

UDC 355.356(100)(091)
Biblid 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. LXXVII, no. 1197, pp. 331–355
Original scientific paper
Received: 18/01/2026
Revised: 11/05/2026
Accepted: 22/05/2026
doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2026.77.1197.5
CC BY-SA 4.0

Miroslav GLIŠIĆ¹, Nevena GLIŠIĆ²

Analysing Lord Ismay's Dictum, "Out, In, and Down", During NATO's Early Development³

SUMMARY

This paper examines the research question of whether NATO, during its early development, was successful in fulfilling the aims articulated in Lord Ismay's famous dictum that NATO should keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. The authors analyse Euro-Atlantic relations after the Second World War and the origins and development of NATO. The research hypothesis tested in this paper is that a thorough analysis of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 cannot confirm the complete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum but rather that the majority of its aspects were inevitably reflected during the first years of the Alliance's evolution.

Using theories of international public administration and international relations, as well as historical lessons, this paper demonstrates that a detailed review of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 does not fully support Lord Ismay's well-known dictum. Specifically, NATO fulfilled the first two aims: keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. However, it

¹ Miroslav Glišić, Research Associate, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia, e-mail: miroslav.glicic@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0003-0829-6873.

² Nevena Glišić, Undergraduate student, Princeton University, USA, e-mail: nevena.glicic2006@gmail.com.

³ The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions they are affiliated with.

did not achieve its objective of keeping Germany down. Instead, NATO significantly contributed to the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany, which proved essential for NATO's continued existence.

Keywords: NATO, Lord Ismay, Euro-Atlantic relations.

Analiza izreke Lorda Ismeja „Napolje, unutra i dole” tokom ranog razvoja NATO

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad se fokusira na istraživačko pitanje da li je NATO, tokom svog ranog razvoja, bio uspšan u ispunjavanju ciljeva izraženih u čuvenoj izreci lorda Ismeja da NATO treba da drži Ruse napolju, Amerikance unutra, a Nemce pod kontrolom. Autori sagledavaju evroatlantske odnose nakon Drugog svetskog rata, kao i nastanak i razvoj NATO-a. Istraživačka hipoteza koja se u ovom radu testira jeste da detaljna analiza nastanka i razvoja NATO-a do 1957. godine ne može da potvrdi potpunu primenu gore navedene izreke lorda Ismeja, ali je većina njenih aspekata neminovno bila zastupljena tokom prvih godina razvoja Alijanse.

Koristeći teorije međunarodne javne administracije i međunarodnih odnosa, kao i istorijske lekcije, ovaj rad pokazuje da detaljan pregled porekla i razvoja NATO-a do 1957. godine ne podržava u potpunosti dobro poznatu izreku lorda Ismeja. Konkretno, NATO je ispunio prva dva cilja: držanje Rusa napolju, a Amerikanaca unutra. Međutim, nije postigao svoj cilj da obuzda Nemačku. Umesto toga, NATO je značajno doprineo obnovi Savezne Republike Nemačke, što se pokazalo neophodnim za dalji opstanak NATO-a.

Ključne reči: NATO, lord Ismej, Evroatlantski odnosi.

Introduction

Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay was born in India on June 27, 1887, and passed away in the United Kingdom on December 17, 1965. He was a British military officer and statesman and the first NATO Secretary-General from 1952 to 1957. While studying various research papers, theses, and scholarly books on NATO, one often comes across a frequently cited dictum attributed to Lord Hastings Ismay. It is a famous description of the newborn Alliance's function at the time: "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".

However, there is no evidence that Ismay actually said this. As Jamie Shea points out, this statement has become such a fitting characterisation

of the post-war situation that few pundits bother with its historical authenticity (2023). This argument seems plausible. Furthermore, Sayle, while explaining the “Pax Atlantica” as a broad pattern of international affairs regarding NATO, cited what Lord Ismay is said to have quipped: that NATO existed to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down, but he also emphasised that there is no official record of that dictum. However, he agreed that this dictum is the best explanation of NATO’s function and made a very interesting observation: “Indeed, we do not have to take Ismay’s word for it, for his dictum was repackaged in countless policy documents over the alliance’s long history as an explanation of NATO’s purpose” (2019, 3). Although scholars can access numerous official reports published by NATO, including NATO Archives Online, which grants access to thousands of declassified and publicly disclosed Alliance documents, as well as other primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, they may struggle to find the specific time and place at which Lord Ismay made his famous dictum. They might also face difficulty determining whether he uttered the dictum only once or on several appropriate occasions. It is more likely that Ismay uttered his famous dictum privately before he became Secretary-General. At that time, he frequently analysed and criticised the newly formed Alliance. A similar claim is also made by Peter Hennessy, who quoted a legend from the Ministry of Defence that “Ismay produced this unforgettable job description while explaining NATO’s functions to a private meeting of Conservative backbenchers in 1949” (Hennessy 1989, 412 and 794). Additionally, the NATO website states that Lord Ismay coined the aforementioned dictum before becoming Secretary-General, during his earlier political career (NATO d). To conclude, the dictum coined by Lord Ismay is authentic, but it predates his appointment as NATO Secretary-General.

In any case, Ismay’s dictum is a useful guide to the purpose and development of NATO throughout its history. But the question is: was this dictum implemented in full or in part by NATO during its early development? Undoubtedly, the Alliance achieved the goals of keeping the Russians out and the Americans in, but failed to achieve the third goal of keeping Germans down. Also, during NATO’s development, many scholars and politicians have rephrased Ismay’s dictum in several different ways.

The paper consists of several interconnected parts that examine the origins and development of NATO to test the aforementioned research hypothesis. In addition to the introduction, theoretical framework, and conclusion, the paper consists of four parts. The first part, titled “The Birth of NATO”, outlines the circumstances leading to the establishment of the Alliance. The second part, “NATO’s early years of development”, provides

an overview of NATO's evolution from its establishment in 1949 up to Lord Ismay becoming Secretary-General. The third part, titled "Lord Ismay, first Secretary-General of NATO", describes the establishment of the position of Secretary-General, as well as the election of this British official to head the Alliance. Finally, the fourth part, entitled "NATO during Lord Ismay's tenure as Secretary-General", outlines the political and administrative challenges faced by the Alliance and how they were addressed. Throughout the four parts mentioned, Lord Ismay's dictum "Out, In, and Down" and NATO's success in fulfilling this triad are discussed.

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

To confirm the research hypothesis, the field of international public administration was applied in the paper, mainly drawing on its concepts from historical institutionalism, particularly the principal-agent theory (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, Tierney, 2006), and the organisational theory of international organisations (Barnet, Finnemore, 2004). The principal-agent theory was especially useful for analysing NATO's decision-making processes and their development and the relationship between member states and the NATO administration. Meanwhile, the organisational theory of international organisations helped examine NATO's strategic concepts and evolution.

The research conducted under the auspices of international public administration definitely required the use of different theories of international relations, namely, a combination of classical realism, neorealism, and liberal institutionalism (Weber and Hyde-Price, 2016). This combination of theoretical approaches was made possible by the application of analytical eclecticism developed by Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). By connecting various mechanisms created under the auspices of the above-mentioned theories through analytical eclecticism, a solid analytical framework was established to explain the origin of NATO as a response to the shift in the balance of power after the Second World War, its institutionalisation for managing collective defence, and the gradual development of organisational structures and procedures. This approach allowed verification of the research hypothesis and examination of NATO's success in implementing Lord Ismay's dictum to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" during its founding and development from 1949 to 1957. Applying classical realism helped identify the circumstances of NATO's origin, such as the development of the Soviet threat, fears of a return to US isolationism, the need for US power in

Europe, and the importance of deterrence and balance. Johnston (2025, 117) highlights the fact that Ismay's dictum is essentially based on a realist approach. Neorealism provided an understanding of bipolarity, Europe's asymmetric dependence on the United States, and the core of NATO's collective defence, especially in the context of the Korean War. From the perspective of liberal institutionalism, the conditions of the establishment of NATO's Secretary-General position, SHAPE, the joint procedures, and an integrated military structure were examined.

A case study of NATO's development from 1949 to 1957 and an analysis of relevant documents were used as research methods. For a better understanding of Lord Ismay's position regarding NATO, several books and articles have been consulted, including Whitehall (Hennessy 1989), Political Leadership in NATO (Jordan 1979), and several of Ismay's autobiographical works, such as Insurance for Peace (1953), Atlantic Alliance (1954), and NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (1955). In addition, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957 – a Study in International Administration (Jordan 1967) and I am the Servant of the Council: Lord Ismay and the Making of the NATO International Staff (Risso 2019) were used to define NATO's development and institutionalisation in its early stages. Finally, to analyse NATO's success in implementing Lord Ismay's dictum "Out, In, and Down", the overall strategic context during the early stages of NATO's development was reviewed using NATO strategy documents and influential works by Kaplan (2007), Sayle (2019), and Rynning (2024), as well as numerous well-known articles published in the Routledge Handbook of NATO, The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security, and The Oxford Handbook of NATO.

The Birth of NATO

The establishment of NATO was influenced by the circumstances that arose after the Second World War. These circumstances were primarily reflected in the Soviet Union's expansionist policy, the need to protect Western European countries, and the United Nations' inadequate response to the problems of the time.

According to Lord Ismay (1955, 3), the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and the Allies' victory did not lead to the peace and prosperity they anticipated. The Charter was built on two flawed assumptions. The first was that the five permanent members of the Security Council would reach enduring agreements on major issues. This proved false. The second assumption was that none of

these powers, aside from Russia's known claims on Japan, sought territorial expansion. Sadly, this was mistaken as well, since the Soviet Union, supported by the Red Army and global communism, pursued an expansionist strategy, which Western European nations had to confront.

The complexity of the situation was evident from the fact that all efforts at reconciliation failed despite numerous international conferences. One such conference was the 1947 Moscow Conference, which unfortunately marked the end of post-war cooperation between the Soviet Union and democratic countries. After the Moscow Conference's failure, a confrontation phase ensued that lasted until 1962, when *détente* was adopted to reduce tension between the two sides. The initial period in the confrontation phase was marked by the dominance of the United States in terms of the advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union ended the US nuclear monopoly in 1949, a bipolar arrangement of military power with enormous conventional and nuclear capabilities emerged, and the two world powers began to expand their networks of allies.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union's expansion into Europe and Asia grew increasingly, and the situation worsened. As Kaplan (2007, 5) notes, "the United States recognised that the survival of Western democracies threatened by Communist internal subversion or external aggression was vital to the security of the United States itself". On the other side, as argued by Geoffrey Wheatcroft (2011), "...most Americans accepted that the goal of keeping the Russians out was worth the price, which meant that the Americans picked up a disproportionate share of the tab". In any case, as Kori Schake and Erica Pepe (2019) argue, if there had been no threat of Soviet aggression after the Second World War, there would have been no Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, or NATO.

To address the challenging situation in Greece and Turkey, the US Government approved a \$400 million aid package until June 1948. This was based on President Truman's address to the US Congress on March 12, 1947, which is known as the Truman Doctrine. In addition to the financial aid, civil and military missions were also sent to these two countries. However, it is important to note that the Truman Doctrine was explicitly designed to address the threats posed on Greece and Turkey and not the other Western European countries, where the situation was also becoming increasingly alarming. This observation was also made by Lord Ismay (1955, 6).

In response to the complex economic conditions in Western Europe at the time, George C. Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, launched the European Recovery Programme in June 1947. The Economic

Cooperation Act, better known as the Marshall Plan, was signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on April 3, 1948, to provide non-military, economic reconstruction and development aid to Europe. However, the Soviet Union viewed this initiative as a tool of American imperialism. Apart from the dire economic situation, Western European countries were also facing significant military threats posed by the Soviet Union. Lord Ismay (1955, 7) provided an assessment that the armed forces of the West were weak, uncoordinated, and severely lacking in modern equipment, leaving nothing but America's possession of the atomic bomb to deter the Soviets from overrunning Western Europe. Moreover, the only hope for restoring the balance of power lay in the free European countries combining together. In this sense, the idea of a defensive alliance among like-minded nations within the United Nations had already been raised by several statesmen, such as Mr Churchill, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Ernest Bevin, and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr Louis S. St Laurent. Baylis (2024, 17) emphasises that St Laurent's speech on September 18, 1947, was the first public statement by any Western leader calling for "creating some form of Western Atlantic security association". In these circumstances, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948. As noted by Baylis (2024, 19), the founding five nations considered the Brussels Pact an essential step towards securing American support for the defence of Western Europe.

After that, the United States Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948. As noted by Lord Ismay (1955, 10), "This marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in a time of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter into an Atlantic Alliance". Following the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty member countries began preliminary talks on the North Atlantic Treaty. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal were formally invited to accede to the Treaty on March 15, 1949, and the North Atlantic Treaty was finally signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 15-16), "When the Foreign Ministers of the founder countries met in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, they started an experiment in international relations unprecedented in peacetime. The Treaty has become the framework for the common defence of over 380 million people on both sides of the Atlantic".

It can be said that during the establishment of NATO, Lord Ismay's dictum was entirely relevant and that future member states were on the right track to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans

down. It was crucial to prevent the spread of communism and protect Western Europe from Russian expansion by keeping the Russians out. Indeed, the Russians have been kept out thanks to the strengthening of Western European states, with significant support from the United States under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, the Vandenberg Resolution was a decisive step in building further capacity to keep the Russians out.

Apart from that, in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was widely feared that the United States might do the same as it did after the First World War. Therefore, it was necessary to dissuade the United States from returning to an isolationist policy and to give it a critical role in establishing a permanent Euro-Atlantic bond. With the adoption of the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States took a decisive step towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Together with the obligations arising from the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States was using resources to strengthen European states under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, paving the way for irreversible Euro-Atlantic integration. There was no longer any doubt that the Americans would be in.

Also, after the Second World War, the major powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, learned from their mistakes in 1919 and decided to keep significant forces in Germany as occupying armies rather than leaving Germany to fend for itself. Jamie Shea (2023) explains that Germany's catastrophic defeat in 1945, resulting in its unconditional surrender and occupation by four countries, including the Soviet Union's occupation of East Germany until 1991, led to the creation of a new and different Germany. This new Germany was divided into two separate states, one capitalist in the west and one communist in the east. It is essential to note that the division of Germany facilitated the broader division of Europe. On the one hand, the Americans, the British, and the French combined their occupation zones to establish a new nation, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, albeit with limited sovereignty, primarily in foreign affairs and defence. On the other hand, Stalin responded by expanding the Soviet zone to include the German Democratic Republic. As a reminder, West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) was established on May 23, 1949, and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) on October 7, 1949. It is quite certain that an occupied and divided Germany could not be a resurgent Germany. By occupying and dividing Germany into two parts, the conditions were created to keep the Germans down.

NATO's Early Years of Development

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, and its ratification by Congress on July 25, 1949, US President Truman signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Act on October 6, 1949. This Act followed the Marshall Plan. After that, the United States supported the European NATO member states, which submitted a formal request for military and financial assistance, effectively creating the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme, which was an essential tool for the containment of Soviet expansion.

Apart from this, the North Atlantic Council began on September 17, 1949, by holding regular sessions and making significant decisions concerning the establishment of an organisational structure, such as the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, the Military Production and Supply Board, and the Council Deputies. Despite NATO's initial efforts, in the year after the Treaty's signing, the situation in Europe was growing increasingly complex, and the Soviet Union possessed far superior armaments to those of the European NATO members.

As Richardson (1966, 18) noted, before the Korean War, it was unclear whether NATO would become a full-fledged military alliance or remain only a political guarantee that the United States would intervene if any of its members were attacked. On the one hand, European leaders were unwilling to increase their armaments efforts at the cost of delaying economic recovery and were even more reluctant to contemplate German rearmament. Also, the US Government, eager to save money, was unwilling to increase the defence budget significantly above the existing level. On the other hand, NATO was forced to adopt a Forward Strategy, even though it significantly lacked the strength to implement it. However, within the United States administration, the balance was shifting in favour of the military strengthening of NATO, especially after the Soviet Union's nuclear test in August 1949.

Apart from the mentioned Soviet nuclear test, the Korean War served as a significant catalyst in accelerating the further development of NATO since June 25, 1950, when the conflict on the rim of East Asia started. Wells (2010, 19) argues that Europe's defences were inadequate to address the Soviet threat, and NATO was a new organisation without any central staff or a single commander. He illustrated that allies had only 10 divisions instead of 54 in West Germany. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York from September 16 to 18, 1950, one of the main topics of discussion was determining the best approach to defending NATO territory against aggression similar to the attack on the Korean Peninsula.

On that occasion, the establishment of integrated forces under centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe, using a Forward Strategy to resist any attack as far as possible to the east, was also considered. Without a doubt, a significant development occurred during the mentioned meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York. The United States proposed that West Germany participate in the integrated forces, with some limitations. This meant that each German unit could not exceed a division level and had to be integrated into larger allied forces. Lord Ismay (1955, 32) observed that the United States' proposal indicated a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany. It is important to note that Germany's participation in the defence of Western European countries had been considered before. However, the Korean War brought this issue to the forefront, underscoring the importance and urgency of deciding on Germany's role within NATO. As Lord Ismay (1955, 33) states, "from a military point of view, the main argument in favour of participation was that NATO's Forward Strategy made it imperative to defend Europe on German soil: this was hardly conceivable without the military and political participation of the German Federal Republic".

All member states were ready to accept the US proposal regarding German participation in NATO, except for France, which believed that rebuilding the German army at this stage would do more harm than good. Since no agreement could be reached, the North Atlantic Council adjourned the meeting to allow member states, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to review the issue. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 33), the Foreign Ministers of the countries mentioned above, after separate consultations, declared that they would increase and strengthen their forces in Germany and that any attack on the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin from any side would be considered an attack on them. They also expressed the view that creating a German national army would not be in line with the interests of Germany and Europe and that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the common defence of Europe was under consideration.

When the North Atlantic Council reconvened on September 26, 1950, apart from the approval of the concept of the integrated forces, representatives of the mentioned countries stated that Germany should be allowed to contribute to the defence of Western Europe, so the Defence Committee was invited to provide recommendations on how this should be done (Ismay 1955, 33). Subsequently, France presented a proposal for creating a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe. According to the proposal, European forces would be at NATO's

disposal and act in accordance with the Washington Treaty's contractual obligations. The proposal was presented to the NATO Defence Committee on October 28, 1950, as an alternative to the US proposal. However, due to significant differences between the US and France, the Defence Committee was unable to reach a final decision. As a result, they tasked the Military Committee and the Council Deputies to continue considering this proposal. On December 13, 1950, the Council Deputies and the Military Committee sent a report to the Defence Committee and the North Atlantic Council. The report was a compromise between the US's and France's proposals. Lord Ismay (1955, 34) explained that the report recommended that Germany's participation was necessary for a realistic and acceptable defence of Western Europe. The report also discussed the maximum size of future German units and other restrictions that should be placed on their defence contributions. The report confirmed that any German participation must be within the NATO structure. This means that German units should be included in the Alliance's integrated defence forces (as proposed by the United States) or in the united European Army (as proposed by France).

In accordance with the joint proposal from the Council Deputies and the Military Committee, during the North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels on December 18-19, 1950, as explained by Lord Ismay (1955, 34), the stance was that allowing German participation would enhance Europe's defence while maintaining the purely defensive nature of NATO. Also, on that occasion, the North Atlantic Council took the first steps regarding German participation in NATO. As Lord Ismay notes (1955, 34), on the one hand, the North Atlantic Council invited the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to continue further consultation and consideration of this issue with the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, France's intention to convene a conference of European powers to organise a united European army was acknowledged. Furthermore, the Council appointed General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander (North Atlantic Council, 1950).

On the one hand, it cannot be said that the Korean War decisively influenced NATO's development as an organisation. Kaplan (2013, 152) notes that "the Korean War was unnecessary to convert the alliance into an organisation. It already existed on June 25, 1950". Therefore, the idea that NATO's structure was created as a result of the Korean War is incorrect. On the other hand, the Korean War had a significant impact on speeding up NATO in overcoming some obstacles to its further development. According to Kaplan (2013, 149), NATO faced several issues in its first year of establishment. France had doubts about the intentions

of Anglo-Americans, including Germany's membership in the Alliance. Smaller NATO member states were unsatisfied with their exclusion from the decision-making process. The United Kingdom was concerned about its position in the "special relationship" with the United States. The United States was impatient with Europe's slow responses, while Europe was dissatisfied with the US's dominance in NATO. The Korean War accelerated West Germany's NATO membership, but it still was not as fast as the United States had hoped. Four years of French objections delayed Germany's entry into NATO, and even then, it had to enter through the back door of an enlarged Brussels Pact, as Kaplan (2013, 148) noted. It can be concluded that the Korean War did not significantly affect NATO's organisational development. However, it certainly affected the approach to defending NATO territory against aggression, similar to that on the Korean Peninsula, which was already widely discussed at the aforementioned meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in New York in September 1950.

During the Lisbon meeting from February 20 to 25, 1952, the North Atlantic Council again considered the issue of German participation in the defence of Western Europe. As negotiations between the three Occupying Powers and Germany failed, the Paris Conference on the European Army resulted in a national treaty drafted by representatives of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. According to Lord Ismay (1955, 47), the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon had four documents on the plan for the European Defence Community: the report of the Paris Conference, the report by the Occupying Powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the report of the Council of Deputies, and the report of the Military Committee. The North Atlantic Council approved all four reports and recommended that the NATO member states sign a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees to be given by the member states of the European Defence Community. These actions underscored the need to defend Western Europe. Consequently, the Treaty on the European Defence Community was signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, alongside the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty mentioned earlier. Additionally, the Brussels Council agreed to operate continuously by appointing Permanent Representatives and a Secretary-General to lead a unified international secretariat, which would support the Council in managing its growing responsibilities (North Atlantic Council, 1952).

In addition to the development of NATO shown above, it is important to emphasise that the first Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North

Atlantic Area was adopted by the Defence Committee on December 1, 1949, and approved by the North Atlantic Council on January 6, 1950, defining the primary mission of NATO as deterring aggression. (NATO b) The main aim of this Strategic Concept, titled DC 6/1, was "To coordinate, in time of peace, our military and economic strength with a view to creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening the peace, independence and stability of the North Atlantic family of nations." This strategy was characterised by a chronic shortage of conventional forces and a reliance on nuclear weapons. The United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union on conventional weapons. In the "Sword and Shield Strategy", the US nuclear forces played the role of a sword, which was supposed to come into effect if the shield formed by NATO conventional forces in Europe was breached.

Unlike the previously analysed period that was related to the birth of NATO, the first years of the Alliance's development, from the signing of the Washington Treaty to the establishment of the position of Secretary-General, cannot be characterised as a period where Lord Ismay's dictum was fully applied. The Russians were kept out during the early years of NATO's development by applying the Forward Strategy, which included, among other things, the deployment of European conventional forces as far to the east as possible; all necessary measures were taken to keep the Russians as far away from the North Atlantic Alliance as possible. Furthermore, the first NATO Strategic Concept provided a solid basis for subsequent planning to enhance member states' defence and keep the Russians out to the east as far as possible.

On the other hand, with the implementation of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme and the aforementioned Strategic Concept, the United States became increasingly involved in shaping the concept of Euro-Atlantic security under NATO's auspices. Also, the appointment of American General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander should not be left out here. With NATO's development, the United States became increasingly involved.

However, we need to address Germany in detail because NATO failed to fully implement Lord Ismay's dictum regarding keeping Germans down during its early years. As noted by Jordan (1979, 39), West Germany's participation in Western defence was one of the most important political issues facing the Allies in the early 1950s. Although it was a matter of direct concern to NATO as a whole, the specific responsibility for Germany rested with the United States, the United

Kingdom, and France (as the Occupying Powers). Therefore, many discussions regarding Germany took place outside of NATO. The heavy economic and military burden that the Korean conflict placed on the Allies, above all on the United States, was the immediate event that prompted these discussions. The United States government wanted Germany to provide twelve divisions for the defence of Europe to free up American troops for use in Korea. However, the French opposed the re-establishment of the German army, and the Germans wanted their sovereignty restored if they were to contribute to the defence of the West. Besides, Germany was indispensable in implementing NATO's Forward Strategy, which the United States of America very well recognised. Nevertheless, the American proposal, which explains Germany's significant role in the fight against the Soviet Union, was not well received by some countries, primarily France, which opposed its rearmament and strengthening. As a result of this division among the Allies, the issue of Germany's NATO membership remained unresolved during the period under consideration.

It can be concluded that Lord Ismay's dictum becomes less applicable when it comes to Germany. This is due to the outbreak of the Korean War and the growing need to implement the Forward Strategy. The experience from the Korean War and the Forward Strategy required West Germany's involvement in the defence of democratic Europe. This would not have been possible if the Germans had remained down.

Lord Ismay, First Secretary-General of NATO

As mentioned, the North Atlantic Council established the post of Secretary-General in February 1952 during its meeting in Lisbon, and the Council Deputies approved Lord Ismay's appointment on March 12, 1952 (North Atlantic Council Deputies, 1952 NATO c). Lord Ismay was part of the group of public officials who developed, managed, and maintained the British Empire. The experience and respect Ismay gained during the war were major factors in his appointment as the first Secretary-General of NATO. Additionally, as cited by Jordan (1967, 17), using several sources, Lord Ismay held various positions, including military staff officer, high-level aide, coordinator, expeditor, and diplomat. He attended conferences in Cairo, Malta, Tehran, Quebec, Moscow, and Yalta before becoming a Cabinet minister. Also, he had dealings with the Russians, the French, and the Americans at the highest level. The aforementioned was of great importance to NATO, especially given the problems it had to face, such as the use of nuclear weapons and the German question.

In addition to Lord Ismay's personal qualities and experience, it is essential to emphasise that he had a negative and rather critical attitude towards NATO, considering that this Alliance was insufficient, too narrow in scope, and inadequately organised to respond to the global challenge posed by Soviet power. He often described NATO as: "Rather a lot of harness and too little horse" (Jordan 1979, 28). In this context, as Risso (2019, 347) mentioned, just a month before he was asked to take over as NATO Secretary-General in January 1952, Lord Ismay accompanied Churchill to visit President Truman to discuss the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. On this occasion, Lord Ismay became very concerned about the slowness of progress and divisions within the Alliance, and he saw NATO as an "overly bureaucratic and inefficient" organisation. Additionally, an interesting event that took place before Lord Ismay was appointed the Secretary-General of NATO. It occurred after he participated in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952. Although the Lisbon meeting produced many important results, Lord Ismay did not like the particular style of mass diplomacy used. He found the arguments unpleasant, so he left Portugal with the remark, "This is the first that I have seen of NATO, and thank heaven it's the last" (Ismay, 2014, Loc. 7,593).

In any case, Lord Ismay took up office on April 4, 1952, as both Secretary-General of the Organisation and Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, on the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. He retired from his post as Secretary-General on May 16, 1957, and was succeeded by Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium (NATO a). As Jordan (1967, 3) observed, when Lord Ismay assumed the office of Secretary-General of NATO in April 1952, he had the opportunity to take on an entirely new role in the history of international organisations. Namely, the creation of the position of Secretary-General of NATO introduced a new model and approach to international administration, given the role and responsibilities of the position. While experiences and practices from the League of Nations and the United Nations could be considered, they could not be entirely relied upon. Unlike his predecessors in other international organisations, the Secretary-General of NATO served in a dual capacity as head of the International Staff and Vice-Chairman (later Chairman) of the North Atlantic Council, as Jordan noted (1967, 45). Accordingly, the Secretary-General's role combined political and administrative functions. It was good for Lord Ismay, who believed that having full and unrestricted authority was essential to be an effective leader in reorganising NATO's civilian structure. He feared that without this authority, he would have less influence than the Chairman of Council Deputies, and the reorganisation

efforts would suffer from the start. On the other side, as noted by Jordan (1967, 47), "Lord Ismay decided not to adopt an aggressive and independent role as Secretary-General. Though he had thought it necessary to claim unfettered authority at the time of his appointment, he did not assume the attitude of a full member of the Council, even though, in a sense, he was one (especially after December 1956). He preferred to regard himself as an international servant of NATO, whose function was stewardship". Also, "the roles of arbiter, mediator, conciliator, and coordinator seemed to fit more appropriately his situation, his experience, and his personality" (Jordan 1967, 48). Furthermore, as Risso (2019, 343) stated, while serving in NATO, Lord Ismay did not see himself as a political leader aiming to make the Alliance an independent and strong actor on the world stage. Instead, he viewed himself as a facilitator. In Lord Ismay's opinion, the Secretary-General's primary responsibility was to help countries understand one another and collaborate effectively to deter aggression.

NATO during Lord Ismay's Tenure as Secretary-General

Lord Ismay, when he became NATO's Secretary-General, believed that NATO should not be based solely on a military structure. At that time, NATO's organisation was ad hoc. He recognised that in the event of war, military and civilian administrations would be interdependent. To address this issue, he established several working groups within NATO to examine various aspects of warfare-related problems. According to Jordan (1967, 85-86), during Lord Ismay's early years in office, the Council had 12 committees and working groups divided into six categories. By 1957, the number of committees had increased to 25. As observed by Risso (2019, 343), "It demonstrates the pivotal role that he played in shaping the early development of the alliance and how his decisions had long-term effects on the history of NATO".

In addition to being involved in the development of NATO's organisational structure, Lord Ismay was also deeply involved in addressing fundamental political and security issues that concerned NATO and the wider international community. The most important issues were certainly the resolution of the German question and the Federal Republic of Germany's membership in NATO, the Cyprus crisis, and the Suez crisis.

As noted by Jordan (1979, 40), the North Atlantic Council had already adopted the text of the draft protocol on reciprocal guarantees to be established by the European Defence Community and NATO at its second weekly meeting after Lord Ismay took office as Secretary-General,

which was held on May 6, 1952. However, the protocol, which extended the guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to West Germany, could not be signed until the treaty on the European Defence Community was ratified. After the arrival of Lord Ismay as Secretary-General, the United States continued to support the European Defence Community; i.e., it was still the position of France that the integration of smaller units would aim for the majority of German forces to come under French command. The above would imply that Germany would not enter NATO as a separate power but under the auspices of France. As Wintage (1970, 194) notes, this French attitude persisted throughout most of Ismay's tenure in NATO as Secretary-General, and the problem was finally resolved in an unexpected way.

In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom were nearing the end of their Allied occupation of West Germany. Likewise, these two countries increasingly supported West Germany's rearmament and viewed NATO as a framework for the unified defence of the Western world against the Soviet Union. Similar to the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, Lord Ismay realised that NATO was not a temporary solution against an immediate threat. Instead, he saw that NATO would become a permanent factor in European security in the future. To ensure NATO's future, Lord Ismay decided in mid-1953 to play a more significant role and to increase consultations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Apart from that, a meeting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France was to be organised in the second half of 1953 in the Bermuda Islands to consider the German question. Lord Ismay secured his presence at this crucial event for NATO's future due to US support. As Wintage (1970, 203) notes, Lord Ismay's contribution to the outcome of the Bermuda Conference, which took place on December 4, 1953, was significant and perhaps his greatest triumph. Lord Ismay's proposals that NATO should remain the main framework for Western politics and security and that the European Defence Community would be an integral part of NATO were accepted. Consequently, the goals he set, which included strengthening NATO's position in the international arena, bringing Germany into the alliance, promoting equality and unity among member countries, and enhancing the Atlantic European front to counter the Soviet Union, were also accepted.

The ratification of the European Defence Community agreement was crucial to Western defence policy. Lord Ismay believed that the European Defence Community was the best way to integrate German forces into the defence of Western Europe. He considered looking for an alternative

solution only as a last resort if the European Defence Community project failed. Otherwise, according to Jordan (1979, 41), this was a typical attitude among Western leaders, and there was no official alternative programme planning for the European Defence Community. However, by the end of 1953, there were indications of French reluctance towards the idea of a supranational army within the European Defence Community. The North Atlantic Council, which met in Paris on April 23, 1954, at the ministerial level, reaffirmed its support for the European Defence Community (North Atlantic Council, 1954). However, with the emergence of negative sentiment against the European Defence Community in France, it became apparent that the agreement would not be ratified, and other alternatives began to be considered more seriously. As Jordan (1979, 41) notes, the possibility of West Germany's direct membership in NATO was discussed during Lord Ismay's official visit to the United Kingdom in the early summer of 1954. After France rejected ratification of the agreement on August 29, 1954, the solution to the problem of German participation in Western European defence through direct NATO membership seemed the most likely path. Jordan (1979, 41) argues that the collapse of the European Defence Community project led to the disappearance of differences between the main Western powers. The United States' desire to replace its troops with German units decreased after the Korean armistice was signed. French concerns about a reinvigorated Wehrmacht subsided. Germany's aspiration for equal treatment was received more favourably as political and economic progress proceeded smoothly under Konrad Adenauer's strong leadership.

After the Bermuda Conference, President Eisenhower of the United States was hopeful that France would ratify the agreement on the European Defence Community. This would have immediately brought Germany into NATO. However, as we saw, his assumptions proved wrong. As mentioned before, in August 1954, France refused to ratify the agreement signed in May 1952. However, regardless of the circumstances, the United States and Europe continued to act vigorously. Negotiations regarding the terms of West Germany's participation in NATO mainly occurred outside the North Atlantic Council within the Nine Powers. At the Conference of Nine Powers in the autumn of 1954, it was agreed to end the occupation of Germany and its membership in NATO. On October 23, 1954, with the signing of the London and Paris Agreements, the German occupation regime ended, and the Federal Republic of Germany received an invitation to join NATO. After that, at the North Atlantic Council meeting on May 9, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to NATO. According to Wintage (1970, 205), Lester Pearson,

speaking on behalf of Canada, indirectly paid tribute to Lord Ismay's work at this meeting.

Therefore, despite the reluctance and opposition of certain European countries, particularly France, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. Some European countries did not want to see Germany rearm, even as an ally. However, the United States believed that the remilitarisation of West Germany was essential to contain Soviet expansion.

It is interesting to note that during Lord Ismay's term as Secretary-General, his famous dictum "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" became less relevant compared to the earlier years of NATO's establishment from 1949 to 1952. In fact, it can be argued that NATO did not achieve its goal of keeping Germany down. To ensure its survival and effectiveness, NATO decided to admit the Federal Republic of Germany as a member, which ultimately strengthened Germany across all aspects.

Moreover, during his tenure as Secretary-General, Lord Ismay strongly advocated for West Germany's membership in NATO. Also, during his mandate, the Soviet Union's proposal of March 10, 1952, on the unification of Germany was not accepted. As a reminder, until 1955, this was the main issue in German politics, and the Western refusal to negotiate based on the Soviet offer led to the thesis of "lost opportunity". According to Richardson (1966, 25), it was widely believed in Germany that reunification could be achieved when the Soviet offer was open, i.e., between 1952 and 1955. On the other hand, supporters of Adenauer's policy saw the Soviet proposal as only a tactical manoeuvre to prevent ratification of the agreement on the European Defence Community. It is quite certain that Germany would be closer to Lord Ismay's dictum, taking into account the proposal of the Soviet Union, than it would be in the case of the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO.

It can be noted that Lord Ismay was firmly committed to the preservation and further development of NATO, regardless of his earlier criticisms of the organisation's effectiveness before taking up the post of Secretary-General. Thus, his paper, published in the *International Journal* entitled "Atlantic Alliance", clearly pointed out that "All political systems have their weaknesses. The measure of their success is their capacity to recognise and overcome these weaknesses. I often think that the greatest weakness of the democratic nations is their inability to come together except in times of mortal danger, and sometimes this is too late. We failed to come together before 1914, and we failed again before 1939. Let us not fail a third time. The year 1949 was a time of mortal danger. The events

leading up to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April of that year are so well-known that they are in danger of being forgotten. In the constantly shifting sands of political developments since the war, these events seem to me to acquire a greater rather than a lesser importance as time goes on" (Ismay 1954, 79).

Also, Lord Ismay admitted that before he became Secretary-General, he did not understand the importance or the full significance of NATO. In his article titled "Insurance for Peace", published in *World Affairs*, he states the following: "It was not until I had studied it closely and had seen for myself the results which it had already achieved that I became convinced, as I certainly am convinced, that it provides the best hope of avoiding the unspeakable horrors of a third world war – that it is, in fact, the best insurance for peace" (Ismay 1953, 104-105).

Therefore, Lord Ismay was fully committed to NATO and its further development. Even with the increase in his power, after the adoption of the "Three Wise Men Report" in the circumstances arising from the Suez crisis, he had no intention of returning to his positions given in his famous dictum, that is, to keep the Germans down. On the contrary, he was aware of the significance of the Federal Republic of Germany's participation in NATO. Also, Clarke (2025, 66) demonstrates that allies knew well that NATO could only be viable with Germany at its territorial heart.

In contrast to Germany, Lord Ismay's dictum remains entirely relevant to the Soviet Union and the United States. Further improvement of the NATO Strategic Concept at the end of 1952, i.e., with the beginning of more intensive integration of nuclear policy into the NATO strategy, ensured a significant balance of forces that kept the Russians out. With NATO's further development of its military and civilian structures, the United States became increasingly part of the Euro-Atlantic bond. As explained by Rynning (2024, 67), NATO's military build-up, with the infusion of US military leadership, included the full package of desired NATO reform, such as an integrated command and integrated forces, substantial US forces stationed in Europe, and German rearmament.

Conclusion

Lord Ismay proved very successful as the Secretary-General of NATO. He managed to build an efficient International Staff and other supporting organisational structures of NATO, as well as to find optimal ways to solve the pressing political and security problems of the time. With his political and administrative powers, which were undoubtedly strong, especially

after the adoption of the "Three Wise Men Report", he managed to establish considerable trust among the member states, which certainly facilitated the making of important decisions on sensitive topics. As the first Secretary-General of NATO, he put the organisation on the right track and ensured its stability and long-term perspective.

Lord Ismay, who had previously expressed doubts about NATO's effectiveness, became a staunch supporter of the Alliance after becoming Secretary-General. During his five-year tenure, he worked diligently to improve NATO's effectiveness and ensure its future. He often referred to himself as a "Servant of the Council". If we consider NATO's evolution during the Cold War, we can see that it began slowly but gained momentum during and after the Korean War. Lord Ismay's tenure as the Secretary-General of NATO was characterised by the rapid evolution of the Alliance. The aforementioned circumstances demanded that Lord Ismay make greater efforts. At the same time, they offered him an opportunity to become more visible among the member states and to increase the significance of the position of Secretary-General.

Based on the information presented, it can be inferred that Lord Ismay was the most fervent supporter of NATO. However, the paper examines whether NATO, during its early development, was successful in fulfilling the aims articulated in Lord Ismay's famous dictum: NATO should keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Considering the already analysed Euro-Atlantic relations after World War II, as well as the origin and development of NATO until 1957, it can be concluded that NATO implemented the mentioned dictum of Lord Ismay entirely only during its establishment. Thus, this paper has proven the research hypothesis that a thorough analysis of NATO's origins and development up to 1957 cannot confirm the complete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum. However, some of its aspects were inevitably reflected during the first years of the Alliance's evolution. In other words, regarding Lord Ismay's famous dictum, NATO succeeded in achieving the first two objectives: keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. However, when it came to the goal of keeping the Germans down, NATO failed to achieve it. Rather, NATO played a vital role in rehabilitating the Federal Republic of Germany, which was necessary for its survival.

It can be concluded that NATO was not entirely successful in implementing the objectives outlined in Lord Ismay's dictum due to the following circumstances. In the early years of NATO's development, Lord Ismay's proposal to keep Germany down was challenged, as the Korean War accelerated the implementation of the Forward Strategy. The United

States started to recognise the importance of West Germany in implementing the Forward Strategy and NATO's Strategic Concept at that time. Consequently, West Germany's participation in NATO has become an increasingly significant topic since the North Atlantic Council's meeting in New York in September 1950. The aforementioned trend also continued when Lord Ismay assumed the post of Secretary-General of NATO. Moreover, with his efforts, he also significantly contributed to the Federal Republic of Germany's admission to NATO in May 1955. It is quite certain that the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO cancelled the relevance of Lord Ismay's dictum in the part where he advocated keeping the Germans down. Germany has significantly strengthened its role in regional and global affairs through NATO membership and European integration, contradicting Lord Ismay's dictum. However, the fact that the German state was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany during the Cold War should not be ignored, which certainly kept the Germans partly down in the Bloc World. Also, as noted in one of the US reports from 1966 and cited by Sayle, NATO served as a politically acceptable receptacle for resurgent German military strength without full independence, lest Germany run amok again (2019, 3).

However, the other two parts of the dictum, uttered by Lord Ismay, NATO has fulfilled entirely. By adopting and implementing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Vandenberg Resolution, the United States entered ever deeper into Euro-Atlantic relations. It thus reduced the possibility of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy towards Western European states. The aforementioned approach continued and was strengthened with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, i.e., the establishment of NATO. On the other hand, Western Europe was relying heavily on the United States to bear the disproportionate burden of its defence costs. As a result, Americans were paying about 75% of NATO's expenses. This has become a recurring trend. It can be concluded that during the period covered by this research, from 1949 to 1957, the United States became increasingly part of Euro-Atlantic integration. Sloan (2024, 211) argues that without the United States, NATO would not have been created in 1949, would not have overcome the Soviet challenge during the Cold War, would not have remained a vital alliance in the post-Cold War world, and would not have endured into the future. On the other hand, with NATO's development, which implied the United States' increasing participation, and the application of the then-current Strategic Concept, the Allies successfully kept the Soviet Union as far east as possible.

Without a doubt, NATO helped prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Germany and other Western European countries.

Despite NATO's incomplete implementation of Lord Ismay's dictum in its early years, the dictum remains relevant today. As Hanhimäki explains, this dictum neatly sums up the multiple rationales behind NATO's founding and helps put some of the Alliance's present-day concerns into proper perspective (2010, xiv). Given the current security situation globally, it is crucial to keep Russians out and Americans in. Also, we should consider limiting Franco-German aspirations to create a European defence system as an alternative to NATO. There is no doubt that in the current circumstances, NATO members are facing an external threat from a more assertive Russia and internal uncertainty from the current US administration. Different threat perceptions among allies, together with internal uncertainty, lead some member states to engage in soft balancing against the United States and intra-alliance hedging to pay closer attention to the European Union's strategic autonomy in the security and defence domain.

Bibliography

- Barnet, Michael, Finnemore, Martha. 2004. *Rules for the World – International Organization in Global Politics*. Cornell University Press.
- Baylis, John. 2024. "The Origins of NATO". In: *Routledge Handbook of NATO*, Olsen, Andreas, John (ed), Routledge: 15-27.
- Clarke, Michael. 2025. "What Is NATO for (Redux)?" In: *The Oxford Handbook of NATO*, Sperling, James and Webber, Mark (eds), Oxford University Press: 59-76.
- Hanhimäki, Jussi. 2010. "Introduction". In: *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Hanhimäki, Jussi, Soutou, Georges-Henri, Germond, Basil (eds), Fondation Pierre du Bois and Routledge: pp xiv-xviii.
- Hawkins, Darren G, Lake, David, A, Nielson, Daniel, L, Tierney, Michael, J. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hennessy, Peter. 1989. *Whitehall*. New York: A Division of Macmillan, Inc.
- Ismay, Lord. 1953. "Insurance for Peace". *World Affairs*, 116 (4) (Winter), 104-105. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20668806>.
- Ismay, Lord. 1954. "Atlantic Alliance". *International Journal*, 9 (2) (Spring), pp. 79-86. www.jstor.org/stable/40197987.

- Ismay, Lord. 1955. *NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954*. Utrecht: Bosch, https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/216977/NATO-The_first_5_years_1949-1954_by_Lord_Ismay_.pdf.
- Ismay, Lord. 2014. *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*. Potomac, Maryland: Pickle Partners Publishing, Kindle edition.
- Johnston, Seth A. 2025. "Realism". In: *The Oxford Handbook of NATO*, Sperling, James and Webber, Mark (eds), Oxford University Press: 113-128.
- Jordan, Robert S. 1967. *The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957 – a Study in International Administration*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Jordan, Robert S. 1979. *Political Leadership in NATO*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. 2007. *NATO 1948 – The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. 2013. *NATO before the Korean War*. Kent: The Kent State University Press.
- North Atlantic Council. 1950. *Final Communiqué*, Sixth Session, December 18-19.
- North Atlantic Council. 1952. *Final Communiqué*, Ninth Session, February 20-25.
- North Atlantic Council. 1954. Ministerial Meeting, *Final Communiqué*, April 23.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (a). "NATO Secretary General", last updated: Jun 20, 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_7294.htm?
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (b). "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969", <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf>.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (c). "North Atlantic Council Deputies", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (d). "Organization, NATO declassified, Lord Ismay", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm#:~:text=NATO%20%2D%20Declassified%3A%20Lord%20Ismay%2C%201952%20%2D%201957.
- Richardson, James L. 1966. *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Risso, Linda. 2019. "I am the Servant of the Council': Lord Ismay and the Making of the NATO International Staff." *Contemporary European History*, 28, 342-357. <https://doi:10.1017/S0960777319000055>.

- Rynning, Sten. 2024. *NATO – From Cold War to Ukraine, a History of the World's Most Powerful Alliance*. Yale University Press.
- Schake, Kori, and Pepe, Erica. 2019. *70 Years of NATO: The Strength of the Past, Looking into the Future*, ETH Zurich, May 6, 2019, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1097618a-96c9-45b2-89f7-092198f84a7c>.
- Sayle, Andrews, Timothy. 2019. *Enduring Alliance – A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. Cornell University Press.
- Shea, Jamie. 2023. "Germany, more Wende and less Zeit, please," *Friends of Europe*, March 23, 2023, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/germany-more-wende-and-less-zeit-please/>.
- Sil, Rudra, and Katzenstein Peter, J. 2010. *Beyond Paradigms – Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sloan, Stanley, R. 2024. "NATO and the United States". In: *Routledge Handbook of NATO*, Olsen, Andreas, John (ed), Routledge: 211-222.
- Weber, Mark, Hyde-Price, Adrian. (Eds.). 2016. *Theorising NATO – New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*. Routledge.
- Wells, Samuel, F, Jr. 2010. "The Korean War – Miscalculation and Alliance transformation". In: *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Hanhimäki, Jussi, Soutou, Georges-Henri, Germond, Basil (eds), Fondation Pierre du Bois and Routledge: 17-31.
- Wheatcroft, Geoffrey. 2011. "Who Needs NATO?", *The New York Times*, June 15, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/opinion/16iht-edwheatcroft16.html>.
- Wintage, Ronald. 1970. *Lord Ismay: a biography*. London: Hutchinson & Co.