in the process of the securitisation of certain topics in this paper related to the Balkan migrant route.

In fact, through political discourse, media coverage, and public opinion, these forced migrations have been socially construed as a security crisis (Bobić and Šantić 2019). As explained by Alimpić et al., it appears that the media are spreading the message that it is acceptable for people who have fled their countries of origin to receive different treatment from European institutions, EU member states, and the social environment in which they arrive. Then, through generalisation, we notice a tendency to portray refugees from Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa as using the wave of refugees to reach Europe’s most developed countries, as well as posing a threat to the security of the European population (Alimpić et al., n.a.). Based on the available data, there are contrasting approaches to the perception of migration, particularly on the European side. The first perspective is dedicated to the complete media and political securitisation of the issue, with the Western Balkans route being presented as a key border line for the preservation of the European security mosaic. The second perspective is formed around the former German chancellor’s decision to welcome a wide range of migrants and asylum seekers to German territory through a comprehensive set of measures for their individual and professional inclusion and social integration. In fact, there is a gap between the dominant perceptions created by media outlets and the relevant and rational perceptions constructed by the former German government during the case study period.

Regarding the Western Balkans, this gap between the image created by the political elite and media outlets and the realistic intentions of the migrants is noticeable. While political and media platforms were strict and constant in the process of securitising the Balkan Route, migrants were just looking for alternatives to reach the borders of the states that constituted their final destinations. The massive increase in population movements via the Balkan Route has accordingly strained the reception capacities and the asylum procedural systems of the countries involved. This has also put into question their policies, border controls, and diplomatic relations, in some cases resulting in heavy-handed responses by security forces.

Political decisions made by one country often reflect on all other countries along the route (Bobić and Janković 2017, 224-225). Although Serbia and North Macedonia were challenged by security issues on their borders, media and political securitisation focused exclusively and dominantly on the persons marked as migrants, which has created long-standing animosities and negative perceptions among domestic populations. As Ana Krasteva explains, the Western Balkans is characterised by a complex jigsaw of security and sovereignty issues and intensive refugee and migration flows from, to, and within the region in a situation of post-conflict reconstruction. These circumstances were negatively instrumentalised by political representatives and media outlets along the Western Balkans migrant route.

The media perception and the created discourse on migrants and the Western Balkans migrant route led to the following thesis: "Risk associated with migration and mobility refers not only to national security but also to 'the fabric of the nation' in cultural, social, and economic contexts" (Milivojević 2019, 6). However, based on the available data, most migrants were not at all interested in asylum status on the Western Balkans route, nor in Serbia or North Macedonia, and the previously mentioned thesis has been built on the social perceptions of migrants.

A valuable example of the media securitisation of the migration issue in the Western Balkans is that "when Serbia's minister of interior visited one of the migrant camps on the border with Hungary in July 2022, many national media outlets published an image of him standing alongside policemen and security officers and overlooking dozens of kneeling migrants with arms behind their heads. The image was to show political decisiveness and the results of the joint security action aimed at minimising criminal acts committed by illegal migrants in the country. Instead, the image triggered a public reaction when many non-governmental organisations, public intellectuals, and migration experts condemned the minister's treatment of migrants as inhumane" (Krstić 2024). On the other side, "it must be noted that some authors have questioned the appropriateness of the term 'transit countries' by emphasising how the politicised nature of the term relates to a broader securitisation discourse on migration (İçduygu & Yüксеker 2012) and arguing that it artificially contributes to a linear narrative of origin-transit-destination, thereby masking the much more complex configuration of contemporary migration patterns" (Collyer & de Haas 2012). Additionally, "remarkably, before June 2015, asylum and migration-related issues had never been on the agenda of top politicians and political parties in Serbia, because until then very few migrants actually applied for asylum" (Bobić and Janković 2017). In the Serbia and North Macedonia case, there is valuable practical

evidence that demonstrates the media and politically led process of migrant securitisation, from the lack of this issue in political agendas in the pre-period through the use of special rhetoric mechanisms such as the concept of transit countries to the public appearance of decision-makers, followed by images in which migrants are dominantly presented as a challenge to national security. Although there is a guarantee in the numerous national laws' provisions which state that "a refugee may be expelled only on the grounds of compelling reasons of national security or public order", and which note that such "provisions represent an important legacy of contemporary civilisation and democratic decision-making processes", the process of managing the Western Balkans Route, including the role of media representations on the issue, leads us to the opposite conclusion (Bataveljić and Božić 2024, 124).

Objectivity regarding the border security challenges associated with the migrant issue at the peak of the Western Balkans migrant route has been replaced by populist media outlets and political rhetoric, which, in the long term, has brought about three outcomes: Local societies have lost the opportunity to develop a meaningful understanding about migrations; extremely negative perceptions regarding the criminal and terrorist origins of migrants were widely entrenched within societies; and the media sector has additionally been instrumentalised as a securitising mechanism in the hands of political actors, while populist content has blurred the picture of the real security issues, thus opening space for the securitisation of everything which could bring political points that could yield political gain.

The Balkan Route - A Long-Standing Challenge for Serbia and North Macedonia

As Nikolić and Maksimović explain, the Western Balkans has been a popular route for migrants for years, but mainly as a transit corridor. The Western Balkans represents a quick passage through the region on the way to EU countries such as Germany, Italy, and France. Further, they note that these refugees come from countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria and that the vast majority of migrants, i.e., over 95%, are men whose most common professions or occupations in the country of origin are skilled manual workers, service or sales workers, artisans, auxiliary workers, and technicians (Nikolić and Maksimović 2024, 78). In such a context, from the perspective of securitisation, it is very difficult to create a clear perception about the domestic/national security threat, except in the context of border management due to the massive waves of migrants. Respectively, since border management was relatively effective, followed by joint deployments of police officers from Western

Balkan states, including EU countries through Frontex, the regional media sector has positioned itself as a generator of indoctrination in the context of the securitisation of migrant issues.

Despite the *de facto* closure of the Balkan Route at the beginning of March 2016, a constant flow of refugees and migrants to the Republic of Serbia continues, mainly from North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with strong support from cross-border smuggling and human trafficking networks. Data show that since 2015, more than one and a half million refugees and migrants have passed through Serbia, of which between a third and a quarter were children. During 2020, the number of refugees and migrants present in Serbia at any given time was around 7,000, and around 6,000 were housed in reception, transit, and asylum centres (UNICEF n.d.).

An increase in the number of migrants was also observed in North Macedonia. According to data from North Macedonia's Ministry of the Interior, in 2022, the number of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees increased by 7% compared to 2021. Thus, in the first nine months of 2022, 35,000 migrants and asylum seekers were registered (Јакимова 2022). Media reports state that migrants are constantly entering the territory of North Macedonia, with the explanation that until 2016 they did so by train or on foot, while currently organised criminal groups transport them by trucks and vans. After the official closure of the Balkan Route, the highest number of illegal crossings was recorded in 2020, when 2,700 migrants were discovered at illegal crossings and around 100 smugglers were arrested (Јакимова 2022).

At the same time, the coordinator of the Serbian reception centre, near the border with North Macedonia, Slobodan Savović, states that between 100 and 400 migrants arrive every day and that this is a new trend coming from Syria and Afghanistan. In fact, the issue of a renewed wave of migration through the Balkan Route has also caused anxiety in the European Union at a time when EU member states are hosting millions of refugees from Ukraine, while at the same time they are facing a serious economic and financial crisis caused by the war in Ukraine (Јакимова 2022).

The fact that migration is an increasingly serious security challenge for both Serbia and North Macedonia is evidenced by the strategic documents of these two countries in the security field. To explain the security challenges in the context of migrant routes and the case of Serbia and North Macedonia, we have to conceptualise the security challenge as an increased asymmetric form of warfare (Münkler 2002), as well as the increased role of more sophisticated and brutal non-state actors (terrorist networks) that have made the security challenges more complex and the security risks less calculable and predictable. In such a context, in the

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, it is stated that “the increasingly restrictive stance of the European Union member states on the reception of migrants increases the chances that the region will become one of the reception zones, whereby the Republic of Serbia would find itself in a situation of taking care of a large number of migrants that exceeds its economic and organisational capacities, and that illegal migration of people from the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa, in conjunction with organised crime, represents a security risk in the region” (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia 2019, 5). That migration is a serious security issue for the Republic of Serbia is evidenced by the fact that illegal migration, together with separatist aspirations, ethnic and religious extremism, the covert action of a foreign factor, and organised crime, is included in the key risks and threats to security in its National Security Strategy (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia 2019, 6). Specifically, when it comes to illegal migration, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia states that “illegal migrants who cross the territory of the Republic of Serbia on their way to the European Union can have multiple unfavourable impacts on the security situation, given the possibility of religious radicalisation, increased tensions among the migrant population, their mutual conflict, and the negative reactions of the local population”. In addition, security risks are represented by the uncontrolled entry of migrants, the possibility of concealing their identity, criminal activity in the form of illegal transport of migrants, and the closing of the borders of neighbouring countries for certain categories of migrants (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia 2019, 7).

When it comes to North Macedonia, the Defence Strategy of that country states “that the influx and transit of migrants and radical extremists and returnees from the battlefields in countries in the Middle East (Iraq and Syria), South Asia (Afghanistan), and North Africa (Libya) affect the regional security when it comes to Southeast Europe” (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of North Macedonia 2020, 4). More specifically, when it comes to North Macedonia, the country’s Defence Strategy states that illegal migration, which was originally the result of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, has been identified as the primary threat to the country’s national security, along with other threats such as economic and political problems; organised crime; activities of foreign intelligence services; radical and violent extremism; terrorism; cybercrime; natural disasters; as well as environmental degradation (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of North Macedonia 2020, 5-6).

The fact that the Balkan Route remains relevant is also evidenced by an agreement signed by the heads of the police of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, North Macedonia, and Austria on the joint registration of refugees at the

Greek-Macedonian border, whereby these five countries will jointly organise the transport of migrants to Austria. Transit through the Balkan Route will only be possible for refugees from war-torn countries (APC - Asylum Protection Centre 2023).

The Role of the European Union in Regulating the Balkan Route

Migrant policy is one of the most important issues and the biggest security challenge the EU has been facing over the last ten years. Despite the coronavirus pandemic and the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the issue of migration remained high on the agenda of European policymakers. That was confirmed by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who pointed out that migration is a European challenge and that it is necessary to achieve a European response that would ensure the strengthening of the external borders of the European Union, a faster and more dignified return of migrants to their countries of origin or transit, the improvement of voluntary solidarity, the addressing of the root causes of migration from third countries, and the securing and establishment of safe and legal routes to Europe (Ljevo 2023).

The Balkan Route was one of the main migratory routes in Europe, which reflected the influx of migrants to the Eastern Mediterranean Route. After the record number of migrants in the EU in 2015, the number of irregular migrants who chose this route had been constantly declining for several years and only began to rise again in 2019. In 2022, 145,600 irregular border crossings were registered on the Balkan Route, i.e., 136% more than in 2021 (Frontex n.d.). That is the highest number of crossings on this route since 2015 and represents about half of all reported irregular crossings in 2022. Citizens of Syria, Afghanistan, and Turkey made up the largest group detected during irregular crossings. However, unlike previous migrant waves, other nationalities were also detected this time, such as Tunisians, Indians, and Burundians (Frontex n.d.). The majority of illegal border crossings can be attributed to migrants who have been staying in the Western Balkans region for some time and have repeatedly tried to reach their target country in the EU. As in previous years, these migrants continued to use illegal border crossings with Greece and Bulgaria through the Balkan Route and to leave the Balkan region via the common northern borders of Hungary, Romania, Croatia, or Serbia (Frontex n.d.).

Regarding this, it is important to highlight that the ministers of interior affairs of the EU member states have signed a statement on increasing financial and material support for effective deportations from the Balkans. In this document, accessed by Statewatch and the Heinrich Böll

Stiftung, it is revealed that the interior ministers of the EU member states in Vienna on February 21-22, 2022, had signed a secret joint statement, Joint Declaration "Regional Return Mechanism, Return Partnerships" (JCP 2022), stating the commitment of the EU and Schengen countries to increase financial and material support for deportations from the Balkans, thus increasing the role of the region as a buffer zone for migration (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2023). In that way, the signatories of this document expressed their determination to intensify cooperation in demand-orientated and targeted support in the field of return, especially from the Western Balkans to third countries. This would ensure rapid coordination of needs and possible assistance in return (Frontex n.d.). This document also calls for flexible return partnerships among the Western Balkan partners, EU partners, and Switzerland on thematic areas of importance for return, such as the exchange of best practices and communication with specific countries of origin and transit. In this context, it is important to emphasise that the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, visited Serbia with the head of the European border agency Frontex, Hans Leijten, to strengthen the partnership between the European Union and the Serbian authorities in the field of migration and border management. On that occasion, the commissioner thanked Serbia for harmonising the country's visa policy with EU policy and said that European Integrated Border Management (EIPM) can only function well with its partners (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2023). In that context, on June 25, 2024, the European Union signed an agreement with Serbia to strengthen cooperation in migration issues and border management. The essential part of the agreement in the context of EU migration management is Frontex's authorisation to carry out joint operations and deploy the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps anywhere in Serbia's territory, including on its borders with neighbouring non-EU countries (EU 2024).

At the same time, the European Commission launched a pilot project with Bulgaria on preventing irregular arrivals, strengthening border and migration management, and a multidisciplinary approach to strengthening border control, including the installation of cameras, patrol vehicles, and observation posts (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2023). In the letter obtained by Statewatch, it is stated that the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, promised EUR 600 million, which would be made available to provide significant support to member states for border control and technological equipment, and that the key goal in spending that money should be the border section along the Bulgaria-Turkey border (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2023).

In fact, the essence of the problem is that many people (refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers) come to the European Union via the so-called Balkan Route, and the allocation of EU funds for this purpose is not sufficient in practice. The number of migrants arriving in the European Union through this route has been increasing, especially in the period after the COVID-19 pandemic. There are several reasons for this. Each year in late summer, a certain increase in migration is noticeable. People set out on their journey before the cold winter weather makes it difficult or impossible to cross the already dangerous Mediterranean Sea (Danas 2022). Currently, an unusually large number of people are entering the European Union without passports, according to Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is also in charge of migration. In this context, the European Union requires that countries along the so-called Balkan Route, particularly Serbia and North Macedonia, fully coordinate their visa policies with those of EU member states. Brussels justifies this position on the grounds that a large number of migrants arrive on European Union territory through countries in the Western Balkans that are in the process of European integration and enjoy a visa-free regime with EU member states. For that reason, citizens of third countries who intend to immigrate to European Union countries use the Balkan Route, and the countries on that route serve as transit stations to reach their desired destinations more easily and efficiently. The importance of this issue is also highlighted in the European Commission's reports on Serbia and North Macedonia.

Serbia

The European Union is the largest donor of funds for migration management in Serbia. The recently signed Administrative Arrangement on the establishment of cooperation between the European Commission and the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of Serbia within the European Migration Network represents a tangible result of good cooperation and of Serbia's successful advancement in this important process (Ministry for European Integration 2023). It is an arrangement that culminates in Serbia's inclusion in the European Network for Migrants, which entails a full exchange of information and access to all databases. On that occasion, the Serbian minister for European integration recalled that Serbia has continued to fulfil its obligations in the integration process concerning the challenges posed by the migrant crisis and the opening of the Western Balkan route, particularly by harmonising its visa regime. Serbia has introduced visas for citizens of six countries in four months (Ministry for European Integration 2023). In the report of the European

Commission for the year 2022, Serbia is praised for its good cooperation with the European Union on the issue of irregular migration, which testifies to the fact that Serbia works and cooperates with the European Union in a dedicated and coordinated manner on the issue of the migrant crisis (Euroactiv 2023).

North Macedonia

When it comes to North Macedonia, it is also important to point out that this country's cooperation with the European Union in coordinating and managing the migrant crisis is crucial in both financial and technical terms. On October 26, 2022, the European Union and North Macedonia signed an agreement on operational cooperation in border management with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (European Commission 2022). Frontex already has around 300 officers in the region, including those participating in joint operations at the European Union's external borders with Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia in accordance with current status agreements. To ensure the implementation of the status agreement, the operational plan is agreed upon directly between Frontex and the authorities of North Macedonia. It will enable Frontex to assist North Macedonia with border management, conduct joint operations, and deploy personnel both at the border with the EU and at the borders of neighbouring partners from the Western Balkans. This will help solve the problem of increasing irregular migration and cross-border crime (European Commission 2022).

The Role of the Media on the Balkan Route

Media discourse plays a key role not only in the spread of potentially biased ideologies but also in the (re)construction of knowledge and attitudes within the collective consciousness (Lazović n.a., 135). The role of media discourse is crucial in spreading ideologies potentially based on prejudices, as well as in shaping and changing people's attitudes and knowledge (van Dijk 2003). One of the most significant ways in which the media shape public opinion is through agenda-setting. It is the process by which the media decide which topics and issues to cover and how to present them to the public, thereby significantly influencing the opinions of media consumers. On the political side, critics of the liberal approach to the refugee crisis received attention across the media spectrum, not just from conservative media outlets. Politicians and activists advocating for solidarity with refugees had to explain that these were terrorist incidents and that refugees are like all other people; there are good and bad

individuals among them (Subotić and Mitrevska, 2025, 104). Considering the use of digital media and social networks in the context of migration perceptions, it is evident that political discourse can travel effortlessly across state borders in the Western Balkans. It is difficult to limit one's audience to a single state or ethnic group (Tomić 2017, 9). Regarding the media, Jevtović and Bajić (2018) studied the content of the front pages of daily newspapers in Serbia during 2015 and 2016. They found examples of a dichotomy between sensationalist and xenophobic discourse, on the one hand, and humanitarian discourse, on the other (Lazović n.a., 137).

Migrants and refugees are often at the very bottom of society, being marginalised by those in power and the media. They also come to countries that already have their own problems. Numerous migrants and refugees, particularly refugees, are settled in the suburbs of large metropolises that already have many problems. In such an environment, they are forced to take their place, learn a new language, seek employment, and deal with discrimination, the trauma of that experience and the place they came from. When it comes to the image created by the media about migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, it is important to point out that the media often talks about this group of people, but rarely do journalists ask them anything, according to journalist and publicist Ismail Einashe (Zorić 2019). "In media reports, the voice of migrants is always missing. When they appear in the media, it is often in a very negative context. That has consequences for societies across Europe", says Einashe. In general, stereotypes play an important role in the discursive construction of in-groups and out-groups. They are, therefore, used strategically by the media and politicians for the discursive construction of the "Other" (Milićević 2025, 90). In media reports, migrants were completely displaced, not only physically during their movement but also mentally. Their voice was completely absent, and most of the reports were very negative and Islamophobic, creating a toxic situation both in the media and in society. In fact, the political situation was influenced by media coverage and further escalated as a result. Examples of this can be found in Great Britain and Italy. In Great Britain, during the 2016 referendum, when the country's citizens voted to leave the EU—the so-called Brexit—the party that advocated for this referendum to be held, the British Independence Party of Nigel Farage, who today leads the Brexit Party, used the so-called migrant crisis of 2015 as an enormous political issue to attract people to vote for their position in the referendum. They used the image of refugees who crossed the Balkans in 2015 and reached the border with Slovakia, standing in a crowd, faceless. That image does not seem out of place in the context of our post-World War II history. However, they used a 2015 image and called it "a watershed moment". Another example is Italy, where a

large number of people come from Africa, i.e., Libya. Thus, Italy's local population had to face the problem of so-called unwanted residents, as most of the European countries refused to do so at the European level. When Angela Merkel opened Germany's borders in 2015, other European nations did not follow suit. In Italy today, the right-wing Matteo Salvini, like his British colleagues, uses the issue of borders and lifeboats to gain support for his political agenda, and he is doing so with great success. Therefore, the media plays a big role in that. In fact, while politicians lead, the media follows them. When you listen to a radio programme, watch a TV show or read a newspaper, you often do not get the whole picture; the media does not provide the complete context. Refugee and migrant communities are often talked about, but never included. They can rarely be heard. They are the subjects of public discussion in the media, but they are not participants. The reason is that when you look at the media – who edits it and who reports, not only when it comes to refugees and migrants but also when we discuss issues of gender or ethnic origin – there are noticeable gaps in media presentation. That applies to Europe as a whole (Zorić 2019). In fact, the media sector, not only on the so-called Balkan Route but also throughout Europe, has served as a mechanism for framing contemporary migrant flows. It has securitised this problem in a distorted way in which migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, as subjects of this security phenomenon, have become the subject of daily political and media discussions. At the same time, the real challenges associated with migrant flows and the problems these citizens face on the ground are ignored, including the challenges faced by the local population due to high levels of migrant flows.

Comments and assumptions, vaguely separated from facts and interpretations, are a frequent media product, and even the mere experience of reading is enough to establish the difference between the media image of people in migration and the media image of the migrant crisis (Mišeljić 2021). Media coverage of the migrant crisis is still more than visible, but primarily negative, manipulative, and sensationalist, which greatly affects not only the process of regulating and managing the migrant crisis, but also the security infrastructure, given the potential for animosity that the media can create and strengthen between the local population and migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers themselves. Religious and racial intolerance, as well as xenophobia and Islamophobia, have found a new form of action in the context of the migrant crisis. The Report on the Migrant Crisis - Between Manipulation and Ethics cites a survey in which more than 58% of respondents believe that as the number of migrants in the country increases, the crime rate also increases, and slightly more than a third see migrants as a threat to Serbian culture,

customs, and values. More than 40% of the respondents also believe that refugees coming to Serbia are actually fighters of ISIS and other terrorist organisations. The authors of the same report warn of the overwhelming number of positive reactions to news about the mistreatment of migrants by the Croatian police and comments such as “That is the real police” and “That is how it should be” (Mišeljić 2021). The media must therefore improve its reporting on people with a migrant background and the diversity of their customs and lifestyles (Deutsche Welle 2007). The previous statement was made by the former German interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who also added that the labour market is the best instrument of integration. “We need a flexible labour law here. We have debates in this regard, not only when it comes to people with a migrant background. We need a social system that encourages people to get a job. The discussion about it is not over yet” (Deutsche Welle 2007). Schäuble likely intended to refocus the perception of migrants, thus shifting this issue away from the security agenda and placing it instead within the state’s internal affairs, with a focus on integration through re-socialisation in the final destination societies and states. The labour market, according to Schäuble, should be a mechanism for the previously mentioned process of re-socialisation and “vertically” structured integration.

In fact, the essence of the problem lies in the basic motives of modern media corporations, from radio stations and classic television stations through modern internet portals and websites to media content on social networks, which are today used as the main instrument for news to reach readers as quickly as possible. The main problem is that the crucial motive in modern media systems is profit, i.e., how to become financially sustainable, increase revenue, and, thereby, improve your business in a financial rather than a professional or journalistic context. We are witnessing a huge amount of fake and unverified news and information available daily in all corners of the world, from the most developed to the poorest, where the Internet is still not a tool freely used by all citizens of a country. At the same time, the process of creating unverified, false, and biased news was driven by the political and business elite, who entered the system of indirect or direct financing of the media to achieve their personal, political, and professional interests. In fact, the modern media system has become an instrument that is financially framed and thereby financially determined.

As such, it has lost its fundamental role not only for migrants but also for reporting on contemporary migrant waves, primarily those that have flooded the European continent in the past decade and are still ongoing. In fact, media reports did not contribute to the relaxation of social frameworks in the process of dealing with migrant waves that had an all-

pervasive impact. Moreover, they had a negative impact by creating a mostly negative image of these waves and presenting migrant, asylum-seeking and refugee groups as a direct security risk to the lives of citizens on the European continent (Kabata and Jacobs, 2023). The opportunity to point out that this is a security challenge in a humanitarian context has been missed. The media also misrepresented the economic perspectives that exist primarily among young migrants, thus undermining the European Union's opportunity to strengthen its role as a "bastion" in respecting basic human and civil rights. At the same time, in addition to the migrant crisis as a security challenge, it is being allowed, mainly with the support of the media and the media system, to create new security challenges that lead to radicalisation, exclusivity, and the superiority of one race over others or one nation over another. Instead of simplifying, this further complicates the security situation on the European continent as a consequence of satisfying narrow political, business, and elite interests.

Conclusion

There is a triple challenge considering the so-called Balkan Route, which also passes through Serbia and North Macedonia. First, there is a problem connected with a broader European challenge and the wider political and security context. Second, it is a humanitarian challenge primarily faced by direct participants in the migration process, i.e., refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers. Third, it is a regional challenge in the Western Balkans and a local challenge for the citizens of Serbia and North Macedonia, as they are most often indirectly threatened by it. Multiple factors have contributed to the fact that the European continent, the European Union, and countries like Serbia and North Macedonia place the migrant issue at the top of their security agenda. First, there is the European Union's lack of readiness to deal systematically with massive migrant waves. Instead, there were individual responses and measures by the European Union member countries, which advocated for a unified European policy. However, in practice, they implemented national migration policies largely determined by the internal political situation.

Second, there is a hybrid relationship between the European Union and countries on the so-called Balkan Route, which are not full members of the European Union, such as Serbia and North Macedonia. The European Union has provided strong support to these countries in dealing with migrant challenges, both financially and technically, but has not provided clear guidelines for a long-term solution. Thus, Serbia and North Macedonia have found themselves in a middle ground between a single European policy on the migrant crisis, the national migrant policies of the

European Union member states, and their own national policies and the pressures of the local and domestic population. In fact, all this time, the migrant issue has lacked a comprehensive, continuous, and coordinated response that would offer a long-term solution.

In this space, the media are only tools in the hands of interest groups. The media did not provide an answer to ordinary citizens as to why the migrant crisis occurred or about the different groups of migrants, from asylum seekers and war refugees to political and economic migrants. The media did not provide an adequate expert explanation to ordinary citizens about the potential dangers and consequences for the local population due to the existence of immense migrant waves on the so-called Balkan migrant route. It served as an instrument in the hands of political elites for mutual accusations and political calculations both at the European and Western Balkan levels. What was missing was a joint supranational and national response that would ensure dual security for migrants and the local population. The media system has been covering the migrant crisis in the current circumstances, as well as over the last decade, as a "silent" reporter on the ground who sees everything but does not say anything in an informative sense, thus playing its role.

In this context, the media sector should never have been placed in the role of a leading public policymaker, since that is a duty of public institutions. The media should have played a public educational role through objective information and relevant, well-based, and impartial thematic frameworks about the contemporary migration process overall, thus contributing to public discussion and critical thought about the potential benefits and risks that the migration issue brings internationally, regionally, and locally in Serbian and North Macedonian societies. Journalism as a profession must regain its well-known but long-faded shine. Along with other political decision-makers, it influences the creation, preparation, and implementation of 21st-century policies, in which people and their well-being come first as primary European values. Today, all the challenges in the context of the migrant crisis are still relevant. The migrant issue is still unresolved, while the animosities between the local population, on the one hand, and migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, on the other, are increasingly pronounced, radical, extreme, and dangerous. The migrant issue is not only a security challenge but also a tangible threat, and the media continues to contribute greatly to it.

Acknowledgement: The paper presents the findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and the Challenges in International Relations in 2026", financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, during the year 2026.

Bibliography

- Aljazeera. 2015. "AI: Srbija i Makedonija na udaru migrantske krize." Accessed August 17, 2024. <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2015/7/7/ai-srbija-i-makedonija-na-udaru-migrantske-krize>.
- Anđela Alimpić Anđela Marković Aleksandar Ostojić Aleksandra Pavlović Tijana Smiljanić Neda Tasić, "Evropski odgovor na izbegličku krizu: dupli standardi i solidarnost na ispitu", <https://www.unhcr.org/rs/sites/rs/files/legacy-pdf/Grupa-6-ass.-Marija-Vlajkovic.pdf>
- Anđelković, Nataša. 2020. "Migranti i Balkan: Jesu li strahovi od nove izbegličke krize opravdani." Accessed 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-51750896>.
- APC (Asylum Protection Center). 2023. "Balkanska ruta: Izbeglice vozom iz Đevđelije do Austrije." Accessed July 26, 2024. <https://www.azilsrbija.rs/balkanska-ruta-izbeglice-vozom-iz-devdelije-do-austrije/?script=cir>.
- Arežina Vera, "Metodologija istraživanja u političkim naukama", *Srpska politička misao* 1/2021. 28 (71) 273–292, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7112021.12>
- Bataveljić Dragan T., Božić Vanda B. 2024. „Savremena migrantska kriza sa posebnim osvrtom na poštovanje ustavnih prava građana zemalja useljenja". *Baština*, (63), 115–132.
- Bobić Mirjana, Šantić Danica, "Forced migrations and Externalization of European Union Border Control: Serbia on the Balkan Migration Route", *International Migration*, 2019, 58, (3), DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/IMIG.12622>
- Bobić, Mirjana, Janković, Stefan. 2017. "Towards understanding of contemporary migration Causes, Consequences, Policies, Reflections". Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade.
- Danas. 2022. „Preko Srbije do Evropske unije: Zašto je Balkanska ruta prohodan put za migrante?" Accessed July 26, 2024.

- <https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/preko-srbije-do-evropske-unije-zasto-je-balkanska-ruta-prohodan-put-za-migrante/>.
- Deutsche Welle. 2007. "Migracija, integracija, mediji." Accessed August 29, 2023. <https://www.dw.com/sr/migracija-integracija-mediji/a-2661483>.
- Dorđe, Tomić. 2017. "Western Balkan security and the European Union: taming securitization on the fringe of Europe". *The Journal of International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development*: 3 (1). 51–74.
- EU. 2024. EU signs agreement with Serbia to strengthen migration and border management cooperation. Belgrade, 25 June 2024.
- Euroactiv. 2023. „Srbija da se uskladi sa spoljnom politikom EU: Odbor za spoljne poslove EP usvojio izveštaj o Srbiji“. Accessed July 28, 2023. <https://euractiv.mondo.rs/politika/a1076/Odbor-za-spoljne-poslove-EP-usvojio-izvestaj-o-Srbiji.html>.
- European Commission. 2022. "Upravljanje granicom: EU potpisala sporazum sa Severnom Makedonijom." Accessed August 29, 2023. <https://webalkans.eu/sr/news/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-north-macedonia/>.
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles. 2023. "Balkan Route: EU Interior Ministers Agreed on Deportation Scheme from the Balkans in Secret, Enhanced EU-Serbia Cooperation Amid Increased Violence Towards Migrants." *EU Commission Making 600 Million Euro*. Accessed September 15, 2023. <https://ecre.org/balkan-route-eu-interior-ministers-agreed-on-deportation-scheme-from-the-balkans-in-secret-enhanced-eu-serbia-cooperation-amid-increased-violence-towards-migrants-eu-commission-making-600-million-e/>.
- Frontex. (n.d.). "Migratory Routes." Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-routes/western-balkan-route/>.
- JCP Ministerial Return Conference – Regional Return Mechanism, Return Partnerships Vienna, 21/22 February 2022 Joint Declaration
- Jelisavac Trošić, Sanja. and Arnaudov, Mitko. 2023. "International law in the context of contemporary migrations: Case study Serbia and North Macedonia." in *Redefinition of the role and significance of the Law*, edited by Angel Ristov. Institute for Legal – Economic Research and Education Iuridica Prima, Ohrid, Republic of North Macedonia.
- Kabata, Monik and Jacobs, An. 2023. "The 'migrant other' as a security threat: the 'migration crisis' and the securitising move of the Polish ruling party in response to the EU relocation scheme." *Journal of*

- Contemporary European Studies*, 31 (4). 1223–1239. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.2146072>.
- Krstić, Aleksandra. 2024. "Images of (In)Security: Visualizing Borders, Migrants and Control in Serbia's News Media". *Journal of Regional Security* 19 (1), 59–76 DOI: 10.5937/jrs18-41755.
- Lazović Vesna. "Evropska migrantska kriza u medijskom diskursu u Srbiji." In: Govoriti, razumeti, delovati: vpogled v uporabno jezikoslovje, T.Balažic Bulc, V. Gorjanc (urs.). Založba Univerze v Ljubljani. 2025. 133147.
- Ljevo, Haris. 2023. "EU između potrebe za radnom snagom i ksenofobije prema izbjeglicama." Accessed August 1, 2023. <https://balkans.aljazeera.net teme/2023/3/12/eu-izmedju-potrebe-za-radnom-snogom-i-ksenofobije-prema-izbjeglicama>.
- Lutovac Zoran. "Migracije i evropske integracije Srbije", *Stanovništvo* (2016), 54(1): 41–63 DOI: 10.2298/STNV160519002L
- Milićević, Ivana. 2025. "Borderland Narratives and Regional Identity: The Role of Security Stereotypes in Shaping Discourses on EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans". *Contemporary Southeastern Europe*, 12 (1). 87–105. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.25364/02.12:2025.1.8>.
- Milivojević, Sanja. 2019. *Border Policing and Security Technologies Mobility and Proliferation of Borders in the Western Balkans*. Routledge, London. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717630>
- Ministry for European Integration. 2023. "Mišćević: Srbija dobila pristup svim razgovorima u Briselu i podacima o migrantima." Accessed September 20, 2023. <https://www.mei.gov.rs/srl/vesti/2727/detaljnije/w/0/miscevic-srbija-dobila-pristup-svim-razgovorima-u-briselu-i-podacima-o-migrantima/>.
- Ministry of Defense of the Republic of North Macedonia. 2020. "Strategy for the defense of the Republic of North Macedonia." Accessed August 8, 2023. https://mod.gov.mk/inc/uploads/2021/06/SLU@BEN_VESNIK_NA_RSM_br_75_od_24.03.2020.pdf.
- Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. 2019. "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia." Accessed July 19, 2023. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/akta_procedura/2019/2206-19%20-%20Lat..pdf.
- Mišeljić, Ljupko. 2021. "Medijska slika ljudi u migracijama u Srbiji: Ksenofobija, mizoginija i islamofobija." Accessed September 11, 2023. <https://balkans.aljazeera.net teme/2021/3/1/medijska-slika-ljudi-u-migracijama-u-srbiji-ksenofobija-mizoginija-i-islamofobija>.

- Münkler, Herfried. 2002. "Asymmetrische Gewalt". *Terrorismus als politisch-militärische Strategie*, Merkur, 56 (1), 1-12.
- Nikolić Ivan, Maksimović Marijana. 2024. "The impact of migratory movements on the labour market in the countries of the Western Balkans", *Stanovništvo*, 62 (1), 65-83. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59954/stnv.531>
- Petrović, Dragan and Bukvić, Rajko. 2017. „Migrantski problem 2014-2017 u Evropi: mediteranska i balkanska ruta“. In: *Društveno-političke i ekonomske implikacije procesa migracija, Tematski zbornik radova, Knj. 3*. Fakultet za pravo, bezbednost i menadžment „Konstantin Veliki“ - Niš i Univerzitet „Union-Nikola Tesla“, Beograd.
- Subotić, Milovan, Mitrevska, Marina. 2025. "Media, Migration and Terrorism – Some Correlations". *Serbian Political Thought*. 2/2025, 90 (32), DOI: 10.5937/spm90-53502
- Taureck, Rita, "Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies". *Journal of International Relations and Development*, (9). 53-61, 2006, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072>
- The Ohio State University. European migrant crisis 2015. Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded), https://origins.osu.edu/sites/default/files/migrated_files/Map_of_the_European_Migrant_Crisis_2015_-_Asylum_applicants%27_countries_of_origin.png.
- UNICEF. (n.d.). "Izbeglička i migrantska kriza." Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/serbia/izbeglicka-i-migrantska-kriza>.
- Zakon o potvrđivanju sporazuma između Vlade Republike Srbije i Vlade Republike Severne Makedonije o saradnji u oblasti borbe protiv trgovine ljudima, *Službeni glasnik RS - Međunarodni ugovori*, broj 3 od 2. marta 2021.
- Zorić, Ognjen. 2019. *Kako su se migranti 'izgubili' u medijima?* Accessed September 5, 2023. <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ismail-einashe/30039335.html>.
- Јакимова, Јасмина. 2022. "Повторно расте бројот на мигранти низ Македонија по балканската рута." Accessed July 22, 2023. <http://bit.ly/3rBnqCJ>.

UDC 336.71:28:502.131.1
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 381–402
Review article
Received: 14/12/2025
Revised: 17/05/2026
Accepted: 25/05/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.7
CC BY-SA 4.0

Mirjana S. DEJANOVIĆ¹

The role of Islamic banking in achieving ESG and SDG sustainable development goals

SUMMARY

This study examines the role of Islamic banking in advancing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular attention to ethical investment practices and Shariah-compliant financial instruments that promote sustainability. A qualitative approach is applied, based on a review of relevant literature and a case study analysis of Islamic banking practices in Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with particular focus on green sukuk, Islamic social finance, and microfinance initiatives. The findings indicate that Islamic banking, grounded in ethics, justice, the prohibition of interest, and social responsibility, naturally aligns with ESG values and SDG objectives, contributing to clean energy, responsible infrastructure, poverty alleviation, and social inclusion. Challenges remain, including regulatory gaps, differing Shariah interpretations, and limited awareness among stakeholders. The study highlights the importance of standardisation, investor education, and the use of digital technologies to expand Islamic banking's impact on sustainable development. At the same time, it underscores the need for stronger collaboration among regulators, financial institutions, and Shariah boards. By combining theoretical insights and practical examples, the research underlines the strategic role of Islamic banking in achieving the SDGs, particularly in affordable and clean energy, sustainable cities, and climate action, with

¹ Faculty of project and innovation management Prof. dr. Petar Jovanović, Belgrade, E-mail: mrmirjanadejanovic@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0003-3369-331X.

green sukuk emerging as a key instrument for financing projects that align ethical principles with global sustainability goals.

Keywords: Islamic finance, ESG, sustainable development goals (SDGs), green sukuk, ethical investment.

Uloga islamskog bankarstva u postizanju ESG i SDG ciljeva održivog razvoja

SAŽETAK

Ova studija ispituje ulogu islamskog bankarstva u podršci ostvarivanju načela životne sredine, društvene odgovornosti i korporativnog upravljanja (ESG), kao i Ciljeva održivog razvoja Ujedinjenih nacija (SDGs), sa posebnim naglaskom na etičke investicione prakse i šerijatski usklađene finansijske instrumente koji promovišu održivost. Primenjen je kvalitativni pristup zasnovan na analizi relevantne literature i studija slučaja praksi islamskog bankarstva u Maleziji, Indoneziji, Saudijskoj Arabiji i Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima, sa fokusom na zelene sukuke, islamske instrumente socijalnih finansija i mikrokreditne inicijative. Nalazi pokazuju da se islamsko bankarstvo, zasnovano na etici, pravdi, zabrani kamate i društvenoj odgovornosti, prirodno usklađuje sa ESG vrednostima i ciljevima SDG agende, doprinoseći razvoju čiste energije, održive infrastrukture, smanjenju siromaštva i unapređenju socijalne inkluzije. Međutim, izazovi i dalje postoje, uključujući regulatorne nedostatke, različita tumačenja šerijatskih principa i ograničenu svest među ključnim akterima. Studija naglašava značaj standardizacije, edukacije investitora i primene digitalnih tehnologija u cilju proširivanja uticaja islamskog bankarstva na održivi razvoj, kao i potrebu za snažnijom saradnjom regulatornih tela, finansijskih institucija i šerijatskih odbora. Kombinovanjem teorijskih uvida i praktičnih primera, istraživanje ističe stratešku ulogu islamskog bankarstva u ostvarivanju ciljeva održivog razvoja, posebno u oblastima pristupačne i čiste energije, održivih gradova i klimatskih akcija, pri čemu se zeleni sukuk izdvaja kao ključni instrument za finansiranje projekata koji povezuju etičke principe sa globalnim ciljevima održivosti.

Ključne reči: islamske finansije, ESG, ciljevi održivog razvoja (SDGs), zeleni sukuk, etičko investiranje.

Introduction

Islamic finance is a financial system grounded in Shariah principles, emphasising ethics, justice, the prohibition of interest, and strong social responsibility. Unlike the conventional financial system, it promotes fair capital allocation, equitable wealth distribution, and the prevention of exploitation, reflecting not only religious and moral norms but also

universal values that are increasingly relevant in today's global context. Sustainability has become a fundamental component of modern finance. The ESG (environmental, social, and governance) framework serves as a global standard for assessing environmental responsibility, social impact, and corporate governance. In parallel, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) define international priorities for addressing climate change, social inequality, and governance challenges while promoting responsible resource use and long-term development.

The ESG approach significantly shapes investment flows, influences regulatory practices, and strengthens institutional and corporate strategies. The connection between ESG principles and Islamic finance has gained prominence amid global environmental and social challenges. Shared foundations, including ethical conduct, stakeholder protection, and the pursuit of social welfare, enable a strong synergy between the two systems.

Numerous studies confirm the compatibility of ESG criteria with the objectives of Islamic law (Maqasid al-Shariah), as highlighted by Shallhoob (2025), Muhamad et al. (2022), and Zain et al. (2024). Challenges persist, including regulatory inconsistency, lack of standardisation, limited education, and low awareness among investors and financial institutions, which hinder the systematic adoption of ESG elements in Islamic financial products (Judijanto et al., 2025; Najid et al., 2024; Utomo et al., 2024; Rusmita et al., 2024). Despite that, innovative instruments such as green sukuk, Islamic microfinance, and socially responsible investment funds demonstrate strong potential to advance sustainable finance within the Islamic framework (Elamin, 2023; Agustin et al., 2023).

The objective of this research is to provide an analytical overview of the opportunities for integrating ESG principles into Islamic financial instruments, to identify regulatory and operational barriers, and to offer practical recommendations for strengthening sustainable development aligned with socially responsible economic values. Drawing on contemporary literature and relevant case studies, this study contributes to a profound understanding of the role that Islamic finance can play in the global transition towards a more sustainable, equitable, and ethically oriented economic system.

Literature review

In many countries, financial inclusion remains limited due to the incompatibility of conventional products with Shariah norms; however, empirical evidence shows that financial inclusion and economic growth

reinforce each other, highlighting the developmental importance of Shariah-compliant instruments (Kim, Yu & Hassan, 2018).

Growing attention to sustainability has positioned green sukuk as a key innovation linking Islamic finance with ESG objectives. Research identifies their role in funding renewable energy, climate resilience, sustainable transport, waste management, and agriculture, with strong investor demand and high perceived security (Fitrah & Soemitra, 2022). Broader governance and CSR considerations in emerging markets underscore the importance of transparency, accountability, and stakeholder protection, which align with both ESG standards and Islamic principles (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014).

The literature consistently highlights the conceptual compatibility between Islamic finance and ESG, although practical integration remains constrained by regulatory inconsistencies, limited standardisation, and varying interpretations of Shariah (Sharipuddin et al., 2021; Shalhoob, 2025). Positive effects of ESG on financial performance depend heavily on institutional structures; for example, stronger governance mechanisms and Shariah supervisory boards enhance investor confidence and profitability (Hussain, Shahmoradi & Turk, 2016; Muneer et al., 2025). However, adoption levels differ considerably, and in the GCC region, both over-reliance on generic ESG scores and politically motivated ESG activity may weaken the link between ESG reporting and firm performance (Al-Jalahma et al., 2020).

Comparative studies indicate that Islamic banks in the MENA region lag behind conventional banks in ESG performance, indicating the need for more robust regulatory frameworks and clearer integration strategies (Jawad et al., 2022). Environmental reporting, however, has been shown to strengthen financial outcomes and institutional value, particularly in Indonesia, where transparency is a key determinant of bank valuation (Dwianto et al., 2024).

Recent research further explores integrated models that combine ESG and Maqasid al-Shariah, particularly in Takaful, demonstrating strong normative compatibility but also the need for unified reporting standards and practical implementation tools (Judijanto et al., 2025; Zain et al., 2024; Agustin et al., 2023). Bibliometric studies point to rapidly growing interest in green sukuk and sustainable Islamic finance but also emphasise the persistent gaps in regulation, measurement frameworks, and financial literacy (Utomo et al., 2024; Mohamed, 2024).

Overall, evidence shows that Islamic finance can significantly contribute to sustainable development when supported by strong governance, transparent reporting, and harmonised standards. The

integration of ESG practices with Shariah principles, particularly through environmental accountability, board expertise, and digital transformation, can position Islamic finance as a global leader in ethical and sustainability-oriented financial systems (Muneer et al., 2025).

Methodology

This research aims to provide an analytical overview of how ESG and SDG principles can be integrated into Islamic financial instruments. It also looks at the main regulatory and operational challenges and offers practical suggestions to improve sustainable development in line with the values of Islamic economics. Using qualitative research methods, including comparative analysis and case studies from Muslim countries and global practices, this study seeks to improve the understanding of the role that Islamic finance can play in supporting ethical, responsible, and sustainable business at the global level.

Islamic finance is a unique financial system based on Shariah principles. It focuses on ethics, fairness, and the prohibition of interest while promoting social responsibility. It supports fair and moral capital management, encourages equal wealth distribution, and avoids exploitation. ESG and SDG principles are used to evaluate companies' sustainability and responsibility. These principles are becoming more important in modern finance and are shaping investment decisions, regulations, and business strategies worldwide. Islamic finance and ESG share common values, such as ethical behaviour and protection of all stakeholders' interests, which creates room for strong cooperation between the two. Nevertheless, there are some challenges to this integration, such as regulatory differences, a lack of unified standards, and limited awareness among investors.

These issues often slow the adoption of ESG practices in Islamic financial products. Even so, there are promising innovations such as green sukuk (Islamic green bonds), Islamic microfinance, and social impact investment funds that show strong potential to support sustainable finance. Real-world examples, such as the development of green sukuk in Indonesia, indicate that these instruments can follow Shariah principles while also helping protect the environment and supporting long-term development.

Case studies of ESG, SDG, and Islamic finance integration

Key characteristics of Islamic finance

Islamic finance is founded on key principles that distinguish it from traditional banking, including justice, risk sharing, joint ownership, and fair distribution of both profits and losses. This system is more resilient to global economic shocks because it is tied to the real economy and avoids speculative financial instruments. In Islamic finance, all parties share risks and rewards, fostering a stable business environment in which no one wishes to incur losses and profits are equitably distributed. While this structure promotes stability, Islamic finance still faces risks and requires careful risk management. A key advantage is that risks are spread across all participants rather than being concentrated on one side. Islamic banks also face challenges, especially in managing rapid growth and adapting to changing business environments, which may demand coordinated structural and operational adjustments to avoid negative effects. This model offers a more stable foundation than conventional banking, underscoring fair resource and risk distributions over guaranteed fixed profits.

Islamic banking growth might be slower, as it tends to be more sustainable and balanced in the long term. As Islamic banks increasingly operate within conventional financial systems, understanding their unique financial contracts, legal frameworks, and liquidity conditions is crucial. They face specific risks, partly due to limited liquidity access and underdeveloped interbank markets and financial instruments. A central model in Islamic banking is profit-and-loss sharing (PLS), in which clients earn returns based on the actual profits or losses from investment projects rather than fixed interest. This shifts some risk from banks to clients, reducing credit risk but exposing bank funds to business uncertainties, similar to that faced by equity investors rather than fixed-return depositors. Despite progress, Islamic finance still struggles with developing fully functional markets, instruments, and regulations. The literature compares Islamic and conventional products, explores legal challenges for investors, and assesses Islamic banking performance, highlighting the need for further development and problem resolution (Zaher & Hassan, 2001).

The prohibition of conventional derivatives reduces the ability of Islamic banks to effectively protect themselves against certain risks, such as changes in interest rates or currency risks. Nevertheless, certain characteristics of the Islamic business model can make these banks more resilient to shocks than conventional banks can be. For example, in the case

of adverse events affecting income from PLS investments, the loss can be shared with investors, thereby reducing pressure on the bank's balance sheet (Hesse et al., 2008).

Islamic finance naturally aligns with ESG goals, raising questions about its role in financial stability. A study comparing conventional-only systems with dual systems (Islamic and conventional banks) revealed that Islamic banks enhance stability. They are more liquid, have higher cash reserves, and avoid risky instruments such as derivatives. Despite their lower net worth, they generate more liquidity per asset and often support conventional banks during crises. Compared with dual systems, conventional-only systems cause more bankruptcies. The study suggests that introducing Islamic banking can increase stability and reduce risk. Future research should include the roles of central banks, regulators, and consumer behaviour (Tekdogan & Atasoy, 2021).

Table 1. Islamic financial instruments and their ESG/SDG focus

Instrument	SDG/ESG Focus Areas	Key outcomes
Green Sukuk	Clean energy, climate action	Mobilises capital for green infrastructure
Zakat & Waqf	Poverty, social inclusion	Supports vulnerable groups, reduces inequalities
Islamic Microfinance	Financial inclusion, SMEs	Empowers entrepreneurs, fosters local development
Socially responsible funds	ESG integration, ethical investing	Promotes responsible corporate behaviour

Source(s): Table by author

Islamic financial instruments, such as green sukuk, zakat, and waqf, Islamic microfinance, and socially responsible investment funds, play a key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ESG principles. Their basic characteristics are as follows:

1. Green Sukuk are specialised bonds used to finance environmentally sustainable projects, such as renewable energy and green infrastructure projects. This instrument enables the mobilisation of capital for projects that have a positive impact on the environment, such as solar and wind turbines or green buildings.
2. Zakat is the obligatory giving of a portion of one's wealth to the poor, whereas waqf is a form of permanent donation that is used to finance

charitable activities. These instruments help reduce poverty and social inequality by enabling the fair distribution of wealth and supporting vulnerable groups in society. In Islamic finance, *zakat* and *waqf* play key roles in supporting social inclusion and reducing poverty.

3. Islamic microfinance provides financial services to small entrepreneurs and impoverished communities who would otherwise not have access to traditional banks. This instrument enables inclusion in the financial system without the use of interest, instead applying the principles of profit and risk sharing. Microfinance supports the development of SMEs and helps the local economy, particularly in developing countries, by providing opportunities for economic growth and improving living standards.
4. Socially responsible funds (SRFs) are investment funds that focus on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) criteria. These funds invest in companies that respect ethical standards and avoid industries such as alcohol, gambling, and weapons. In line with Islamic principles, SRFs promote responsible corporate behaviour and accountability towards society, the environment, and good governance, enabling investors to invest in projects with positive social impact.

Owing to its fair principles, Islamic finance can be categorised as high-fair finance, which aligns most closely with sustainable finance and business according to ESG principles. A detailed explanation of how ESG principles are realised through Islamic finance is provided below:

1. The prohibition of interest
2. Risk sharing
3. Investing in halal sectors
4. Connecting with the real economy
5. Ethics and social responsibility

Shariah principles closely align with ESG values by promoting ethical, asset-backed, and socially responsible financing. Profit is earned through real investments and shared risk, whereas activities involving alcohol, gambling, speculation, or weapons are prohibited. Financial products must be tied to tangible assets, aiming for fair wealth distribution, transparency, and social benefits. Regulatory bodies play a key role in this alignment. Central banks oversee banking operations, licence issuance, and sukuk regulation. Agencies such as Malaysia's Securities Commission and Indonesia's Financial Services Authority regulate capital markets and ESG compliance. International bodies such as AAOIFI and IFSB set standards and promote ESG integration in Islamic finance.

A key innovation is green sukuk, Islamic bonds designed to fund environmentally sustainable projects. They promote ESG goals and the UN SDGs by encouraging efficient resource use and green energy investment. While green sukuk alone cannot solve climate issues, it is a vital part of broader strategic sustainability efforts. Achieving lasting impact requires collective global action and greater investment in green projects. Green sukuk offers a quick, accessible way for issuers and investors to support climate-friendly initiatives (World Bank, 2025).

Case studies of Malaysia and Indonesia

Malaysia and Indonesia are key centres of Islamic finance in Southeast Asia, each developing its sector differently. Malaysia, with Kuala Lumpur as its financial hub, has established an advanced Islamic banking system and sukuk market that includes innovative tools such as green sukuk. These developments are strongly supported by government regulations, expert training, and international promotion. Indonesia, home to the largest Muslim population, focuses primarily on expanding Islamic banking for its domestic market and promoting financial inclusion. While there is some competition between the two to attract international investment, they cooperate well in international forums and share experiences. Malaysia leads in innovation, whereas Indonesia adopts a more conservative, local approach. Together, they drive growth in the regional Islamic finance sector.

Malaysia pioneered green Islamic financial instruments by issuing the world's first green sukuk in 2017 to fund solar power plants, laying the foundation for sustainable investing under Islamic principles. This success stems from strong government support, including the creation of specialised Islamic finance institutions, the issuance of government sukuk, expert training, and research centres. These initiatives blend Shariah compliance with financial innovation, enabling Muslim investors to participate in green projects. Malaysia leverages its position outside traditional Islamic finance centres to create products with international acceptance. Green sukuk also advances Malaysia's environmental and social goals and enhances its reputation as a leader in Islamic finance innovation.

Owing to its robust institutions and market backing, Malaysia has become a global leader in integrating sustainability within Islamic finance. The Securities Commission of Malaysia developed the green sukuk framework to achieve economic, political, and environmental objectives through standards, promotion, and international collaboration with organisations such as ASEAN, the UNDP, and the Islamic Development

Bank. Partnerships with the World Bank help align these efforts with global standards while offering financial incentives, training, and regional expansion. Green sukuk forms part of a broader strategy to expand the Islamic finance market, promote sustainable investment, and increase environmental responsibility in line with Malaysia's long-term national plans. Local credit agencies have also created their own sustainable finance rules, illustrated by the verification of the fourth green sukuk in January 2018, signalling growing domestic demand.

The true environmental impact of green sukuk remains uncertain. Out of ten issued sukuk, two did not receive the highest environmental certification, and one was rated "Tier 3", indicating minimal contribution to a low-carbon future. That finding reveals weaknesses in the Green Bond Principles, including the risk of greenwashing, showing that these instruments only partially support real environmental change. While green sukuk is an important innovation and political achievement, it has not fully addressed greenwashing or the deep application of Islamic principles for environmental protection. Financial ecology analysis highlights the complexity of these tools and the need for further research on how policies, markets, and environmental needs interact in different contexts (Liu & Lai, 2021).

Despite these challenges, green sukuk finance is vital, as it promotes ESG and SDG principles. Significant progress has been made, and Islamic finance has contributed to sustainable development goals. Current strengths and weaknesses should inform the creation of improved solutions that boost financing aligned with ESG and SDGs. Finance combined with ethics plays a crucial role in driving sustainability by directing capital towards environmentally responsible projects. Ethics ensures that financial decisions consider not only profit but also social and environmental impacts, emphasising transparency, responsibility, and fairness, which help reduce abuse and harm to society and the environment. A study of 23 Shariah banks in Indonesia and Malaysia from 2017 to 2022 revealed that Islamic social reporting significantly enhances Maqasid Shariah performance, underscoring its importance in meeting ethical and Shariah goals. The Maqasid Shariah index measures how well institutions align with Shariah principles, focusing on sustainability, responsibility, and ethics. Intellectual capital and corporate governance had little or slightly negative effects, suggesting that they alone do not improve Maqasid Shariah performance without strong social reporting (Puji Astuti & Raharja, 2024).

Indonesia issued its first sovereign green sukuk in 2018 to fund renewable energy and combat climate change. The government has launched several green sukuk series, including a global series in 2018 and a retail series in 2019, which attracted many young investors. Funds are allocated only to projects that meet the “Eligible Green Projects” criteria and are aligned with green bond principles, such as renewable energy, sustainable transport, waste management, sustainable agriculture, and climate resilience. Green sukuk finances low-carbon projects and helps build economic resilience, supporting national and global sustainable development goals. They play a vital role in funding infrastructure projects that protect the environment and advance the SDGs, making them key tools for transitioning to a sustainable economy.

Despite their growing popularity, research on measuring the „greenness” of these tools is still evolving, especially post-COVID-19. Major challenges include weak greenhouse gas emission measurement methods, the management of green projects, and a lack of standardised accounting frameworks (Alam et al., 2023). The success of the green sukuk market depends on international cooperation, the involvement of regulators and experts, investor awareness, and alignment with global standards. Transparency in sharing sustainability information is crucial; a study of Indonesian commercial banks reveals that simply sharing sustainability information positively impacts company value, whereas ESG scores and digital transactions alone do not have the same effect without effective stakeholder communication (Triyani & Siswanti, 2024). These findings confirm the importance of quality reporting and institutional support in sustainable finance. A comparative study of Bank Syariah Indonesia and Maybank Islamic Berhad shows that while both follow Shariah practices, they differ in detail and quality of sustainability reporting, particularly in corporate social responsibility and environmental transparency. Harmonising sustainability reporting standards among Islamic banks is needed to strengthen the ethical and responsible nature of this sector (Adirestuty et al., 2024).

Another study on Indonesian Shariah banks from 2012 to 2020 revealed that sharing information on Islamic corporate governance and Islamic corporate social responsibility positively affects banks’ financial performance. Integrating governance and socially responsible practices helps improve business efficiency and build investor trust, aligning with Shariah values and long-term sustainability principles (Nasution et al., 2022).

The Gulf countries: The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have successfully used green sukuk to finance sustainable infrastructure and energy transitions. The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) has developed a comprehensive framework for Saudi Arabia's sustainable energy transformation, responding to the growing demand for electricity and the need to reduce fossil fuel use. The SEC was the first issuer in the region to issue green sukuk instruments aimed at financing renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The company implements an ESG strategy that encompasses the transition to a low-carbon economy, community empowerment, and ethical business practices. Through internal monitoring and reporting mechanisms, the SEC ensures that the proceeds from sukuk are used to finance only qualified green projects, while investments in renewable sources and network automation enhance the capacity, efficiency, and reliability of the electricity system, contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and improving the quality of service for customers (Shalhoob, 2023).

This contributes to the development of renewable energy and increases investor confidence because the rules are clear and consistent. Additionally, research shows that actors in Saudi Arabia's Islamic finance sector perceive a positive link between ESG reporting and financial performance, particularly when ESG practices align with Maqasid al-Shariah (the objectives of Islamic law). The integration of ESG principles with Islamic values further strengthens stakeholder trust, promotes corporate responsibility, and contributes to long-term sustainability. However, the research does not measure direct financial outcomes, and perceptions vary depending on industry and demographic factors (Shalhoob, 2025).

In contrast, Kuwait and Oman face difficulties due to fragmented regulations. Laws and rules are not unified, consistent, or harmonised. Instead of having a clear, coherent rule regulating a specific area, various laws or regulations may be scattered, contradictory, or unrelated, leading to confusion and making implementation difficult. This means that laws and regulations are misaligned or opaque, reducing investor confidence and making it harder to finance green projects.

The implementation of technologies such as blockchain contributes to greater transparency and efficiency in tracking funds. It enables a clear, immutable record of all transactions, reducing the risk of misuse of funds and facilitating the tracking of how money is used. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and risk sharing allow investments in renewable projects to be safer and more profitable. Inspiration from Africa and Southeast Asia shows that such models increase project success because they

involve shared responsibility between the state and private investors, thereby reducing risks and encouraging greater investment (Morshed, 2025).

Countries with clear, coordinated laws that utilise new technologies and partnerships are more successful in attracting funds for green projects, whereas those with fragmented regulations struggle to draw investors. In GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), individual ESG factors positively affect Islamic banks' financial performance: social factors improve multiple indicators, governance impacts return on equity, and environmental factors correlate with Tobin's *Q*, reflecting market value and ecological responsibility. Although the overall ESG score has no significant effect, Islamic banks have strong potential to support sustainable development through improved ESG practices and niche services. The authors recommend that bank management, investors, and policymakers integrate ESG factors into strategies and develop tailored ESG frameworks suited to Islamic banking's unique ethics and operations (Alghafes et al., 2024).

Research also indicates that ESG integration can expand into Islamic finance areas such as *Takaful* (Islamic insurance). One study proposes a framework embedding ESG principles into *Takaful* models, which are aligned with Islamic law's core values – protecting life, faith, intellect, progeny, and wealth. This approach helps *Takaful* operators enhance ethical standards, social impact, and environmental responsibility. This paper calls for standardised ESG reporting and further practical research, emphasising that ESG-driven practices can strengthen financial stability, social cohesion, and sustainable development goals (Judijanto et al., 2025).

Research combining the 17 SDGs and ESG principles with Shariah values has created a comprehensive framework that shows strong alignment, particularly in protecting life, religion, intellect, progeny, and wealth. This provides *Takaful* operators with guidance to enhance ethical credibility, social impact, and environmental responsibility. The study also calls for a standardised disclosure index to transparently communicate their commitment to ethics and sustainability, fostering responsible Islamic finance growth (Zain et al., 2024).

A broader bibliometric analysis of green and sustainable finance in Islamic banking from 2001 to 2024 confirms the increasing interest in green *sukuk*, ESG investments, and climate finance, alongside greater alignment with global sustainability goals. However, challenges, such as the lack of regulatory standards and underdeveloped financial technologies, are highlighted. The study recommends clearer ESG guidelines and increased investment in innovation to increase Islamic finance's role in combating

climate change, encouraging further research and advanced product development (Utomo, Sudarmanto & Muhammadong, 2024).

Empirical research on 85 Islamic banks from OIC countries (2007–2016) shows that ESG reporting varies with institutional and economic conditions. Larger, more leveraged banks report more on ESG. Governance reporting is more common in stronger economies, whereas social and environmental reporting is more common in less developed economies. Tobin's Q predicts ESG activity, and overall ESG performance increases bank performance. However, only environmental reporting improves ROA and Tobin's Q; social and governance reporting may negatively affect operational performance. This study suggests mandating ESG reporting and creating regulations aligned with Islamic sustainability values (Buallay et al., 2020).

Environmental reporting within ESG frameworks plays a crucial role in boosting the market value of Islamic banks, especially when aligned with financial performance. A systematic review highlights the importance of Maqasid Al-Shariah in enhancing financial results by promoting environmental sustainability, strengthening corporate governance, and achieving long-term shareholder goals. By integrating Maqasid principles into the ESG framework, Islamic banks can balance shareholder interests with Shariah and sustainability objectives, leading to more stable operations.

The research has also emphasised that stakeholder engagement, transparency, and social responsibility significantly improve financial performance. The impact of corporate governance on stock returns is analysed in this context, with justice and societal welfare, which are key Maqasid principles, being fundamental to business success. This study concludes that aligning ESG with Maqasid Al-Shariah is essential for long-term sustainable development and broader societal progress (Radin et al., 2024).

For effective implementation, enhanced financial literacy, proper regulatory frameworks, and stronger corporate governance are needed. This integration promises improved social and economic outcomes, reinforcing the sector's sustainability (Marpaung and Lubis, 2025). These findings highlight the important connection between Islamic finance and global sustainable development efforts.

Discussion and recommendations

Islamic finance is positioned as a bridge between traditional ESG frameworks and ethically motivated, religiously grounded financial models. Its role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is

particularly significant in Muslim-majority countries, but also in the global context, which is seeking more stable, fair, and sustainable financial systems.

At the core of Islamic finance are principles of ethics, justice, the prohibition of interest, the avoidance of speculation, and an emphasis on real economic transactions. These values align naturally with ESG principles and sustainable development goals. Instruments such as green sukuk bonds facilitate the financing of renewable energy projects, sustainable infrastructure, energy efficiency, and environmental protection, all of which are in accordance with Shariah values. At the same time, Islamic microfinance institutions contribute to the financial inclusion of marginalised groups, directly supporting SDG 1 (poverty eradication), SDG 10 (reduced inequalities), and SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities). Additionally, Islamic finance places a strong focus on the real economy and emphasises the avoidance of excessive speculation, which contributes to greater stability within the financial system. Key instruments that integrate ESG and Islamic values include green sukuk, Islamic microfinance, waqf (charitable investments), and socially responsible investments (SRIs) within the Shariah framework. Nevertheless, despite its clear advantages, the Islamic financial sector faces several challenges, such as the following:

1. A lack of regulatory harmonisation and differing interpretations of Shariah norms between countries make the standardisation and comparability of ESG reporting difficult.
2. Weak transparency and the absence of specific ESG standards for Islamic finance reduce trust and complicate impact measurement.
3. Insufficient education and awareness about ESG integration in the Islamic context hinder progress.
4. Technical and institutional limitations, particularly in developing countries, complicate the implementation of complex evaluation models.
5. The limited international perception of Islamic instruments as being locally or religiously confined reduces global demand and liquidity.

Green sukuk, as an innovative Shariah-compliant instrument, successfully integrates Islamic and ESG principles and is widely used to finance renewable energy projects, climate change resilience, and sustainable transportation. However, the market faces challenges such as a lack of global standardisation, which hinders verification and comparability; high issuance costs due to separate Shariah and ESG audits; and limited interest from international investors, who still see green sukuk as a niche Islamic financial product. To overcome these obstacles, efforts

should focus on developing globally relevant ESG standards, including clear ESG metrics, to ensure alignment. Greater cooperation between regulatory bodies can help harmonise these financial instruments and their financial and ESG interpretations, contributing to consistent global standards. Digitisation and fintech solutions can improve transparency, lower issuance costs, and facilitate ESG impact tracking. Education and awareness among stakeholders, including investors, regulators, decision-makers, and the public, are also vital to highlight the potential of these innovations for sustainable development.

Binding global standards are needed, particularly concerning the SDGs and ESG, with institutions such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) playing leading roles in establishing certification frameworks. Although ISO 26000 is an important social responsibility standard, its impact is limited by the absence of certification options, underscoring the need for mandatory certification mechanisms overseen by regulatory bodies. While international ESG frameworks such as GRI, SASB, TCFD, ISSB, and ISO standards 14001, 45001, and 37001 exist, the lack of a universal certification system remains a major barrier to consistent application and comparability. The situation is similar for the SDGs, where tools such as the UN SDG Compass exist. However, a global certification system is unavailable, thus highlighting the need for a unified certification institution under the UNDP to ensure universal oversight and application of ESG and SDG principles.

Results

Islamic finance can significantly contribute to achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs) through alignment with ESG principles. By investing in projects that promote environmental preservation, social inclusion, and responsible governance, Islamic financial institutions can act as catalysts for sustainable change. Instruments such as green sukuk bonds enable the financing of renewable energy projects, energy efficiency, and sustainable agriculture, and are important tools for stimulating sustainable development. Additionally, Islamic microfinance institutions can support the development of affordable housing and infrastructure in poorer communities, contributing to the goals of sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) and affordable and clean energy (SDG 7). In this way, Islamic financial instruments have become tools for long-term development that balance economic benefits with social and environmental values.

Although green sukuk demonstrates significant potential for financing low-carbon projects and contributing to the SDGs, the market for this instrument faces several challenges that may limit its reach and effectiveness.

First, the lack of global standardisation makes comparability, verification, and mutual trust among investors, regulators, and issuers difficult. Without unified international frameworks, the practice of issuing green sukuk varies across countries, leading to regulatory fragmentation and making integration into the global sustainable finance market more challenging.

Second, high issuance costs, which include the complex processes of Shariah compliance review and verification of the “greenness” of projects, pose a significant barrier for smaller institutions and countries with limited technical capacity. The double verification processes, in line with sustainability principles and Islamic financial rules, require expertise, time, and additional resources.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is a need for greater interest from investors outside the Islamic world. Despite the universal sustainability component of green sukuk, many international investors still perceive it as a special financial instrument that is confined to Muslim countries or Islamic communities. That limits liquidity and market depth, further increasing risk and reducing its attractiveness to a broader investor base.

The key challenges identified include regulatory shortcomings, differing interpretations of Islamic financial principles, a lack of transparency, and the absence of ESG and SDG standardisation in the Islamic context.

Conclusion

There is clear evidence of complementarity between ESG principles and Shariah goals, with Islamic financial institutions demonstrating the potential to lead in sustainable and ethical practices. Full integration requires the following:

1. Strengthening regulatory frameworks and standardising ESG reporting.
2. Enhancing institutional capacity and educating management structures.
3. Developing financial instruments that link green goals with Shariah compliance.

4. Expanding empirical validation of the effects of ESG performance on financial performance and social impact.

Future research should focus on longitudinal analyses, comparative studies between Islamic and conventional institutions, and evaluations of the impact of digital technologies on ESG implementation in Islamic banking. Green sukuk represents an innovative instrument that links the principles of Islamic finance and sustainable development. Its role is not only in mobilising capital but also in contributing to the global transition towards a green economy. With further development of regulations, standardisation, and expansion of the investor base, green sukuk could become a key instrument in combating climate change and promoting responsible finance. Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are examples that success is based on coordinated legislative frameworks, technological innovations, partnerships, and market actor education.

Although challenges such as the standardisation of green criteria and the avoidance of greenwashing still exist, it is clear that Islamic financial principles, combined with ethics and the ESG framework, represent a powerful tool for achieving sustainable development, directing capital not only towards financial returns but also towards positive social and environmental outcomes. For Islamic finance, particularly for instruments such as green sukuk, realising their full potential requires coordinated advancement in standardisation, regulation, digitalisation, and capacity building. The establishment of harmonised global standards and robust certification frameworks, supported by leading international bodies, would mitigate existing structural barriers and enhance market credibility. Going forward, key priorities include rigorous quantitative assessment of the economic and sustainability impacts of Islamic finance, the development of innovative financial instruments aligned with ESG principles, stronger collaboration between regulatory authorities and ESG specialists, and the systematic integration of Islamic finance into global sustainability and responsible investment architectures. To further encourage investment in environmentally sustainable practices, one effective proposal is to introduce tax incentives, such as capital gains tax exemptions for investments in green sukuk and other green financial instruments. Such measures could significantly stimulate investors and accelerate the growth of the green bond market, thereby strengthening the contribution of the Islamic financial sector to sustainable development on a global scale. Only through such synergistic efforts can long-term sustainability and efficiency in the Islamic financial sector be achieved while also driving broader social and ecological transformation.

Bibliography

- Adirestuty, F., Al Adawiyah, R.A., Ratnasari, R.T., Chazanah, I.N. and Irsyad, S.M., 2024. "Analisis Laporan Keberlanjutan Studi Komparasi Bank Syariah Indonesia dan Maybank Islamic Berhad 2019-2022". *Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Islam*, 10(1), 769-777.
- Agustin, F., Muhtadi, R. & Sahal, S., 2023. "The importance of implementing the environment, social and government (ESG) and Maqasid Sharia-based Islamic finance in Islamic banks". *Journal of Islamic Economic Laws*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.23917/jisel.v6i2.21214>
- Alam, A. et al., 2023. "Development and evaluation of Islamic green financing: A systematic review of green sukuk." *Environmental Economics*, 14(1), 61.
- Alghafes, R., Karim, S., Aliani, K., Qureishi, N. & Alkayed, L., 2024. "Influence of key ESG factors on Islamic banks' financial performance: Evidence from GCC countries". *International Review of Economics & Finance*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.103629>
- Al-Jalahma, A., Al-Fadhel, H., Al-Muhanadi, M., & Al-Zaimoor, N., 2020. "Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure and firm performance: Evidence from GCC Banking sector". In: 2020 *International Conference on Decision Aid Sciences and Application (DASA)*, Sakheer, Bahrain, 08-09 November. IEEE. DOI: 10.1109/DASA51403.2020.9317210
- Astuti, P. and Raharja, S., 2024. "Islamic Social Reporting, Intellectual Capital, and Corporate Governance Influence on Maqashid Sharia Performance: A Case Study of Sharia Banks in Indonesia and Malaysia (2017-2022)". *Maksipreneur: Manajemen, Koperasi, dan Entrepreneurship*, 13(2), 393-407.
- Bennett, M., 2014. The Sukuk financing model for green projects. *Sukuk.com*, 26 July.
- Boubaker, S. & Nguyen, D.K., 2014. *Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: Emerging markets focus*. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Buallay, A., Abu Wadi, R.M., Kukreja, G. & Hassan, A.A., 2020. "Evaluating ESG disclosures of Islamic banks: evidence from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Members". *International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development*, 14(3), 266-287. <http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=108045>
- Dwianto, A., Setiawati, E., Triyono, T., Witono, B. & Ahyani, F., 2024. "Do Environmental Accounting and the Performance of the Banks

- Contribute to the Value of the Islamic Banks?”. SSRN 4747846. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4747846>.
- Elamin, M., 2023. “Advancing ethical and sustainable economy: Islamic finance solutions for environmental, social, & economic challenges in the digital age”. *International Journal of Membrane Science and Technology*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15379/ijmst.v10i5.2515>.
- Fitrah, R. & Soemitra, A., 2022. “Green sukuk for sustainable development goals in Indonesia: A literature study”. *Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Islam*, 8(1), 231–240.
- Hesse, H., Jobst, A. & Solé, J., 2008. *Trends and challenges in Islamic finance*.
- Hussain, M., Shahmoradi, A. & Turk, R., 2016. An overview of Islamic finance. *Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy*, 7(01), p.1650003.
- Jawad, A. & Abdulla, Y., 2022. “ESG scores in MENA banks”. *International Conference on Sustainable Islamic Business and Finance (SIBF)*, 69-73. <https://doi.org/10.1109/SIBF56821.2022.9939932>
- Judijanto, L., Fathoni, A., Fauziah, D., Lasmiatun, K. & Ashari, M., 2025. “ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) integration in global Islamic finance”. *West Science Islamic Studies*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.58812/wsiss.v3i01.1612>.
- Kim, D.W., Yu, J.S. & Hassan, M.K., 2018. “Financial inclusion and economic growth in OIC countries”. *Research in International Business and Finance*, 43, 1–14.
- Liu, F.H. & Lai, K.P., 2021. “Ecologies of green finance: Green sukuk and development of green Islamic finance in Malaysia”. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 53(8), 1896–1914.
- Mohamed, H., 2024. “Integrating Shariah principles with ESG for sustainable finance: A comprehensive framework”. *World Scientific Annual Review of Islamic Finance*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1142/s2811023424500023>.
- Morshed, A., 2025. “Sustainable energy revolution: Green finance as the key to the Arab Gulf States’ future”. *International Journal of Energy Sector Management*.
- Muhamad, S., Zain, F., Samad, N., Rahman, A. & Yasoa’, M., 2022. “Measuring sustainable performance of Islamic banks: Integrating the principles of environmental, social and governance (ESG) and Maqasid Shari’ah”. *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science*, 1102. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/1102/1/012080>.

- Muneer, S., Singh, A., Choudhary, M.H. and Alshammari, A.S., 2025. "Economic evolution in the digital age: Assessing the influence of digital transformation and energy consumption on sustainable development". *Frontiers in Human Dynamics*, 7, 1523887.
- Najid, N., Muhamat, A. & Jaafar, M., 2024. "Integration of Islamic finance with ESG sustainability efforts evidence in Malaysia". *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.47772/ijriss.2024.8120016>.
- Radin, D. N., Shaharuddin, N., Bujang, I. i Rijanto, I. F., 2024. "The Interaction of Maqasid Al-Shariah in the Relationship Between ESG and Firm Financial Performance". *ASEAN Journal on Science and Technology for Development*, 41(2), 1-15. <https://ajstd.ubd.edu.bn/journal>.
- Rusmita, S., Mansor, F. & Ali, N., 2024. "Fundamental and role ESG in Islamic finance and business: A literature review and content analysis". *International Journal of Religion*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61707/92eqh267>.
- Shalhooob, H., 2023. "Green sukuk in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and potentials of sustainability in the light of Saudi vision 2030". *Journal of Governance and Regulation*, 12(4).
- Shalhooob, H., 2025. "ESG disclosure and financial performance: Survey evidence from accounting and Islamic finance". *Sustainability*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17041582>.
- Sharipuddin, S.L., Ayub, N.A.F., Mahassan, N.A., & Rahim, M.A. (2021). "Among 100 Top Company Performance of Real Estate Industry: Does Chief Financial Officer Matters?." E-Proceeding 8th International Conference on Public Policy and Social Science (ICoPS) 2021, UiTM Cawangan N. Sembilan, Kampus Seremban
- Tekdogan, O.F. & Atasoy, B.S., 2021. "Does Islamic banking promote financial stability? Evidence from an agent-based model". *Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance*, 7(2), 201–232.
- Triyani, M. & Siswanti, I., 2024. "The effect of sustainability reporting disclosure, environment, social and governance rating, and digital banking transactions on firm value with financial performance as an intervening variable (Case study on commercial bank in Indonesia)". *Journal of Management and Economic Studies*, 6(1), 17-37. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.26677/TR1010.2024.1380> [24 August 2025].
- Utomo, B., Sudarmanto, E. & Muhammadong, M., 2024. "The growth of green and sustainable finance in Islamic banking: A bibliometric

approach". *Sciences du Nord Economics and Business*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.58812/sneb.v1i2.29>.

World Bank, 2018. "Green sukuk: Financing the future". <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2018/02/15/green-sukuk--financing-the-future>. 22/07/2025.

Zain, F., Muhamad, S., Abdullah, H., Tajuddin, S. & Abdullah, W., 2024. "Integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) principles with Maqasid al-Shariah: A blueprint for sustainable takaful operations". *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/imefm-11-2023-0422>.

Zaher, T.S. & Kabir Hassan, M., 2001. A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and banking. *Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments*, 10(4), 155–199.

Međunarodna politika

Recenzenti

- Dr Aleksandar Gajić, naučni savetnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
- Prof. dr Aleksandar Milošević, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd
- Dr Ana Batrićević, naučni savetnik, Institut za sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, Beograd
- Dr Ana Čović, naučni savetnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd
- Dr Anđela Đukanović, naučni saradnik, Institut za sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, Beograd
- Prof. dr Artur Adamcik, vanredni profesor, Centar za Evropu, Univerzitet u Varšavi
- Dr Biljana Grujić Vučkovski, naučni saradnik, Institut za ekonomiku poljoprivrede, Beograd
- Prof. dr Biljana Jovanović Gavrilović, redovni profesor, Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Biljana Vankovska, redovni profesor, Filozofski fakultet, Institut za bezbednost, odbrana i mir, Skopje
- Prof. dr Vanja Bajović, vanredni profesor, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Vladan Pavlović, redovni profesor, Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini sa privremenim sedištem u Kosovskoj Mitrovici
- Doc. dr Vladimir Ajzenhamer, docent, Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Vladimir Grečić, redovni profesor, Srpska akademija ekonomskih nauka, Beograd
- Dr Vladimir Ristanović, naučni saradnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
- Prof. dr Gojko Rikalović, redovni profesor, Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu

- Doc. dr Goran Tepšić, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Dejan Vuletić, viši naučni saradnik, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd
- Prof. dr Dejan Molnar, vanredni profesor, Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Dragan Đukanović, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Dragoljub Todić, redovni profesor, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
- Dr Dušan Dostanić, naučni saradnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd
- Dr Dragica Luković Jablanović, predavač, Visoka sportska i zdravstvena škola, Beograd
- Dr Edita Stojić-Karanović, naučni savetnik, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
- Prof. dr Zijad Bećirović, vanredni profesor, Međunarodni institut za bliskoistočne i balkanske studije, Ljubljana (IFIMES)
- Prof. dr Zoran Krstić, redovni profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu
- Dr Igor Novaković, direktor istraživanja, Centar za međunarodne i bezbednosne poslove, ISAC fond, Beograd
- Dr Jelena Kostić, naučni savetnik, Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
- Prof. dr Jelena Lopičić-Jančić, redovni profesor, Fakultet za diplomatiju i bezbednost
- Dr Luka Glušac, naučni saradnik, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd
- Prof. dr Maja Kovačević, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Maja Nastić, redovni profesor, Pravni fakultet, Univerzitet u Nišu
- Prof. dr Marijana Joksimović, redovni profesor, Fakultet za finansije, bankarstvo i reviziju, Alfa BK Univerzitet, Beograd
- Dr Marijana Maksimović, viši naučni saradnik, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd
- Prof. dr Marko Babić, vanredni profesor, Centar za Evropu, Univerzitet u Varšavi
- Prof. dr Marko Veković, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Doc. dr Marko Dašić, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

- Dr Marko Kovačević, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Milan Igrutinović, naučni saradnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
- Prof. dr Milan Lipovac, vanredni profesor, Fakultet bezbednosti Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Doc. dr Milka Dimitrovska, Institut za sociološka i političko-pravna istraživanja, Skoplje, Severna Makedonija
- Dr Milorad Stamenović, naučni saradnik, Inventis, Universite Cote'D Azur, Francuska
- Dr Miloš Jončić, naučni saradnik i ministar savetnik, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije
- Prof. dr Miloš Hrnjaz, vanredni profesor Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Mina Zirojević, viši naučni saradnik, Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
- Dr Miljana Đurčević Cucić, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Miroljub Jevtić, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Miša Đurković, naučni savetnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
- Dr Nada Raduški, naučni savetnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd
- Prof. dr Nemanja Džuverović, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Prof. dr Petar Stanojević, redovni profesor, Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Rajko Petrović, naučni saradnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
- Dr Sanja Stojković Zlatanović, viši naučni saradnik, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd
- Dr Sanja Stošić, naučni saradnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd
- Dr Svetlana Stanarević, vanredni profesor, Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Senada Šelo Šabić, viša znanstvena suradnica, Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose, Zagreb
- Prof. dr Siniša Atlagić, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu
- Dr Srećko Đukić, ambasador u penziji, Forum za međunarodne odnose Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji, Beograd
- Prof. dr Stevan Nedeljković, vanredni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Dr Stevan Rapaić, viši naučni saradnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd

Prof. dr Stefano Bianchini, penzionisani profesor istorije i politike istočne Evrope, Univerzitet u Bolonji, izvršni urednik časopisa "Southeastern Europe"

Dr Strahinja Obrenović, asistent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Doc. dr Suzana Balaban, docent, Fakultet za finansije, bankarstvo i reviziju, Alfa BK Univerzitet, Beograd

Doc. dr Stefan Surlić, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Dr Uroš Ćemalović, viši naučni saradnik, Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

Prof. dr Filip Ejodus, redovni profesor, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

OPIS ČASOPISA, CILJEVI I OPSEG

Međunarodna politika je recenzirani naučni časopis otvorenog pristupa koji izdaje Institut za međunarodnu politiku, vodeća naučna institucija u regionu posvećena istraživanju međunarodnih odnosa. Više od 70 godina ovaj interdisciplinarni časopis objavljuje originalne, analitičke, teorijske, pregledne i stručne radove o širokom spektru savremenih međunarodnih političkih, ekonomskih i pravnih odnosa. U svoja tri godišnja izdanja časopis *Međunarodna politika* ima za cilj da objavljuje visoko kvalitetna istraživanja orijentisana na razmatranje širokog spektra međunarodnih i spoljnopolitičkih pitanja. U tom kontekstu časopis se interesuje za politike najvažnijih aktera koji oblikuju savremene međunarodne odnose. Relevantne su i teme posvećene različitim teritorijalnim i etničkim sukobima i sporovima, od međudržavnih do unutardržavnih, kao i njihovim širim regionalnim i globalnim političkim, ekonomskim i pravnim implikacijama. Za časopis su značajne i druga pitanja koja utiču na savremene međunarodne odnose, kao što su globalna trgovina, ekonomski i energetske odnosi, međunarodne i regionalne integracija, različiti oblici terorizma i fundamentalizma, kao i izazovi koje predstavljaju migrantska kriza, globalno širenje zaraznih bolesti i nuklearnih kapaciteta u svetu. Dakle, ovaj naučni časopis je zasnovan na otvorenom i širokom pristupu predmetnoj oblasti, dajući prvenstvo priložima koji nude otvorena, teorijski i praktično utemeljena gledišta aktuelnih međunarodnih procesa. Na taj način časopis nastoji da na što kredibilniji način objasni raznolike i nedovoljno istražene nove fenomene na međunarodnoj sceni.

OBAVEZE IZDAVAČKOG SAVETA, UREDNIKA I UREĐIVAČKOG ODBORA

Izdavački savet je savetodavno telo koje aktivno doprinosi razvoju časopisa. Zadaci i dužnosti članova Saveta su: podrška razvoju časopisa, promocija časopisa, podsticanje stručnjaka u naučnom istraživanju političkih, bezbednosnih, ekonomskih i pravnih aspekata međunarodnih odnosa da se uključe u rad časopisa kao autori i/ili recenzenti, pisanje uvodnika, recenzija i komentara o radovima.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik *Međunarodne politike* donosi konačnu odluku o tome koji će se rukopisi objaviti. Prilikom donošenja odluke glavni i odgovorni

urednik rukovodi se uređivačkom politikom vodeći računa o zakonskim propisima koji se odnose na klevetu, kršenja autorskih prava i plagiranje.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik i njegov zamenik zadržavaju diskreciono pravo da primljene rukopise procene i odbiju bez recenziranja, ukoliko utvrde da ne odgovaraju sadržinskim i formalnim standardima pisanja naučnoistraživačkog rada i tematskim zahtevima uređivačke politike. Radovi koji ne zadovoljavaju tehničke standarde propisane Uputstvom za autore, čak i u slučaju da je sadržaj korektan, biće vraćeni autorima na usklađivanje. U redovnim okolnostima, redakcija obaveštava autora o tome da li je prihvatila tekst i pokrenula postupak recenziranja u roku od sedam dana od datuma prijema rukopisa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da budu u bilo kakvom sukobu interesa u vezi sa rukopisima koje razmatraju. Iz postupka izbora recenzenata i odlučivanja o sudbini rukopisa isključuju se članovi Uređivačkog odbora kod kojih postoji sukob interesa. Ako takav sukob interesa postoji, o izboru recenzenata i sudbini rukopisa odlučuje glavni i odgovorni urednik. Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora su dužni da blagovremeno prijave postojanje sukoba interesa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i Uređivački odbor dužni su da sud o rukopisu donesu na osnovu njegovog sadržaja, bez rasnih, polnih/rodnih, verskih, etničkih ili političkih predrasuda.

Urednici i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznete u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju da se koriste za sticanje lične koristi.

Urednici i članovi redakcije dužni su da preduzmu sve razumne mere kako bi identitet recenzenata ostao nepoznat autorima pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije i kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima.

OBAVEZE AUTORA

Autori garantuju da rukopis predstavlja njihov originalan doprinos, da nije objavljen ranije i da se ne razmatra za objavljivanje na drugom mestu. Istovremeno predavanje istog rukopisa u više časopisa predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda. Takav rukopis se momentalno isključuje iz daljeg razmatranja. Autori takođe garantuju da nakon objavljivanja u časopisu *Međunarodna politika* rukopis neće biti objavljen u drugoj publikaciji na bilo kom jeziku bez saglasnosti nosioca autorskih prava.

U slučaju da je poslati rukopis rezultat naučnoistraživačkog projekta ili da je, u prethodnoj verziji, bio izložen na skupu u vidu usmenog saopštenja (pod istim ili sličnim naslovom), detaljniji podaci o projektu, konferenciji i slično, navode se u fusnoti na samom početku teksta. Rad koji je već objavljen u nekom časopisu ne može biti preštampan u *Međunarodnoj politici*.

Autori su dužni da se pridržavaju etičkih standarda koji se odnose na naučnoistraživački rad. Autori garantuju da rukopis ne sadrži neosnovane ili nezakonite tvrdnje i ne krši prava drugih. Izdavač neće snositi nikakvu odgovornost u slučaju ispostavljanja bilo kakvih zahteva za naknadu štete.

Sadržaj rada

Rad treba da sadrži dovoljno detalja i referenci kako bi se recenzentima, a potom i čitaocima omogućilo da provere tvrdnje koje su u njemu iznesene. Namerno iznošenje netačnih tvrdnji predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda. Prikazi skupova i knjiga moraju da budu precizni i objektivni.

Autori snose svu odgovornost za sadržaj predatih rukopisa i dužni su da, ako je to potrebno, pre njihovog objavljivanja pribave saglasnost svih lica ili institucija koje su neposredno učestvovala u istraživanju koje je u rukopisu predstavljeno.

Autori koji žele da u rad uključe ilustracije, tabele ili druge materijale koji su već negde objavljeni obavezni su da za to pribave saglasnost nosilaca autorskih prava. Materijal za koji takvi dokazi nisu dostavljeni smatraće se originalnim delom autora.

Autorstvo

Autori su dužni da kao autore navedu samo ona lica koja su značajno doprinela sadržaju rukopisa, odnosno dužni su da sva lica koja su značajno doprinela sadržaju rukopisa navedu kao autore. Ako su u bitnim aspektima istraživačkog projekta i pripreme rukopisa učestvovala i druga lica koja nisu autori, njihov doprinos treba pomenuti u napomeni ili zahvalnici.

Navođenje izvora

Autori su dužni da ispravno citiraju izvore koji su bitno uticali na sadržaj istraživanja i rukopisa. Informacije koje su dobili u privatnom razgovoru ili korespondenciji sa trećim licima, prilikom recenziranja prijava projekata ili rukopisa i slično, ne smeju se koristiti bez izričite pisane dozvole izvora.

Sukob interesa

Autori su dužni da u radu ukažu na finansijske ili bilo koje druge sukobe interesa koji bi mogli da utiču na iznesene rezultate i interpretacije.

Greške u objavljenim radovima

U slučaju da autori otkriju važnu grešku u svom radu nakon njegovog objavljivanja, dužni su da momentalno o tome obaveste urednika ili izdavača i da sa njima sarađuju kako bi se rad povukao ili ispravio.

Predavanjem rukopisa redakciji *Međunarodne politike* autori se obavezuju na poštovanje navedenih obaveza.

PLAGIJARIZAM

Plagiranje, odnosno preuzimanje tuđih ideja, reči ili drugih oblika kreativnog izraza i predstavljanje kao svojih, predstavlja grubo kršenje naučne i izdavačke etike. Plagiranje može da uključuje i kršenje autorskih prava, što je zakonom kažnjivo. Plagijat obuhvata sledeće:

- Doslovno ili gotovo doslovno preuzimanje ili smišljeno parafraziranje (u cilju prikrivanja plagijata) delova tekstova drugih autora bez jasnog ukazivanja na izvor ili obeležavanje kopiranih fragmenata (na primer, korišćenjem navodnika);
- Kopiranje slika ili tabela iz tuđih radova bez pravilnog navođenja izvora i/ili bez dozvole autora ili nosilaca autorskih prava.

Rukopisi kod kojih postoje jasne indicije da se radi o plagijatu biće automatski odbijeni i autorima će biti trajno zabranjeno da objavljuju u časopisu.

Ako se ustanovi da je rad koji je objavljen u časopisu plagijat, isti će biti povučen u skladu sa procedurom opisanom pod *Povlačenje već objavljenih radova*, a autorima će biti trajno zabranjeno da objavljuju u časopisu.

OBAVEZE RECENZENATA

Recenzenti su dužni da stručno, argumentovano, nepristrasno i u zadatim rokovima dostave uredniku ocenu naučne vrednosti rukopisa.

Recenzenti evaluiraju radove u odnosu na usklađenost teme rada sa profilom časopisa, relevantnost istraživane oblasti i primenjenih metoda, originalnost i naučnu relevantnost podataka iznesenih u rukopisu, stil naučnog izlaganja i opremljenost teksta naučnim aparatom.

Recenzent koji ima osnovane sumnje ili saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda od strane autora dužan je da o tome obavesti urednika. Recenzent treba da prepozna važne objavljene radove koje autori nisu citirali. On treba da upozori urednika i na bitne sličnosti i podudarnosti između rukopisa koji se razmatra i bilo kojeg drugog objavljenog rada ili rukopisa koji je u postupku recenzije u nekom drugom časopisu, ako o tome ima lična saznanja. Ako ima saznanja da je isti rukopis razmatra u više časopisa u isto vreme, recenzent je dužan da o tome obavesti urednika.

Recenzent ne sme da bude u sukobu interesa sa autorima ili finansijerom istraživanja. Ukoliko postoji sukob interesa, recenzent je dužan da o tome momentalno obavesti urednika.

Recenzent koji sebe smatra nekompetentnim za temu ili oblast kojom se rukopis bavi dužan je da o tome obavesti urednika.

Recenzija mora biti objektivna. Sud recenzenata mora biti jasan i potkrepljen argumentima.

Rukopisi koji su poslani recenzentu smatraju se poverljivim dokumentima. Recenzenti ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznesene u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju se koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

POSTUPAK RECENZIJE

Primljeni radovi podležu recenziji. Cilj recenzije je da glavnom i odgovornom uredniku pomogne u donošenju odluke o tome da li rad treba prihvatiti ili odbiti i da kroz proces komunikacije sa autorima poboljša kvalitet rukopisa.

Recenzije su dvostruko anonimne – identitet autora je nepoznat recenzentima i obrnuto. Identitet recenzenata ostaje nepoznat autorima i obrnuto pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije. Urednici garantuju da će pre slanja rukopisa na recenziju iz njega biti uklonjeni lični podaci autora (pre svega, ime i afilijacija) i da će se preduzeti sve razumne mere kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima. Tokom čitavog procesa, recenzenti deluju nezavisno jedni od drugih. Recenzentima nije poznat identitet drugih recenzenata. Ako odluke recenzenata nisu iste, urednici mogu da traže mišljenje drugih recenzenata.

Rok za okončanje postupka recenziranja je 30 dana od datuma kada recenzenti prime rukopis.

Izbor recenzenata spada u diskreciona prava glavnog i odgovornog urednika i njegovog zamenika. Recenzenti moraju da raspolažu relevantnim znanjima u vezi sa oblašću kojom se rukopis bavi i ne smeju biti iz iste institucije kao autor, niti to smeju biti autori koji su u skorije vreme objavljivali publikacije zajedno (kao koautori) sa bilo kojim od autora podnesenog rada.

Urednici šalju podneti rukopis sa obrascem recenzije dvojici recenzenata koji su stručnjaci za naučnu oblast kojom se rad bavi. Obrazac recenzije sadrži niz pitanja na koja treba odgovoriti, a koja recenzentima ukazuju koji su to aspekti koje treba obuhvatiti kako bi se donela odluka o sudbini jednog rukopisa. U završnom delu obrasca, recenzenti moraju da navedu svoja zapažanja i predloge kako da se podneti rukopis poboljša.

Tokom postupka recenzije urednici mogu da zahtevaju od autora da dostave dodatne informacije (uključujući i primarne podatke), ako su one potrebne za donošenje suda o naučnom doprinosu rukopisa. Urednici i recenzenti moraju da čuvaju takve informacije kao poverljive i ne smeju ih koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

U slučaju da autori imaju ozbiljne i osnovane zamerke na račun recenzije, urednici će proveriti da li je recenzija objektivna i da li zadovoljava akademske

standarde. Ako se pojavi sumnja u objektivnost ili kvalitet recenzije, urednici će tražiti mišljenje drugih recenzenata.

RAZREŠAVANJE SPORNIH SITUACIJA

Svaki pojedinac ili institucija mogu u bilo kom trenutku da urednicima i/ili Uređivačkom odboru prijave saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda i drugim nepravilnostima i da o tome dostave neophodne informacije i dokaze.

Provera iznetih navoda i dokaza

- Glavni i odgovorni urednik će u dogovoru sa Uređivačkim odborom odlučiti o pokretanju postupka koji ima za cilj proveru iznesenih navoda i dokaza;
- Tokom tog postupka svi izneseni dokazi smatraće se poverljivim materijalom i biće predloženi samo onim licima koja su direktno uključena u postupak;
- Licima za koja se sumnja da su prekršila etičke standarde biće data mogućnost da odgovore na iznete optužbe.

Odluke u vezi sa utvrđenim kršenjem etičkih standarda donosi glavni i odgovorni urednik u saradnji sa Uređivačkim odborom i, ako je to potrebno, grupom stručnjaka. Predviđene su sledeće mere, a mogu se primenjivati pojedinačno ili istovremeno:

- Objavljivanje saopštenja ili uvodnika u kom se opisuje slučaj kršenja etičkih standarda;
- Slanje službenog obaveštenja rukovodiocima ili poslodavcima autora/recenzenta;
- Bezuslovno odbijanje rukopisa ili povlačenje već objavljenog rada u skladu sa procedurom opisanom pod *Povlačenje već objavljenih radova*;
- Autoru se trajno zabranjuje da objavljuje u časopisu *Međunarodna politika*;
- Upoznavanje relevantnih stručnih organizacija ili nadležnih organa sa slučajem kako bi mogli da preduzmu odgovarajuće mere.

Prilikom rešavanja spornih situacija Uređivački odbor se rukovodi smernicama i preporukama Odbora za etiku u izdavaštvu (*Committee on Publication Ethics – COPE*, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>).

POVLAČENJE VEĆ OBJAVLJENIH RADOVA

U slučaju kršenja prava izdavača, nosilaca autorskih prava ili autora, povrede profesionalnih etičkih kodeksa, tj. u slučaju slanja istog rukopisa u više časopisa u isto vreme, lažne tvrdnje o autorstvu, plagijata, manipulacije podacima u cilju prevare, kao i u svim drugim slučajevima grubog kršenja etičkih standarda,

objavljeni rad se mora povući. U nekim slučajevima već objavljeni rad se može povući i kako bi se ispravile naknadno uočene greške.

Standardi za razrešavanje situacija kada mora doći do povlačenja rada definisani su smernicama Odbora za etiku u izdavaštvu (*Committee on Publication Ethics – COPE*, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>), a ista praksa je usvojena i od strane časopisa *Međunarodna politika*.

POLITIKA OTVORENOG PRISTUPA

Časopis *Međunarodna politika* je dostupan u skladu s principima otvorenog pristupa. Objavljuje se i u papirnom i u digitalnom obliku. Članci mogu da budu preuzeti besplatno sa sajta i distribuirani za akademske i druge svrhe. Časopis se rukovodi *Budimpeštanskom deklaracijom o otvorenom pristupu* u kojoj se navodi:

Pod „otvorenim pristupom” [recenziranoj naučnoj literaturi] podrazumeva se njena slobodna raspoloživost na javnom internetu, koja dozvoljava bilo kom korisniku da čita, preuzme, kopira, distribuira, štampa, pretražuje ili usmeri putem linka ka punom tekstu članka, popisuje za potrebe indeksiranja, prosleđuje u vidu podatka ka softveru, i koristi ih za bilo koju zakonitu svrhu, bez finansijskih, pravnih ili tehničkih prepreka osim onih koje su neodvojive od samog pristupa internetu. Jedino ograničenje u pogledu reprodukcije i distribucije, i jedina uloga autorskih prava u ovom domenu, trebalo bi da bude davanje autorima kontrole u pogledu integriteta njihovog rada i prava da budu pravilno prepoznati i citirani.

Časopis omogućuje besplatan pristup svim svojim člancima, bez pretplate i bez ikakvih povezanih troškova. Sadržaj časopisa objavljuje se bez odlaganja (bez tzv. perioda embarga) i materijali mogu biti korišćeni bez traženja posebne dozvole pod uslovom da se navodi referenca ka originalnom dokumentu.

POLITIKA LICENCIRANJA I AUTORSKIH PRAVA

Objavljeni članci će biti distribuirani u skladu sa međunarodnom licencom Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA), omogućavajući deljenje – kopiranje i ponovnu distribuciju u bilo kom obliku ili mediju – i prilagođavanje – prerađivanje, menjanje ili nadgradnju za bilo koju svrhu, čak i komercijalnu, pod uslovom da se pridaje odgovarajuće priznanje originalnom(ima) autoru(ima), da se obezbedi veza do licence, da se navede da li su izmene napravljene i da se novo delo distribuira pod identičnom licencom kao i originalno delo. Korisnici moraju dati detaljnu referencu na originalni rad, koja sadrži ime(a) autora, naslov objavljenog istraživanja, puni naslov časopisa, tom, broj, raspon stranica i DOI. U elektronskom izdavaštvu, korisnici su takođe obavezni da povežu sadržaj sa originalnim člankom objavljenim u časopisu i korišćenom licencom. Autori mogu da se bave posebnim, dodatnim ugovornim aranžmanima za neekskluzivnu distribuciju objavljene verzije dela časopisa (npr.,

da ga postave u institucionalni repozitorijum ili objave u knjizi), uz potvrdu njegovog prvobitnog objavljivanja u *Međunarodnoj politici*.

Autori zadržavaju autorska prava na svoje radove bez ograničenja. Autori daju izdavaču pravo prvog objavljivanja i druga neisključiva izdavačka prava.

Autor(i) garantuju da je njihov rukopis njihovo originalno delo koje ranije nije objavljeno; da se ne razmatra za objavljivanje na drugom mestu; i da su njegovo objavljivanje odobrili svi koautori, ako ih ima, kao i prećutno ili eksplicitno nadležni organi u ustanovi u kojoj je rad izveden.

Autor(i) potvrđuju da članak ne sadrži neosnovane ili nezakonite izjave i da ne krši prava drugih. Autor(i) takođe potvrđuju da nemaju sukob interesa koji bi mogao uticati na integritet rukopisa i validnost zaključaka predstavljenih u njemu. Ako su uključena dela zaštićena autorskim pravima, Autor(i) snose odgovornost da dobiju pismenu dozvolu od vlasnika autorskih prava. Odgovorni autor (potpisnik) garantuje da ima puna ovlašćenja za tu svrhu u ime drugih autora. Ako Autor(i) koristi bilo koje lične podatke subjekata istraživanja ili drugih pojedinaca, oni potvrđuju da su dobili sve saglasnosti koje se zahtevaju po važećem zakonu i da su se pridržavali smernica izdavača u vezi sa korišćenjem takvih slika ili ličnih podataka.

Po prijemu lektorisane verzije rukopisa, autor(i) se slažu da je u najkraćem roku pažljivo pročitaju, skrenu pažnju Časopisu na bilo kakvu štamparsku grešku i odobre objavljivanje korigovane lektorisane verzije. Autor za dopisivanje je saglasan da obavesti svoje koautore o bilo kom od gore navedenih uslova.

Dok časopis dozvoljava autoru(ima) da deponuje autorovu dostavljenu, prihvaćenu i objavljenu verziju članka u institucionalni repozitorijum i nekomercijalne repozitorijume zasnovane na predmetima, ili da je objave na ličnom veb sajtu autora i veb sajtu odeljenja (uključujući sajtove za društvene mreže, kao što su ResearchGate, Academia.edu, itd.) u bilo kom trenutku nakon objavljivanja, Urednički tim savetuje Autora(e) da deponuje objavljenu verziju.

UGOVOR O LICENCI

Dolepotpisani autor(i) ovim putem daju svoju pravnu saglasnost da *Međunarodna politika*, ISSN 0513-3657 eISSN 2787-0618

objavi članak: _____,

od autora: _____,

uključujući i bilo koju tabelu, ilustraciju ili drugi materijal koji je poslat za objavljivanje kao deo rukopisa, da bude naveden kao prvobitni izdavač u slučaju ponovne upotrebe, i da ga distribuira u svim oblicima i medijima.

Prava akademske izdavačke komunikacije

Razumem da zadržavam autorska prava u članku i da se na *Međunarodnu politiku* ne prenose prava na patente, zaštitne znakove ili druga prava intelektualne svojine. Kao autor, razumem da ću imati ista prava ponovne upotrebe članka kao ona koja su predviđena za treća lica (korisnike članka), u okviru licence *Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International/ Autorstvo – Deliti pod istim uslovima 4.0 Međunarodna* (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Prava korisnika

Izdavač će primeniti licencu CC BY-SA 4.0 na članak objavljen u *Međunarodnoj politici* na njegovoj internet platformi u skladu s principima otvorenog pristupa.

Potpis(i) autora

Datum

ODRICANJE ODGOVORNOSTI

Stavovi izneti u objavljenim radovima ne izražavaju stavove uredništva i Uređivačkog odbora. Autori preuzimaju pravnu i moralnu odgovornost za ideje iznete u svojim radovima. Izdavač neće snositi nikakvu odgovornost u slučaju ispostavljanja bilo kakvih zahteva za naknadu štete.

Uputstvo za autore

Međunarodna politika je četvoromesečni časopis koji izlazi u aprilu, septembru i decembru svake godine. Rokovi za predaju radova su: za prvi broj – 15. februar, za drugi broj – 15. maj, za treći broj – 15. avgust. Časopis objavljuje članke na srpskom i na engleskom jeziku.

Časopis objavljuje recenzirane originalne i pregledne članke i prikaze knjiga iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa, spoljne politike, međunarodnog javnog prava i međunarodne ekonomije.

Originalni istraživački članak predstavlja rezultate istraživanja sa jasnim doprinosom proširenju i/ili produbljivanju postojećeg znanja. Treba ga postaviti tako da ima sledeće delove: kontekst i cilj istraživanja; jasno objašnjenje teorijske osnove (pregled literature) u uvodu; hipoteza ili istraživačko pitanje; primenjene metode; prezentaciju i objašnjenje rezultata; i zaključak koji govori o glavnim nalazima istraživanja, hipotezi ili istraživačkom pitanju.

Pregledni članak pruža sveobuhvatan rezime istraživanja o određenoj temi ili perspektivu o stanju na terenu opisujući trenutne oblasti dogovora, kao i kontroverze i debate. Pregledni članak identifikuje praznine u znanju i najkritičnija istraživačka pitanja na koja još uvek nije odgovoreno. Takođe sugeriše pravce za buduća istraživanja.

Recenzija knjige je sistematski opis i/ili kritička analiza kvaliteta i značaja knjige, uređenog toma ili udžbenika. Recenzija knjige treba da sadrži opšti opis teme ili problema o kome se knjiga bavi, rezime glavnog argumenta knjige, osnovne informacije o autoru, pregled sadržaja knjige, prednosti i slabosti, i sažetak mišljenja recenzenta o knjizi.

Uslov za uzimanje u razmatranje priloga je da budu pripremljeni u skladu sa sledećim uputstvima.

I – Uputstvo za pisanje članaka

1. Članci treba da sadrže od 7.000 do 10.000 reči.
2. Članke pisati u Word dokumentu, latinicom, korišćenjem fonta Times New Roman, veličine 12, sa brojevima stranica u donjem desnom uglu i za paragraf uključiti Alignment Justified i Spacing After 6pt, Line spacing Single.
3. U apstraktu autor treba da ukaže na istraživačko pitanje, najbitnije hipoteze, kontekst i zaključke istraživanja. Apstrakt treba da sadrži do 200 reči, a ispod njega autor navodi do 10 ključnih reči.
4. Latinske, starogrčke i druge ne-engleske reči i izrazi u tekstu navode se u *italic-u* (npr. *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire*, itd.).

5. U rukopisu moraju biti data puna imena, nikako inicijali. Strano ime i prezime treba pisati u srpskoj transkripciji, s tim što se prilikom prvog pominjanja u tekstu mora navesti kako glase u originalu, i to u zagradi posle srpske transkripcije.
6. Izvori se navode korišćenjem formata: „autor datum, stranica“ zasnovanom na Čikaškom stilu – *The Chicago Manual of Style* 18th edition i prilagođenog potrebama časopisa (internet link https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html). Korišćene izvore navesti unutar teksta, na kraju rečenice pre tačke i sa sledećim elementima (autor, godina objave i broj citirane strane). Kada se ime autora pominje u rečenici, onda na njenom kraju nije potrebno ponavljati ime autora, ali je potrebno navesti godinu i broj stranice.

Primeri:

(Janković and Lazić 2021, 355).

(Jelisavac-Trošić 2015, 41).

Kuik points out that these questions suggest that small states can resist the power of large states and use and adapt it for their purposes (2010, 3).

Kada se u zagradi navodi više izvora, potrebno ih je razdvojiti tačkom i zarezom. Primer:

(Görgülü 2012, 283-284; Babayev and Spanger 2020, 293).

Kada se u rečenici navode dva ili više radova jednog autora, nije potrebno ponavljati prezime autora.

Primeri:

(Đukanović 2019, 2024) (Hermann 1999a, 1999b).

Kada se autor dva ili više puta uzastopno poziva na isti izvor u zagradama koristiti Ibid., ili ibidem, uz naznaku broja strane ili stranica.

Primer: (Ibid., 55).

Uređivanje bibliografije (internet link: https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html).

Knjiga/Monografija

Prezime i ime autora. godina izdanja. *Naziv monografije*. Izdavač.

Primeri:

Rakipi, Albert. 2022. *Albanian Foreign Policy The Perils of Change*. Albanian Institute for International Studies.

Đukanović, Dragan. 2020. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Hudson, Valerie M., and Benjamin S. Day. 2020. *Foreign Policy Analysis Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Rakipi 81, 2022).

(Đukanović 115, 2020).

(Hudson and Day 7, 2020).

Članak u zborniku radova

Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja. "Naziv članka". In: *Naziv zbornika radova*, ime i prezime urednika sa skraćenicama (ed/s.). Izdavač. broj stranica. DOI broj.

Ukoliko je članak na srpskom jeziku: Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja.

„Naziv članka“. U: *Naziv zbornika radova*, ime i prezime urednika sa skraćenicama (ur./urs). Izdavač. broj stranica. DOI broj.

Primeri:

Frontini, Andrea and Davide Denti. 2020. "Italy and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: the Europeanization of national interests?". In: *The National Politics of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans*, James Ker-Lindsay, Ioannis Armakolas, Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat (eds.). Routledge. 59–77. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003002253>.

Трапара, Владимир. 2023. „Политика САД према руско-украјинском сукобу: између геополитике и идеологије“. У: *Рат у Украјини: оно што знамо и оно што не знамо*, Небојша Вуковић и Михајло Копанџа (урс.). Институт за међународну политику и привреду и Факултет безбедности Универзитета у Београду. 53–67. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_rat_ukrajina.2023.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Frontini and Denti 2020, 63).

(Трапара 2023, 57).

Članak u časopisu

Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja. "Naziv članka". *Naziv časopisa* volumen (broj): broj stranica. DOI broj.

Ukoliko je članak na srpskom jeziku: Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja.

„Naziv članka“. *Naziv časopisa* volumen (broj): broj stranica. DOI broj.

Primeri:

Jović-Lazić, Ana. 2022. "The role of Turkey in the second Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as a reflection of continuity and change in its foreign policy". *Međunarodni problemi* 74 (1): 29–49. <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2201029J>.

Krstić, Milan. 2021. „Međusobna izvinjenja Srbije i Hrvatske: uzroci i efekti izvinjenja i razlozi njihovog ograničenog uticaja“. *Tragovi: Časopis za srpske i hrvatske teme* 4

(2): 146–173. <https://doi.org/10.52328/t.4.2.5>.

Bailes, Alyson J. K., Bradley A. Thayer and Baldur Thorhallsson. 2016. "Alliance theory and alliance 'Shelter': the complexities of small state alliance behaviour". *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* 1 (1): 9–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1189806>.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Jović-Lazić 2022, 35).

(Krstić 2021, 150).

(Alyson, Thayer and Thorhallsson 2016, 13).

Članci u novinama

Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja. "Naziv članka" *Naziv novina*, datum objave. internet link.

Ukoliko je članak na srpskom jeziku: Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja.

„Naziv članka“ *Naziv novina*, datum objave. internet link.

Primeri :

Gall, Carlotta. 2022. "Turkey Offers to Evacuate Mariupol Fighters Despite Disagreements" *The New York Times*, 14 May. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/14/world/europe/azovstal-evacuation-turkey.html>.

Vasiljević, Branka. 2019. „Srpski spasioci rukama otkopavali ruševine“ *Politika*, 02. decembar. <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/443204/Srpski-spasioci-rukama-otkopavali-rusevine>.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Gall 2022).

(Vasiljević 2019).

Prikaz knjige ili zbornika radova

Prezime i ime autora. godina objavljivanja. *Naziv knjige ili zbornika radova*, ime i prezime autora knjige odnosno urednika zbornika. *Naziv časopisa* volumen (broj).

Primeri:

Zierler, Matthew C., 2023. *The success of small states in international relations: mice that roar*, Godfrey Baldacchino. *Small States & Territories* 6 (2).

Gajić, Draga. 2024. *The Future of Foreign Policy is Feminist*, Kristina Lunz. *Međunarodni problemi* 76 (4).

Navođenje u tekstu

(Zierler 2023).

(Gajić 2024).

Dokumenta i pravni akti

“Naziv dokumenta”. godina izdanja. *Časopis ili službeno glasilo u kome je dokument objavljen*, volumen (broj). Mesto izdanja.

Primer:

“Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine”. 1991. *Službeni list APV*, 17(91). Novi Sad.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine 1991).

Teze ili disertacije

Prezime i ime autora. godina odbrane disertacije. “Naziv disertacije”. Akademski nivo., Ime univerziteta na kojem je disertacija odbranjena.

Ukoliko je disertacija na srpskom jeziku: Prezime i ime autora. godina odbrane disertacije. „Naziv disertacije”. Akademski nivo., Ime univerziteta na kojem je disertacija odbranjena.

Primeri:

Pedi, Revecca. 2016. "Theory of International Relations: Small States in the International System". PhD thesis., University of Macedonia.

Дашић, Марко. 2020. "Међународни политички положај као одредница спољне политике малих држава: студија случаја Републике Србије од 2000. до 2018. године". Докторска дисертација., Универзитет у Београду.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Pedi 2016, 39).

(Дашић 2020, 58).

Internet izvori

Prezime i ime autora. godina objave. "Naziv izvora". Izdavač. datum pristupa. internet link.

Ukoliko je izvor na srpskom jeziku: Prezime i ime autora. godina objave. „Naziv izvora“. Izdavač. datum pristupa. internet link.

Colombo, Silvia. 2012. "The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring: Between Outreach, Patronage and Repression". Istituto Affari Internazionali. 25/12/2024. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1209.pdf>.

Novaković, Igor., Jelena Kajganović i Sara Nikčević. 2013. „Studija praktične politike, Srbija i Mađarska, političke i ekonomske perspektive“. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung i Centar za međunarodne i bezbednosne poslove. 04/08/2020. <https://www.isac-fund.org/download/srb-hunSRP.pdf>.

Navođenje u tekstu

(Colombo 2012).

(Novaković, Kajganović i Nikčević 2013).

Izvore u bibliografiji poredati prema engleskom alfabetu, odnosno prema abecedi ukoliko je članak napisan na srpskom jeziku.

II – Uputstvo za pisanje prikaza knjiga i skupova

Prikazi knjiga i skupova ne smeju biti duži od 1.200 reči (8.800 znakova sa razmacima). Pisati latinicom, Times New Roman, veličine 12, sa brojevima stranica u donjem desnom uglu i za paragraf uključiti Alignment Justified i Spacing After 6pt, Line spacing Single.

Na početku prikaza navode se naslov (ne radi se o naslovu knjige tj. skupa, nego o naslovu koji je dao autor prikaza), pa zatim bibliografske

odrednice knjige u skladu sa prethodno uređenim pravilima, odnosno skupa sa podacima o nazivu skupa, mestu i datumu održavanja.

Prikazi knjiga i skupova moraju sadržati izvore kao i pune reference u bibliografiji (minimum 5) u skladu sa prethodno navedenim uputstvom.

III - Uputstvo za slanje rukopisa

Izvršiti neophodnu registraciju na veb-sajt časopisa kroz uređivanje email-a i korisničkog imena, kao i putem kasnije verifikacije primljenog mejla od strane časopisa. Nakon toga, potrebno je prijaviti se na veb-sajt časopisa uređivanjem lozinke napravljenog naloga.

Popuniti tražene odeljke, uključujući i podatke autora za korespodenciju.

Napraviti dva Word dokumenta. U prvom napisati naslov, imena autora, zvanja, naziv ustanove u kojoj je zaposlen i njeno sedište, kao i e-adrese i ORCID svih autora. U drugom napisati naslov, apstrakt (na srpskom i engleskom), ključne reči i sam rukopis, bez imena i prezimena autora. Treći dokument je popunjena autorska izjava, preuzeta sa veb-sajta časopisa.

Potvrditi slanje rukopisa.

EDITORIAL POLICY

JOURNAL DESCRIPTION, OBJECTIVES, AND SCOPE

International Politics is a peer-reviewed, open-access scientific journal published by the Institute of International Politics, a leading scientific institution in the region dedicated to the research of international relations. This interdisciplinary journal has been publishing original, analytical, theoretical, review, and expert papers on a wide range of topics in contemporary international political, economic, and legal relations for more than 70 years. The journal *International Politics* aims to publish high-quality research on a wide range of international and foreign policy issues in its three yearly issues. In that context, the journal investigates the policies of the most important actors who shape contemporary international relations. Topics dedicated to various territorial and ethnic conflicts and disputes, from interstate to intrastate, as well as their wider regional and global political, economic, and legal implications, are also relevant. Other issues affecting contemporary international relations are also significant for the journal, such as global trade, economic and energy relations, international and regional integration, various forms of terrorism and fundamentalism, as well as the challenges posed by the migrant crisis, the global spread of infectious diseases, and nuclear capacity in the world. Therefore, this scientific journal is based on an open and broad approach to the subject area, giving priority to contributions that offer open and theoretically and practically grounded points of view on current international processes. In this way, the journal tries to explain diverse and insufficiently researched phenomena on the international stage.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PUBLISHING COUNCIL, EDITORS, AND EDITORIAL BOARD

The Publishing Council is an advisory body that actively contributes to the development of the journal. Members of the Council are responsible for helping the journal grow and promoting it. They are also supposed to encourage experts in the field of scientific research on the political, security, economic, and legal aspects of international relations to write for or review the journal, as well as write editorials, reviews, and comments on works.

The Editor-in-Chief of *International Politics* makes the final decision on which manuscripts will be published. When making a decision, the Editor-in-

Chief is guided by the editorial policy, taking into account legal regulations related to defamation, copyright infringement, and plagiarism.

The Editor-in-Chief and Deputy Editor-in-Chief retain the discretionary right to evaluate and reject received manuscripts without peer review if they determine that manuscripts do not correspond to the content and formal standards for writing scientific research articles and the thematic requirements of editorial policy. Articles that do not meet the technical standards prescribed in the *Instructions to Authors*, even if the content is correct, will be returned to the authors for alignment. In regular circumstances, the editorial office will inform authors whether their articles are accepted or not and if the review procedure is initiated within seven days from the date of manuscript receipt.

The Editor-in-Chief, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief, and the members of the Editorial Board must not have any conflict of interest related to manuscripts they consider. Any member of the Editorial Board with a conflict of interest will be excluded from the procedure of selecting reviewers and deciding the fate of manuscripts. If such a conflict of interest exists, the Editor-in-Chief determines the reviewers and the future of manuscripts. The Editor-in-Chief, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief, and the members of the Editorial Board are obliged to report the conflicts of interest promptly.

The Editor-in-Chief, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief, and the Editorial Board are obliged to evaluate manuscripts based on their content, without any racial, sexual/gender, religious, ethnic, or political prejudices.

The editors and members of the Editorial Board must not use unpublished material from submitted manuscripts for their own research without express written permission from the authors. The information and ideas presented in submitted manuscripts must be kept confidential. They must not be used for gaining personal benefit.

The editors and members of the editorial office are obliged to take all reasonable measures so that the identities of reviewers remain unknown to authors before, during, and after the review process and to keep authors' identities anonymous to reviewers.

AUTHORS' OBLIGATIONS

Authors warrant that manuscripts represent their original contributions, which have not been published before and are not being considered for publication elsewhere. Simultaneous enrollment of the same manuscript in several journals represents a violation of ethical standards. Such a manuscript is immediately excluded from further consideration. The authors also guarantee that after the manuscript is published in the journal *International Politics*, it will not be published in any other publication or journal without the permission of the copyright holder.

In the case that the submitted manuscript is the result of a scientific research project or that, in the previous version, it was presented at a conference in the form of an oral presentation (under the same or similar title), more detailed information about projects, conferences, and the like should be listed in the footnote at the very beginning of the manuscript. An article published in another journal cannot be reprinted in *International Politics*.

Authors must adhere to the applicable ethical standards related to scientific research work. Authors guarantee that their manuscripts do not contain unfounded or illegal claims and do not violate the rights of others. The publisher will not bear responsibility in the case of any requests for damages.

Content of articles

An article should contain enough details and references to allow reviewers and readers to verify the claims presented. Intentionally making false claims is a violation of ethical standards. Conferences and book reviews must be accurate and objective.

Authors bear all responsibility for the content of submitted manuscripts. They are obliged, if necessary, to obtain the consent of all persons or institutions that directly participated in the research presented in the manuscript before its publication.

Authors who wish to include illustrations, tables, or other materials that have already been published elsewhere are obliged to obtain consent from copyright holders. Material for which no such proof has been submitted will be considered the author's original work.

Authorship

Authors are obliged to list as authors only those persons who have significantly contributed to the content of the manuscript, i.e., all persons who have contributed considerably to the content of the manuscript must be cited as authors. If other persons who are not authors have participated in essential aspects of the research project and the manuscript preparation, their contributions should be mentioned in a note or acknowledgment.

Citation of sources

Authors are obliged to correctly cite sources that have significantly influenced research and manuscript content. The information obtained in private conversations or correspondence with third parties may not be used without the express written permission of the source.

Conflicts of interest

Authors are obliged to indicate financial or any other conflicts of interest that could affect the presented results and interpretations.

Errors in published articles

If an author finds an important error in their article after it has been published, they are required to notify the editor or publisher immediately and cooperate with them to withdraw the article or correct the article.

By submitting the manuscript to the editorial office of *International Politics*, the authors commit to complying with the stated obligations.

PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism, i.e., taking other people's ideas, words, or other forms of creative expression and presenting them as one's own, is a gross violation of scientific and publishing ethics. Plagiarism can also include copyright infringement, which is punishable by law. Plagiarism includes the following:

- Verbatim or nearly verbatim copying or intentional paraphrasing (to hide plagiarism) of parts of other authors' works without clearly indicating the source or labeling the copied fragments (for example, by using quotation marks);
- Copying pictures or tables from other people's work without proper attribution of the source and/or without the permission of the author or copyright holders.

Manuscripts, where there is a clear indication of plagiarism, will be automatically rejected and their authors will be permanently banned from publishing in the journal.

If it is found that the article published in the journal is plagiarized, the article will be withdrawn in accordance with the procedure described under *Withdrawal of already published articles*, and the authors will be permanently prohibited from publishing in the journal.

REVIEWERS' OBLIGATIONS

Reviewers are obliged to provide the editor with a professional, well-argued, impartial assessment of the scientific value of articles within the given deadlines.

Reviewers evaluate articles in relation to the compliance of the articles' topic with the journal's profile, the relevance of the researched area and applied methods, the originality and scientific relevance of the data presented in

manuscripts, the style of scientific presentation, and the use of scientific apparatus in the text.

A reviewer who has well-founded suspicions or knowledge of ethical standards' violations by an author is obliged to inform the editor about it. A reviewer should recognize important published works not cited by their authors. He should also alert the editor to important similarities and coincidences between manuscripts under consideration or of any other published articles or manuscripts that are in the review process in another journal, if he/she has personal knowledge of this fact. If a reviewer has knowledge that the same manuscript is being considered in several journals at the same time, the reviewer is obliged to inform the editor about it.

A reviewer must not have a conflict of interest with authors or a research financier. If there is a conflict of interest, a reviewer is obliged to inform the editor about it immediately.

If a reviewer believes he or she is incompetent for the topic or area of the manuscript, the editor must be notified immediately.

Reviews must be objective. The judgment of reviewers must be clear and supported by arguments.

Manuscripts sent to reviewers are considered confidential documents. Reviewers may not use unpublished material from submitted manuscripts for their research without the express written permission of the authors, and information and ideas expressed in submitted manuscripts must be preserved as confidential and may not be used for personal gain.

Received articles are subject to peer review. The review aims to help the Editor-in-Chief decide whether the article should be accepted or rejected and, through the process of communication with the authors, improve the manuscript's quality.

Reviews are doubly anonymous: authors' identities are unknown to reviewers, and vice versa. The identity of reviewers remains unknown to authors and vice versa before, during, and after the review process. Editors guarantee that the personal data of authors (primarily, name and affiliation) will be removed from manuscripts before they are sent for review and that all reasonable measures will be taken so that the identities of authors remain unknown to reviewers. Throughout the process, reviewers act independently of each other. Reviewers do not know the identities of other reviewers. If the decisions of reviewers are not the same, editors may seek the opinion of other reviewers.

The deadline for completing the review process is 30 days from the date when reviewers receive the manuscript.

The choice of reviewers falls within the discretionary rights of the Editor-in-Chief and the Deputy Editor-in-Chief. Reviewers must have relevant knowledge related to the field that manuscripts deal with. Reviewers cannot be authors who

have recently co-authored publications with any of the authors of submitted articles, nor can they be from the same field institutions as authors.

Editors send submitted manuscripts with a peer review form to two reviewers who are experts in the scientific field the articles deal with. The review form contains a series of questions that need to be answered and which indicate to reviewers which aspects should be covered in order to make a decision about the fate of a manuscript. In the final part of the form, reviewers must provide their observations and suggestions on how to improve the submitted manuscript.

During the review process, editors may require authors to provide additional information (including primary data) if it is needed to make a judgment about the scientific contribution of the manuscript. Editors and reviewers must keep such information confidential and must not use it for personal gain.

In cases where authors have serious and well-founded objections to reviews, editors will check whether the review is objective and whether it meets academic standards. If there is doubt about the objectivity or quality of the review, editors will seek the opinion of other reviewers.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Any individual or institution can report violations of ethical standards or other irregularities at any time and provide the necessary information and evidence to editors and/or the Editorial Board.

Verification of the allegations and evidence presented

- The Editor-in-Chief, in agreement with the Editorial Board, will decide on the initiation of the procedure aimed at checking the presented allegations and evidence;
- During that procedure, all presented evidence will be considered confidential and will be presented only to the persons directly involved in the procedure;
- Persons suspected of violating ethical standards will be given the opportunity to respond to the accusations.

Decisions regarding the established violations of ethical standards are made by the Editor-in-Chief in cooperation with the Editorial Board and, if necessary, with a group of experts. The following measures are planned and can be applied individually or simultaneously:

- Publishing a press release or an editorial describing the breach of ethical standards;
- Sending official notice to managers or employers of an author/reviewer;
- Unconditional rejection of manuscripts or withdrawal of already published articles in accordance with the procedure described under *Withdrawal of already published articles*;

- The author is permanently prohibited from publishing in *International Politics*;
- Informing the relevant professional organizations or authorities about the case so that they can take appropriate measures.

When resolving disputed situations, the Editorial Board is guided by the guidelines and recommendations of the Committee on Publication Ethics (Committee on Publication Ethics - COPE, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>).

WITHDRAWAL OF ALREADY PUBLISHED ARTICLES

In the case of violation of the rights of publishers, copyright holders, or authors, violations of professional ethical codes, i.e., in the case of sending the same manuscripts to several journals at the same time, false claims of authorship, plagiarism, manipulation of data for the purpose of fraud, as well as in all other cases of gross violation of ethical standards, the published article must be withdrawn. In some cases, an already published article can be withdrawn in order to correct subsequently observed errors.

Standards for resolving situations when an article must be withdrawn are defined by the guidelines of the Committee on Publication Ethics (Committee on Publication Ethics - COPE, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>), and the same practice was also adopted by *International Politics*.

OPEN ACCESS POLICY

International Politics is available in accordance with the principles of open access. It is published in both paper and digital form. Articles can be downloaded free of charge from the site and further distributed for academic and other purposes. The journal is guided by the *Budapest Declaration* on Open Access, which states:

Under “open access” [peer-reviewed scientific literature], it is understood as its free availability on the public Internet, which allows any user to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or direct via a link to the full text of the article, sign for the purposes of indexing, forward in the form of data to software, and use it for any lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical obstacles other than those that are inseparable from internet access itself. The only restriction on reproduction and distribution, and the sole purpose of copyright in this domain, should be to give authors control over the integrity of their work and the right to be properly recognized and cited.

The journal provides free access to all its articles without subscriptions or any associated costs. The content of the journal is published without delay (without the so-called embargo period), and materials can be used without asking for special permission provided that the reference to the original document is cited.

LICENSING AND COPYRIGHT POLICY

The published articles will be disseminated in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA), allowing to share – copy and redistribute in any form or medium – and adapt – remix, transform, and build upon it for any purpose, even commercially, provided that an appropriate credit is given to the original author(s), a link to the license is provided, it is stated whether changes have been made and the new work is disseminated under the identical license as the original work. The users must provide a detailed reference to the original work, containing the author name(s), title of the published research, full journal title, volume, issue, page span and DOI. In electronic publishing, users are also required to link the content with both the original article published in the journal and the licence used. The authors may pursue separate, additional contractual arrangements for the nonexclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in *The International Politics*.

Author(s) retain the copyright of their papers without restrictions. Author(s) grant the publisher the right of first publication, and other non-exclusive publishing rights.

The Author(s) warrant that their manuscript is their original work that has not been published before; that it is not under consideration for publication elsewhere; and that its publication has been approved by all co-authors, if any, as well as tacitly or explicitly by the responsible authorities at the institution where the work was carried out.

The Author(s) affirm that the article contains no unfounded or unlawful statements and does not violate the rights of others. The author(s) also affirm that they hold no conflict of interest that may affect the integrity of the Manuscript and the validity of the findings presented in it. If copyrighted works are included, the Author(s) bear responsibility to obtain written permission from the copyright owners. The Corresponding author, as the signing author, warrants that he/she has full power to make this grant on behalf of the Author(s). If the Author(s) are using any personal details of research subjects or other individuals, they affirm that they have obtained all consents required by applicable law and complied with the publisher's policies relating to the use of such images or personal information.

Upon receiving the proofs, the Author(s) agree to promptly check the proofs carefully, correct any typographical errors, and authorize the publication of the corrected proofs.

The Corresponding author agrees to inform his/her co-authors, of any of the above terms.

While the Journal allows Author(s) to deposit Author's submitted, accepted and published version of the article in an institutional repository and non-commercial subject-based repositories, or to publish it on Author's personal

website and departmental website (including social networking sites, such as ResearchGate, Academia.edu, etc.) at any time after publication, the Editorial team advises Author(s) to deposit the published version

LICENSE AGREEMENT

The undersigned author(s) hereby grant *International Politics*, ISSN 0513-3657 eISSN 2787-0618 their legal consent

to publish the article: _____,

from the author: _____,

including any table, illustration, or other material submitted for publication as part of the manuscript, to be listed as the original publisher in case of reuse, and distribute in all forms and media.

Scholarly publishing and communication rights

I understand that I retain the copyright of the article, and I do not transfer patent rights, trademarks, or other intellectual property rights to *International Politics*. As the author, I understand that I will have the same rights to reuse the article as those intended for third parties (users of the article) under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International Copyright License (CCBY-SA 4.0).

User rights

The publisher will apply the CC BY-SA 4.0 license to the article published in *International Politics* on its Internet platform in accordance with the principles of open access.

Signature(s) of the Author(s)

Date

DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY

The views expressed in the published articles do not express the views of the Editorial Office and the Editorial Board. Authors assume legal and moral responsibility for the ideas expressed in their works. The publisher will not bear any liability in the event of any damage claims.

Author instructions

Međunarodna politika (International Politics) is a quarterly journal published in April, September, and December each year. Submission deadlines are: For the first issue – February 15, for the second issue – May 15, for the third issue – August 15. The journal publishes articles in Serbian and English. The journal accepts peer-reviewed original research articles, review articles, and book reviews in the fields of international relations, foreign policy, international public law, and international economics.

Original Research Article: Should present research results with a clear contribution to the expansion or deepening of existing knowledge. It must include: research context and aim; clear explanation of the theoretical background (literature review); hypothesis or research question; applied methods; presentation and explanation of results; and a conclusion outlining main findings and answering the hypothesis or research question.

Review Article: Offers a comprehensive summary of research on a specific topic or current state of the field, outlining areas of agreement and ongoing debates. It identifies knowledge gaps and key unanswered research questions and proposes future research directions.

Book Review: Provides a systematic description and/or critical analysis of the quality and importance of a book, edited volume, or textbook. It should include: a general description of the topic/problem, summary of the book's main argument, author background, content overview, strengths and weaknesses, and the reviewer's opinion.

I – Article Formatting Guidelines

1. Articles must be between 7,000 and 10,000 words.
2. Write in Word, using Latin script, Times New Roman, size 12, page numbers bottom right.
3. Use Justified alignment, Spacing After: 6pt, Line spacing: Single.
4. Abstract: Must present the research question, key hypotheses, context, and conclusions. Max 200 words, followed by up to 10 keywords.
5. Italicize Latin, Ancient Greek, and other non-English expressions (e.g., *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire*).
6. Use full names, not initials. Foreign names should be transcribed into Serbian, with the original in brackets at first mention.
7. Sources should be cited using the format: "author year, page," based on the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 18th edition, and adapted to the needs of the journal (web link: https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html). Sources used should be cited within the text, at the end of the sentence before the period, and

should include the following elements: author's name, year of publication, and page number. When the author's name is mentioned in the sentence, it does not need to be repeated at the end of the sentence, but the year and page number must still be included.

Examples:

(Janković and Lazić 2021, 355).

(Jelisavac-Trošić 2015, 41).

Kuik points out that these questions suggest that small states can resist the power of large states and use and adapt it for their purposes (2010, 3).

Multiple sources: separate with semicolon.

(Görgülü 2012, 283-284; Babayev and Spanger 2020, 293).

Multiple works by the same author. (Đukanović 2019, 2024) (Hermann 1999a, 1999b).

For repeated reference: use Ibid., or Ibidem. Example:

(Ibid., 55).

Bibliography Examples:

Books/Monographs:

Last name, First name. Year. *Title*. Publisher. Examples:

Rakipi, Albert. 2022. *Albanian Foreign Policy: The Perils of Change*. AIIS.

Đukanović, Dragan. 2020. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću*. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Hudson, Valerie M., and Benjamin S. Day. 2020. *Foreign Policy Analysis Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield.

In text reference

(Rakipi 81, 2022).

(Đukanović 115, 2020).

(Hudson and Day 7, 2020).

Chapter in an Edited Volume

Last name, First name. Year of publication. "Title of the chapter". In: *Title of the edited volume*, first and last name of the editor(s) with abbreviations (ed/s.). Publisher. Page range. DOI number.

If the chapter is in Serbian:

Last name, First name. Year of publication. „Title of the chapter“. U: *Title of the edited volume*, first and last name of the editor(s) with abbreviations (ur./urs). Publisher. Page range. DOI number.

Examples:

Frontini, Andrea and Davide Denti. 2020. “Italy and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: the Europeanization of national interests?”. In: *The National Politics of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans*, James Ker-Lindsay, Ioannis Armakolas, Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat (eds.). Routledge. 59–77. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003002253>.

Трапара, Владимир. 2023. „Политика САД према руско-украјинском сукобу: између геополитике и идеологије“. У: *Рат у Украјини: оно што знамо и оно што не знамо*, Небојша Вуковић и Михајло Копача (урс.). Институт за међународну политику и привреду и Факултет безбедности Универзитета у Београду. 53–67. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_rat_ukrajina.2023.

In text reference

(Frontini and Denti 2020, 63).

(Трапара 2023, 57).

Journal Articles:

Last name, First name. Year of publication. “Title of the article”. *Journal Name* volume (issue): page numbers. DOI number.

If the article is in Serbian:

Last name, First name. Year of publication. „Title of the article“. *Journal Name* volume (issue): page numbers. DOI number.

Examples:

Jović-Lazić, Ana. 2022. “The role of Turkey in the second Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as a reflection of continuity and change in its foreign policy”. *Međunarodni problemi* 74 (1): 29–49. <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2201029J>.

Krstić, Milan. 2021. „Međusobna izvinjenja Srbije i Hrvatske: uzroci i efekti izvinjenja i razlozi njihovog ograničenog uticaja“. *Tragovi: Časopis za srpske i hrvatske teme* 4 (2): 146–173. <https://doi.org/10.52328/t.4.2.5>.

Bailes, Alyson J. K., Bradley A. Thayer and Baldur Thorhallsson. 2016. “Alliance theory and alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state

alliance behaviour". *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* 1 (1): 9–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1189806>.

In text reference

(Jović-Lazić 2022, 35).

(Krstić 2021, 150).

(Alyson, Thayer and Thorhallsson 2016, 13).

Newspaper Articles:

Last name, First name. Year. "Title" *Newspaper Name*, date. URL. If the article is in Serbian:

Last name, First name. Year. „Title“ *Newspaper Name*, date. URL.

Examples:

Gall, Carlotta. 2022. "Turkey Offers to Evacuate Mariupol Fighters Despite Disagreements" *The New York Times*, 14 May. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/14/world/europe/azovstal-evacuation-turkey.html>.
 Vasiljević, Branka. 2019. „Srpski spasioći rukama otkopavali ruševine" *Politika*, 02. decembar. <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/443204/Srpski-spasioći-rukama-otkopavali-rusevine>.

In text reference

(Gall 2022).

(Vasiljević 2019).

Book Reviews:

Last name, First name. Year. *Title of Review*, author's name. *Journal Name* volume (issue).

Examples:

Zierler, Matthew C., 2023. *The success of small states in international relations: mice that roar*, Godfrey Baldacchino. *Small States & Territories* 6 (2).

Gajić, Draga. 2024. *The Future of Foreign Policy is Feminist*, Kristina Lunz. *Međunarodni problemi* 76 (4).

In text reference

(Zierler 2023).

(Gajić 2024).

Documents/Legal Acts:

"Title". Year. *Journal or Publication name* volume (issue). Place of publication.

Example:

"Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine". 1991. *Službeni list APV*, 17(91). Novi Sad.

In text reference

(Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine 1991).

Theses/Dissertations:

Last name, First name. Year. "Title". Academic rang., University. If the thesis is in Serbian:

Last name, First name. Year. „Title“. Academic rang., University.

Examples:

Pedi, Rebecca. 2016. "Theory of International Relations: Small States in the International System". PhD thesis., University of Macedonia.

Дашић, Марко. 2020. "Међународни политички положај као одредница спољне политике малих држава: студија случаја Републике Србије од 2000. до 2018. године". Докторска дисертација, Универзитет у Београду.

In text reference

(Pedi 2016, 39).

(Дашић 2020, 58).

Internet Sources:

Last name, First name. Year. "Title". Publisher. Access date. URL. If the source is in Serbian:

Last name, First name. Year. „Title“. Publisher. Access date. URL.

Examples:

Colombo, Silvia. 2012. "The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring: Between Outreach, Patronage and Repression". Istituto Affari Internazionali. 25/12/2024. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1209.pdf>.

Novaković, Igor., Jelena Kajganović i Sara Nikčević. 2013. „Studija praktične politike, Srbija i Mađarska, političke i ekonomske perspektive“.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung i Centar za međunarodne i bezbednosne poslove.
04/08/2020. <https://www.isac-fund.org/download/srb-hunSRP.pdf>.

In text reference

(Colombo 2012).

(Novaković, Kajganović i Nikčević 2013).

II - Instructions for Writing Book and Conference Reviews

Book and conference reviews must not exceed 1,200 words (8,800 characters including spaces). Use Latin script, Times New Roman, font size 12, with page numbers in the bottom right corner. Paragraphs should be formatted with Justified alignment, Spacing After: 6pt, and Single line spacing.

At the beginning of the review, provide the title (this is not the book or conference title, but the title given by the review author), followed by the bibliographic details of the book in accordance with previously specified rules, or for conferences, include the name of the conference, location, and date of the event.

Book and conference reviews must include sources and full references in the bibliography (a minimum of 5), formatted in accordance with the previously outlined citation guidelines.

III - Instructions for Manuscript Submission

Complete the required registration on the journal's website by entering email and username, and verifying the confirmation email sent by the journal. After that, log into the website and set your account password.

Fill out the required sections, including the corresponding author's contact details.

Prepare two Word documents: The first document should include the title, authors' names, academic titles, institutional affiliation and location, and the email addresses and ORCID ID of all authors. The second document should contain the title, abstract (in both Serbian and English), keywords, and the manuscript text – without the authors' names. A third document is the completed author declaration form, downloaded from the journal's website.

Confirm the submission of the manuscript.

CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji
Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd

327

MEĐUNARODNA politika / glavni i odgovorni urednik
Ana Jović-Lazić. - God. 1, br. 1 (1950)-
. - Beograd : Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu,
1950- (Beograd : Donat Graf). - 24 cm

Tri puta godišnje. - Drugo izdanje na drugom medijumu
: Međunarodna politika (Online) = ISSN 2787-0618
ISSN 0543-3657 = Međunarodna politika COBISS.SR-ID
3092482

COBISS.SR-ID 3092482

IZDANJA

INSTITUTA ZA MEĐUNARODNU POLITIKU I PRIVREDU

ČASOPISI:

Međunarodna politika, naučni časopis na srpskom i engleskom jeziku

The Review of International Affairs, naučni časopis na engleskom jeziku

Međunarodni problemi, naučni časopis na srpskom i engleskom jeziku

Evropsko zakonodavstvo, naučno-stručni časopis za pravo Evropske unije

KNJIGE:

Невена Станковић, *Рестриктивне мере Европске уније: генеза, ефекти и перспективе – случај Русије*, 2026.

Вељко Благојевић, *Изазови стратешког одвраћања*, 2026.

Ana Jović-Lazić, *The Strategic Fallout: How Russia's War on Ukraine Has Eroded Its Influence in the Post-Soviet Region*, 2026

Наташа Станојевић, *Ратна економија Русије*, 2026.

Squaring the Circle: The New Global Dynamics, Ivona Lađevac, Stefano Valente, Erin Carlin (Eds.), 2026

Данило Бабић, *Политичка мисао у Подсахарској Африци – од ослобођења до данас*, 2026.

150 years since the Herzegovina Uprising: impact on regional security and European geopolitics, Dušan Proroković, Draga Mastilović (Eds.), 2025

Recalibrating the Global Compass: China and Shared Future in a Fragmented World, Katarina Zakić, Dragan Trailović (Eds.), 2025

Никола Марковић, *Краљевина СХС и Грчко-турски рат (1919–1923), Уз осврт на европску и балканску дипломатију тога доба*, 2025.

Bogdan Stojanović, Duško Dimitrijević, *Geopolitika svemira i međunarodno pravo*, 2025.

Aleksandra Tošović-Stevanović, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić, *Ekonomska dimenzija održivog razvoja*, 2025.

Драган Петровић, *Ратни сукоб у Украјини*, 2025.

Mitko Arnaudov, *Male države u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima: između želja, kapaciteta i mogućnosti*, 2025.

Геополитика малих држава, Небојша Вуковић, Владимир Ајзенхамер (ур), 2025.

Геостратешка будућност Балкана, Вељко Благојевић, Милован Суботић (ур), 2025.

Марко Новаковић, *Дипломата – између етике, права и одговорности*, 2025.

Михајло Вучић, Марко Новаковић, *Спољна и безбедносна политика ЕУ у савременим међународним односима: изабрани осврти на случајеве из праксе*, 2025.

Јелица Горданић, *Уједињене нације – успон и пад једне идеје*, 2025.

80 Years Since the End of World War II: Changes in International Relations 1945-2025, Dušan Proroković, Rich Mifsud, Rudy B. Baker, Zuokui Liu (Eds.), 2025.